DEEPAK MISRA, J. ( 1 ) IN this appeal under Section 454 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') the appellants call in question the validity of the order dated 7-7-93 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Jaipur in Criminal Misc. Case No. 1/93 refusing to exercise jurisdiction under Section 452 of the Code. ( 2 ) THE present appellants along with one Pramila Patnaik faced trial under Sections 304-B, 498-A and 306 of the Indian Penal Code (in short, 'the IPC') in S. T. Case No. 239/54 of 1989 and were ultimately convicted for the said offences by the learned trial Judge and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 8 years under Section 304-B, IPC. No separate sentence was awarded for the other charges. It is relevant to state here that the learned trial Judge while convicting the accused persons and sentencing them as aforesaid had given directions in respect of the seized articles directing that if the parties were desirous of establishing their claim over the seized properties they should approach the Civil Court within the period of limitation after reaching of the finality of his judgment, failing which the seized articles would be forfeited to the State after a year from the last date of the period of limitation was over. An appeal was carried to this Court forming the subject matter of Criminal Appeal No. 239/90 wherein this Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence but did not pass any order relating to the direction made in respect of the seized articles. ( 3 ) AFTER the judgment of this Court the present appellants filed an application under Section 452 of the Code with the prayer that the seized articles should be handed over to them as they were entitled to the same, for they were seized during investigation from their custody. It is pertinent to mention here that some of the seized articles were given in zima of P. W. 1, the father of the bride. 'the said application was resisted to by the Public Prosecutor contending that the same should be disposed of as per the order passed by the said Court on earlier occasion as that part of the order has been affirmed. 'the said application was resisted to by the Public Prosecutor contending that the same should be disposed of as per the order passed by the said Court on earlier occasion as that part of the order has been affirmed. The learned Additional Sessions Judge after referring to the judgment delivered in S. T. Case No. 238/54 of 1989 and the judgment passed in the criminal appeal by this Court came to hold that as the appellate Court had not passed any order for disposal of the properties the direction given at the first instance in relation to the disposal of the seized properties has been affirmed and, therefore, he has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. ( 4 ) MR. D. P. Dhal, the learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge is erroneous inasmuch as this Court in effect had set aside the foundation on which the direction was issued by the Court below and, therefore, refusal to adjudicate under Section 452 of the Code amounts to non-exercise of jurisdiction vested in him under law. Mr. S. S. Das, the learned counsel for the State has supported the impugned order on the grounds which have been referred to therein. ( 5 ) IT is apparent that while convicting the accused persons the learned trial Judge had issued the direction for disposal of the seized properties by taking into consideration the prohibition contained under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and the rival claims. It is worthwhile to reproduce the said direction :-"p. W. 6 seized all the marriage articles and left in zima of father-in-law of Subasini and P. W. 7 reseized it and left it in the zima of P. W. 1. On a motion being made by accused persons on 7-2-90, the Court directed the production of the articles which were committed to the Court of Sessions. In the instant case P. W. 1 acted in contravention of the Dowry Prohibition Act and is equally an accomplish to the giving of dowry. It is not a case that the accused persons demanded further dowry after the marriage. All that was, accused persons insisted for the old settled dowry demand. Keeping in view all these facts the accused persons were not proceeded I/sec. It is not a case that the accused persons demanded further dowry after the marriage. All that was, accused persons insisted for the old settled dowry demand. Keeping in view all these facts the accused persons were not proceeded I/sec. 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, as such the Court is not inclined to pass any order of disposal of property. Devolution of property is a civil matter. It is also to be tested in view of the giving of dowry by P. W. 1 whether he is entitled to enforce the claim. The fact and circumstances of the instance case was confined to the ascertainment of cruelty if any exerted on Subasini and her suicidal death, if have been abated by the accused persons, option is left upon the contesting parties to establish their claim over these properties in the civil Court and the successful party therein would be entitled to get those properties which has been committed to this Court. If the suit is not filed within the period of limitation after the reaching of finality of this judgment, the seized articles will be forfeited to the State after a year from the last date of period of limitation has been over. However if appeal is preferred, in the event, the disposal of M. Os. and seized properties will be guided by the appellate orders. "the judgment was appealed against before this Court. It is well settled that a party aggrieved by any direction relating to disposal of the properties after inquiry or trial can challenge the same by an independent appeal, and there can be a composite appeal against the judgment of conviction as well as the direction pertaining to disposal of the properties. While disposing of the appeal this Court had not given any specific direction for disposal of the properties. It is apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court to find out the basis for acquittal. The reasonings given by the learned Judge are :-"from the testimony of the witnesses and the contents of the letters filed in the case, it is clear that the two families, that is, parents of Subasini and her parents-in-law were on visiting terms and had correspondence with each other. The reasonings given by the learned Judge are :-"from the testimony of the witnesses and the contents of the letters filed in the case, it is clear that the two families, that is, parents of Subasini and her parents-in-law were on visiting terms and had correspondence with each other. None of the witnesses has any direct knowledge about any demand/pressure on Subasini for dowry or about cruelty, ill-treatment and torture allegedly meted out to her in the house of her parents-in-1aw. Their source of information mainly was the letters written by Subasini. Therefore the letters filed in the case assume considerable