JUDGMENT M. SRINIVASAN, C.J. A: INTRODUCTION—The first of these petitions has been filed by the Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission through its Secretary. The said petitioner will be referred to here-in-after as the Commission. 2. As the parties in both the writ petitions are same with different ranks, for the sake of convenience we will refer to them according to their ranks in CWP 264/97 are Respondents 3 and 4 in the other writ petition. The 3rd Respondent in CWP No. 264/97, namely, the State of Himachal Pradesh is the first respondent in other writ petition. Respondents 4 and 5 in the CWP No. 264/97 are the petitioners in the other writ petition. 3. The Commission issued an advertisement on 1.1.1997 calling for applications for appointments 10 posts in the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Services, etc. As per the advertisement a Combined Competitive Examination, 1995 would be held at Shimla, Mandi and Dharmashala for selection of candidates for recruitment to the posts/services under the Government of Himachal Pradesh. The following were the details of the posts mentioned in the advertisement:— "(1) There vacancies in Himachal Pradesh Administrative Service, Class-I (Gazetted) in the pay scale of Rs. 2,200-4,000. Out of these three, one vacancy is reserved for Scheduled Tribe candidates of Himachal Pradesh. (2) Four vacancies in the Himachal Pradesh Police Service, Class-I (Gazetted), in the pay scale of Rs. 2,200-4,000, including one vacancy reserved for Scheduled Caste candidates of Himachal! Pradesh and one vacancy reserved for ex-servicemen candidates. (3) Three vacancies in the post of Block Development and Panchayat Officer, Class-ll (Gazetted), in the pay scale of Rs. 2410-4000, including one vacancy reserved for other Backward Classes candidates of Himachal Pradesh and one vacancy reserved for ex-sericemen (Scheduled Caste Category) candidates." 4. A note was appended thereto which reads as follows:— (i) The number of vacancies mentioned above as well as the categories of services/posts to be filled in on the basis of this examination, are subject to variation with proportionate variation in the number of vacancies reserved for various categories in accordance with the rules/instructions in force, The candidates belonging to reserved categories for whom vacancies have not been received from the Government, may also apply and they will be considered for the vacancies meant for General Category candidates, if any vacancy(s) reserved for such category(s) is not received after the publication of this advertisement. Last date of receipt of applications will not be extended. (ii) The number of candidates to be called for viva voce test after the written examination shall be determined by the Commission at its discretion and this number shall as far as possible be three times of the number of vacancies notified for being filed through this examination. (iii) The venues of examination in Shimla/Mandi/Dharmshala centres will be intimated in the admission letters (iv) The candidates are advised to carefully read the instructions contained in this Advertisement and those given in the application form in order to ensure that they are eligible for admission to this examination in terms of said instructions/ conditions and relevant rules. It is also made clear that those who do not fulfil requisite qualifications/eligibility conditions, will appear in the written examination at their own risk. The eligibility of candidates called for interview will be determined on the day of interview on the basis of original documents and the Commission will not be responsible, if the candidature of any candidate is rejected, at-that stage, on that account." 5. The last date of receipt of applications in the office of the Commission was 30.1.1996. That advertisement was based upon the requisition received by the Commission from the State Government on 29.8,1995, 9.8.1995 and I 4.11.1995. Thereafter, requisitions were being received by the Commission with reference to other vacancies in other posts and on receipt of each I requisition an advertisement was being issued in the Newspapers by the Commission that the filling up of those posts would also be considered on the basis of the results of the examination held in pursuance of the first advertisement and the subsequent interviews. 6. The relevant particulars of the dates of requisitions, posts and the advertisements are found in the following tabular statement:— Sr. No. Posts Date of Advertisement Date of requisition No. of vacancies Gen SC SI Ex-service man OBC Date of occurrence of vacancy. 1 2 3 4 5 6(0 j6£if > 6(ivi 6(v) 7 1. HAS 3 1.1.1996 (The Tribune) Annexure A-1 29.8.1995 (Annexure R-1) 3 2 1 1. post existing 1.4.1995. 2. HPS4 1.1.1996 (The Tribune Annexure A-1) 9.8.1995 (Annexure R-IV) 4 2 1 1 All existing vacancies stated to be requisitioned on 9.8.1995 to clear backlog. 3. 1 2 3 4 5 6(0 j6£if > 6(ivi 6(v) 7 1. HAS 3 1.1.1996 (The Tribune) Annexure A-1 29.8.1995 (Annexure R-1) 3 2 1 1. post existing 1.4.1995. 2. HPS4 1.1.1996 (The Tribune Annexure A-1) 9.8.1995 (Annexure R-IV) 4 2 1 1 All existing vacancies stated to be requisitioned on 9.8.1995 to clear backlog. 3. BDPO3 1.1.1996 (The Tribune Annexure A-1) 4.11.1995 (Annexure R-VII) 3 1 1 1 SC category 1 post existing since 4/95 and 2 posts anticipated on 12/95 4. Distt. 1 Welfare -cum-Probatior officer. 30.1.1996 (Indian Express Annexure R-2/> l and 1.2.1996 (The Tribune, Annexure A-2). 5.1.1996 > (Annexure \) R-lll 1 1 ana z/yo. 1 post anticipated on 1.2.1996. 5. Tehsil-dars 6 3.4.1996 (Indian Express and Tribune -Annexure R-2/E 15.3.1996 I (Annexure J) 6 4 1 1 All vacancies in June, 1995 6. HAS 4 12.6.1996 (Indian Express Annexure R 2/C 20.5.1996 (Annexure 3 R-1) 4 1 1 1 (SC category) 1 Genl. 1 post existing on 25.1.1996 and 3 vacancies expected on 1.1.1996 and 2.1.1997 and 1.2.1997 respectively. 7. BDO11 25.9.1996 (The Tribune Annexure A-3) as also Annexui R-2/D). 31.8.1996 (Annexure R-VII e 11 8 1 1 1 All anticipated vacancies: 3 in 10/96: 1 each in 12/96, 2/97, 3/97, 4/97, 5/97, 7/97 and 2 in 10/97. 8. ETO:2 25.9.1996 (The Tribune Annexure A-3 as also R-2/D) 14.8.1997 (Annexure R-VIII) 2 1 1 Existing since 31.5.1996 and 30.6.1996 respectively. 9. Assistant 3 Registrar Co.-o| -Societies 12.6.1996 (Indian Express o Annexure R-2/C 22.5.1996 (Annexure ; R-ll) 3 2 1 Existing since 7.8.1995". 7. Thus, before the interviews commenced, 37 posts were available and also notified to the Commission by the Government pursuant to which advertisements were issued by the Commission. 8. In response to the advertisements 4665 candidates filed applications for appearing in the examination. The examinations were held from 21.7.1996 to 10.8.1996. 9. Respondents 4 and 5 CWP No. 264/97 were among the applicants and they appeared in the examination. Respondent No. 1 in CWP No. 264/ 97 who is the 3rd respondent in the other writ petition sent an application for the examination in the prescribed form. Column No. 32 in the application form requires the applicant to write clearly in the space below the services for which he wishes to compete. Respondent No. 1 in CWP No. 264/ 97 who is the 3rd respondent in the other writ petition sent an application for the examination in the prescribed form. Column No. 32 in the application form requires the applicant to write clearly in the space below the services for which he wishes to compete. The column also required the applicant if he wishes to compete for more than one service to state in the said space the services in order of his preference. It is made clear by the said column that the applicants selection of services and the order of preference once made will be treated as final and no addition or change would be allowed. In that polumn the first respondent wrote as follows: "1. HAS 2. HPS 3. B.D. & P.O. 4. and all the remaining if advertised in the near future," Obviously, the first respondent filled up column No. 32 in that manner as he was aware of the clause in the advertisement dated. 1.1.96 which stated specifically that the number of vacancies mentioned therein as well as the categories of services/posts to be filled in on the basis of the said examination were subject to variation with proportionate variation in the number of vacancies reserved for various categories in accordance with the Rules/instructions in force. 10. After having sent that application the first respondent chose not to appear in the examination, thus giving up the idea of competing for the Services. The 2nd respondent who was also eligible as per the prescribed qualifications did not choose to apply at all 11. However, on October 31, 1996, Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed an application before the State Administrative Tribunal under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act praying for the following reliefs: "(i) That the 27 more posts sought to be filled in by the respondents by way of Addenda on the basis of initial advertisement at Annexure A-1 may kindly be quashed and setaside, (ii) That the respondents may be directed to confine the selection qua the vacancies/posts which were advertised vide advertisement dated 1.1.1996 (Annexure A-1). (iii) That if during the pendency of Original Application, respondent No. 2 recommends names of candidates beyond the vacancies advertised vide Annexure A-1, in that event, the recommendations in excess of said advertisement may kindly be quashed and set aside. (iv) That Respondent Nos. (iii) That if during the pendency of Original Application, respondent No. 2 recommends names of candidates beyond the vacancies advertised vide Annexure A-1, in that event, the recommendations in excess of said advertisement may kindly be quashed and set aside. (iv) That Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 may be directed to advertise 27 posts, which are sought to be filled by them by way of Addenda by giving fresh opportunity to all eligible candidates in accordance with. law. (v) That if during the pendency of present original Application, Respondent No. 1 issues letter of appointment and candidates are offered appointments in excess of vacancies advertised vide advertisement at Annexure A-1, in that event those selections/appointments may be quashed and setaside." 12. That application was taken on file by the Tribunal as O.A. No. 1648/96. The Tribunal passed an interim order on 8.11.1996 permitting the selection process to go on but directing that the results should be kept in a sealed cover till the disposal of the main application. It was thereafter interviews were held for 99 persons. Respondents 4 and 5 were among the successful in the written examination and called for interviews. They did appear in the said interviews. By a final order dated June 24, 1997, the Tribunal directed the State Government and the Commission to confine the Selection only qua the vacancies/ posts which were initially advertised on 1.1.1996 or subsequently advertised on or before January 30, 1996, the last date of receipt of applications. Thus, the Tribunal had permitted by the said final order the State Government and the Commission to fill-up only 11 posts on the basis of the Selection process already held. The Tribunal has categorically held that with respect to the remaining posts fresh advertisements should be issued after due notification of the vacancies and calling for applications. It is the said order of the Tribunal which is challenged in these two Writ Petitions. 13. The following is the gist of the arguments of the counsel for the Commission. That even in the advertisement dated 1.1.1996 it was made clear that the number of vacancies were subject to variation as also the categories of services/posts to be filled in on the basis of the examination mentioned therein. The Commission has to issue advertisements only as and when requisitions are issued by the Government. That even in the advertisement dated 1.1.1996 it was made clear that the number of vacancies were subject to variation as also the categories of services/posts to be filled in on the basis of the examination mentioned therein. The Commission has to issue advertisements only as and when requisitions are issued by the Government. As all such requisitions for the vacancies which arise during the relevant year and which are reasonably expected to arise in that year or in the next year are not sent to the Commission at the same time as they proceed from different Departments of the Government, the Commission has to necessarily issue advertisement mentioning the number of vacancies for which requisitions have already been received and also specifying that the said number is subject to variation. Such a procedure has been in vogue for quite a long time and no exception has been taken thereto by anybody previously. The same procedure is adopted by the Union Public Service Commission when they issue a notice calling for applications for Civil Services Examination, the Public Service Commission, Uttar Pradesh when they call for applications for combined State/Subordinate Services (Preliminary) Examinations and Haryana Public Service Commission, Chandigarh with reference to their competitive examinations. As such a provision is made in the advertisement itself, there was nothing wrong in the Commission issuing subsequent advertisements for the requisitions received before the completion of the selection process for which also different advertisements have been issued. Thus, there was no arbitrariness or want of fairness or transparency in the action of the Government or the Commission. The first respondent having himself been fully aware of the fact that the examination mentioned in the advertisement would be the basis for filling up other posts with reference to which advertisements would