JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.:- Veena Sharma, (hereinafter referred to as the "petitioner") has preferred this revision petition against the judgment passed by the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Nalagarh, District Solan dated 29-3-1994, whereby after recording preliminary evidence, trial court has dismissed the complaint filed by her under Section 323/342/504/506/218/219 read with Section 109 of the I.P.C. Two reacons were assigned by the trial Court while passing the aforesa id order, namely, that the complaint is barred by limitation and that the court at Nalagarh has no jurisdiction to lake cognisance I against the accused as the jurisdiction specifically lies with the court at Una. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. In order to properly appreciate and understand the respective submissions, brief facts need to be referred to. According to petitioner, respondents No. l and 2, who are police officials and were posted at the relevant point of time in Una District during the course of investigation of FIR No.200/X8 registered at Police Station Una, under Section 363/365/34 of the I.P.C. visited her house at Village Nangal Nihal, Tehsil Nalagarh, District Solan on 29.6.1988 accompanied by other L police officials and according to her, she and her mother were abused, beaten, I intimidated and she as well as her mother were arrested. According to petitioner, she had informed both respondents No. l and 2 the police officials that I she is a minor and her age is 17 years, which fact according to the petitioner had been taken down by both of them in the records but despite that she I along with her mother lima Devi were arrested at the instance of respondents 1 No. 3 to 6 and were put up in jail and they were bailed out in the evening of I 30-6-1988. She further stated that after the completion of investigation of FIR I No.200/1988 when challan was put up on her application it was ordered that I since the petitioner was a juvenile offender under Section 2(4) of the Juvenile I Justice Act. 1986, proceedings against her were ordered to be dropped. However, while doing so liberty was reserved to the prosecution to file a separate I challan before Juvenile Court at Una. Challan in fact was put up and finally by I means of order dated 5-12-1992, the petitioner was discharged by the Juvenile I Court. 1986, proceedings against her were ordered to be dropped. However, while doing so liberty was reserved to the prosecution to file a separate I challan before Juvenile Court at Una. Challan in fact was put up and finally by I means of order dated 5-12-1992, the petitioner was discharged by the Juvenile I Court. A copy of the order passed by the Juvenile court is at page 29 of the I file whereas the copy of the order accepting the plea of the petitioner dated I 31-8-1992 passed by Judicial Magistrate (2), Una is also there on the file at I pages 45 to 46. The fact of the petitioner along with other having been arrested I is also prima facie established from the report submitted by the police for I obtaining judicial remand and the copy of such report is at pages 43 and 44 of I the file of the trial Court. 3. Case of the petitioner further as revealed from her preliminary evidence recorded by the trial Court is that respondents No .l and 2, who were 1 public sen1 ants and were charged with preparation of investigation record, both I of them prepared the same in the manner which they knew to be incorrect with I the intent that they will thereby cause injury to the petitioner. In addition to I this, here case further was that respondents No. l and 2 being public servants maliciously produced in judicial proceedings report by not showing her minor deposit having been informed at the time of her arrest by the petitioner and were guilty of offences under Section 218 of 219 besides Sections 323, 342. 504 and 506 of the I.P.C. In addition to her own statement, petitioner had got statement of K one Shanti Sarup recorded in preliminary evidence. When both the statements arc K read together prima facie case appears to have been made out. 4. Here it may be appropriate to consider the fact that from the contemporancous judicial record, it is apparent that on the day when the petitioner wasp arrested she was a juvenile and in case she was involved in the case, she was delinquent juvenile. 4. Here it may be appropriate to consider the fact that from the contemporancous judicial record, it is apparent that on the day when the petitioner wasp arrested she was a juvenile and in case she was involved in the case, she was delinquent juvenile. Accordingly her case had to be dealt with by the police J under the previsions of Juvenile Justice Act 1986 and H.P. Juvenile Justice Rules1989 (hereinafter referred to as the Act and Rules respectively.) Shri M.S. Chandel was not in a position to controvert this position when his attention was drawn to the file of the trial court. In fact, if the petitioner was a juvenile delinquent within the meaning of Section 2(e) and a juvenile below 18 years of age within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Act. There was no question of