Judgment :- J.B. Koshy, J. Petitioners in all these original petitions are licensees of foreign liquor shops or bars in the hotels and restaurants having FL 1 or FL 2 licences. Petitioners can purchase liquor only from Kerala State Bewarages (Manufacturing and Marketing) Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation'). As per the conditions of licence purchase can be effected only through the Corporation holding FL 9 licence. Corporation is purchasing liquor in bulk from the manufacturers of Indian made foreign liquor (IMFL). During the abkari year 1996-97 Government had enhanced excise duty to the tune of 200% with effect from 1.4.1996. The above duty was reduced to 100% with effect from 1.4.1997. There was a sight increase in price of liquor from June. 1997. It is the contention of the petitioners that the Corporation was not able to supply the requirements. In view of the increased price in 1996-97. licensees did not purchase the usual quota in March 1997. But in view of the reduction in duty there was high demand. Considering the possible demand. petitioners have auctioned the shops with high bid amount. But. the Corporation did not supply the required quantity in April. 1997 and this continued in May also. They have filed representations to the Minister stating that they have auctioned the shops at high rates. But the Corporation is not supplying liquor enough for distribution. In view of the non-supply. they will have to struggle hard for paying kist in time. They also requested that they may be allowed to bring foreign liquor from other sources. In the Kerala Liquor Transits Rules. 1975 there are enough stringent provisions to prevent misuse of permission to transport liquor. Sale of liquor is the privilege of the State. Only because of the licence. petitioners are able to sell liquor. But. as per the licence conditions. petitioners are bound to buy liquor only through the Corporation. The Corporation is not supplying liquor as demanded by the petitioners. Therefore. it is prayed that there should be proportionate reduction in the kist amount payable for April and May. 1997. There are compelling circumstances to reduce the kist amount notwithstanding rules 6(25) and 6(26) of the Abkari Shops (Disposal in auction) Rules. The Corporation is not supplying liquor as demanded by the petitioners. Therefore. it is prayed that there should be proportionate reduction in the kist amount payable for April and May. 1997. There are compelling circumstances to reduce the kist amount notwithstanding rules 6(25) and 6(26) of the Abkari Shops (Disposal in auction) Rules. It is also submitted by them that when they bid the shops.-they had in their mind that in 1997-98 there is a reduction of excise duty and consequently reduction in price and there was prohibition of arrack and therefore. they will be able to sell liquor in good quantities and get a good profit. Since it is compulsory for them to purchase liquor from the Corporation. they were also on the belief that Corporation will supply liquor as demanded by them. Since liquor was not supplied as demanded. they were not able to sell liquor as expected and in view of non-availability of liquor. not due to their fault. they are unable to pay full kist and theory of 'legitimate expectation' is applicable. In spite of their legitimate expectation they were not able to get supply and sell liquor. They are doing the business with licences from the Government and in view of the non-supply of liquor by the Corporation as expected. consequent kist reduction should be granted in the quantum of excise duty. 2. Petitioners relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. Nandlal & Ors. (1993 Supp. (1) SCC 681). In that case. retail sale of country liquor in the State of Rajasthan was regulated by Rajasthan Excise Act. 1950. They can sell liquor only as per the provisions of the Act and Rules. During 1967-68. licences were granted under two different systems. One was called the 'Guarantee System' and the other was called 'Exclusive Privilege System'. Under the Guarantee System. licensees were guaranteed to draw from the Government Warehouse and sell during that year country liquor of a specified value which was called the amount guaranteed. Licensee was obliged to deposit 10% of the amount of guarantee by way of security at the time of grant of licence. Licencee was also under an obligation to draw from the warehouse every month liquor equivalent in value to I/ 12th pf the amount guaranteed. Under the Exclusive Privilege System. Licensee was obliged to deposit 10% of the amount of guarantee by way of security at the time of grant of licence. Licencee was also under an obligation to draw from the warehouse every month liquor equivalent in value to I/ 12th pf the amount guaranteed. Under the Exclusive Privilege System. licensee was granted exclusive privilege of selling country liquor by retail within a particular local area. Under this system also. licencee was required to deposit 10% of the said amount by way of security at the time of grant of licence. Total amount has to be deposited in 12 monthly instalments and the licensee was entitled to draw liquor from the Government Warehouse using