be issued subsequently has taken care to mention in column 32 of his application that it was for all the examinations which would be advertised again in the near future. In such circumstances, it is not open to the 1st respondent to challenge the process of selection with regard to other posts for which advertisements were issued subsequent to 30.1.1996. Moreover, the 1st respondent after having applied did not choose to appear in the examination thereby giving-up his idea of competing for the services. In such circumstances, it is not open to the 1st respondent to challenge the process of selection with regard to other posts for which advertisements were issued subsequent to 30.1.1996. Moreover, the 1st respondent after having applied did not choose to appear in the examination thereby giving-up his idea of competing for the services. It is not, therefore, open to him to file an application before the Tribunal challenging the process of selection, as regards the 2nd respondent he was eligible even at the time of the first advertisement but he never thought of competing for the services and he could not, therefore, make any complaint regarding the selection. The Supreme Court has in Prem Singhs case (1996) 4 S.C.C. 319 categorically laid down that the Court may not while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction invalidate the excess appointments and may mould the relief in such a manner as to strike a just balance between the interest of the State and the interest of the persons seeking public employment. The Court held in that case that what relief should be granted in such cases would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court also pointed out that the authority concerned cold take into account not only the actual vacancies but also vacancies which were likely to arise because of retirement, etc. by the time the selection process was completed and it would not be just and equitable to invalidate all the appointments made in excess. In this case the facts and circumstances show that almost all the vacancies excepting 7 were in existence before the interviews were concluded and the said 7 vacancies were reasonably anticipated to arise before the end of this year for which advertisement had already been issued on 25.9.1996. Hence, the order of the Tribunal is unsustainable and it has to be quashed. Reliance was placed on some more decisions to which a detailed reference will be made later. (ii) Respondent Nos. 4 & 5. 14. The contentions of respondents 4 and 5 which are in addition to those put-forward by learned Counsel for the Commission are as follows. The Commission conducts written tests and interviews for the purpose of filling up various public posts and recruitment to the services of thr; State of all the examinations conducted by the Commission. 4 & 5. 14. The contentions of respondents 4 and 5 which are in addition to those put-forward by learned Counsel for the Commission are as follows. The Commission conducts written tests and interviews for the purpose of filling up various public posts and recruitment to the services of thr; State of all the examinations conducted by the Commission. The examination conducted for filling-up posts in Himachal Pradesh Administrative Services and Allied Services is known as "Himachal Pradesh Administrative Services etc. Combined competitive Examination." It is an annual feature and a person inter alia in order to be eligible for the said examination should have a minimum qualification of graduation. The Commission is only to conduct the examination and interviews but appointments are made by the Government. A candidate has to appear in four compulsory papers and two optional subjects. There are in all 30 optional subjects. The Commission has to prepare itself for conducting examination in all for 64 papers. It is a tedious process and takes a lot of time. A candidate should be at least 21 years of age on the date prescribed qua eligibility and the upper age limit is 31. The total attempts provided to a candidate are only 4. They are calculated on the basis of the number of times a candidate appears in the written examination. The 4th respondent belongs to Scheduled Tribe category and he has appeared in the written examination for the 4th time. He is eligible only for one more attempt as he belongs to the category of Scheduled Tribes. As he was successful in the written test he was called for interview. The 5th respondent is an ex-serviceman. He has appeared in the written test for the 2nd time and was successful. Respondents 4 and 5 did not avail of several other opportunities to join various other jobs but devoted their entire time for the preparation of the examination conducted by the Commission. The interests of the persons who have appeared in the examination and are successful should have more weight than the interests of respondents 1 and 2 who did not choose to take part in the examination. The interests of the State Government would also outweigh the interests of respondents 1 and 2 as there are number of vacancies in the various Departments which should be filled up immediately. The interests of the State Government would also outweigh the interests of respondents 1 and 2 as there are number of vacancies in the various Departments which should be filled up immediately. The respondents T and 2 have not chosen to challenge the provision in the advertisement that the number of vacancies as well as category of services/posts were subject to variation. Without challenging the validity of the said advertisement it was not open to the said respondents to challenge the selection process. They applied to the Tribunal in their own personal interest and they could not claim that they were prosecuting the proceedings in public interest. (Hi) State Government 15. Learned Advocate-General appearing for the State Government put-forward the following contentions: that there is no statutory Rule fixing any time-limit for any Government Department to send a requisition to the Commission. Secondly there is no Rule fixing a particular time-limit for holding examinations in any year. The State Government issued an advertisement for the year 1994 on 27.10.1994 which was published on 29.10.1994. Written examinations were held from 13.4.95 to 30.4.1995. The advertisement now in question is for the year 1995. That was published on 1.1.1996. There was no advertisement between October 1994 and January 1996 for the examinations due to be held in 1995. Requisitions were being sent for the vacancies in 1995 and the anticipated vacancies in 1995, 1996 and 1997. there is no error whatever in the procedure adopted by the State Government or the Commission. Hence, the order of the Tribunal is un-sustainable. (iv) Respondent-1. 16. Learned Counsel for the first respondent advanced the following arguments. Article 16(1) of the Constitution of India guarantees equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. That clause reiterates the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. The Commission issued an advertisement-calling for applications and prescribed the last date for such applications to be 30.1.1996. Later on when it issued further advertisement for more number of posts which were found to be vacant or which had fallen vacant subsequently, the Commission did not extend or change the last date for applications thereby preventing persons who had become eligible to apply subsequent to 30.1.1996. Later on when it issued further advertisement for more number of posts which were found to be vacant or which had fallen vacant subsequently, the Commission did not extend or change the last date for applications thereby preventing persons who had become eligible to apply subsequent to 30.1.1996. The said action of the Commission has in effect carved out a class of persons who had applied before 30.1.1996 for being considered for appointment discriminating against all other persons who were eligible to apply. That is an arbitrary exercise of power in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Under the rules, the authorities are bound to hold competitive examination every year and fill up the vacancies which would arise during the course of that year. Thus the competitive examination in each year can be only with reference to the vacancies arising in that year and if they are not filled up during that year a fresh examination has to be conducted. The action of the authorities in the present case by including as many as 27 posts for being filled up on the basis of the results in the competitive examination held pursuant to the advertisement issued on 1.1.1996 is, therefore, unconstitutional as it is not only devoid of fairness but also transparency. In such cases there is no question of estoppel or waiver. The fundamental right of a citizen cannot be given up and the fact that the first respondent did to participate in the examination after having applied for the same will not deprive him of the right to challenge the illegal action of the authority. It cannot also be said that Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have no locus standi to challenge the proceedings of the Commission as they are calling in question the Constitutional validity of a State action which any member of the public is entitled to do. The directions contained in Prem Singhs case issued by the Supreme Court were in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and they cannot be equated with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in several other cases and in particular in Madam Lai and others v. State of J & K and others, (1995) 3 S.C.C. 486. The order of the Tribunal is very much in accordance with the law said down by the Supreme Court and this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot interfere with the same. Hence the writ petitions should be dismissed. 17. The second respondent has chosen to remain ex-parte in this writ petition. 18. On the above contentions two questions arise for decision: (1) whether respondents 1 and 2 could challenge the action of the Commission and the State Government? (2) Whether the Tribunals order is in accordance with law? 19. There is no dispute in this case with regard to the facts averred by the petitioners in the writ petition. It is necessary to lay. emphasis on the salient features therein. The advertisement issued by the Commission on 1.1.1996 made it clear in express terms that the number of vacancies mentioned therein as well as the categories of service/posts to be filled in on the basis of the examination advertised therein were subject to variation with proportionate variation in the number of vacancies reserved in various categories in accordance with rules/ instructions in force. The said advertisement and the provision therein for variation as referred to above is in accord with a long-standing practice prevailing not only in this State but also in some other States and with the Union Public Service Commission. That is evident from Annexures P-4, P-5 and P-6, filed by Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 along with the writ petition. The said Annexures pertain to the Union Public Service Commission, the Public Service Commission of Uttar Pradesh and the Haryana Public Service Commission, Chandigarh. No doubt the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Service Rules provide for a competitive examination to be held at any place in Himachal Pradesh each year in the month of September for the purpose of selection by competition of as many candidates for the services as the Governor may determine. But the advertisement dated 1.1.1996 is in relation to a combined competitive examination to be held at Shimla, Mandi and Dharamsala not only for Himachal! Pradesh Administrative Service but also for Himachal Pradesh Police Service, Block Development, Panchayat Officers and other State Services. There is no rule, statutory or otherwise, fixing a particular time-limit within which the requisitions from the various departments should be sne to the Commission. 20. Pradesh Administrative Service but also for Himachal Pradesh Police Service, Block Development, Panchayat Officers and other State Services. There is no rule, statutory or otherwise, fixing a particular time-limit within which the requisitions from the various departments should be sne to the Commission. 