G. C. BHARUKA, J. ( 1 ) IN this appeal, the sole question which requires our consideration is as to whether sugar candy, locally known as "kallusakkare" falls within the abmit of entry 31-B of the Fifth Schedule to the karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (in short the 'state Act') and thus is exempt from levy of tax thereunder. ( 2 ) THE appellant is a registered dealer under the provisions of the State Act. It inter alia carried on business of sale and purchase in sugar candy. It appears that because of some communication made by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes under his letter No. CLR. CRA. 80/93-94 dated 1. 9. 1993, taking a view that sugar candy, instead of being an exempted commodity, is liable to tax at the rate of 4% under Entry 18a of the second schedule to the State Act, the appellate taking that to be a cause of action, filed Writ Petition No. 29519/95 in this Court for declaring the said clarification as contrary to the statutory provisions. But, having failed before the learned single Judge in getting the said declaration, has preferred the present appeal. ( 3 ) THE mode and manner of manufacturing sugar candy is not in serious dispute. As stated by the appellant, for manufacturing sugar candy, first Sugar is boiled in pans and then is kept aside for couple of days in galvanized trays to allow it to settle and crystalise in granular form. It is then hammered into small blocks. This Court in the case of M. L. ABDUL MALIK AND CO. , v. COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER, 1963 14 STC 214 had the occasion to ascertain the qualitative difference between sugar and sugar candy though in a different context. In that case/ by relying on the certificate issued by the National Sugar Institute at Kanpur, it was held that sugar candy is only a purer form of sugar. It was also held that sugar candy contains more than 90% of sucrose and therefore falls within the statutory definition of 'sugar' as set out in the Additional Duties of excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 (in short the 'central Act' ). ( 4 ) SECTION 5 of the State Act provides for levy of tax on sale or purchase of goods. ( 4 ) SECTION 5 of the State Act provides for levy of tax on sale or purchase of goods. Sub-section (3) thereof provides that the tax under the said Act will be leviable on various goods at the rates prescribed in the Second Schedule thereof. Section 8 of the State Act provides that no tax shall be payable under the Act on the sale of goods specified in the Fifth Schedule subject to the conditions and exceptions, if any, set out therein. The competing entries on the basis of which rival contentions have been raised are at.. No. 18a of Part S of the Second Schedule and Entry at Sl. No. 31-B of the Fifth schedule. These entries as those stood from 1. 4. 1992, being relevant for the present purposes, read as under: second Schedule Part 8: s. N. 18-A: Sugar and Sugar preparations excluding such sugar and sugar preparations as are covered, described or specified elsewhere in any of the Schedules. Fifth Schedule s. No. 31-B: Sugar as described from time to time in column 3 of the First schedule to the additional Duties Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957, but excluding confectionary and the like. ( 5 ) FROM the above entries, in the two Schedules to the State Act, it is quite clear that if Sugar candy can be found to be included or. covered by Section No. 31-B of the Fifth Schedule, then no tax can be levied on the sale or purchase thereof. Now for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether sugar candy is covered by the expression 'sugar' even for the purpose of Entry at Sl. No. 31-B noticed above, we are required to refer to the First Schedule to the Central Act. The note appended to the first schedule to this Act provides that the interpretation, of the schedule is to be governed by the. provisions contained in the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (in short the Tariff act' ). ( 6 ) NOW turning to Chapter 17 of the Tariff Act, which deals with Sugar and Sugar confectionaries, we find that note 2 thereof defines 'sugar' to mean any form of sugar in which the sucrose content is expressed as percentage of material dried to constant weight at 105c would be more than 90. ( 6 ) NOW turning to Chapter 17 of the Tariff Act, which deals with Sugar and Sugar confectionaries, we find that note 2 thereof defines 'sugar' to mean any form of sugar in which the sucrose content is expressed as percentage of material dried to constant weight at 105c would be more than 90. ( 7 ) REVERTING to the facts of the present case, it is not in dispute that, sugar candy contains more than 90% of sucrose. Therefore, it definitely falls within the statutory definition of 'sugar' as set out for the purpose of Central