the said deposits. The State was not able to supply liquor as agreed or intended by the petitioners. It was held by the Court that it is for the writ petitioners to establish their contention that in spite of their demand State could not supply the requisite quantity of liquor. The mere fact that there was a shortfall in overall production of country liquor in the State during the said year does not establish the contention of the petitioners. Contention of the petitioners has to be proved. However. it was held that State has got an obligation to make requisite quantity of material available to the contractor on demand and contractor's obligation to lift the material from the State Warehouse. The Court held as follows: "Before parting with this matter. we must refer to an extreme argument urged by Shri Gupta on behalf of the State. According to him. the liability of the licensee to pay the agreed amount remains unaffected even if there is a total failure on the part of the State in supplying the liquor. We cannot obviously agree with such a proposition. State is the only source of supply for such licensees. Unless the State supplies them the liquor they cannot carry on their business. As stated earlier. it is essentially a commercial contract. no doubt. governed by statutory provisions. The obligation to supply constitutes the underpinning of the contract. This does not. however. mean that the State is bound to supply as much as is demanded or that its failure to supply on a given day or in a given week can be termed as Mule to supply. no doubt. governed by statutory provisions. The obligation to supply constitutes the underpinning of the contract. This does not. however. mean that the State is bound to supply as much as is demanded or that its failure to supply on a given day or in a given week can be termed as Mule to supply. Supplies of liquor are normally effected through warehouses and depots maintained by or on behalf of the State. Supplies have to be drawn over the month. It cannot be insisted that the entire monthly quantity or any other quantity must be supplied at once or as and when demanded by licensee. All that can be said is that all licencees must be treated in a fair and equal manner in the matter of supplies. particularly during the lean years. Due regard must also be had to the rules. conditions of licence and agreement and other provisions applicable in that behalf. in determining whether there was a failure on the part of the State to supply. Again. the extent of relief in case of failure on the part of the State to supply depends upon the length of period of non-supply. the loss caused to the licensee on that account. all of which has to be judged in the light of the relevant provisions of the Act. rules. conditions of licence and agreement and other orders. if any applicable" .(para 19) Based upon the above decision. it was argued that since the Corporation which is an instrumentality of the State failed to supply liquor as demanded depending upon the shortfall in each case. reduction in kist should be granted. It was further argued that in view of legitimate expectation they are entitled to claim proportionate reduction in kist in the circumstances detailed earlier. 3. Petitioners also relied on the decision reported in Union of India and Ors. v. Hindustan Development Corpn. & Ors. (AIR 1994 SC 988 = ((1993) 3 SCC 499). In the above case. it was held that legitimate expectation may come in various forms and owe their existence to different kinds of circumstances. Legitimate expectation gives the applicant sufficient locus standi for judicial review. A case of legitimate expectation would arise when a body by representation or by past practice aroused expectation which it would be within its powers to fulfil. In this case. Legitimate expectation gives the applicant sufficient locus standi for judicial review. A case of legitimate expectation would arise when a body by representation or by past practice aroused expectation which it would be within its powers to fulfil. In this case. it was argued that since it was the obligation of the Corporation to supply liquor as demanded and in earlier years it was supplied. non-supply of the quantities as required by the petitioners would amount to violation of legitimate expectation and therefore. this Court should interfere in the matter. 4. Learned Advocate General on behalf of the Government contended that under R.6(25) of the Abkari Shops (Disposal in auction) Rules. how kist should be paid is specifically mentioned. In R.6(26) it is provided as follows: "No remission or abatement of the rental shall be claimable by the licensee on any account whatsoever." In view of the above rule. petitioners have no right to claim for abatement or remission of rent even if circumstances alleged are correct. Learned Advocate General relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Assistant Excise Commissioner v. Issac Peter (1994 (1) KLT 698). In that case. it was held that licensees cannot claim remission in view of R.6(25). The decision in State of Rajasthan v. Nandalal (1993) Supp (1) SCC 681) relied on by the petitioners were also considered in paragraph 16 of the above