H. N. TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) IN both these Writ Petitions, respondents 2 and 3, had filed the application for vacation of the interim order. These Writ Petitions relate to the same parties and with respect to the matter of semi-permanent theatre (in a Village in Yelburga Taluk, Raichur District ). The petitioner, namely, Manjunatha Talkies, through its proprietor had challenged the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner/district Magistrate, Raichur, dated 15-1-1997 - Annexure D, to these Writ Petitions (in Writ Petition No. 2693 of 1997) and order dated 24-2-1997 (subject-matter of Writ Petition No. 6482 of 1997 ). In both these cases, for the vacation of interim order, lengthy arguments were exchanged and in the circumstances, I thought it fit that the case may be heard and finally disposed of by one common judgment instead of dealing with the application for vacation of interim order, as counter and rejoinder have been exchanged. I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners in both these cases as well as the learned Government Advocate - Smt. Bharati Nagesh, appearing in both these petitions on behalf of the District Magistrate, Raichur. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case in brief are that the petitioner - Manjunatha Talkies, had been running semi-permanent talkies in Mangalore Village of Yelburga Taluk, in the Raichur District, since long, that is from 1983 or so. According to petitioner's case on 9th June, 1980, the property bearing Panchayat No. 6/757, measuring 1 acre 20 guntas in Sy. No. 471/d, in Mangalore Village was jointly purchased by the petitioner and respondents 2 and 3, from one Sri. Virupakshappa and with all fairness, the learned Counsels for the parties do not dispute this position and it appears to be an admitted fact. Petitioner has, no doubt, stated that subsequently due to some financial problems, respondents 2 and 3, had given up their rights in the said property by taking the land and executed in the deed and on this basis, the petitioner claimed himself to be the full owner of the property. Petitioner has, no doubt, stated that subsequently due to some financial problems, respondents 2 and 3, had given up their rights in the said property by taking the land and executed in the deed and on this basis, the petitioner claimed himself to be the full owner of the property. The petitioner's case that he filed the application before Respondent No. 1, for N. O. C. and after obtaining the same, the petitioner moved application for licence after submitting the necessary fee and documents and licence was granted to the petitioner for exhibiting the films and since thereafter, that is, 1983, according to the petitioner, the petitioner had been exhibiting the films and had sought renewal of licence from time to time. The petitioner's further case has been that he filed an application for conversion of his touring talkies into a semi-permanent talkies under Rule 105 and by order dated 15-3-93, Annexure B, to the Writ Petition 2693 of 1997, Respondent No. 1, that is, the Deputy Commissioner i. e. District Magistrate, allowed the conversion of touring talkies into semi-permanent talkies and petitioner thereafter, obtained renewal of licence from time to time for showing the cinema. Petitioner's further case is that on 18th Nov. 1996 and 20th Dec. 1996, the petitioner submitted application for renewal of his licence for the period from 1-1-1997 to 31-12-1997, to 1st respondent and submitted all the necessary documents. The petitioner has annexed a copy of that application - Annexure C to Writ Petition No. 2693 of 1997. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3, to the renewal application, filed objections that licence be not renewed on the ground that they are holders and owners of the property to the extent of 25% each, while 50%, they admitted belonged to the present petitioner. According to the petitioner's case, this stand of the respondent was only to harass the petitioner. The 1st respondent according to the petitioner, vide Annexure D, rejected the application for renewal of the licence, dated 15-1-1997. ( 3 ) FEELING aggrieved from that order dated 15-1-1997, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 2693 of 1997. This Court granted an interim order in that Writ Petition which order Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashwathanarayana Rao, had been pleased to pass, read as under. Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner, Issue rule. ( 3 ) FEELING aggrieved from that order dated 15-1-1997, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 2693 of 1997. This Court granted an interim order in that Writ Petition which order Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashwathanarayana Rao, had been pleased to pass, read as under. Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner, Issue rule. By way of an interim order, the 1st respondent is directed to consider the application of the petitioner as per Annexure C, without reference to the objections of respondents 2 and 3, and if necessary, conditions are satisfied to issue licence as prayed for. This order is passed subject to final result of the case. The learned Government Advocate, was directed to take notice. ( 4 ) THEREAFTER, notice having been served, the respondents Nos. 2 and 3, put in their appearance and filed the objections to the Writ Petition as well as application for vacation of the interim order dated 30th Jan. 1997. The application for vacation or interim order had been made on 6-6-1997. It may be mentioned here that in the order dated 15-1-1997, the District Magistrate has observed :i am of the view that the petitioner has failed to produce to the satisfaction of the licensing authority documentary evidence in proof of his lawful possession of the site upon which he intends to continue to exhibit films. He also failed to comply with the basic requirement to be eligible to get his cinema licence renewed for the period beyond 31-12-1996, as contemplated under Rule 6 of Karnataka Cinema Regulations, 1971. Hence, the following order :in view of the facts narrated, the request of the petitioner to grant his licence for the period beyond 31-12-1996, for exhibition of the films over the site jointly owned by the petitioner and both the objection petitions are hereby rejected. " ( 5 ) THE District Magistrate, appears to have taken the view that if possession of the joint owner is not the lawful possession and as such, he rejected the application for regrant of licence beyond 31-12-1996. On the interim order of this Court quoted above, the District Magistrate, passed order dated 24-2-1997, which is Annexure B to W. P. No. 6482/97. In paragraph 7 of the order, the District Magistrate has observed as under :"that I found on record, the annual inspection report dated 30-11-1996, submitted by Tahsildar, Yelbarga. On the interim order of this Court quoted above, the District Magistrate, passed order dated 24-2-1997, which is Annexure B to W. P. No. 6482/97. In paragraph 7 of the order, the District Magistrate has observed as under :"that I found on record, the annual inspection report dated 30-11-1996, submitted by Tahsildar, Yelbarga. As per his annual inspection report, the following requirements are not fulfilled by the applicants as per rule : (i) The precautionary measures as against fire required to be taken under Rule 76 of Karnataka Cinema (Regulation) Rules, 1971 are not taken, that is,cleanliness as required under Rule 77 is not maintained. (ii) The applicant was found to have stored drums in the booking violating the conditions of Rule 83. (iii) The design of projection room is not as required under Rule 111-U and also electrical installations are also not provided as per requirement under Rules 62 to 67, 70 and 7 and fire fighting appliances were not kept as required under Rule 111 (Z ). (iv) Auditorium is not kept clean and seating arrangement is not good passage in corridors as required under Rule 50 is not provided, proper ventilation and closets urinals and water facilities as required under rule are not provided. The applicant has not been serious, to substantially to comply with the requirements to be eligible to continue to exhibit films. He has failed to provide safety, convenience and comfort of the persons attending exhibition of films therein. "after making these observations in paragraph 7, the Deputy Commissioner/district Magistrate, Raichur passed the following order :"the application of the Proprietor Manjunatha Chitra Mandira, Mangalore Taluk, Yelburga regarding regrant of licence to him for exhibiting films for the period beyond 31-12-1996, is hereby rejected. " ( 6 ) AS mentioned earlier, feeling aggrieved from this order of the District Magistrate/deputy Commissioner, Raichur, the petitioner Manjunatha Talkies through its proprietor filed petition No. 6482/97. ( 7 ) ON notice having been issued, appearance has been put in on behalf of the Government, Smt. Bharati Nagesh the learned Govt. Advocate and on behalf of respondents 2 and 3, appearance has been put by Sri. Nanjundaswamy, holding brief for Sri. Kaleemullah Sheriff. Statement of objections on behalf of Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondents 2 and 3 have also been filed in this case. Advocate and on behalf of respondents 2 and 3, appearance has been put by Sri. Nanjundaswamy, holding brief for Sri. Kaleemullah Sheriff. Statement of objections on behalf of Respondent No. 1 as well as Respondents 2 and 3 have also been filed in this case. ( 8 ) RESPONDENTS 2 and 3, as mentioned earlier, filed applications for vacation of stay order. It had been submitted on behalf of the petitioners by the Counsel for the petitioners by Sri. C. M. Desai, assisted by other Counsel that the first order dated 15-1-1997, has been the result of non-exercise of jurisdiction vested in the District Magistrate when he rejected the application for regrant of licence from 1-1-1996, onwards, on the basis of its failure to understand and appreciate the meaning of lawful possession in context of the joint owner. Possession of the petitioner has, no doubt, admitted over the site and the building-cinema. Learned Counsel submitted that the petitioner, really, is the full owner of the property, but even if for a moment, he be taken to be the joint owner with owners-respondents 2 and 3, which petitioner does not concede, the respondents at the most could claim to be owners to the extent of 25% each, though petitioner does not admit their shares, because, they have already transferred their interests and right in the property, as alleged. So, petitioner's Counsel submitted that as respondents 2 and 3, do not dispute the petitioner's right of ownership to the property at the most to the extent of 50%, as such petitioner has been running the cinema in the building of which petitioner, continues to be in possession. Learned Counsel contended that possession of the petitioner, even if for a moment be taken as co-owner to