Judgment M.A.A. Khan, J.-In this ease a charge-sheet for prosecuting the petitioner for the offences under Sections 420, 466, 467, 468 and 471 was filed in the Court of the trial Magistrate on 29-7-1977. The charges for the aforesaid offences were framed against him on 12-2-1979. It is reported that the prosecution closed their evidence on 10-7-1996. After the closure of prosecution evidence, the Assistant Public Prosecutor who was In-charge of the prosecution, moved an application under Section 311, CrPC requesting the learned Magistrate to summon Amarnath Purohit and Ratanalal as the witnesses in this case. This application was allowed to the extent of Ralanlal witness only. The said Ratanlal was also examined. It is reported that the accused was to be examined under Section 313 CrPC on 11-7-1996. But the Assistant Public Prosecutor again moved an application under Section 311, CrPC for summoning three more witnesses namely, Omprakash Sharma, Ram Gopal and Shy am Lal. Out of these three witnesses, Omprakash Sharma was to depose that he had taken the specimen signature of the accused for getting them compared with his admitted signatures by an expert. The rest of the two witnesses were Investigating Officers in the case. By his impugned order dated 7-11-1996, the learned Magistrate allowed the said application to the extent of Omprakash Sharma only. Aggrieved by such order of the learned Magistrate, the accused has moved this petition under Section 482, CrPC. 2. Thelearned counsel for the petitioner, relying upon the decisions of this Court in the cases of Magan Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, (1990) 2 WLN 188, Battada Ponapa Apachu vs. State of Rajasthan, (1985) 1 WLN 342, Virendra Kumar vs. State of Rajasthan, (1989) 2 WLN 171 and Ganpath Ram vs. State of Rajasthan, 1993 Raj Cri C 41, wherein it was held that the provisions contained in Section 311, CrPC were meant to enable the Court to arrive at truth and not to fill up gaps and lacunas in the prosecution case, vehemently urged that the impugned order not only impairs the fundamental right of the accused petitioner for speedy and fair trial but also that it amounts to filling up lacunas in prosecution case and therefore, promotes abuse of the process of the Court rather than to secure the ends of justice. 3. 3. Thelearned Public Prosecutor supporting the impugned order submitted that since the witness allowed to be examined by the Court was a material witness in the case and the learned Magistrate has exercised the discretion vested with him under Section 311, CrPC in judicial manner, the impugned order should not be disturbed. 4. Section 311, CrPC empowers any Court at any stage of enquiry, trial or any proceeding under the Code to summon any person as a witness or to examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined. It further provides that the Court shall summon and examine or recall or re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case. In the first part of the Section, a discretion has been vested in the Magistrate to summon any person as a witness or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness or to recall and re-examine any person already examined. This part of the provision obviously makes reference to those cases where the evidence of the witnesses, sought to be summoned, is relevant to an issue involved in the case. The latter part, however, cast an obligation on the Magistrate to summon such witness whose evidence, in his opinion, appears to be essential to the just decision of the case. Whereas to exercise the jurisdiction vested in the Magistrate in the first Part of the Section is to be exercised in the context of relevancy of the evidence in the case, the obligation to summon, examine or recall and re-examine a person whose evidence appears to the Magistrate to be essential to the just decision of the case refers to the value and worth of such evidence for just decision of that case. In any case, discretion has to be exercised by the Magistrate judicially and not arbitrarily. The object of Section 311 is not to shut the doors on a party to the litigation to produce such evidence as is not only relevant to the issues involved in the case, but also such evidence which is essential for its just decision. In any case, discretion has to be exercised by the Magistrate judicially and not arbitrarily. The object of Section 311 is not to shut the doors on a party to the litigation to produce such evidence as is not only relevant to the issues involved in the case, but also such evidence which is essential for its just decision. The purpose behind the Section obviously is that the true cases should not go unpunished for want of material evidence and innocent person should also not be punished for their failing to bring relevant and material evidence on record at an earlier stage of the proceedings. 5. Though Section 311 CrPC does not speak of any particular point of time at which discretion vested in the Magistrate may be exercised, but it should be exercised as and when considered necessary by the Magistrate. However, in exercising the discretion vested by this provision in the Magistrate, care should be taken that it does not forfeit the right of the adversary in any manner and no injustice is caused to him. If in the process of doing justice to one party injustice is likely to be done to the other party by the fact of omission or commission of the former party, then the discretion vested in Section 311, CrPC should not be exercised as that would simply amount to filling up the lacunas in the case of one party at the cost of the other party. 