judgment. Validity of R.6(26) was upheld by the Supreme Court. Conditions of the above rule were also engrafted in the relevant contract and licences. Apart from the binding nature of the rule. petitioners have also agreed to abide by the above rule by the licence conditions. Supreme Court also held as follows: "Not only the conditions are statutory in this case but they are formally drawn in the shape of statutory Rules. In such a situation. it would not be permissible to say that there was some other condition or term agreed upon or implied between the parties which is not found therein. Moreover. any implied term should be consistent with the express terms of the contract and not otherwise. This principle was affined as far back as 1865 by Cockburn. CJ.. in Churchwards. The Queen (U65-66(1)Q.E.D, 173). The learned Chief justice said: "Where a contract is silent. Moreover. any implied term should be consistent with the express terms of the contract and not otherwise. This principle was affined as far back as 1865 by Cockburn. CJ.. in Churchwards. The Queen (U65-66(1)Q.E.D, 173). The learned Chief justice said: "Where a contract is silent. the court or jury who are called upon to imply an obligation on the other side which does not appear in the terms of the contract. must take great care that they' do not make the contract speak where it was intentionally silent; and. above all. that they do no t make it speak entirely contrary to what. as may be gathered from the whole terms and tenor of the contract. was the intention of the parties. This I take to be a sound and safe rule of construction with regard to implied covenants and agreements which are not expressed in the contract." It is argued by the learned Advocate General that in view of the conditions in the contract. rule. etc. present claim of the petitioners will not survive. 5. The Supreme Court in Panna Lai and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (1975 (2) SCC 633) held' that the onerous nature of the terms is no ground for the licencees to reside from the express obligations undertaken by them. The Court observed: "The licences in the present case are contracts between the parties. The licensees voluntarily accepted the contracts. They fully exploited to their advantage the contracts to the exclusion of others. The High Court rightly said that it was not open to the appellants to resale from the contracts on the ground that the terms of payment were onerous. The reasons given by the High Court were that the licensees accepted the licence by excluding their competitors and it would not be open to the licensees to challenge the terms either on the ground of inconvenient consequence of terms or of harshness of terms." The above decision was again considered by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana & Ors. v. Lai Chand & Ors. ((1984) 3 SCC 634) and held that after making bid for grant of exclusive privilege of liquor vend with full knowledge of terms and conduits of auction. the bidder cannot wriggle out of the contractual obligations arising out of acceptance of his bid by filing writ petition. v. Lai Chand & Ors. ((1984) 3 SCC 634) and held that after making bid for grant of exclusive privilege of liquor vend with full knowledge of terms and conduits of auction. the bidder cannot wriggle out of the contractual obligations arising out of acceptance of his bid by filing writ petition. Same view was expressed by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Jage Ram (AIR 1980 SC 2018) and in State of Punjab v. Dial Chand Gian Chand & Co. (AIR 1983 SC 743). In these cases also petitioners accepted the conditions mentioned in R.6(25) and petitioners cannot wriggle out of the circumstances. 6. In this connection. I also refer to the decision of this Court reported in Thomas v. State of Kerala (1991 (1) KLT 19). This court held as follows: "The Supreme Court had indicated that abider in an abkari auction could not be permitted to avoid contractual obligations voluntarily incurred and to work the licences on terms as he finds convenient. Decisions about the exercise of a power by an authority in relation to an ordinary trade could not have any application. when no legal right had been posited on the materials and in the peculiar constitutional setup in relation to trade in intoxicating liquors. Looked that way. the latter decision of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Jage Ram (AIR 1980 SC 2018) contains helpful observations to discountenance the plea put forward by the abkari contractors. It was emphasised in that decision that the amount which the contractors agreed to pay to the State Government under the terms of the auction was neither a fee nor excise duty. The State could have as well as stipulated a lumpsum payment. and directed the issue of licence to be conditional on the payment of such sum. The contractor was obliged to pay the amount as the price of a privilege with the State patted with in favour of the contractor." (Para 47) I am of the opinion that in view of the clear provisions in the licence conditions which were agreed to by the petitioners and in view of R.6(26). petitioners cannot claim rebate of kist on the allegation that enough quantity of liquor was not supplied by the Corporation. 