20. The first respondent was fully aware of the prevailing practice and also the specific note in the advertisement that there will be variation in the number of vacancies as well as the categories of service/posts to be filled in on the basis of the examination. That is why he wrote in column No. 32 of the application form that he was applying for HAS/HPS/Block Development Officer/Panchayat Officer and all the remaining services if advertised in the near future. Thus as a matter of fact he was an applicant for all the posts. But for reasons best known to him he did not appear in the examination. Thus he did have equal opportunity with all the 4665 candidates who had appeared in the examination. He was never deprived of any opportunity to apply for the posts which were subsequently advertised by the authorities and as a matter of fact he had applied for those posts. As regards the second respondent, he was eligible to apply even when the first advertisement was published, but he did not choose to apply at all. He also had as much opportunity as the 4665 candidates who took part in the examination. - 21. In the application filed by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 before the Administrative Tribunal, no mala fides were alleged as against the authorities. Nor has the first respondent alleged any mala fides in the reply filed by him in the writ petition. The only reason given by the first respondent for not appearing in the examination after having sent in his application was that there were only nine posts available for general category candidates and he did not choose to appear in the examination. That statement is wrong. Before the examinations commenced on 21.7.96, advertisements had been issued for fourteen posts out of which eight posts were under general category in addition to those advertised on 1.1.1996. After the written examinations in thirteen more posts were advertised out which nine were of general category. That statement is wrong. Before the examinations commenced on 21.7.96, advertisements had been issued for fourteen posts out of which eight posts were under general category in addition to those advertised on 1.1.1996. After the written examinations in thirteen more posts were advertised out which nine were of general category. It was further stated that thee were only four chances for getting qualified for the posts on the basis of the examination and Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 decided not to appear and apply respectively for the posts in question keeping in view the meagre number of vacancies available for general category candidates. Nothing was stated in the said application before the Tribunal as to whether any particular person was deprived of his opportunity to apply for the examination-and appear in the same because the advertisements subsequent to 30.11996 were issued with reference to posts other than the 11 posts advertised earlier. A perusal of the application before the Tribunal also shows that the same was filed only as personal interest litigation and not as a public interest litigation, in other words, the application filed by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 before the Tribunal was only on their own behalf and not on behalf of the general public. 22. As pointed out by Respondent No. 4 he has already availed of four opportunities and he would have only one more opportunity if he is not selected in the present instance. There may be several other persons like him and some of them might have exhausted all the four opportunities available to them. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 only claimed that they did not appear and apply respectively because of the meagre number of vacancies. Several other persons would have applied and appeared because of the \note contained in the advertisement that the number of vacancies could Vary before the completion of the process of selection. Many of them might get prevented from applying for a subsequent examination on account of their age. When the Court is called upon to strike down the action of the State in such a situation, it cannot ignore the aforesaid facts and circumstances before passing the order. It is the duty of the Court to weigh all the facts and circumstances and come to a conclusion which is in the best interest of justice. 23. When the Court is called upon to strike down the action of the State in such a situation, it cannot ignore the aforesaid facts and circumstances before passing the order. It is the duty of the Court to weigh all the facts and circumstances and come to a conclusion which is in the best interest of justice. 23. With the above factual matrix in the background if we consider the practical side of the matter on first principles, we can easily visualies the following. No doubt, Government departments are expected to take steps sufficiently in advance before the expected vacancies occur or within a short time after the vacancies have occurred. But it is well known that as a matter of practice this system is not being followed by the departments. Most of them wake up only when the shoe starts pinching or in other words, the arrears of work get accumulated to an unmanageable extent. But when combined competitive examinations are being held by a common agency, namely, the Public Service Commission, the question has to be considered whether it is practicable or even theoretically advisable to expect the Commission to hold different examinations from time to time whenever the requisitions are sent by the departments concerned for the purpose of making selection. As pointed out by Respondent Nos. 4 and 5, the Commission is to conduct examination inasmany as 64 papers. Even assuming that separate examinations could be conducted for each department, several subjects on which the candidate should be examined will certainly be common and a process of holding such examinations will be most unwieldy and unmanageable. It cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that different groups of people will be applying for different examinations. No body can be prevented from applying for several examinations if he is eligible. It is only to avoid such a situation the Commission conducts a combined competitive examination once in a year with respect to all the departments from whom requisitions have been received. As a matter of convenience if requisitions are received before the completion of the selection process, the posts with reference to which such requisitions were received are also filled up on the basis of the examination already held. It cannot be said that by adopting such procedure the authorities have acted arbitrarily or without fairness. As a matter of convenience if requisitions are received before the completion of the selection process, the posts with reference to which such requisitions were received are also filled up on the basis of the examination already held. It cannot be said that by adopting such procedure the authorities have acted arbitrarily or without fairness. Nor can it be said in such a situation that there is want of transparency in the action of the authorities. If the members of the public are clearly told that the examination is being held not merely for filling up certain number of posts specified in the advertisement but also for other posts for which advertisements are issued before the completion of the selection process, it cannot be contended that the persons concerned have been denied equality of opportunity or/ that a separate class has been carved out leading to grave discrimination. It is also to be kept in mind that generally a selection process takes abut nearly two years to be completed. When the number of applications is in thousands it may not be possible to finish it with in a short time. F. Case Law. 24. Keeping the above facts in mind, we will analyse the relevant rulings. QUESTION No. 1. The First question relates to the locus standi of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 before the Tribunal before the Tribunal, a decision of this Court C.W.P. No. 1463 of 1996 (Harinder Singh Rather v. State of Himachal Pradesh) dated 6.8.1996 was relied on by Respondent Nos. 4 and 5. In a similar situation, a Division Bench of this Court has taken the view that the petitioners in the writ petition had no locus standi to challenge the action of the State Government in filling up more posts than what were advertised initially. The Tribunal has expressed an opinion that the said decision of the Division Bench of this Court runs counter to the ratio of the judgments of the Supreme Court in Prem Singh and others v. Haryana State Electricity Board and others (1996) 4 S.C. 319 and Madan Lai and others v. State of J. & K and others, (1995) 3 S.C.c. 486, and, therefore, it could not be followed. Before us, both sides argued the question vehemently and cited several rulings in support of their respective contentions. 25. Before us, both sides argued the question vehemently and cited several rulings in support of their respective contentions. 25. In Lord Dennings book The Discipline of Law, at page 117, the following passage is found so far as locus standi is concerned: "So far as locus standi is concerned, the Courts of common law, when granting certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition, have always kept their options open, they have held that it is in’ the discretion of the Court whom it shall hear; and whether to grant such a remedy or not. The tendency in the past was to limit them to persons who had a particular grievance of their own over and above the rest of the public, but in recent years there has been a remarkable series of cases in which private persons have come to the Court and have been heard. There is now a much wider concept of locus standi when complaint is made against a public authority. It extends to anyone who is not a mere busy body but is coming to the Court on behalf of the public at large." . 26. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent while placing reliance on the aforesaid passage has drawn our attention to some passages in the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.R Gupta v. Union of India and another, 1981 (Supp.) S.C.C. 86, which read as follows: "18. The types of cases which we have dealt with so far for the purpose of considering the question of locus standi are those where there is a specific legal injury either to the applicant or to some other person or persons for whose benefit the action is brought, arising from violation of some constitutional or legal right or legally protected interest. What is complained of in these cases is a specific legal injury suffered by a person or a determinate class or group of persons. But there may be cases where the State or a public authority may act in violation of a constitutional or statutory obligation or fail to carry out such obligation, resulting in injury to public interest or what may conveniently be termed as public injury as distinguished from private injury. Who would have standing to complain against such act or omission of the State or public authority? Can any member of the public sue for judicial redress? Who would have standing to complain against such act or omission of the State or public authority? Can any member of the public sue for judicial redress? Or is the standing limited only to a certain class of persons? Or is there no one who can complain and the public injury must so unredressed? To answer these questions it is first of all necessary to understand what is the true purpose of the judicial function. This is what Prof. This states in his book on Locus Standi and Judicial Review : Is the judicial function primarily aimed at preserving legal order by confining the legislative and executive organs of government within their powers in the interest of the public (jurisdiction de droit object if) or is it mainly directed towards the protection of private individuals by preventing illegal encroachents on their individual rights (jurisdiction de droit subject if)? The first contention rests on the theory that Courts are the final arbiters of what is legal and illegal... Requirements of locus standi are, therefore, unnecessary in this case since the merely impede the purpose of the function as conceived here. On the other hand, where the primce aim of the judicial process is to protect individual rights, its concern with the regularity of law and administration is limited to the extent that individual rights are infringed." We would regard the first proposition as correctly setting out the nature and purpose of the judicial function, as it is essential to the maintenance of the rule of law that every organ of the State must act within the limits of its power and carry out the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution or the law. If the state or any public authority acts beyond the scope of its power and thereby causes a specific legal injury to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons, it would be a case of private injury actionable in the manner discussed in the preceding paragraphs. So also if the duty is owed by the State or any public authority to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons, it would give rise to a corresponding right in such person or determinate class or group of persons and they would be entitled to maintain an action for judicial redress. So also if the duty is owed by the State or any public authority to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons, it would give rise to a corresponding right in such person or determinate class or group of persons and they would be entitled to maintain an action for judicial redress. But if no specific legal injury is caused to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons by the act or omission of the State or any public authority and the injury is caused only to public interest, the question arises as to who can maintain an action for vindicating the rule of law and setting aside the unlawful action or enforcing the performance of the public duty. If no one can maintain an action for redress of such public wrong or public injury, it would be disastrous for the rule of law, for it would be open to the State or a public authority to act with impunity beyond the scope of its power or in breach of a public duty owed by it. The Courts cannot countenance such a situation where the observance of the law is left to the sweet will of the authority bound by it, without any redress if the law is contravened. The view has, therefore, been taken by the Courts in many decisions that whenever there is a public wrong or public injury caused by an act or omission of the State or a public authority which is contrary to the Constitution or the law, any member of the public acting bona fide and having sufficient interest can maintain an action or redressal of such public wrong or public injury. The strict rule of standing which insists that only a person who has suffered a specific legal injury can maintain an action for judicial adress is relaxed and a broad rule is evolved which gives standing to any member of the public who is not a mere busy body or a meddle some interloper but who has sufficient interest in the proceeding. 