6. The right to speedy trial has by now been recognized as a part of fundamental right of an accused as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Since the right, to speedy trial has been recognised as a part of fundamental right of the accused, care is required to be taken in exercising the discretion vested in the Magistrate by Section 311, CrPC if the exercise of the discretion makes’ an already delayed prosecution to linger on with no explanation for delayed act of the prosecutor, such an exercise of the discretion cannot be said to have been exercised judicially 7. In the Instant case, the charge-sheet was submitted in the year 1977 and the accused was put on trial as late as in the year 1979. In the Instant case, the charge-sheet was submitted in the year 1977 and the accused was put on trial as late as in the year 1979. He continued to face the trial up to 11-7-1996, when, after giving an opportunity to the prosecution under Section 311, CrPC to examine Ratan Lal, the case was finally fixed for examination of the accused. That shows that for about two decades, the accused had already faced the ordeal of this litigation. Such long period should have been sufficient for the prosecution to get awakened from its slumber and to have requested the learned Magistrate to summon such other persons whom the prosecution considered to be necessarily examined for the just decision of the case. Speedy trial of an accused is his fundamental right, but a fair and impartial trial is also of no less importance in the administration of criminal justice. In the present case, there was absolutely no reason, and no explanation was advanced by the prosecution in that behalf , as to why the request for summoning the 3 witnesses including Omprakash could not have been made earlier and what was the evidence to be tendered through these three witnesses? Omprakash, who has been allowed to be examined by the learned Magistrate, was to simply depose that he had taken specimen signature of the accused for comparison. This fact was known to the prosecution from the very beginning and there was no reason as to why Omprakash could not have been cited as a witness and summoned as such at an earlier stage of the trial. The report of the hand writing expert, admissible under Section 45 of the Evidence Act and the ground in respect of such report relevant under Section 51 of the said Act, could have been of some worth and value, but the testimony of Omprakash was not of that standard. Therefore, Omprakash cannot be said to be such a witness whose evidence was so material for the just decision of the case as to warrant his summoning after a lapse of 20 years. It is, thus, evident that the learned Magistrate had not exercised the jurisdiction vested in him under Section 311, Cr, P.C. in a judicial manner. Therefore, Omprakash cannot be said to be such a witness whose evidence was so material for the just decision of the case as to warrant his summoning after a lapse of 20 years. It is, thus, evident that the learned Magistrate had not exercised the jurisdiction vested in him under Section 311, Cr, P.C. in a judicial manner. His summoning Omprakash after a lapse of about 20 years obviously amounted to allowing the prosecution to fill up the gap in its case rather than to an effort to decide the case justly. The case presents an instance of gross abuse of the process of this Court by the learned Magistrate. This Court, I feel, would be failing in its duty in not preventing such abuse of the process of law/Court in exercise of its exceptional powers under Section 482, CrPC and in not keeping supervisory and superintending vigil under Section 483 over such awry misadventures. 8. Inthe cases cited (supra), this Court has -consistently held that the discretion vested in the Court under Section 311, CrPC is to be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily. The arbitrary exercise of such jurisdiction in the present case makes a mockery of the very system on administration of justice. The impugned order, thus, in my opinion, amounts to gross abuse of the process of the Court and does not appear to have been passed to procure the ends of justice. In that sense of the matter, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside in exercise of the powers of this Court under Section 482, CrPC. 9. In the result, the impugned order dated 7-11-1996 passed by the learned Magistrate under Section 311, CrPC summoning Omprakash as witness in the case is hereby set aside. The learned Magistrate is directed to dispose of the case expeditiously. 10. A copy of this order shall be sent to the Registrar Rajasthan High Court, for being placed before the Hon’ ble Chief Justice for his kind perusal and issuance of suitable directions to the Magistracy in the State Judiciary with regard to the necessity of speedy trials of Criminal Cases, if deemed proper. A copy hereof , shall also be sent to the Director Prosecution to enquire into the conduct of the A.P.P. concerned and take suitable disciplinary action against him, if found wanting in bona fides. 11. The petition is allowed.