Judgment Aftab Alam, J. 1. This application arises from a pre-emption proceeding in terms of Sec.16 (3) of the Bihar land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act. 2. The lands in respect of which the claim of pre-emption is raised were sold by a certain Samardi Sharma (originally impleaded as Respondent No.9 in this writ petition, now deceased) in favour of respondents No.10 through a sale deed executed on 26-9-1979. The registration of the sale deed was completed on 11-10-1979. Respondents 5 to 8 raised a claim of pre-emption and filed an application under Sec.16 (3) of the act on 24-10-1979. Two days prior to the filing of the pre-emption application respondent No.10, the first vendee, executed as sale deed in respect of the disputed lands in favour of the present petitioner on 24-10-1979. The registration of the second sale deed in the petitioners favour was completed on 9-12-1979. 3. This writ petition has thus been filed by the second transferee against the order passed by the Board of revenue by which the revisional authority, setting aside the order passed by the two Courts below has remitted the matter to the Court of the first instance to rehear and decide the case in the light of the directions given in the impugned order. 4. Before proceeding to examine the case of the petitioner on merits it would be necessary to decide the question of maintainability of this writ petition which stands abated against the heirs and legal representatives of the original vendor Samardi Sharma. As noted above, the deceased was impleaded as Respondent No.9. From the service report of notice issued to him it transpired that he was dead. Thereupon this Court by order dated 20-12-19% allowed four weeks time to take steps for substitution vice deceased respondent no.9. By order dated 28-1-1997 the time for filing a substitution petition was extended till 10-2-1997. As no substitution petition was filed within the time granted by the Court the writ petition stood abated against the heirs and legal representatives of deceased respondent No.9 who was the original vendor. 5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents 5 to 8 submitted that the vendor being a necessary party, the writ petition having abated against his heirs and legal representatives has become incompetent to proceed and must therefore be dismissed on that score alone. 5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents 5 to 8 submitted that the vendor being a necessary party, the writ petition having abated against his heirs and legal representatives has become incompetent to proceed and must therefore be dismissed on that score alone. In support of the submission that the vendor was a necessary party, learned counsel relied upon a judgment of this Court by a learned single Judge in Ram Chandra Singh and ors. V/s. The Subdivisional Officer Hajipur and Ors. [1989 P. L. J. R.103 : 1989 (1) BLJ 157 ]. 6. It is indeed true that in that decision (see para-14) Mr. Justice S. B. Sinha held that the transferor is a necessary party to a proceeding under Section 16 (3) of the Act. However, his lordship seems to have arrived at this inference solely on the basis of Rule 19 (4) of the Bihar Land Ceiling Rules, 1963 which requires the Collector, on an application for pre-emption being made to issue notices to the transferor and transferee besides the applicant and to pass an order only after affording them an opportunity of showing cause. 7. In paragraph 13 of the Judgment his Lordship has observed as follows: "13. From a perusal of the Rule 19 of the Bihar Land Ceiling Rules, it is evident that the notice of the application has to be sent simultaneously to the transferor and the transferee by registered post with A/d by the applicant. In term of Rule 14 (4) of the said Rules, the Collector is bound to issue notice to the transferor and give an opportunity of showing cause to the transferor as also the transferee. Rule 19 of the rules is mandatory In nature and in absence of any notice having been given to the transferor, the entire proceeding becomes vitiated in law. " 8. With utmost respect to the learned Single Judge, I am inclined to look at this question from a slightly different point of view. It is now established beyond any doubt that a claim of pre-emption can arise only when there has been a completed transfer. In other words, the stage for the exercise of the right of pre-emption comments only after the transfer of property in the disputed land is completed and an application under Sec.16 (3) can therefore be filed only after the registration of the sale deed is completed. In other words, the stage for the exercise of the right of pre-emption comments only after the transfer of property in the disputed land is completed and an application under Sec.16 (3) can therefore be filed only after the registration of the sale deed is completed. (See Nand kishore Singh V/s. Satyanarayan Singh, a. I. R.1978 Pat 315 ). There are countless cases in which the claim of preemption failed for the sole reason that the application under Sec.16 (3) was filed before the registration of the sale deed was completed. It is, thus, obvious that when an application under Section 16 (3) is filed the transferor ceases to have any right, title or interest in the disputed land which stands completely transferred in favour of the transferee. 