7. Statements were filed by the petitioners as well as the Corporation regarding supply of liquor during April and May. petitioners cannot claim rebate of kist on the allegation that enough quantity of liquor was not supplied by the Corporation. 7. Statements were filed by the petitioners as well as the Corporation regarding supply of liquor during April and May. I had directed the Corporation to file a statement showing supply of liquor during April and May for the years 1995.1996 and 1997. The statement filed shows that even though Corporation did not supply liquor as demanded by the licensees during the time. comparing to the previous years. there were normal supply in April and May 1997 also. It is true that Corporation has also admitted that in view of reduction in price more liquor was demanded by the licensees and liquor was lifted on the first day itself in huge quantities so as to exhaust stock of the Corporation and it was coupled with lorry strike. Therefore. liquor was not supplied as demanded by the licensees. From 1.4.1996 excise duty of liquor was increased to 200% and a price of liquor was increased by more than double and from 1.4.1997 excise duty was reduced to 100%. That is why supply position for 1995 April and May was called for as at that lime price of the liquor was not increased. The Corporation statement is as follows: This shows that in April. 1995 when Corporation sold 2.66 lakhs cases of IMFL, it was increased to 5.55 lakhs cases in April. 1997. In May. 1995 sale of IMFL was 2.42 lakhs cases. That was also increased by almost double and in May. 1997 Corporation sold 4.95 lakhs cases of IMFL. In May. 1996 sale was much below than May. 1995. Therefore. comparing the sales of the Corporation one cannot see that there is much decrease in the supply position. 8. In the reply affidavit dated 8.7.1997 filed by the petitioner in O.P. No. 7246 of 1997. details of purchases effected by certain FL 1 licensees are also shown for the period 1995-96.1996-97 and 1997-98. Ext. P3 is one of such statement. It is seen that in April, 1995, the purchase was to the tune of Rs. 9.85.056-65 and in May. 1995 it was Rs. 9.44.868-65. Purchase in April. 1997 was Rs. 12.32.535-50 and in May. 1997 Rs. 9.45.411-50. There was increase in purchase in 1997-98 compared to 1995-96. However. purchases in April and May. Ext. P3 is one of such statement. It is seen that in April, 1995, the purchase was to the tune of Rs. 9.85.056-65 and in May. 1995 it was Rs. 9.44.868-65. Purchase in April. 1997 was Rs. 12.32.535-50 and in May. 1997 Rs. 9.45.411-50. There was increase in purchase in 1997-98 compared to 1995-96. However. purchases in April and May. 1996 were higher in terms of rupee value because value of liquor was high as excise duty was 200% in May. 1996 whereas in 1997-98 excise duty was only 100% and there is not much difference in quantity. Same is the case of the sale value also. Ext. P3(a) is a statement regarding another FL 1 shop. Purchase value and sales value are shown as follows: It shows that there is considerable increase in purchase and sales from 1995 to 1997. It was doubted. Even though there was 200% excise duty during 1996 and it was reduced to 100% from 1.4.1997 in rupee value. in purchase as well as sales. there is an increase in value also in April.. 1997 than in April and May. 1996. Certainly there is increase from April. 1995 in terms of money value. Therefore. compared to the quantity. there was increase only in April and May 1997. compared. to April and May. 1995-96 regarding purchase and sales. With regard to Ext. P3(b) also the position is not different. As per Ext. P3(b) purchase for April 1995 is Rs. 19.44.519-38 whereas in April, 1997 it is Rs. 28.82.613-63. Purchase in April 1996 was very low. It was only Rs. 6.84.426/-. Therefore. statements filed themselves will not show that there is such a sharp decline in the supply of liquor as per the normal circumstances. even though it is true that as demanded by the petitioners entire quantity of liquor was not supplied. Therefore. on the facts of the case also. this is not a fit case where this Court's indulgence should be granted in favour of the petitioners. In view of R.6(26) and contractual conditions as engrafted in the licence conditions and in view of the factual position. contentions raised by the writ petitioners on legitimate expectation cannot be prima facie accepted. But having raised such a contention. I would like to consider the same in detail. 8A. In view of R.6(26) and contractual conditions as engrafted in the licence conditions and in view of the factual position. contentions raised by the writ petitioners on legitimate expectation cannot be prima facie accepted. But having raised such a contention. I would like to consider the same in detail. 