the extent of 50%, i. e. , 1/2 share for the purpose of this case, cannot be said to be unlawful possession. May the other co-owners have remedies to claim mesne profits etc. Learned Counsel contended that possession of the petitioner, even if for a moment be taken as co-owner to the extent of 50%, i. e. , 1/2 share for the purpose of this case, cannot be said to be unlawful possession. May the other co-owners have remedies to claim mesne profits etc. , if proves that the petitioner has not become the exclusive and sole owner, then, in that case Respondents 2 and 3, may make a claim share in profits under law, but so far as the granting or regranting licence is concerned, possession of the petitioner could not be said to be unlawful, as the petitioner's title so far is concerned as a co-owner is, as much the owner of the property as other co-owners. That may be a case, where co-owners have some dispute among themselves, learned Counsel contended they may file a suit for partition or for mesne profits, but in that case, the person filing the suit will have to prove that he continues to be the owner, so he submitted that respondent No. 1, when it passed order dated 15-1-97, respondent No. 1, committed error of law apparent on the face of record, when it opined that petitioner's possession was unlawful or that nothing has been shown to establish lawful possession of the petitioner. ( 9 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners with reference to Writ Petition No. 6482/97, urged and submitted that the petitioner had filed necessary certificates including the precautionary measures certificate required with respect to accidental fire from the Station Officers, Fire Station, Gangavathi, which according to the petitions, was issued on 12-12-1996, to the petitioners. Petitioners' Counsel further invited my attention to the allegations of Paragraph 10 of the Writ Petition that by letter dated 13-12-1996, clearance certificate, electrical fitness certificate, health certificate, P. W. D. certificate and (5) declaration, had been filed by the petitioners with the District Magistrate. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that so far as fire Department Certificate is concerned, it was filed later on, the copy of which, learned Counsel stated is Annexure C, to this Writ Petition. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the District Magistrate, while passing order dated Feb. 24th, 1997, did not apply their mind to the documents and passed the order impugned. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the District Magistrate, while passing order dated Feb. 24th, 1997, did not apply their mind to the documents and passed the order impugned. Learned Counsel contended that the petitioners had not been given opportunity by the District Magistrate when he rejected the petitioners' application for regrant of licence. The learned Counsel contended that there is no specific denial of allegations made in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Writ Petition. In alternative, learned Counsel contended that so far as facts referred in I. As. I to III, that they relate to the grant of fresh licence, learned Counsel contended that if authority thought that there was certain deficiency, the authority should have been given same as reasons before rejection of the petitioner's application. ( 10 ) ON behalf of the respondent No. 1, learned Government Advocate - Smt. Bharati Nagesh contended that this petition should be dismissed and this Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226, as the petitioners had got the alternative remedy for filing the appeal under Section 10 of the Karnataka Cinema Regulations Act. Learned Govt. Advocate contended that when the law provides an alternative remedy, then the parties should not be allowed or encouraged to have recourse to the remedy under Article 226 without availing the alternative remedy. Learned Govt. Advocate contended that in the statement of objections filed by the State in W. P. No. 6482 of 1997, in Paragraph 7, it has been clearly stated that all other averments which are not specifically traversed herein or hereinabove are hereby denied as false and not maintainable and therefore, it should be taken to be denial of allegations in Paragraphs 9 and 10 of these Writ Petitions. ( 11 ) ON behalf of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 - Sri. Nanjundappa, holding brief for the respondents' Counsel - Sri. Kaleemulla Sheriff, also press the contention that petition be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy of appeal being available to the petitioners which they have not availed. Sri. ( 11 ) ON behalf of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 - Sri. Nanjundappa, holding brief for the respondents' Counsel - Sri. Kaleemulla Sheriff, also press the contention that petition be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy of appeal being available to the petitioners which they have not availed. Sri. Nanjundappa, further contended that Respondents 2 and 3 are the owners of 50% of the property and no doubt 50% of the title of owership in property belongs to the petitioner, that is, 50% of the ownership of the property belongs to the petitioners and 50% of the ownership jointly belong to Respondents 2 and 3 and therefore, petitioners could not solely and exclusively utilise the property for their own benefit and therefore, the Deputy Commissioner had rightly rejected the licence under the order dated 15th Jan. 1997, and he further