23. 23. We would, therefore, hold that any member of the public having sufficient interest can maintain an action for judicial redress for public injury arising from breach of public duty or from violation of some provision of the Constitution or the law and seek enforcement of such public duty and observance of such constitutional or legal provision. This is absolutely essential for maintaining the rule of law, furthering the cause of justice and accelerating the pace of realisation of the constitutional objectives." 27. However, in the very next two paragraphs of the judgment, a note of caution is issued in the following words: "But, we must be careful to see that the member of the public, who approaches the Court in cases of this kind, is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private profit or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The Court must not allow its process to be abused by politicians and others to delay legitimate administrative action or to gain a political objective...... Before we part with this general discussion in regard to locus standi, there is one point we would like to emphasise and it is, that cases may arise where there is undoubtedly public injury by the act or omission of the State or a public authority but such act or omission also causes specific legal injury to an individual or to a specific class or group of individuals. In such cases, a member of the public having sufficient interest can certainly maintain an action challenging the legality of such act or omission, but if the person or specific class or group of persons who are primarily injured as a result of such act or omission, do not wish to claim any relief and accept such act or omission willingly and without protest, the member of the public who complains of a secondary public injury cannot maintain the action, for the effect of entertaining the action at the instance of such member of the public would be to foist a relief on the person or specific class or group of persons primarily injured, which they do not want." 28. Reliance is placed on a judgment in J. Mohapatra and Co. and another v. State of Orissa and another, (1984) 4. S.C.C. 103. Reliance is placed on a judgment in J. Mohapatra and Co. and another v. State of Orissa and another, (1984) 4. S.C.C. 103. In that case, the State Government used to issue administrative instructions constituting Committee and laying down the procedure for selecting books for general reading to be kept in School or College Libraries for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982. The Committee constituted under the Chairmanship of Director of Public Instruction(Schools) Orissa selected a supplementary list of 105 books out of 1718 books which had been submitted for selection in addition to the list of 466 books already selected by the Purchase Committee. There were unprecedented floods and cyclones in the months of August and September, as a result of which large number of Schools and Colleges suffered and Libraries of many Schools and Colleges were wahsed away. The Central Government as part of relief programme gave grants to the State during February and March 1983 aggregating to Rs. 45 lacs for the purchase of books for Libraries of non-governmental Schools and Colleges. As it was a time-bound grant, the State Government decided to utilise the same for purchasing books out of the books selected for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 and the supplementary list of 105 books referred to earlier. Thus, the books were selected. The said selection was challenged by the appellants before the Supreme Court, who were publishers on several grounds including bias on the part of some members of the assessment sub-committee, who were themselves authors of certain books, which were submitted for selection. The High Court dismissed the same and an appeal was filed in the Supreme Court.. One of the reasons given by the High Court was that the 1st appellant had submitted 29 books, out of which six were selected and was, therefore, not competent to question the selection on the ground of bias. The High Court also held that the 2nd appellant had not submitted any book for selection and was, therefore, not a person aggrieved. Commenting upon the said reasoning, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "We are unable to follow the reasoning behind the first ground upon which the High Court rested its decision. The High Court also held that the 2nd appellant had not submitted any book for selection and was, therefore, not a person aggrieved. Commenting upon the said reasoning, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "We are unable to follow the reasoning behind the first ground upon which the High Court rested its decision. It appears to us paradoxical that when a person has submitted books for selection, it is to be said that he has waived the objection which he had to the constitution of the Sub-Committee and that when a person had not submitted any books for selection it is to be said that he is not a person aggrieved. To say so would be a contradiction in terms. If the reasoning of the High Court were correct, the sequitur would be that nobody would be able to challenge any selection of books, for a person who challenges the selection must either be one who as submitted a book or books for selection or one who has not submitted any book for selection. In our opinion, the High Court was not right in the view it took. Merely by submitting books for selection of which some might have been selected, a person cannot be said to have waived the objection which he may have to the constitution of the committee which selects the books Similarly, merely because a person does not submit any book for selection, it cannot be said that he is not a person aggrieved. Today, the law with respect to locus standi has considerably advanced both in this country and in England and in the case of public interest litigation it is not necessary that a petitioner should himself have a personal interest in the matter. It is unnecessary to refer to the decisions of this Court on the point or to dilate further upon it. We may, however, mention that at the hearing of this appeal before us this contention was not raised on behalf of the respondents." 29. It is clear from the above passage that the contention was not raised before the Court by the respondents therein, but the Court made those observations on account of the self-contradictory reasoning in the judgment of the High Court. 30. It is clear from the above passage that the contention was not raised before the Court by the respondents therein, but the Court made those observations on account of the self-contradictory reasoning in the judgment of the High Court. 30. Out attention is drawn to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others, AIR 1986 SC 180, wherein the Constitution Bench had pointed out that there could be no estoppel or waiver in the matter of fundamental rights. The relevant passage reads as follows:— "The plea of estoppel is closely connected with the plea of waiver, the object of both being to ensure bona fides in day-to-day transactions. In Basheshwar Nath v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi, 91959) Supp. (1) SCR 528 : (AIR 1959 SC 149), a Constitution Bench of this Court considered the question whether the fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution can be waived. Two members of the Bench (Das CJ. and Kappor J.) held that there can be no waiver of the fundamental right founded on Article 14 of the Constitution. Two others (N.H. Bhagwati and Subba Rao, J J.) held that not only could there be no wavier of the right conferred by Article 14, but there could be no waiver of any other fundamental right guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. The Constitution makes no distinction, according to the learned Judges, between fundamental rights enacted for the benefit of an individual and those enacted in public interest or on grounds of public policy.” 31. Reliance is also placed of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa and others, (1991) 4 S.C.C. 54. In paragraph 35, the Court has pointed out that locus standi to approach by way of a writ petition and refusal to grant relief in equity jurisdiction are two different aspects, which may be with the same result. In paragraph 35, the Court has pointed out that locus standi to approach by way of a writ petition and refusal to grant relief in equity jurisdiction are two different aspects, which may be with the same result. The Court has observed that the residents of the locality seeking protection and maintenance of environment of their locality cannot be said to be busy-bodies or interlopers and even otherwise physical or personal or economic injury may give rise to civil or criminal action but violation of rule of law either by ignoring or affronting individual or action of the executive in disregard of the provisions of law raises substantial issue of accountability of those entrusted with responsibility of the administration. The Court further said: "It furnished enough cause of action either for individual or community in general to approach by way of writ petition and the authorities cannot be permitted to seek shelter under cover of technicalities of locus standi nor they can be heard to plead for restraint in exercise of discretion as grave issues of public concern outweigh such considerations." That was a case in which the complaint before the Court was that an open space reserved for public park in development scheme duly approved and published under the Bangalore Development Authority Act was sought to be converted into a civic amenity site for the purpose of hospital/nursing home and allotted to a private person or body of persons for that purpose. The Court held that the said action was not valid in law. That ruling cannot help the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein in the present case. 32. In Madan Lal and others v. State of J & K and others, (1995) 3 S.C.C. 486, the process of selection of Munsifs in the State pursuant to an advertisement notice inviting applications in the months of July and August 1993 was challenged on several grounds. The first ground was that the viva voice test conducted by the Public Service Commission was patently illegal as there was nothing to show that the members, who conducted the test had assigned separate marks faculty-wise for assessing the performance of the candidate concerned as per Rule 10 of the relevant Rules. The first ground was that the viva voice test conducted by the Public Service Commission was patently illegal as there was nothing to show that the members, who conducted the test had assigned separate marks faculty-wise for assessing the performance of the candidate concerned as per Rule 10 of the relevant Rules. Rejecting the said contention, the Court observed that if a candidate takes a calculated chance and appears at the interview then only because the result of the interview is not palatable to him, he cannot turn round and subsequently contend that the process of interview was unfair or the selection Committee was not properly constituted. Reliance was placed by the Court on its earlier judgment in Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla, AIR 1986 S.C. 1043. 33. The 8th contention in that case was that the requisition forwarded by the State Government was only for holding the selection process for recruiting candidates from open market for filling 11 vacancies, but the Commission prepared a merit list of 16 candidates from general category and four candidates from reserved category, in all 20 which was violative of Rule 41 of the relevant Rules as the advertisement was issued only for 11 vacancies and the requisition sent by the Government was also only for those vacancies. Accepting that contention partially the Supreme Court clarified the position by holding that as the requisition was for 11 posts only appointments should be effected out of the list of 20 selected candidates only for 11 posts and not beyond the same. While giving directions to that effect, the Supreme Court made the following observations on which reliance is placed by learned counsel for Respondent No. 1: "It is no doubt true that even if requisition is made by the Government for 11 posts the Public Service Commission may send merit list of suitable candidates which may exceed 11. That by itself may not be bad but at the time of giving actual appointments the merit list has to be so operated that only 11 vacancies are filled up, because the requisition being for 11 vacancies, the consequent advertisement and recruitment could also be for 11 vacancies and no more. That by itself may not be bad but at the time of giving actual appointments the merit list has to be so operated that only 11 vacancies are filled up, because the requisition being for 11 vacancies, the consequent advertisement and recruitment could also be for 11 vacancies and no more. It is easy to visualise that if requisition is for 11 vacancies and that results in the initiation of recruitment process by way of advertisement, whether the advertisement mentions filing up of 11 vacancies or not, the prospective candidates can easily find out from the office of the Commission that the requisition for the proposed recruitment is for filling up 11 vacancies. In such a case a given candidate may not like to compete for diverse reasons but if requisition is for larger number of vacancies for which recruitment is initiated, he may like to compete. Consequently, the actual appointments to the posts have to be confined to the posts for recruitment to which requisition is sent by the Government, in such an eventuality candidates in excess of 11 who are lower in the merit list of candidates can only be treated as wait-listed candidates in order of merit to fill only the 11 vacancies for which recruitment has been made, in the event of any higher candidate not being available to fill the 11 vacancies, for any reason. Once, the 11 vacancies are filled by candidates taken in order of merit from the select list that list will get exhausted, having served its purpose." 