importance. The letters were written during the period from 1-6-87 to 2-8-88. Most of the letters were written by Subasini to her husband and to her parents. I have carefully perused all the letters. From the contents of the letters I do not find any expression either explicit or even implicit alleging any pressure on her on account of dowry demands or any assault, ill-treatment, cruel behaviour, torture on that ground. On the other hand, the contents of the letters clearly indicate that she was always trying to impress on her husband not to worry about her and take good care of himself. The letters further indicate that she was deeply in love for her husband and very much wanted to be with him. She felt that she was lucky in getting him as her husband. In her letters she was always asking him to write to her more often. She had given certain instructions to him regarding food to be taken by him. In her letters to her parents-in-law she was quite respectful towards them and concerned about other members of their family. The contents of some of the letters however show that she was unhappy since she was not able to visit her parents regularly and was not able to join her husband wherever he was posted. It further appears from her letters that she was very happy on the birth of her son and was completely shattered on the death of the child. She was particularly unhappy about the medical advice given to her that she should not conceive for about four years. Even during that period she has tried to console her husband and requested him to take good care of himself. She was particularly unhappy about the medical advice given to her that she should not conceive for about four years. Even during that period she has tried to console her husband and requested him to take good care of himself. In herletters to her parents she did not make any complaint about any demand/pressure on her for dowry or any assault, cruelty, torture etc. She was mostly asking them to come and see her at her in-laws' place. From her letter dated 9-7-88 (Ext. 1) addressed to her father she had written that if anything happened to her then he should take steps, if necessary, taking recourse to process of law, to take return of the ornaments and articles given to her as dowry. She had also requested him to take her to his house immediately but nothing is stated in the letter indicating any apprehension in her mind or any particular reason for her request to leave her marital home. Even in that letter she wrote that she would be leaving the ornaments either with her husband or in her almirah. Though this letter indicates some apprehension to her life, but as noted earlier, no specific reason for it is stated. Further, simply from this letter it is not possible to accept that Subasini was subjected to cruelty, harrasment or torture on account of or relating to the demand for dowry. In the absence of acceptable evidence to establish this foundational fact, the charges under Sections 304-B, 498-A and 306, IPC cannot be said to have been established even applying the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act. Considering the evidence on record as shortly discussed in the preceding paragraphs in the light of the principle laid down by the Apex Courts and other High Court and the decided cases noted earlier, I have no hesitation in holding that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges framed against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge was clearly in error in holding to the contrary. 'from the perusal of the aforesaid judgment it is quite clear that this Court was of the view that ingredients of the offences were not proved by the prosecution, but had not recorded any finding that the properties be longed to the accused persons. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge was clearly in error in holding to the contrary. 'from the perusal of the aforesaid judgment it is quite clear that this Court was of the view that ingredients of the offences were not proved by the prosecution, but had not recorded any finding that the properties be longed to the accused persons. Reading the judgment of this Court in proper perspective it cannot be concluded that the direction of the learned trial Judge has been impliedly set aside. In absence of any direction contained in the judgment of this Court in appeal, it can be safely concluded that the direction given by the learned trial Judge in regard to the disposal of property was affirmed. In the case of Baratam Jagannath Rao v. State of Orissa, reported in (1986) 1 Orissa LR 618, after taking note of the fact that there was no delineation in appeal with regard to the order passed in relation to disposal of the property in exercise of powers under Section 452 of the Code by the learned trial Judge, this Court proceeded to state as follows :-"that order is obviously one under Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 452 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which can be modified or set aside the order of conviction passed by the learned Magistrate, did not set aside the direction of the Magistrate regarding delivery of M. Os. I to V to the informant. That apart, an order passed under Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 452, Cr. P. C. , is applicable under Sec. 454, Cr. P. C. , and under Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 454, Cr. P. C. any person aggrieved by the order made by a Court under Sec. 452, Cr. P. C. , can appeal against the same. If P. W. 10 was really aggrieved by the order, then he should have preferred an appeal as contemplated under sub-sec (1) of Sec. 454, Cr. P. C. He having not preferred any appeal is not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge by filing a petition after disposal of the criminal appeal. If P. W. 10 was really aggrieved by the order, then he should have preferred an appeal as contemplated under sub-sec (1) of Sec. 454, Cr. P. C. He having not preferred any appeal is not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge by filing a petition after disposal of the criminal appeal. In my view, the Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by P. W. 10 before him after disposal of the appeal and, therefore, the impugned order directing an enquiry into the matter at the instance of P. W. 10 must also be held to be bad in law. . . . "the ratio of the aforesaid decision applies in full force to the present case. In the case in hand, this Court in appeal had not dealt with the direction given by the learned trial Judge. The direction having not been set aside stands as it is. In view of this factual position, a fresh application under Section 452 at the instance of the accused persons is not maintainable and the finding of the Court below in that regard is impregnable. As the order passed by the Court below does not suffer from any infirmity the same has to get the stamp of approval from this Court. ( 6 ) RESULTANTLY the appeal, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. Appeal dismissed. .