8A. Doctrine of 'legitimate expectation' is mostly confined to the right of a fair hearing before a decision which results in negative a promise or withdrawing an undertaking. is taken. The doctrine does not give scope to claim relief straightaway from the administrative authorities as no crystallised right as such is involved. It is true that where a person's legitimate expectation is not fulfilled by taking a particular decision then the decision maker should justify the denial of such expectation by showing some over-riding public interest. According to Administrative Law. 7th Edn. by H. W.R. Wade. (Page 525) legitimate expectation was made its first appearance in a case where alien students of 'Scientology' were refused extension of their entry permits as an act of policy by the Home Secretary. who had announced that two discretionary benefits should be granted to this sect. Court of Appeal held that they had no legitimate expectation of extension beyond the permitted time and so no right to a hearing though revocation of their permits within that time would have been contrary to legitimate expectation. Doctrine of legitimate expectation has been developed both in the context of reasonableness and in the context of natural justice. Lord Bridge has said in Re Westminster CC. (1986 AC 668 at 692) as follows: "The Courts have developed a relatively novel doctrine in public law that a duty of consultation may arise from a legitimate expectation of consultation aroused either by a promise or by an established practice of consultation". In Attorney General of Hong Kong v. Ng. Yuen Shiu (1983 2 AC 629). the Privy Council considered the theory of legitimate expectation. Government of Hong Kong announced that certain illegal immigrants who were liable to deportation would be interviewed individually and treated on merits in each case. The Privy Council in the above case quashed a deportation order where the immigrant had only-been allowed to answer questions without being able to put his own case holding that when a public authority has promised to follow a certain procedure. The Privy Council in the above case quashed a deportation order where the immigrant had only-been allowed to answer questions without being able to put his own case holding that when a public authority has promised to follow a certain procedure. it is in the interest of good administration that it should act fairly and should implement its promise so long as implementation does not interfere with its statutory duty. 9. In Halsbury' s Laws of England. Fourth Edn. Vol. I (I)151 a passage explaining the scope of 'legitimate expectations' runs thus: "81. Legitimate expectations:- A person may have a legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority. including an implied representation. or from consistent past practice. The existence of a legitimate expectation may have a number of different consequences; it may give locus stand! to seek leave to apply for judicial review; it may mean that the authority ought not to act so as to defeat the expectation without some overriding reason of public policy to justify its doing so; or it may mean that. if the authority proposes to defeat a person's legitimate expectation. it must afford him an opportunity to make representations on the matter. The courts also distinguish. for example. in licensing cases. between original applications. applications to renew and revocations of a party who has been gran ted licence may have a legitimate expectation that it will be renewed unless there is some good reason not to do so. and may therefore. Been titled to greater procedural protection than a mere applicant for a grant". In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service ((1984) 3 All E.R.935) it has been held that an aggrieved person is entitled to judicial review if he is able to show that a decision of the public authority affected him of some benefit or advantage which in the past he had been permitted to enjoy and which he legitimately expected to be permitted to continue to enjoy either until he was given reasons for withdrawal and the opportunity to comment on such reasons. In Food Corporation of India v. Kamadhenu Cattle Feed Industries ((1993) 1 SCC 71) it was held as follows: "The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen. in such a situation. may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right. but failure to consider and give due weight to i t may render the decision arbitrary. and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case". 10. In Navjyoti Co-operative Group Housing Society v. Union of India ((1992) 4 SCC 477) it was held as follows: "In the aforesaid facts. the Group Housing societies. were entitled to "legitimate expectation' of following consistent past practice in the matter of allotment. even though they may not have any legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The existence of "legitimate expectation' may have a number of different consequences and one of such consequences is that the authority sought not to act to defeat the legitimate expectation' without some overriding reason of public policy to justify its doing so. In a case of "legitimate expectation' if the authority purposes to defeat a person's legitimate expectation' it should afford him an opportunity to make representations in the matter" (Para 15) It was further held that: "It may be indicated here that the doctrine of legitimate expectation' imposes in essence a duty on public authority to act fairly by taking into consideration all