34. The question before the Court arose under circumstances and facts which are different from those in this case. The contention as with regard to the maintainability of the petition on the ground that the petitioner therein had taken part in the selection process and they could not challenge the selection as such. While holding that the petitioners were not competent to challenge the selection process, the Court issued directions to the respondents to fill up only the 11 posts for which requisition was issued by the State Government to the Public Service Commission and advertisement was issued by the Commission calling for applications. Hence, that ruling cannot be relied upon by the 1 st respondent as supporting his contention on the question of locus standi. 35. Hence, that ruling cannot be relied upon by the 1 st respondent as supporting his contention on the question of locus standi. 35. In Prem Singh and others v. Haryana State Electricity Board and others, (1996) 4 S.C.C. 319, an advertisement was issued for 62 posts. A merit list was prepared after completing the selection process containing the names of 212 candidates. Appointments were made of 137 persons out of that list. That was challenged by some of the candidates, who were not selected/appointed and one person, who been eligible soon after the last date for receiving the applications. A contention was raised that the petitioners had no locus standi. The Court rejected that contention in the following words: "In our opinion, there is no substance in the objection raised with respect to locus standi of the original writ petitioners. The candidates could not have anticipated when they appeared for the interview that the Selection Committee would recommend candidates and the Board would make appointments far in excess of the advertised posts. The petitioner who was not eligible had a just grievance that due to appointments of candidates in excess of the posts advertised he was deprived of the right of consideration for appointment against the posts which would have become vacant after he acquired eligibility." 36. The facts in that case are evident from the judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in Satbir Singh Bura and others v. The Haryana State Electricity Board and others, 1996(2) SIR, 372. In para 14 of the judgment of the High Court, the following facts are set out— The advertisement (Annexure P1) issued by the respondent-Board was for making recruitment to the 82 posts. There was no provision in the advertisement reserving a right with the Board to increase or decrease the number of posts, Nor was there an/ provision for preparing a waiting list/reserve list to fill the anticipated vacancies which were likely to occur in the near future. It is, therefore crystal clear that the Board had intended to make appointments only against the 62 advertised posts. In the light of this advertisement, we have now to decide whether the action of the Board in preparing a select list of 212 persons and giving appointment to 138 persons is legally sustainable.” 37. It is, therefore crystal clear that the Board had intended to make appointments only against the 62 advertised posts. In the light of this advertisement, we have now to decide whether the action of the Board in preparing a select list of 212 persons and giving appointment to 138 persons is legally sustainable.” 37. On such facts, the High Court quashed the entire Select list of 212 candidates, but the Supreme Court inspite of those facts upheld the selection and appointment of 37 candidates in ail, that is, 25 in excess of the number mentioned in the advertisement. We will have to refer to this judgment at length when we deal with the second question. For the present purpose of question No. 1, it is sufficient to take note of the distinguishing Matures in the facts of the case, fn that case, the advertisement was only for 62 posts and there was no provision for variation of the number of posts or for preparation of waiting list. In present case, the advertisement made it clear that the number of posts as well as the categories/service thereof would be subject to variation. Secondly, in that case excepting one petitioner, all the others had taken part in the selection process. They had no inkling that the selection would be with reference to more number of posts than advertised. One of them, who was not eligible on the data of advertisement had become eligible subsequently and he was denied an opportunity to compete for the posts, as there was no subsequent advertisement balling for the applications. In the present case, Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were both eligible on the date of the first advertisement and one of them did apply for all the posts including those which were to be advertised later No acceptable reason was given before the Tribunal as to why the 1st respondent did not appear in the examination after having applied for all the posts 1 Hence, no reliance can be placed by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on the judgment in Prern Singhs case in support of their locus standi. 38. Reliance is placed upon the observations in a judgment of the I Full Bench of this Court in Ms. Arti Gupta and another v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, CWP No. 1685 of 1996 dated 16.10.1996. 1 and 2 on the judgment in Prern Singhs case in support of their locus standi. 38. Reliance is placed upon the observations in a judgment of the I Full Bench of this Court in Ms. Arti Gupta and another v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, CWP No. 1685 of 1996 dated 16.10.1996. The question which arose in that case was whether a public interest litigation could be filed before the Administrative Tribunal. While answering that question in the affirmative, the Full Bench said— "The only other question to be considered is whether the petitioners in CWP No. 1665/96 who have not even applied for the post in question can move the Tribunal for reliefs. On principle, the question has to be answered only in the affirmative. The language used in the provisions of the Act clearly show that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is in relation to the matters set out in Sections 14 and 15 and it does not depend upon the status or otherwise of the applicant before it. Even an utter stranger can move the Tribunal with reference to the matters set out in those Sections. The wording of Section 28 of the Act, which excludes the jurisdiction of the High Court is also to the same effect. In fact, a question arose before the High Court of Madras in Thanga Maruthamuthu v. Government of Tamilnadu and others, Writ Appeal No. 116/96, whether a public interest litigation could be dealt with by the Administrative Tribunal. A learned Single Judge of that Court held that in public interest litigation, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction and it is only the High Court which can entertain such petitions. That judgment was reversed by a Division Bench of that Court vide its judgment dated 6.3.1996. The Division Bench said— "The contention that it is a public interest litigation and the relief sought is the one for a writ of Quo Warranto, which cannot be granted by the Central Administrative Tribunal, therefore, the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be maintained, is only stated to be rejected. The Division Bench said— "The contention that it is a public interest litigation and the relief sought is the one for a writ of Quo Warranto, which cannot be granted by the Central Administrative Tribunal, therefore, the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be maintained, is only stated to be rejected. The said contention fails to take* note of the fact that the substance of the relief sought for by the petitioner is to set aside the order of the State Government Extending the Services of the 4th respondent, and thereby preventing the 4th respondent from functioning as a member of the Indian Administrative Service. The fact that it is a public interest litigation will not clothe this Court with the jurisdiction to hear and decide the Writ Petition when the very subject-matter of the writ petition is excluded from the purview of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution." 39. Both of us were perties to that judgment. That ruling has no bearing in the present case and the observations made by the Full Bench cannot be torn out of the context and utilised in the present case. 40. We have also pointed out that the application filed by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 before the Tribunal was not in public interest but it was only in their own interest. It is in the light of the averments made by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in their application before the Tribunal, the question of locus standi has to be decided. The 1st respondent having applied for all the posts advertised between 1.1.1996 and 25.9.1996 (both inclusive) cannot contend that he was deprived of an opportunity to apply for the posts, which were advertised initially on 1.1.1996. He did have the opportunity and availed of the same by sending his application before the Tribunal for not appearing in the examination after applying, therefore, has already been found by us to be based on a wrong statement of facts. The 2nd respondent, who has not chosen to appear before us and contest the writ petitions did not apply at all though he was eligible on the date of the first advertisement itself. He cannot also complain that he was deprived of an opportunity to apply for the posts, which were advertised subsequent to 1.1.1996. The 2nd respondent, who has not chosen to appear before us and contest the writ petitions did not apply at all though he was eligible on the date of the first advertisement itself. He cannot also complain that he was deprived of an opportunity to apply for the posts, which were advertised subsequent to 1.1.1996. At the risk of repetition, it is to be pointed out that there is no averment in the application before the Tribunal by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that any person, who became eligible subsequent to 1.1.1996 was deprived of his opportunity to apply for the posts in question as the advertisements were made subsequently but related to the examination held in pursuance of the first advertisement dated 1.1.1996. 41. In Shri Sachidanand Pandey and another v. The State of West Bengal and others, AIR 1987 S.C. 1109. Justice Khalid observed as follows— "58. My purpose in adding these few lines of my own is to highlight the need for restraint on the part of the public interest litigants when they move Courts. Public interest litigation has now come to stay. But one is led to think that it poses a threat to Courts and public alike. Such cases are now filed without any rhyme or reason. It is, therefore, necessary to lay down clear guidelines and to outline the correct parameters for entertainment of such petitions. If Courts do not restrict the free flow of such cases in the name of Public Interest Litigations, the traditional litigation will suffer and the Courts of law, instead of dispensing justice, will have to take upon themselves administrative and executive functions. 59........................................ 60. It is only when Courts are apprised of gross violation of fundamental rights by a group or a class action or when basic human rights are invaded or when there are complaints of such acts as shock the judicial conscience that the Courts, especially this Court, should leave aside procedural shackles and hear such petitions and extend its jurisdiction under all available provisions for remedying the hardships and miseries of the needy, the underdog and the neglected. It will be second to none in extending help when such help is required. But this does not mean that the doors of this Court are always open for anyone to walk in. It is necessary to have some self imposed restraint on public interest litigations." 42. It will be second to none in extending help when such help is required. But this does not mean that the doors of this Court are always open for anyone to walk in. It is necessary to have some self imposed restraint on public interest litigations." 42. In Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and others, AIR 1993 S.C. 892, the Court after defining the expression public interest litigation said thus— "60. Be that as it may, it needless to emphasis that the requirement of locus standi of a party to a litigation is mandatory, because the legal capacity of the party to any litigation whether in private or public action in relation to any specific remedy sought for has to be primarily ascertained at the threshold. 61.................................................... 62. In contrast, the strict rule of locus standi applicable to private litigation is relaxed and a broad rule is evolved which gives the right of locus standi to any member of the public acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in instituting an action for redressal of public wrong or public injury, but who is not a mere busy body or a meddlesome interloper, since the dominant object of PIL is to ensure observance of the provisions of the Constitution or the law which can be best achieved to advance the cause of community or disadvantaged groups and individuals or public interest by permitting any person, having no personal gain or private motivation or any other oblique consideration but acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in maintaining an action for judicial redress for public injury to put the judicial machinery in motion like actio popularis of Roman Law whereby any citizen could bring such an action in respect of a public dialect. 