contended that para 7 of the order per se reveals that the question of non-compliance with the requirements of law by the petitioners and therefore, the authority rightly rejected the renewal or regrant of licence in favour of the petitioners. ( 12 ) IN the statement of objections filed by Respondents 2 and 3, there is no denial of averments made in paragraphs 9 and 10 of these Writ Petitions. ( 13 ) I have applied my mind to the contentions made by the learned Counsels for the parties and the learned Govt. Advocate. That as regards the first contention or the preliminary objections raised on behalf of the respondents, namely, by the learned Govt. Advocate - Smt. Bharati Nagesh as well as by Sri. Nanjundappa, brief holder appearing for the Respondents 2 and 3, that petition should be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy available to the petitioners by way of appeal. 13-A. In my opinion, when the affidavits have already been exchanged in the matter between the parties, it does not appear to be just and proper to dismiss these Writ Petitions on the ground of alternative remedy. It is one of the sound principles in the matter of exercise of power under Article 226, that if a party has got alternative remedy, this Court may abstain from exercising its power, but this is not an absolute bar against the exercise of power. It is one of the sound principles in the matter of exercise of power under Article 226, that if a party has got alternative remedy, this Court may abstain from exercising its power, but this is not an absolute bar against the exercise of power. ( 14 ) THE Apex Court in very many cases, laid down the law in this connection beginning from the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammed Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 , that the rule requiring adherence and availing or pursuing of the statutory remedy before approaching this Court under Article 226, is a rule of policy and restraint in exercise of discretionary power under Article 226 rather than rule of law and the Supreme Court has already laid down exception to the rule of convenience and discretion and its exercise. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mohammed Nooh's case observes as under (Para 10) :"the fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior Court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should, in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior Courts subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior Court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies. In the King v. Postmaster-General; Ex Parte Carmichael, (1928) 1 KB 291 (E), a certiorari was issued although the aggrieved party had an alternative remedy by way of appeal. It has been held that the superior Court will readily issue a certiorari in a case where there has been a denial of natural justice before a Court of summary jurisdiction. The case of Rex v. Wandsworth Justices; Ex Parte Read, (1942) 1 KB 281 (F) is an authority in point. In that case a man had been convicted in a Court of summary jurisdiction without giving him an opportunity of being heard. The case of Rex v. Wandsworth Justices; Ex Parte Read, (1942) 1 KB 281 (F) is an authority in point. In that case a man had been convicted in a Court of summary jurisdiction without giving him an opportunity of being heard. It was held that his remedy was not by a case stated or by an appeal before the quarter sessions but by application to the High Court for an order of certiorari to remove and quash the conviction. "their Lordships further observed in para 11, as under :"on the authorities referred to above it appears to as that there may conceivably be cases and the instant case is in point - where the error, irregularity or illegality touching jurisdiction or procedure committed by an inferior Court or tribunal of first instance is so patent and loudly obtrusive that it leaves on its decision an indelible stamp of infirmity or vice which cannot be obliterated or cured on appeal or revision. If an inferior Court or tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or manifestly conducts the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and which offends the superior Court's sense of fair play the superior Court may, we think, quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the Court or tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another inferior Court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or if recourse was had to it, it confirmed what ex facie was a nullity for reasons aforementioned. This would be so all the more if the tribunals holding the original trial and the tribunals hearing the appeal or revision were merely departmental tribunals composed of persons belonging to the departmental hierarchy without adequate legal training and background and whose glaring lapses occasionally come to our notice. The Superior Court will ordinarily decline to interfere by issuing certiorari and all we say is that in a proper case of the kind mentioned above it has the power to do so and should exercise it. We say no more than that. The Superior Court will ordinarily decline to interfere by issuing certiorari and all we say is that in a proper case of the kind mentioned above it has the power to do so and should exercise it. We say no more than that. "in the case of Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana, AIR 1985 SC 1147 vide para 9 of the report, their Lordships have laid it down as under :"ordinarily it is