relevant factors relating to such legitimate expectation'. Within the conspectus of fair dealing in case of legitimate expectation'. the reasonable opportunities to make representation by the parties likely to be affected by any change of consistent past policy. come in." (para 16) Considering all these decisions. in Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation & Ors. ((1993) 3 SCC 499) it was held as follows: "Therefore. the claim based on the principle of legitimate expectation can be sustained and the decision resulting in denial of such expectation can be questioned provided the same is found to be unfair. unreasonable. arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice". ((1993) 3 SCC 499) it was held as follows: "Therefore. the claim based on the principle of legitimate expectation can be sustained and the decision resulting in denial of such expectation can be questioned provided the same is found to be unfair. unreasonable. arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice". (Para 25) Another interesting decision on the subject is the decision reported in Attorney General for New South Wales v. Quin ((1990) 64 Aust. LJR 327). It is a case from Australia. This case was elaborately discussed in the article 'Legitimate Expectations: A conceptual Analysis' by P.P. Graig in 1992 Law Quarterly Review. Vol. 108. at page 79. There also. it is held that it is well known that the concept of legitimate acceptations made an early appearance in the context of natural justice and fairness. In Quin's case. the Local Courts Act abolished Courts of Petty Sessions and replaced them by local courts. S.12 of the Act empowered the Governor to appoint any qualified person to be a Magistrate in the new court system. Mr. Quin. who had been a Stipendiary Magistrate in charge of a Court of Petty Sessions under the old system was not selected. That was challenged. The challenge was upheld by the appellate court on the ground that the Selection Committee had taken into account an adverse report on him without giving a notice to him of the comments of the same. In the appeal by the Attorney-General against that order before the High Court. it was argued on behalf of Mr. Quin that he had a legitimate expectation that he would be treated in the same way as his former colleagues considering his application on its own merits. Coming to the nature of the substantive impact of the doctrine. Brennan. J. observed that the doctrine of legitimate expectations ought not to "unlock the gate which shuts the court out of review on the merits", and that the courts should not trespass "into the forbidden field of the merits" by striking down administrative acts or decisions which fail to fulfil the expectations. 11. The decision in R. v. Liverpool Corpn. ex.p. Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators' Association ((1972) 2 QB 299) provides a suitable example. In that case. the city council had pursued a policy of limiting the number of licensed taxis to 300. 11. The decision in R. v. Liverpool Corpn. ex.p. Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators' Association ((1972) 2 QB 299) provides a suitable example. In that case. the city council had pursued a policy of limiting the number of licensed taxis to 300. The applications were assured on a variety of occasions that this figure would not be increased without consultation with them. This position was reinforced by an undertaking given by the relevant committee Chairman that the figure of 300 would not be exceeded until certain relevant legislation on the matter had been passed. Notwithstanding this sequence of events the committee resolved to increase the number of taxis-without any further opportunity for consultation by the applicants. It was held that the council could not be allowed to resale from their undertaking "without notice to and representations from the applicants". and while the council could depart from the undertaking it could only do not so after "due and proper consideration of the representations of all those interested. In all these cases. it can be seen that legitimate expectation was applied in cases where there was an express policy or regular practice was established and promise or practice was the source of legitimate expectation. That too have a fair hearing. 12. In R.v. Jockey Club (1993 (2) All E.R.225) the question of legitimate expectation was considered by the Queen's Bench. Jockey club is a private body which controlled and regularised horse racing in Great Britain. It carried out a-policy review on the need to allocate additional racing fixtures in the future to accommodate the needs of existing race courses and possible new courses. The resulting report stated that an additional 60 fixtures ought to be allocated in 1990 and 1991 and that an unspecified number of fixtures should be made available to any new licensed race course. The report was adopted by the Jockey Club in December. 1988 and copies were sent to the existing race course owners; but. not to prospective new race course owners such as the petitioners in the case. Finally. Jockey Club made it known that it had an additional 30 fixtures to allocate in 1990 and a further 30 fixtures in 1991. The report was adopted by the Jockey Club in December. 