66. 66. Though we have, in our country, recognised a departure from the strict rule of locus standi as applicable to a person in private action and broadened and liberalised the rule of standing and thereby permitted a member of the public, having no personal gain or oblique motive to approach the Court for enforcement of the constitutional or legal rights of socially or economically disadvantaged persons who on account of their poverty or total ignorance of their fundamental rights are unable to enter the portals of the Courts for judicial redress, yet no precise and inflexible working definition has been evolved in respect of locus standi of an individual seeking judicial remedy and various activities in the field of PIL. Probably, some reservation and diversity of approach to the philosophy of PIL among some of the Judges of this Court as reflected from the various decisions of this Court, is one of the reasons for this Court finding it difficult to evolve a consistent jurisprudence in the field of PIL. True, in defining the rule of locus standi no rigid litmus test can be applied since the broad contours of PIL are still developing a pace seemingly with divergent views on several aspects of the concept of this newly developed law and discovered jurisdiction leading to a rapid transformation of judicial activism with a far-reaching change both in the nature and form of the judicial process." 43. As rightly pointed out be the learned Counsel for Respondent Nos. 4 and 5, the application before the Tribunal was filed by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 only in their own interest and not in the interest of the public. The attempt made by the 1st respondent to convert the same into a public interest litigation before us cannot be countenanced in the facts and circumstances of the case. When tests laid down in Shri Sachidanand Pandeys case and Janata Dais case, referred to above, are applied there could be no doubt whatever that Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein had no locus standi to maintain the application O.A. No. 1.648/96 before the said Administrative Tribunal. The ruling of this Court in Harinder Singh Rathores case (CWP No. 1463/ 96) decided on 6.8.1996 is still good law and it will apply to the present case. Consequently, we answer question No. 1 in the negative and against Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 2. The ruling of this Court in Harinder Singh Rathores case (CWP No. 1463/ 96) decided on 6.8.1996 is still good law and it will apply to the present case. Consequently, we answer question No. 1 in the negative and against Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 2. Question No. 2. 44. Now we shall consider the second question. Several rulings have been cited before us by the Counsel. We shall refer to them chronologically. 45. In Jaisinghani v. Union of India and others, AIR 1967 S.C. 1427, the Supreme Court had to consider the scope of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution when promotion or appointment to a service is to be made from two sources. The Court said— "In this context it is important to emphasis that the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon exclusive authorities, must be confined with clearly defined limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and, in general, such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should be know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule it is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. (See Dicey-Law of the Constitution- Tenth Edn.,Introduction ex). Law has reached its finest moments, stated Douglas, J. in United States v. Wunderlich, (1951) 342 US 98, when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion of some ruler Where discretion is absolute, man has always suffered. It is in this sense that the rule of law may be said to be the sworn enemy of caprice. Discretion, as Lord Mansfield stated it in classic terms in the case of John Wilkes, (1770) 4 Burr 2528 at p. 2539 means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour it must not be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful." 46. The facts in that case were entirely different and as the above passage itself shows the above observations were made in that "context". 47. The next decision is found in E.R Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, AIR 1974 SC 555. The facts in that case were entirely different and as the above passage itself shows the above observations were made in that "context". 47. The next decision is found in E.R Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, AIR 1974 SC 555. In paragraph 85, the Court observed: "Article 16 embodies the fundamental guarantee that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Though enacted as a distinct and independent fundamental right because of its great importance as a principle ensuring equality of opportunity in public employment which is so vital to the building up of the new classless egalitarian society envisaged i the Constitution, Article 16 is only an instance of the application of the concept of equality enshrined in Article 14. In other words, Article 14 is the genus while Article 16 is a species. Article 16 gives effect to the doctrine of equality in all matters relating to public employment. The basic principle which, therefore, informs both Articles 14 and 16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination. Now, what is the content and reach of this great equalising principle? It is founding faith, to use the words of Bose, J., a way of life1, and it must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic or lexicorgraphic approach. We cannot contenance any attempt to truncate its all embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynimic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be cribbed, cabined and confined within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according . to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14, and if it affects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Article 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according . to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14, and if it affects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Article 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that State action must be based on valid relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided-by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would be denial of equality. Where the operative reason for State action, as distinguished from motive inducing from the antechamber of the mind, is not legitimate and relevant but is extaneous and outside the area of permissible considerations, it would amount to mala fide exercise of power and that is hit by Articles 14 and 16. Mala fide exercise of power and arbitrariness are different lethal radiations emanating from the same vice; in fact the latter comprehends the former. Both are inhibited by Articles 14 and 16." 48. The above case was quoted in Delhi Transport Corporation v. D. T. C Mazdoor Congress and others, 1991 Supp. (1) SCC 600 and the same principle was reiterated. 49. In Ashok Kumar Yadav and others v. State of Haryana and others, (1985) 4 SCC 417, a Bench of four Judges considered a batch of appeals against the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court quashing and setting aside the selections made by the Haryana Public Service Commission to the Haryana Civil Service (Executive) and other Allied Services. The Haryana Public Service Commission invited applications for recruitment to 61 posts. The relevant rules provided for a written competitive examination in compulsory and optional subjects followed by a viva voice test Originally, the number of vacancies was 61 but it rose to 119 during the time taken up in the written examination and the viva voice test. The Commission selected 119 candidates and recommended to the State Government. The same was challenged by unsuccessful candidates on several grounds. The High Court quashed all the selections and the results declared by the Commission and directed the Commission and the State Government to forthwith declare the results on the basis of the written examination alone scrupulously excluding all considerations of viva voice test. 50. The same was challenged by unsuccessful candidates on several grounds. The High Court quashed all the selections and the results declared by the Commission and directed the Commission and the State Government to forthwith declare the results on the basis of the written examination alone scrupulously excluding all considerations of viva voice test. 50. In the judgment of the High Court reported in Shri Subhash Chander Sharma and others v. State of Haryana and others, 1984 (1) S.L.R. 165, the question whether the selection of more number of candidates than the number for which applications were invited originally was bad was answered in the negative. The High Court discussed the question at length and found that there was nothing wrong in filling up more number of vacancies than those mentioned in the original advertisement calling for applications. It is worthwhile extracting the relevant passages in the said judgment, which read as follows : “51 Before parting with this judgment, we must in all fairness advert to three contentions raised on behalf of the writ petitioners which were pressed before us in all seriousness but in which we are unable to detect any merit. First pinning themselves on the observations of the Division Bench in Sachida Nand Sharma and others v. Subordinate Services Selection Board, Haryana and others, C.W.R No. 285 of 1983 decided on June 1,1983 (hereinafter referred to as the Headmasters case) learned counsel for the writ petitioners had vehemently contended that in the present case the filling of more than the 60 posts originally advertised must be struck down. It was argued that as in the Headmasters case, so here the Commission had recommended nearly double the number of candidates than the posts originally advertised and apart from other contentions, all appointments beyond 60 posts must necessarily be invalidated. 52. Since much more than what has been said there is sought to be read into the observations in the Headmasters case, it seems apt to examine the matter somewhat closely. Therein the selection was by the Subordinate Services Selection Board, Haryana, which in January, 1981 had invited applications to fill 70 posts of Headmasters through an advertisement. 52. Since much more than what has been said there is sought to be read into the observations in the Headmasters case, it seems apt to examine the matter somewhat closely. Therein the selection was by the Subordinate Services Selection Board, Haryana, which in January, 1981 had invited applications to fill 70 posts of Headmasters through an advertisement. However, after the process of selections in the end of the year 1982 or early 1983, the Board recommended a list of as many as 321 candidates to be appointed as Headmasters against vacancies which were even likely to arise in the future. It was on those peculiar facts and a variety of other considerations that the Division Bench was compelled to hold that there had been denial of equal opportunity for employment to public services at least qua the posts which were likely to arise in several years ahead. 53. ................................... 54. Again, it has to be recalled that in the Headmasters case the advertisement specified the vacancies with some precision by saying that more or less candidates could be selected against the said vacancies. The Bench construed it to mean that only a marginal variation i.e. may be 68 or 69 or 71 or 72, etc. would be within the range of the language employed. Herein, the advertisement itself indicated therein that the number of vacancies mentioned was liable to variation. Additional affidavits have been filed on the record to show that the respective departments made precise requisitions for more posts having become available and the number of vacancies were varied upwards within the parameters of the language employed in advertisement. 