9. Coupled with this one must also bear in mind that the provision contained in Sec.16 (3) of the Act "was unlike the law of pre-emption under the Mohammadan Law in that it gets rid of the procedural matters thereunder and provides not the right of substitution of the applicant in place of the transferee but a right of reconveyance of land in question. (See Hira Lalagrawal V/s. Ram-padarath Singh, A. I. R.1969. S. C.244, where in paragraph 2 of the decision the Supreme Court noted with approval the observations made in a bench decision of this Court. 10. Two facts thus emerge from the aforesaid discussion; one is that the application under Sec.16 (3) can only be filed at a stage when the transferor no longer has any right, title and interest in the land forming the subject matter of the claim and the other is that the pre-emption under Sec.16 (3) of the act involves a reconveyance of title by the transferee in favour of the applicant and not the substitution of the applicant in place of the transferee in the original sale deed. It therefore follows that the pre-emptor seeks a relief against the transferee and not against the transferor and in case he succeeds in his claim it is the transferee alone who is directed by court to reconvey the property to the pre-emption by executing a fresh deed of transfer. 11. For the reasons discussed above, I find it difficult to see how the transferor can be held to be a necessary party to a proceeding under Sec.16 (3) of the Act. 12. 11. For the reasons discussed above, I find it difficult to see how the transferor can be held to be a necessary party to a proceeding under Sec.16 (3) of the Act. 12. Having regard to Rule 19 (4) of the Rules I would go so far as to say that the transferor would be a proper party to a proceeding under Sec.16 (3) of the Act but I find it difficult to hold that the proceeding was bound to fail in case of his non-impleadment or that this writ petition must be held to have become incompetent having abated against the heirs and legal representatives of the original vendor. The preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition is accordingly rejected and it is held that this writ petition is competent to proceed on merits. 13. Coming now to the merits of the case it is the admitted position that the petitioner, the second transferee was not impleaded as an opposite party in the application under Sec.16 (3)of the Act. Even when the first vendee respondent No.10 appeared in the proceeding and filed show cause stating that he had transferred the land in favour of the petitioner, no steps were taken by the pre-emptor to have the petitioner added as an Opposite party. 14. By order dated 5-8-1980 the d. C. L. R. rejected the claim of pre-emption. Against this order the pre-emptor filed an appeal before the Addl. Collector. The petitioner was not made a party even at the appellate stage. The Addl. Collector by order dated 11-5-1981 allowed the claim of pre-emption and directed respondent No.10, the first vendee, to reconvey the disputed land to the pre-emptor. It is not understandable how respondent No.10 could have reconveyed the lands in favour of the pre-emptor as he had already sold them to the petitioner. 15. Against the appellate order both the petitioner and respondent No.10 jointly filed revision before the board of Revenue which by resolution dated 24-5-1993 set aside the orders passed by the Court below on the ground that those were passed in the absence of the petitioner and remanded the matter back to the Trial Court for deciding the entire issues afresh in accordance with law in presence of the pre-emptor, the vendor, the purchaser and the subsequent purchaser. It is this order that the petitioner seeks to challenge in this writ petition. 16. It is this order that the petitioner seeks to challenge in this writ petition. 16. It has been held by me in two recent decisions dated 22-4-1997 in (i)C. W. J. C. No.4983/95 and (ii) C. W. J. C no.3340 with C. W. J. C. No.3341/95 that in a case where the first transferee made a second transfer by executing the sale deed before the filing of the pre-emption application, though the registration of the second sale deed might have been completed after the filing of the preemption application, the claim of preemption would not be maintainable in case the second transferee was not brought on the record on being impleaded as one of the Opposite party. Following these decisions, it has to be held that the claim of pre-emption raised by respondents 5 to 8 was not maintainable for the reason that the petitioner was not added as a party to the proceeding even after the sale in his favour came to light from the show cause filed by the first transferee. I am further of the view that the Board of revenue committed an error in remanding the matter back to the first Court with a direction to decide the matter afresh impleading the petitioner as a party to the proceeding. 17. It may be noted that the order of the Board of Revenue was passed on 24-5-1993, that is to say, about 14 years after the registration of the sale deed in favour of the petitioner was completed. 18. Moreover, as the proceeding was not maintainable at the first instance the defect regarding its maintainability could not be cured on remand by the revisional Court. For such a course would take away a valuable right that had already accrued to the petitioner. 19. For the reasons stated above, I am of the view that the impugned order passed by the Board of Revenue is untenable in law. It is, accordingly, set aside and it is declared that the preemption application filed by respondents 5 to 8 was not maintainable. In the result, this application is allowed. There shall be, however, no order as to costs. Petition Allowed.