1988 and copies were sent to the existing race course owners; but. not to prospective new race course owners such as the petitioners in the case. Finally. Jockey Club made it known that it had an additional 30 fixtures to allocate in 1990 and a further 30 fixtures in 1991. The applicant had purchased a green field site with a view to establishing a race course on it and having seen the report he spent 100.000 Pounds on the site in the belief that the new race course would be allocated 15 fixtures in 1991. In Jiriy 1989 the applicant sent a copy of its development proposals for the new race course to the Jockey Club. Jockey Club wrote to the applicant stating that notwithstanding the report the Jockey Club had made no commitment as to the number of fixtures which would be allocated to new race courses. In the meeting it was made known that no fixtures would be allocated for the applicant's new race course during 1991. Applicant sought judicial review of the Jockey Club's decision refusing to allocate to the applicant at least 15 racing fixtures at its new race course for 1991 contending that the report had raised a legitimate expectation in the applicant that the Jockey Club would grant a minimum of 15 fixtures for the new race course. It was held that applicant could not rely on the report as the report had raised a legitimate expectation that the Jockey Club would grant a minimum 15 fixtures for the applicant in the new race cause for 1991 as there was no clear and unambiguous representation in the report that their report would be accepted and Jockey Club did not supply copy of the report to the applicant directly. It was held that for getting the benefit of legitimate expectation. there should be a clear promise or a clear and unambiguous representation and burden of proof is on the person who claims the benefit on the basis of legitimate expectation. 13. In R. V. Devon County Council ((1995) 1 All E.R.73) the Court of Appeal held that sometimes legitimate expectation can denote a substantive right; an entitlement that the claimant asserts cannot be denied. However. it was held that the claimant's right will only be found established. 13. In R. V. Devon County Council ((1995) 1 All E.R.73) the Court of Appeal held that sometimes legitimate expectation can denote a substantive right; an entitlement that the claimant asserts cannot be denied. However. it was held that the claimant's right will only be found established. It was held by Lord Justice Simon Brown as follows: "These various authorities show that the claimant's right will only be found established when there is a clear and unambiguous representation upon which it was reasonable for him to rely. Then the administrator or other public body will be held bound in fairness by the representation made. unless only its promise or undertaking as to how its power would be exercised is inconsistent with the statutory duties imposed upon it. The doctrine employed in this sense is akin to an estoppel." It was also held in the above case that an interest which a person entitled cannot be properly withdrawn without giving an opportunity of hearing and it was added as follows: "The final category of legitimate expectation encompasses those cases in which it is held that a particular procedure not otherwise required by law in the protection of an interest. must be followed consequent upon some specific promise or practice. Fairness requires that the public authority be held to it. The authority is bound by its assurance. whether expressly given by way of a promise or implied by way of established practice." Therefore. in all these cases. the question of legitimate expectation was considered mainly on the basis of procedural infirmities. However. when it was found that there is a substantive right created by clear and unambiguous promise by public officers as thereby the applicants legitimately expects. 14. In these cases. there is no promise or representation by the Government or Corporation that whatever quantity of liquor demanded will be given. From the statements submitted also. it is clear that there was more or less normal supply. There is a term in R.6(26) itself that licensees cannot claim any rebate or concession from the kist payable on any account whatsoever. With open eyes it was accepted and knowing that condition. they participated in the auction. After accepting the above conditions. From the statements submitted also. it is clear that there was more or less normal supply. There is a term in R.6(26) itself that licensees cannot claim any rebate or concession from the kist payable on any account whatsoever. With open eyes it was accepted and knowing that condition. they participated in the auction. After accepting the above conditions. petitioners have no manner of right to claim reduction of kist on the basis of legitimate expectation that whatever quantity of liquor demanded will be supplied and if not supplied there will be a reduction of kist. 15. For the first time. Supreme Court held in M.P. Oil Extraction & Anr.v. State of M.P. & Ors. (JT 1997 (6) SC 97) that doctrine of legitimate expectation can constitute