true that the Court has imposed a restraint in its own wisdom on its exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 226 where the party invoking the jurisdiction has an effective, adequate alternative remedy. More often, it has been expressly stated that the rule which requires the exhaustion of alternative remedies is a rule of convenience and discretion rather than rule of law. At any rate it does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court. In fact in the very decision relied upon by the High Court in the State of U. P. v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 , it is observed 'that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where, is no other equally effective remedy. ' It should be made specifically clear that where the order complained against is alleged to be illegal or invalid as being contrary to law, a petition at the instance of person adversely affected by it, would lie to the High Court under Art. 226 and such a petition cannot be rejected on the ground that an appeal lies to the higher officer or the State Government. An appeal in all cases cannot be said to provide in all situations an alternative effective remedy keeping aside the nice distinction between jurisdiction and merits. "this has been one of trite principles which has been reiterated at times again by the Supreme Court. Keeping this principle in view, I proceed to examine the question. In the present case, firstly, authority by its order dated 15-1-1997, rejected the application for regrant for licence for the period 1st Jan. 1997 to 31st Dec. "this has been one of trite principles which has been reiterated at times again by the Supreme Court. Keeping this principle in view, I proceed to examine the question. In the present case, firstly, authority by its order dated 15-1-1997, rejected the application for regrant for licence for the period 1st Jan. 1997 to 31st Dec. 1997, on the ground that petitioners have not shown any of their lawful possession and on a writ being filed, this Court issued the interim direction that: Without taking into consideration the objections of Respondents 2 and 3, the District Magistrate or Deputy Commissioner should consider the application for grant of licence or regrant of licence and this order was made subject to final result of W. P. No. 2693 of 1997. ( 15 ) REALLY, when this Court directed under the directions of this Court, the authority if considered that application and passed order impugned, the proper course for the petitioners was to approach to this Court by petition under Article 226, instead of going in appeal, because the order which the District Magistrate or the Deputy Commissioner, did pass in Feb. 1997, had been passed in pursuance of the direction issued by this Court and subject to the result of that Writ Petition. ( 16 ) THE counter-affidavits as mentioned earlier have already been exchanged. Apart from that, it may also be mentioned that the petitioners' case in the second Writ Petition has been that he has not been given opportunity of hearing before the rejection of his application and the documents filed by him have not been looked into by the District Magistrate for regrant of licence vide order dated Feb. 24th, 1977. If and when the order has been passed against a party without hearing and if it has been passed for certain alleged deficiencies, natural justice requires that party should have been made aware before the passing of order of rejection and given opportunity to show that these deficiencies did not exist, this having not been done, definitely, the order dated 24th Feb. 1997, has been illegal. 1997, has been illegal. Apart from that, it appears from the allegations of paragraphs 9 and 10, that petitioner had filed the certificate from the Fire Department from the Station Officer, to the effect that Management had maintained the fire avoiding equipments, as per Rule 75, no doubt certificate was issued subject to the conditions that extinguishers have to be tested every year from this office. The petitioners have already annexed this certificate copy of which is at Annexure C, had been filed before the District Magistrate. In paragraph 10, petitioner has stated that all other certificates along with letter Annexure D, had been filed, the date of that application is dated 12-12-1996. ( 17 ) THESE allegations of paragraphs 9 and 10, have not been specifically denied in para 7, of the counter-affidavit filed by the State as well same are vague in nature. Specific denial, I mean, to say that it has nowhere been stated that it has wrongly been stated in the affidavit that petitioner has filed Annexure D, such allegations could be made after verifying the record. It is also one of the trite principles of law, allegations are not been specifically denied, it should be taken to be admitted. The Counsel laid emphasis that the documents have been filed. In this view of the matter, the order subject-matter of W. P. No. 6483 of 1997, passed by the District Magistrate, has been per se illegal and suffers from error of law apparent on face of record and of jurisdiction deserves to be quashed. Annexure B, to W. P. No. 2693 of 1997, in my opinion, the Respondent No. 1, was wrong in rejecting the regrant/certificate on the ground that petitioner has not shown or not proved or that he has not filed any document for establishing his lawful possession over the site or building. ( 18 ) AS mentioned earlier and as comes out from the affidavit also, filed by Respondents 2 and 3, it is admitted