Acts. Consequently, it has to be held that sugar candy is also covered by Entry 31-B of the Fifth Schedule to the State Act and thus exempt from levy of tax under the said Act. ( 8 ) THE view of ours is squarely substantiated by the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of STATE OF GUJARAT v. SAKKARWALA BROTHERS, 1967 19 STC 24 to this case also a question, similar to one at hand, had fallen for consideration with respect to three commodities made out of sugar, namely Patasa, Harda and Alchidana The said question had arisen in the context of Entry 47 of Schedule 'a' to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, wherein the definition of sugar was adopted from the first schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act 1944, which defined sugar to mean 'any form of sugar containing more than 90% of sucrose'. The Apex court, on consideration of rival contentions, came to the conclusion that all the three commodities prepared out of sugar were nothing but 'sugar' for the purpose of Sales Tax Act. The relevant passage in this regard is to the following effect: "it was urged by the Learned Advocate-General that the word "sugar" in entry 47 has been used in the same sense in which it is used in common parlance and that in common parlance, "patasa", "harda" and "alchidana" are not commercially known as and cannot be asked for or obtained as sugar. The learned Advocate-General is right when he says that the article known as "patasa", "harda" and "alchidana" bear a distinct and different name from sugar and are not commercially purchased or sold as sugar. The Legislature, in entry 47, does not use the word sugar simpliciter. The learned Advocate-General is right when he says that the article known as "patasa", "harda" and "alchidana" bear a distinct and different name from sugar and are not commercially purchased or sold as sugar. The Legislature, in entry 47, does not use the word sugar simpliciter. It has in terms stated that what is covered is sugar as defined in item No. 8 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. When we turn to the definition appearing in the aforesaid item No. 8 that definition is not intended merely to cover sugar as known in common parlance. As stated by us earlier, it is intended to cover all forms of sugar. It is further intended to cover only sugar in any form which contains more than 90 per cent of sucrose. A definition which refers to the chemical contents of an article cannot be said to be definition which is intended to cover the article as understood in common parlance. It is with a view, to give a meaning different from that which the article bears in common parlance that a special definition has been given, and it is not possible for us to interpret the words used in entry 47 as only covering the term sugar as used in common parlance. A reference has been made to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Tungabhadra Industries Ltd. , Kurnool v. Commercial Tax officer, Kurnool. In that case, it was held that when raw groundnut oil was converted into refined oil by a process whereunder the non-oily content of the raw oil was separated and removed, rendering the oily content of the oil hundred per cent. , the groundnut oil so refined continued to be groundnut oil within the meaning of Rules 5 (1) (k) and 18 (2) of the Madras general Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939, notwithstanding that such oil did not possess the characteristic colour or taste, odour etc. , of the raw groundnut oil. It was further held that the fact that in the course of hydrogenation the oil absorbed two atoms of hydrogen and that there was an intermolecular change in the content of the substance was not decisive of the matter. , of the raw groundnut oil. It was further held that the fact that in the course of hydrogenation the oil absorbed two atoms of hydrogen and that there was an intermolecular change in the content of the substance was not decisive of the matter. They held that there was no use to which the groundnut oil could be put for which the hydrogenated oil could not be used and that there was no use to which the hydrogenated oil could be put for which raw oil could not be used. On the facts of the present case, in spite of the fact that sugar assumes the forms of "patasa", "harda" and "alchidana", they could be put to the same use as sugar. In our view the term "sugar" as used in entry 47 is wide enough to cover "patasa", "harda" and "alchidana". ( 9 ) UNFORTUNATELY, the said decision of the Supreme Court was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge. In the said view of the matter, the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge is set aside and it is declared that Sugar Candy is covered by Sl. No. 31-B of the fifth Schedule to the State Act and therefore exempt from levy of tax thereunder. No costs.