order dated 31-8-1992 having been suffered by the prosecution and thereafter order having been passed by the Juvenile Court on 5.12.92. In case the petitioner was in fact not juvenile within the meaning of the Act. both these orders would have been questioned by the State immediately, after the arrest of petitioner, respondents No. 1 and 2 were bond to act in accordance with the provisions of Section 18 of the Act Admittedly, it had not been done by respondents No, 1 and 2. So far the matter relating to jurisdiction is concerned, this case is squarely covered by Section 178(c) of the Cr.P.C. From the preliminary evidence recorded by the trial Court, it is clear that the acts of giving beating, hurling abuses, as well as taking the petitioner into custody and putting her under arrest besides intimidation and preparation of records etc. were all undertaken by respondents No. l and 2 on the abatment of respondents No.3 to 6 at Village Nangal Nihla. Commission of some of these offences may have been completed within the jurisdiction of Una but. that would not mean that no offence prima facie was committed by respondents No .l and 2 within the jurisdiction of court at Nalagarh in view of the preliminary evidence recorded by the trial Court and there were specific allegations in that behalf. Thus the court at Nalagarh has got jurisdiction to try and determine the complaint as lodgod by the petitioner. Thus the court at Nalagarh has got jurisdiction to try and determine the complaint as lodgod by the petitioner. Decision of the Honblc Apex Court reported in case Sujata Mukherjee v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee (1997) 5 SCC 30 can be referred with advantage in this behalf. That Being so the contention to the contrary raised by Shri M.S. Chandel hat no criminal act was committed even if it be assumed for the sake of argument without being conceded by the respondents at Village Nagpal Nihla is hereby rejected. 5. Now coming to the point of limitation, in this case petitioner was arrested on 29.6.1988 at village Nangal Nihla by respondents No. l and 2 according to her complaint on the abetment of respondents No.3 to 6. The complaint out of which this revision has arisen was filed before the trial Court on 17- 11-1993. So far offence under Section 219 of the I PC is concerned, if is punishable with 7 years imprisonment. In this view of the matter. Section 468 Cr.P.C. is not attracted to the facts of the. present case. Even otherwise under law, the period for limitation in relation to offences which may be tried together shall be determined with references to the offence which is punishable-with the more severe punishment. 6. In the instant case, as already noticed infraction of Section 219 of the IPC is also complained of by the petitioner and as already observed, there is enough evidence to prime facie hold so, therefore, the findings recorded by the trial Court while passing the impugned order do not appear to be prima facie correct. For this reason, the decision relied upon by Shri Chandel reported in case State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh, AIR 1981 S.C. 1054 is not applicable to the acts of the present case. 7. Faced with this situation, Shri Chandel urged that in case what is alleged by the petitioner is accepted still for want of enough evidence the impugned order calls for no interference in the present revision petition/ It was also urged by Sh. Chandel that no record of arrest was produced by the petitioner so as to invoke Sections 218 of 219 of the I.P.C. and no case is made out for condonation of delay. Chandel that no record of arrest was produced by the petitioner so as to invoke Sections 218 of 219 of the I.P.C. and no case is made out for condonation of delay. In case any hardship was caused to the petitioner as alleged by her or that the facts were not properly recorded in the ordinary course of things, she would have complained in that behalf before the Court below on in any case at the time when the report (for obtaining her judicial remand alongwith other persons in FIR No.200 of 88 P.S. Una), was submitted to the court below. These submissions have been made simply to be rejected in these proceedings. 8. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the legal position explained, it is clear that the order parsed by the trial Court is illegal and improper and cannot be sustained either in law or in facts as well as evidence and documents produced during the course of preliminary evidence before the court below. Al a consequence, this revision is allowed and the order passed by Judicial Magistrate 1st Class. Nalagarh on 29-3-1994 is hereby set aside. The case is remanded back to the trial Court to issue process against the respondents and thereafter proceed in accordance with law. It is. however, made clear that any observation made in this order is limited for the purpose of determination of this revision petition and the trial court will proceed to hear and determine this case on the basis of evidence and other materials those may be examined by the parties during the course of the trial, without being influenced by am observation made herein. -