position that petitioner is owner of the property, may he not be the exclusive owner of the property. ( 18 ) AS mentioned earlier and as comes out from the affidavit also, filed by Respondents 2 and 3, it is admitted position that petitioner is owner of the property, may he not be the exclusive owner of the property. The Respondents 2 and 3, admit that he is owner to the extent of 50%, in the property may it be that he is a co-owner, no doubt, petitioner claims himself to be exclusive owner of the property, on the facts mentioned in the writ petitions that Respondents 2 and 3, have transferred their rights, but this matter is sub-judise in Civil Court, I do not wish to make any observations and whatever my observations are, relate to the subject-matter in this case. It is beyond doubt that petitioner is and has been a co-owner with the Respondents 2 and 3 and petitioners' right as admitted by respondents in the counter-affidavit had been to the extent of 50% ownership of property in dispute. Whether rest of 50% of the ownership vests in Respondents 2 and 3 or they as well stood transferred to the petitioners, as claimed, that is a subject-matter which can be decided by the Civil Court. There is no dispute that cinema was being run and it continued to be run till 31-12-96, and that it was being run by the petitioners at the time when application for regrant of licence from 1-1-1997 to 31-12-1996, had been made. It means petitioners have been in actual possession of the property through out after certificates to the renewal of licence or regrant of licence was sought. The possession of owner or co-owner cannot be said to be unlawful. A co-owner of a property is owner thereof as another co-owner and a co-owner's possession is his own possession as owner thereof as well on behalf of other co-owner. It may be also for the benefit of other co-owner as well. In the case of Vishwanath Pillai v. Special Tahsildar for Land Acquisition reported in AIR 1991 SC 1966 at p. 1968, their Lordships of Supreme Court after having referred to earlier decisions of their Lordships laid it down:"a co-owner is as much owner of the entire property as a sole owner of property. It is not correct to say that a co-owner's property is not his own. "this Court in the case of Bhagwan Das v. Mrs. It is not correct to say that a co-owner's property is not his own. "this Court in the case of Bhagwan Das v. Mrs. R. J. D'souza, ILR (1995) 1 Kant 440 at 456 laid it down as under :-"unless there is a partition or division of the property, every co-owner is owner of every inch and every particle of that property and is entitled to enjoy that property free from any encumbrance or stranger. "thus, considered as above, co-owner can never be said to be illegal or unlawful possession of that property, i. e. , co-ownership property. The admitted position for time being is that petitioner's possession has been as of the owner of the property, (may be of 50% ownership or of full ownership, that is not material) qua a stranger to the property, so, petitioner's possession cannot be said to be unlawful, as it is based on legal title. The very admitted facts really reveal that petitioner's possession has not been unlawful and therefore, on that ground when application was rejected by the District Magistrate/deputy Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner committed error of law apparent on the face of record in rejecting that application vide order dated 15-1-1997. Thus considered, in my opinion, the orders impugned in the two Writ Petitions, namely, Writ Petition No. 2693 of 1997, order dated 15-1-1997 and order impugned in W. P. No. 6482 of 1997, namely order dated 24-2-1997, suffer from illegal refusal to exercise the jurisdiction or the powers vested as well as suffer from error of law. The orders in both these writ petitions are to be quashed. ( 19 ) IN the result, these Writ Petitions Nos. 2693 of 1997 and 6482 of 1997, both deserves to be allowed and are hereby allowed. The orders impugned dated 15-1-1997 and 24-2-1997, passed by the District Magistrate in the matter of regrant or renewal of the licence for the period from 1-1-97 to 31-12-1997, rejecting the application are hereby quashed. 2693 of 1997 and 6482 of 1997, both deserves to be allowed and are hereby allowed. The orders impugned dated 15-1-1997 and 24-2-1997, passed by the District Magistrate in the matter of regrant or renewal of the licence for the period from 1-1-97 to 31-12-1997, rejecting the application are hereby quashed. Let the direction in the nature of mandamus be issued to the respondent No. 1, to consider, decide and dispose of petitioner's application for regrant/renewal of the licence, as prayed for, according to law and, after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner as well and if in the opinion of the opposite parties, if it is found after perusal of the documents on record that the petitioner has satisfied the requirement of law, then the petitioner may be granted the renewal of the licence keeping in view the observations of this Court in the earlier part of this order with reference to Rule 6 and lawful possession. Costs are made easy. Let the matter be disposed of at the earliest within a period of 6 weeks from the date of communication of this order. Till the disposal of the application by the District Magistrate, the petitioner will continue with exhibition of cinema under the earlier interim order. ( 20 ) SMT. Bharati Nagesh, Govt. Advocate, permitted to file memo. Petitions allowed.