JUDGMENT M. SRINIVASAN, C.J.— Since these writ petitions are to be allowed on a very short ground, we are not considering any of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. There was a disciplinary enquiry against the petitioners in the present cases and the enquiry authority found against them. The disciplinary authority accepted the inquiring officers reports and passed the orders removing the petitioners from service. Appeals were filed by the petitioners. In the memoranda of appeals a request was made for personal hearing. 2. The appellate authority did not give a personal hearing on the ground that there was no provision in the regulations applicable to the employees. The appellate authority considered the matter on the basis of the record and dismissed the appeals upholding the orders passed by the disciplinary authority. 3. It is represented in these cases that the inquiry officers reports were not furnished to the petitioners before the order of the disciplinary authority was passed and they were made available only at the stage of appeals. It is not in dispute that the inquiring authoritys reports were perused by the petitioners and contentions were raised before the appellate authority. No doubt the regulations applicable to the employees, namely, Punjab National Bank Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977, do not provide for a personal hearing. Regulation No. 17 deals with appeals. But clause (ii) of Regulation No. 17 provides that the Appellate Authority shall consider whether the findings are justified or whether the penalty is excessive or inadequate and pass appropriate orders. 4. On the facts of these cases when the inquiring authoritys reports were not made available to the employees prior to the filing of the appeals, the question is, whether they should have been given an opportunity to be heard personally even though there is no provision in the rules/regulations as such. The Supreme Court has considered the question of personal hearing in Ram Chander v. Union of India and others, (1986) 3 SCC 103. The relevant passages are as follows : "11. After the amendment, the requirement of clause (2) will be satisfied by holding an inquiry in which the government servant has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The relevant passages are as follows : "11. After the amendment, the requirement of clause (2) will be satisfied by holding an inquiry in which the government servant has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. But the essential safeguard of showing his innocence at the second stage i.e., after the disciplinary authority has come to a tentative conclusion of guilt upon a perusal of the findings reached by the Inquiry Officer on the basis of the evidence adduced, as also against the proposed punishment, has been removed ot the detriment of the delinquent officer. In view of the said amendment of Article 311(2) of the Constitution, Rule 10(5) of the Railway Servants Rules has been substituted to bring it in conformity with clause (2), of Article 311, as amended. Rule 10(5), as substituted, provides as follows : 10(5) If the disciplinary authority, having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charges and on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 6 should be imposed on the railway servant, it shall make an order imposing such penalty and it shall not be necessary to give the railway servant any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed : Provided that in every case where it is necessary to consult the Commission, the record of the inquiry shall be forwarded by the disciplinary authority to the Commission for its advice and such advice shall be taken into consideration before making an order imposing any such penalty on the railway servant. 14. After the majority decision in Tulsi Ram Patel case (1985) 3 SCC 398, it can no longer be disputed that the right to make a representation on the proposed penalty which was to be found in clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution having been taken away by the Forty-Second Amendment, there is no provision of law under which a government servant can claim this right. 15. 15. It seems to be purely academic to refer to the vintage decisions of the Privy Council in High Commissioner for India v. I.M. Lal I, AIR 1948 PC 121 and that of this Court in Khem Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300 following it or the plethora of decision thereafter which have now become otiose after the Forty-Second Amendment by which the words a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him were deleted at the end of clause (2) of Article 311 and proviso to clause (2) substituted, with the object of doing away with the second opportunity of making representation at the stage of imposing penalty i.e., at the conclusion of the inquiry. It is however necessary to refer to these two decisions briefly with the object of showing the prejudicial effect on such delinquent government servants. More so, because the majority decision in Tulsiram Patel case seeks to justify the amendment effected by the Forty-Second Amendment of clause (2) of Article 311 by observing that "clause (2) of Article 311 as originally enacted and the legislative history of that clause wholly rule out the giving of any opportunity" SCC P. 455, Para 65. We have our own reservations about the correctness of this proposition. It is not quite accurate to suggest that the opportunity of showing cause before a government servant was dismissed, removed or reduced in rank was not contemplated by law nor justified by the legislative history. 25. Professor de Smith at pp. 242-43 refers to the recent greater readiness of the courts to find a breach of natural justice cured by a subsequent hearing before an appellate tribunal. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 818 although the majority held that the expression that immediate action is necessary in Section 18- AA(1)(a) of the Industrial Undertakings (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, does not exclude absolutely, by necessary implication, the application of the audi alteram partem rule, Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissented with the view and expressed that the expression immediate action may in certain situations mean exclusion of the application of the rules of natural justice and a post-decisional hearing provided by the statute itself may be a sufficient substitute. It is not necessary for our purpose to go into the vexed question whether a post-decisional hearing is a substitute of the denial of a right of hearing at the initial stage or the observance of the rules of natural justice since the majority in Tulsiram Patel case unequivocally lays down that the only stage at which a government servant gets a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him i.e., an opportunity to exonerate himself from the charge by showing that the evidence adduced at the inquiry is not worthy of credence or consideration or that the charges proved against him are not of such a character as to merit the extreme penalty of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank and that any of the lesser punishments ought to have been sufficient in his case, is at the stage of hearing of a departmental appeal. Such being the legal position, it is of utmost importance after the Forty-Second Amendment as interpreted by the majority in Tulsiram Patel case that the Appellate Authority must not only give a hearing to the government servant concerned but also pass a reasoned order dealing with the contentions raised by him in the appeal. We wish to emphasize that reasoned decisions by tribunals, such as the Railway Board in the present case, will promote public confidence in the administrative process. An objective consideration is possible only if the deliquent servant is heard and given a chance to satisfy the authority regarding the final orders that may be passed on his appeal. Considerations of fair play and justice also require that such a personal hearing should be given." 5. The reasoning of the Supreme Court is that a reasonable opportunity must be given to the person concerned on the basis of the principles of natural justice. In this case even though the regulation does not contain a specific provision for personal hearing when the delinquent officer has not been furnished with a copy of the inquiring authoritys report before the appeal was filed, it is absolutely necessary to hear him in person when he had an opportunity of looking into the inquiry report and making his submissions. In such situation the appellate authority should have heard the petitioners in person before passing orders in the appeals. 6. In such situation the appellate authority should have heard the petitioners in person before passing orders in the appeals. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents draws our attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364. The question of natural justice in departmental inquiries has been dealt with at length, but the particular aspect which has been considered by the court in that case was with regard to violation of rules and regulations prescribed for the disciplinary inquiry. The following passage summarises the principles settled by the court : "33. We may summarise the principles emerging from the above discussion. (These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and are evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee): (1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substative nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character. (2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case. (3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this : procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under-"No notice", "no opportunity" and "no hearing" categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself properly and effective. If it is fond that the has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this obvious, no interference is called for. If it is fond that the has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as it dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle. (4)(a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee. (b) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived it, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of the said violation. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived it, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of the said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/employee has not waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727. The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called. (5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature of impact of the order/action the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between "no opportunity" and no adequate opportunity, i.e., between "no notice /no hearing" and "no fair hearing", (a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it Void or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b). But in the latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi alteram partem) has ot be examined from the standpoint of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has ot see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. (It is made clear that this principle (No. 5) does not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere). (It is made clear that this principle (No. 5) does not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere). (6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the primary principle of natural justice) the Court/Tribunal/Authority must always bear in mind the ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them. (7) There may be situations where the interests of State or public interest may call for a curtailing of the rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations, the Court may have to balance public/State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision." 7. Even in the above passage it is pointed out that in the cases falling under "no notice", no opportunity" and "no hearing" categories, the violation of the rules will be considered to be invalidating the resultant order. In fact, in clause (5) of the aforesaid passage it is pointed out by the court that in the case of no notice/no hearing, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it Void or a nullity if one chooses to). Thus the Supreme Court has taken the view that in case of no hearing, the orders will be invalid. 8. In the present case we have already pointed out that the inquiry report having been furnished to the petitioners for the first time after the orders of the disciplinary authority, the appellate authority ought to have heard the petitioners in person before the disposal of the appeal, On this short ground, the orders passed by the appellate authority are set aside and the appellate authority are set aside and the appellate authority shall re-hear the appeals and the petitioners must be given an opportunity of personal hearing. After such hearing the appellate authority may pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. The appellate authority is requested to dispose of the appeals within a period of three months from this date.