55. However,, the pristinely legal distinction herein is that the holding of the examination in thepresent case is governed by statutory rules and regulations, which was not remotely the situation in the Headmasters case. The relevant rule 9 of the Punjab Civil Service (Executive Bench) Rules, 1930, is in the following terms : "Competitive examination to be held yearly for selection of candidates for Register B. (1) A competitive examination hereafter called the examination the regulations of which are contained in Appendix I to these rules, shall be held at any place in Haryana each year or about the month of January for the purpose of selection by competition of as many candidates for the Service as the Governor of Haryana may determine.1 56. it is patent from the aforesaid rule that it visualises a scheme of annual written examination and viva voce thereafter for completing the selection. The process because of large number of candidates resulting from the rising tide of the educated-unemployed might well take a period of one to two years for finalisation. Therefore, for the purposes of annual examination, it is incumbent on the authorities to take stock of the existing vacancies as also to reasonably anticipate the vacancies which would arise by the time the selective process is likely to be completed. Mr. P.P. Rao, the learned counsel for the private respondents, in an illimitable argument pointed out that public interest requires and indeed demands that as and when vacancies arise candidates should be available to man them in order to avoid the public mischief of important posts remaining vacant for long periods merely because of the tortuous and long process of selection. Consequently the true ideal and indeed real public interest mandates that a reasonable anticipation of vacancies should be made and the process of selection initiated early so as to provide ana incumbent the oment a vacancy in fact arises. This according to Mr. Rao was not only permissible but in fact, obligatory. Equally and back log of existing vacancies on the date fixed for inviting application, which may be conveniently lebelled as the cut-off date, for conforming to the qualificatios prescribed, has equally to be taken into consideration, it was pointed out from the working of the Union Public Service Commission and other State Commissions that they all adopted a pragmatic approach by taking into consideration the existing vacancies and reasonably anticipating vacancies in relation to the process of selection in a composite competitive examination which may sometimes well take a couple of years, it was contended on behalf of the respondents not without plausibility that this procedure becomes imperative in practice and can in no way be termed as unconstitutional. 57. Equally we find merit in Mr. Raos lucid submission that no inflexible right arises in favour of the citizen to be considered for and to be appointed to a post from the moment it fails vacant in the public service. 57. Equally we find merit in Mr. Raos lucid submission that no inflexible right arises in favour of the citizen to be considered for and to be appointed to a post from the moment it fails vacant in the public service. It was submitted and in our view rightly that the constitutional right of equality of opportunity for consideration comes into play only when the employer throws a post open by advertisement or otherwise for filling the said vacancies. Therefore, Article 16 visualises an equality of opportunity for public posts only when they are so thrown open by the State or the employer and not earlier Indeed, it cannot and does not envisage any abstract or doctrinaire right to any and every post as and when it may happen to arise under the State. It was pointed but that the State may defer appointment to the post at its reasonable discretion and no mandamus can be issued against it for either filling these posts or insisting upon consideration against it till they are advertised or otherwise applications are invited thereto. Reliance was rightly placed on State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha, AIR 1973 SC 2216 wherein their Lordships had observed in no uncertain terms that even a selection by an august body like the High Court itself gives no inflexible right to appointment to a candidate and the State may validly refuse to appoint such a selectee. Consequently, it appears to us that the issue of consideration under Article 16 has to be viewed in the context of the posts being thrown open and not earlier. It has rightly been pointed out that no duty or obligation is cast on the State to disclose and publish forthwith the number of vacancies which may arise from time to time. Consequently, no fundamental right inheres in the citizens to be considered for such vacancies as and when they may happen to arise. It was submitted that the right of the State to defer appointments to posts, or even the absoluted one of not appointing any one thereto, and even abolishing them, cannot be unreasonably fettered. Therefore, the corresponding rights and duties herein arise only on that point of time when the posts are thrown open and applications are invited therefore and this must inevitably remain in the discretion of the employer-State. 51. Therefore, the corresponding rights and duties herein arise only on that point of time when the posts are thrown open and applications are invited therefore and this must inevitably remain in the discretion of the employer-State. 51. When that judgment was assailed before the Supreme Court by aggrieved persons including the State Government and the Public Service Commission, the persons who were successful in the High Court could well have raised that question and challenged the correctness of the view expressed by the High Court. The judgment of the Supreme Court does not make any reference to such a contention. It cannot, however, be said that the Bench of four Judges would have ignored the aspect of the matter if the selection for more number of posts than advertised originally and filling up the vacancies which were found to exist or arose after such advertisement and before the completion of selection process was per se illegal and unconstitutional as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, the Bench after affirming only one of the reasons given by the High Court, namely, the percentage of marks allocated for viva voice test at 33.3% in the case of ex-service officers and 22.2% in the case of others was very high infecting the selection process with the vice of arbitrariness did not interfere with the selections and appointments on the ground that the integrity and efficiency of the entire administrative machinery would be seriously jeopardised. Thus, the judgment of the High Court was reversed. 52. In A. V Bhogeshwarudu v. Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission and another, J.T. 1989(4) S.C. 130, the question was whether vacancies which arose after the preliminary process of selection started in 1983 before it was completed in 1987 could be filled up with persons, who were successful in the selection process when some of the persons recommended by the Commission did not join the posts. The Court held that there was no need "for fresh selection and those who were next in order of merit out of the list already prepared could be appointed in such vacancies. 53. The Court held that there was no need "for fresh selection and those who were next in order of merit out of the list already prepared could be appointed in such vacancies. 53. In Manjeet Singh, UDC and others v. Employees State Insurance Corporation and another, (1990) 2 S.C.C. 367, a Bench of three Judges considered the question whether vacancies accumulated on account of the failure of the authorities to hold annual recruitment examinations for several years could be filled up by appointing persons who were in the old panel prepared on the basis of the last examination. In 1983, applications were invited for filling up one third vacancies by direct recruitment. A select list was drawn in which the petitioners before the Court were included. The panel was also notified in 1984. Instead of appointing the petitioners and others who were in that list, the Corporation was filling up the vacancies by promoting its employees on ad hoc basis or otherwise. That action was challenged. The Court directed fifty per cent of the vacancies existing up to December 31, 1989 to be filled up out of the panel prepared in 1984 and the remaining by holding a fresh recruitment examination before September 30, 1990. The relevant passage in the judgment reads thus— "As already indicated, the last list on the basis of recruitment examination was drawn up in 1984. There have been a good number of vacancies then existing and subsequently a number of them have arisen as against which only 116 appointments have been made, including 16 out of the reserved categories. At one stage of the hearing we had indicated to Shri Madhav Reddy, appearing for the respondent Corporation that the existing vacancies should be filled up out of the panel of 1984 and in answer to this suggestion, an affidavit has been filed to say that candidates have been waiting for the holding of fresh recruitment examination and if out of the panel of 1984 all the existing vacancies are directed to be filed up, they would be frustrated. There is force in the submission. The Tribunal in its decision has indicated that even up to June 20, 1984, there were some vacancies which were available to be Tilled up out of the panel. On account of respondents inaction in holding of annual recruitment examinations, vacancies have accumulated. There is force in the submission. The Tribunal in its decision has indicated that even up to June 20, 1984, there were some vacancies which were available to be Tilled up out of the panel. On account of respondents inaction in holding of annual recruitment examinations, vacancies have accumulated. Keeping all these aspects in view, we direct that 50 per cent of the vacancies existing up to December 31, 1989, relatable to the one-third quota should be filled up out of the panel after giving credit to 116 appointments noticed by the Tribunal. The remaining vacancies should be filled up by holding of a fresh recruitment examination latest before September 30, 1990." 54. In Hoshiar Singh v. State of Haryana and others, 1993 Supp (4) S.C.C. 377, a Bench of two Judges held that selection of candidates by the Selection Committee in excess of the requisition was illegal. It is necessary to refer to the following facts of this case. The Director-General of Police has sent a requisition to the Subordinate Services Selection Board, Haryana in October 1987 for selecting candidates for appointment on six posts of Inspectors of Police. Accordingly, an advertisement was issued on 22.1.1986 inviting applications for six posts. A written test was held and on the basis of the result thereof candidates were called for physical efficiency and measurement test and viva voce. Such physical efficiency and measurement test as well as interview was held from January 28 1991 to January 31 1991. A few days prior to that on January 24, 1991, the Director-General of Police had sent a revised requisition for eight posts of Inspectors. In March 1991, the Board sent a list of nineteen candidates and appointments were made of eighteen persons out of the said list. That was challenged and one of the grounds was that the number of posts that could be filled could not exceed the number of posts that were advertised. Dealing with that contention, the Court said— "The learned Counsel for these appellants have not been able to show that after the revised requisition dated January 24, 1991 whereby the Board was requested to send its recommendation for 8 posts, any further requisition was sent by the Director-General of Police for a larger number of posts. Dealing with that contention, the Court said— "The learned Counsel for these appellants have not been able to show that after the revised requisition dated January 24, 1991 whereby the Board was requested to send its recommendation for 8 posts, any further requisition was sent by the Director-General of Police for a larger number of posts. Since the requisition was for eight posts of Inspector of Police, the Board was required to send its recommendations for eight posts only. The Board, on its own, could not recommend names of 19 persons for appointment even though the requisition was for eight posts only because the selection and recommendation of larger number of persons that the posts for which requisition is sent. The appointment on the additional posts on the basis of such selection and recommendation would deprive candidates who were not eligible for appointment to the posts on the last date for submission of applications mentioned in the advertisement and who became eligible for appointment thereafter, of the opportunity of being considered for appointment on the additional posts because if the said additional posts are advertised subsequently those who become eligible for appointment would be entitled to apply for the same. The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that the Selection of 19 persons by the Board even though the requisition was for 8 posts only, was not legally sustainable. It is to be noted that the Bench has laid emphasis on the requisition made by the Director-General of Police which was only for eight posts as on the date of interview though the advertisement was only for six posts. 55. In State of Bihar and others v. Secretariat Assistant Successful Examinees Union 1986 and others, (1994) 1 S.C.C. 126, another Bench of two Judges considered a similar question arising in different circumstances. The Bihar State Subordinate Services Selection Board issued an advertisement in 1985 inviting applications for appointment to the post of Assistance in the Secretariat and other connected offices of the Government of Bohar. It was stated in the advertisement that vacancies up to the year 1985-86 were to be filled up. The number of vacancies was not notified. By a communication in August 1987, the Joint Secretary in the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms informed the Secretary of the Board that the total number of vacancies as then existing was 357. It was stated in the advertisement that vacancies up to the year 1985-86 were to be filled up. The number of vacancies was not notified. By a communication in August 1987, the Joint Secretary in the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms informed the Secretary of the Board that the total number of vacancies as then existing was 357. The examinations were held in November 1987 and results were published in July 1990. 