a substantive and enforceable right in certain circumstances. In that case as per the industrial policy some connections were given to the newly set up industries in the backward and tribal area. There was provision for extension of protection for a further period. In such circumstances. it was held that the companies can claim the benefit of the doctrine of legitimate expectation and claim it as an enforceable substantive right. The legitimate expectations of the respondents as persons having agreement with specific renewal clause which constitute both a representation and established past practice by the State of M.P. cannot be denied or thwarted unless overwhelming and specific higher public interest is shown to override those legitimate expectations. After considering the arguments of Dr. Singhvi. the Supreme Court held as follows: " It has been rightly contended by Dr. Singh vi that the respondents legitimately expect that the renewal clause should be given effect to in usual manner and according to past practice unless there is any special reason not to adhere to such practice. The doctrine of legitimate expectation' has been judicially recognised by this court in a number of decisions. The doctrine of "legitimate expectation' operates in the domain of public law and in appropriate case. constitutes a substantive and enforceable right". In this case. petitioners were not able to establish such right. A citizen has no fundamental right to trade or business in liquor as held by the Supreme Court in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Karndtaka & Ors. ((1995) 1 SCC 574). When licence is granted with certain conditions. that conditions are binding. In this case. petitioners were not able to establish such right. A citizen has no fundamental right to trade or business in liquor as held by the Supreme Court in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Karndtaka & Ors. ((1995) 1 SCC 574). When licence is granted with certain conditions. that conditions are binding. Petitioners finally contended that even in Issac Peter's case reported in 1994 (1) KLT 698 it was held that if the guaranteed amount of arrack was not supplied there would have been a claim. In R.8(1) as existing at that time. there was an obligation on the State to supply monthly quota of arrack. But. what was decided was that there was no obligation to supply additional quota even though in earlier years additional quota was supplied. In the absence of a guaranteed quota. specified rule or undertaking or promise that minimum quantity will be supplied through the Corporation. Government or the Corporation cannot be bound on the theory of 'legitimate expectation'. In that case. the claim of legitimate expectation was denied because theory of legitimate expectation cannot be worked against statutory or. contractual terms. It was held in that case that: "the rule cannot be invoked to modify or vary the express terms of contract. more so when they are statutory in nature. No decision has been brought to our notice supporting the said proposition." (Para 25). Here also even on repeated requests. petitioners were unable to cite any decision supporting the plea that legitimate expectation can be invoked to modify or vary the express terms of contract or statutory rules. In the above case. it was also observed by the Supreme Court that: "It is inconceivable that the licensees yet expected legitimately that additional supplies equal to the previous year's additional supplies would be supplied during this year." (Para 25) Petitioners have failed to prove that they can rely on the plea of legitimate expectation. In view of clear provisions in R.6(26) of Abkari Shops (Disposal in auction) Rules and in the licence conditions which form part of the contract and in view of the facts of these cases. I am of the view that after accepting the above conditions no remission or statement can be claimed on account of 'legitimate expectation'. Even without Rule 6(26) and contractual stipulation against reduction of kist on any circumstances. I am of the view that after accepting the above conditions no remission or statement can be claimed on account of 'legitimate expectation'. Even without Rule 6(26) and contractual stipulation against reduction of kist on any circumstances. I am of the opinion that in the absence of a specific promise to supply any quantity of liquor demanded. expectation of making a good profit by doing business in liquor. will not give a substantive right to the licensees to claim against the Government on the ground of 'legitimate expectation'. Therefore. all the original petitions have no merit and are dismissed. 16. In two or three cases. 50% of the kist amount payable in April and June were stayed pending final result of the original petitions. In other writ petitions 50% of the kist amount payable for one month was stayed. In view of the decision in the original petitions. petitioners will be liable to pay the amount. In view of the facts and circumstances of these cases. I am of opinion that one month's time should be given for payment of the amount. If they pay the amount within one month from today. petitioners shall not be treated as defaulters.