309 appointments were made. The empanelled candidates who were not appointed approached the High Court in 1991 and the latter gave directions to the State Government to appoint them in the vacancies available up to 1991. The State Government preferred the appeal before the Supreme Court. While setting aside the directions of the High Court partially the Supreme Court said that the list prepared on the basis of the examination held in 1987 could be utilised for filling up the vacancies which existed till December 31, 1988. Thus, the Court upheld the claim of the empanelled candidates for appointment against the vacancies available till the last day of the calendar year following the year of announcement of the vacancies and not the subsequent vacancies. 56. Strong reliance is placed upon the judgment in Madan Lal v. State of J & K (1995) 3 S.C.C. 486 by the counsel for the 1st respondent. We have already referred to it when we dealt with the first question. In that case the parties approached the Court challenging the selection process before any appointment was made. The Court found, as a fact, that the Government had sent a requisition for 11 posts only but the Commission sent a list of 20 candidates. While holding that there was nothing wrong in sending such a list, the Court held that the appointment could be only with reference to 11 vacancies for which a requisition was sent by the Government. While holding that there was nothing wrong in sending such a list, the Court held that the appointment could be only with reference to 11 vacancies for which a requisition was sent by the Government. The Court referred to Rule 41 of the relevant Recruitment Rules and observed on the basis of the language of the Rule that if requisition for recruitment is for 11 vacancies and the merit list prepared is for 20 candidates, the moment 11 vacancies are filled in from the merit list, the list gets exhausted or if during the span of one year from the date of the publication of such list all the 11 vacancies are not filled in, the moment the year is over the ist gets exhausted. While holding so, the Court observed: "This means that if requisition is for filling up of 11 vacancies, and it does nto include any anticipated vacancies, the recruitment to be initiated by the Commission could be for selecting 11 suitable candidates." Thus emphasis was laid on the fact that the requisition was not for any anticipated vacancy. Ultimately, the Court gave certain directions as to how the State Government should make appointments on the basis of the list sent by the Commission. The Court also took note of the decision in Hoshiar Singhs case, 1993 Supp (4) S.C.C. 377 and extracted a passage from the judgment therein. It is on that basis, the Court said: "In the present case as the requisition is for 11 posts and even though the Commission might have sent list of 20 selected candidates, the appointments to be effected out of the said list would be on 11 posts and not beyond 11 posts, as discussed by us earlier." 57. The next case in chronology cited before us is Ashok Kumar v. Chairman, Banking Sen/jce Recruitment Board, (1996) 1 S.C.C. 283. In that case, the requisition was for a total of 1713 posts but the select list prepared by the Board contained 3100 names, the Court held that recruitment of candidates in excess of the notified vacancies is a denial and deprivation of the Constitutional right under Article 14 read with Article 16(1) of the Constitution. But the Court did not disturd the appointments as they were already made and none of the appointees was impleaded. 58. But the Court did not disturd the appointments as they were already made and none of the appointees was impleaded. 58. Once again we come to Prem Singhs case, (1996) 4 S.C.C. 319 referred to already while considering question No. 1. The distinguishing features in the facts of the case have already been mentioned by us in paras 36 and 37 of this judgment. The Division Bench traced the case law on the subject at length. It is significant to note that the Bench referred to the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Subhash Chanders case, (1984) 1 SLR 165 and also the decision of the Supreme Court on appeal therefrom in Ashok Kumars case (1985) 4 S.C.C. 417. The Division Bench did not disapprove the view expressed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in that case. After referring to all the subsequent decisions culminating in Madan Lais case, (1995) 3 S.C.C. 486, the Division Bench stated the law thus: "25. From the above decussion of the case law it becomes clear that the selection process by way of requisition and advertisement can be started for clear vacancies and also for anticipated vacancies but not for future vacancies. If the requisition and advertisement are for a certain number of posts only the State cannot make more appointments than the number of posts advertised, even though it might have prepared a select list of more candidates. The State can deviate from the advertisement and make appointments on posts falling vacant thereafter in exceptional circumstances only or in an emergent situation and that too by taking a policy decision in that behalf. Even when filling up of more posts than advertised is challenged the Court may not, while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction invalidate the excess appointments and may mould the relief in such a manner as to strike a just balance between the interest of the State and the interest of persons seeking public employment. What relief should be granted in such cases would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 26. In the present case, as against the 62 advertised posts the Board made appointments on 138 posts. The selection process was started for 62 clear vacancies and at that time anticipated vacancies were not taken into account. What relief should be granted in such cases would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 26. In the present case, as against the 62 advertised posts the Board made appointments on 138 posts. The selection process was started for 62 clear vacancies and at that time anticipated vacancies were not taken into account. Therefore, strictly speaking, the Board was not justified in making more than 62 appointments pursuant to the advertisement published on 2.11.1991 and the selection process which followed thereafter. But as the Board could have taken into account not only the actual vacancies but also vacancies which wee likely to arise because of retirement, etc. By the time the selection process was completed it would not be just and equitable to invalidate all the appointments made on posts in excess of 62. However, the appointments which were made against future vacancies in this case on posts which wee newly created must be regarded as invalid. As stated earlier, after the selection process had started 13 posts had become vacant because of retirement and 12 because of deaths. The vacancies which were likely to arise as a result of retirement could have been reasonably anticipated by the Board. The Board through oversight had not taken them into consideration while a requisition was made for filling up 62 posts. Even with respect to the appointments made against vacancies which arose because of deaths, a lenient view can be taken and on consideration of expediency and equity they need not be quashed. Therefore, in view of the special facts and circumstances of this case we do not think it proper to invalidate the appointments made on those 25 additional posts." 59. The contention of learned Counsel for the 1st respondent that directions given by the Supreme Court in that case were in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution may be correct to some extent. But the law is declared unequivocally in paragraph 25 of the judgment quoted above. As laid down therein the Court has to strike a just balance between the interest of the State and the interest of persons seeking public employment. 60. In the present case as many as 4665 candidates responded to the advertisement dated 1.1.1996 calling for applications for ten posts only. They were not deterred by the fact that only five posts were available in the general category. 60. In the present case as many as 4665 candidates responded to the advertisement dated 1.1.1996 calling for applications for ten posts only. They were not deterred by the fact that only five posts were available in the general category. There is nothing wrong in presuming that they were all hopeful that the number would increase before the conclusion of the selection process. The first respondent was also one among them and he had the presence of mind to apply for all the posts which may be advertised later before the selection was completed. As a matter of fact, four advertisements were issued months before the written examinations compenced on 21.7.1996, increasing number of posts to 24 in all out of which 13 fell in the general category. The first respondent found it to be meagre and abstained from the examination. Most of the vacancies occurred in 1995. Seven vacancies are to occur in 1997 and the remaining occurred in 1996. If the principle in State of Bihar v. Secretariat Assistant, (1994) 1 S.C.C. 126 is to be applied, appointments can be made to fill up vacancies up to the end of 31.12.1997, as all the vacancies have been announced in 1996 itself. 61. There are three more decisions to be referred. In Dilip Kumar Tripathy and others v. State of Orissa and others, AIR 1997 S.C, 440, the Court quashed the second select list prepared with reference to future vacancies even though there were no vacancies available at that time. The ruling has no relevance in this case. 62. In N. Mohanan v. State of Kerala and others, (1997) 2 S.C.C. 556, the Court held that a waiting select list gets cancelled on the issue of a fresh notification inviting fresh applications for appointments and that mere inclusion of the name in the list of selected candidates does not confer any right upon any candidate to be selected unless the relevant rules so indicate. Refrain to an earlier judgment in Babita Prasads case, 1993 Supp (3) S.C.C. 268, the Court pointed out the difference between a list for which no limit was prescribed and a panel which is prepared having correlation to the existing vacancies or anticipated vacancies arising in the near future. That itself shows that thee could be a valid panel for anticipated vacancies also arising in the near future. 63. That itself shows that thee could be a valid panel for anticipated vacancies also arising in the near future. 63. The last of the cases referred to is that of Sanjat Bhattacharjee v. Union of India and others, (1997) 4 S.C.C. 283. The contention that the petitioner was in the waiting list and no fresh recruitment was in the waiting list and no fresh recruitment should be resorted till the list gets exhausted was rejected in that case. It is seen that the notified vacancies were 480. The rank of the petitioner in that case was 779 in the merit list prepared in 1989. the facts being entirely different, the ruling has no relevance in this case. 64. An analysis of the above rulings shows that a merit list can be prepared on the basis of written examination, and oral interview not only for the existing vacancies but also for anticipated vacancies arising in the near future but there should be a requisition from the Government therefore or an announcement of such vacancies. Once such announcements are made by advertisements or otherwise, appointments can be made for such vacancies upto the end of calendar year next to which the said announcement was made. 65. The first respondent would appear to have had knowledge of the said legal position. That is why perhaps he mentioned in Column 32 of the application that he applies for all posts including those which may be advertised in the near future. At any rate, the fact that the initial advertisement dated 1.1.1996 provided for variation and subsequent advertisements were issued before the completion of the selection process as well as the first respondents applying for all posts are the relevant facts and circumstances of this case to be taken into before striking down the State action. Those facts show that the said State action is not is not violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. There is no want of transparency as similar advertisements with provision for variation in the number of posts have been usually issue. In the absence of any allegation of any mala fide on the part of the concerned authorities, we do not find any merit in the contentions of the first respondent. 66. There is no want of transparency as similar advertisements with provision for variation in the number of posts have been usually issue. In the absence of any allegation of any mala fide on the part of the concerned authorities, we do not find any merit in the contentions of the first respondent. 66. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case in the light of the principles settled by the Supreme Court in the cases referred to above, we have no hesitation to hold that the order of the Tribunal is erroneous and unsustainable. The selection process adopted in this case is not arbitrary or unfair. There is no want of transparency in the action of the State Government. Hence, we allow these two writ petitions and quash the order of the Administrative Tribunal dated 24.6.1997 in O.A. No. 1648 of 1996. The said Original Application will stand dismissed. The parties will bear their respective costs. 67. However, before parting with the case, we would like to point out that the State Government and the Public Service Commission should see to it that examinations are held every as contemplated by the Rules and vacancies arising in each year are filled up without delay. They should also see to it that no room is given in future for complaints of this type. We do hope that the concerned authorities will discharge their duties in this regard with almost sincerity and due regard for the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India.-