JUDGMENT 1. - These petitions under section 482 Cr.P.C. raise common questions of law on identical facts. These were heard together and are now disposed of by this combined order. 2. The petitioners are licensed traders of agricultural produce, particularly "Tilhan Seeds". They carry on their business in the market yard of the "market area" at Bharatpur. The respondent is a body corporate, incorporated under section 8 and established under section 6 of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1961 (the Act) by the State Government for the better regulation of buying and selling of agricultural produce. 3. Sometimes in the years 1981-82 the Deputy Director, Krishi Marketing, Rajasthan inspected a number of oil mills, including the present petitioners, and found them to have engaged themselves in extracting oil from oil seeds and sold the same during the period between 19.8.1975 to 22.4.1977. It was noted by him that the petitioners were licensed to purchase and sell "oil-seeds" only and not to manufacture oil and sell the same. He further noted that though the petitioners had paid the prescribed market fees for dealing in oil-seeds. Yet they did not pay or paid less such fees in respect to the transactions of sale of oil. On scrutiny of the details of relevant transactions during the aforesaid period the following position was noted. S. No. Name of the petitioner Sale of oil Amount Fee payable Amount Fee paid Amount Fee unpaid Amount 1. M/s. Sri Om Industries & Oil Mills 1,23,941,89.00 1,23,941.89 39.42 1,23,902.47 2. M/s. Agrawal Oil Industries 38,962,15.00 38,962.15 140256 37,539.59 3. M/s. Bansal Industries & Oil Mills 71,979,02.00 71,979.02 1549.05 70,429.97 4. M/s. Suprabhat Industries & Oil Mills 42,437,43.00 42,437.43 379.94 42,037.44 The respondent was of the opinion that the petitioners ought to have paid market fee @ Re 1% per Rupees hundred on the sale of oil by them during the aforementioned period, which they failed to pay despite notices. Complaints for offence under section 17 punish-able under section 28 of the Act were, therefore, filed under section 32 by the Secretary to the respondent against the petitioners in the Court of a Magistrate at Bharatpur. Complaints for offence under section 17 punish-able under section 28 of the Act were, therefore, filed under section 32 by the Secretary to the respondent against the petitioners in the Court of a Magistrate at Bharatpur. However, the trial Court dismissed such complaints on the ground that since the charge of market fee on manufacture and sale of oil had been withdrawn and done away with much before the filing of the complaints against the petitioners, there were no sufficient grounds to proceed with their prosecutions. The proceedings were, therefore, dropped. On Revision applications having been preferred under section 397 Cr.P.C. by the respondent against the relevant orders of the learned Magistrate, the learned Special Judge disagreed with the Magistrate and held that since the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioners was a continuing offence within the meaning of Section 472 Cr.P.C. and the Magistrate was competent under section 473 Cr.P.C. to condone the delay, if any, committed in presenting the complaints in the Court of Magistrate, the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioners was bad in law. Aggrieved by such orders of the learned Special Judge/Addl. Sessions Judge, the present petitions have been preferred by the petitioners. 4. At the very outset it may be observed that since the relevant orders of the Magistrate were reversed by the learned Special Judge/Addl. Sessions Judge in exercise of powers under section 397(1) Cr.P.C. revisions under section 397(3) Cr.P.C. are maintainable against the impugned orders. These petitions are, therefore, directed to be treated as Revision Application under section 397(3) Cr.P.C. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners have advanced two fold arguments. In the first place it was urged that since the petitioners were licensed dealers in oil-seeds and paying the prescribed fees at the time of making purchase of such seeds, they were not liable to pay further market fee for, and at the time of, selling oil manufactured from the oil seeds. In the second place it was submitted that, if at all, the offence under section 17 was committed during the period between 19.8.1975 to 22.4.1977 and since the offence committed was not a continuing offence, and even if so, such offence ceased to be an offence at all w.e.f. 23.4.1977, no complaints for offence under section 17/28 could have been filed and maintained against them. Though the learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned orders yet I find ample force in the reasoning's of the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners. 6. It is not in dispute that the petitioners had been issued licences either under section 4(2) or Section 14(1)(ix) of the Act to deal in oil-seeds, as traders within the territorial jurisdiction of the market established under section 9 of the Act. It is also not in dispute that the petitioners had duly paid market fees at the point of making purchases of the oil-seeds by them during the period afore-mentioned. The controversy between the parties is with regard to the non-payment of market fees for manufacturing oil from the oil-seeds and selling the same by the petitioners during the period afore mentioned. The basis of the argument advanced in that respect on behalf of the respondent is the Notification No. F.(10)(2) Agr.(Gr.2/ 75 dated 19.8.1975 (S.O. No. 103). By this notification the State Government. had declared its intention of regulating the purchase and sale of the agricultural produce specified in Schedule (K) of the notification in such areas as were specified in Schedule (Kh). At S.No. 4 of Schedule (Ka) 'Tilhan and Tail" (oil-seeds and oil), of various kinds and variety were specified. At S.No. 3 of the Schedule (Kha) market area at Bharatpur was specified. Thus the respondent was authorised by the State Government to regulate the buying and selling of various agricultural produce including "oil-seeds and oil". It follows, therefore, that the respondent was entitled to charge fees under section 17 from the traders/dealers in respect to the buying and selling of oil-seeds. 7. A similar notification No. F-10(2)/Agr./Gr.11/75 dated 20.12.1975 S.O. No. 235, published in Rajasthan Gazette Part 4 (Ga) dated 20.12.1975 had also been issued in respect of ground- nut oil and vanaspati oil. 8. It is clear that the above notifications authorised the respondents to permit transactions of purchases and sales by the dealers/ traders in the market area in respect of the agricultural produce specified in the above notifications and accordingly charge market fee under section 17 from them. 9. It, however, appears that objections were raised by the dealers/traders of the agricultural produce, making purchases of the oil-seeds and paying market fees in respect to the transactions of purchases and sales of such seeds and extracting oil from the oil seeds. 9. It, however, appears that objections were raised by the dealers/traders of the agricultural produce, making purchases of the oil-seeds and paying market fees in respect to the transactions of purchases and sales of such seeds and extracting oil from the oil seeds. They appear to have contended that since oil was extracted from such oil seeds in respect to which fees had already been paid by them at the time of purchase of the oil seeds, charge of additional fee at the time of sale of the manufactured oil was not justified. After considering such objections the State Government took a decision not to charge market fees in respect to the manufacture of oil and sale thereof by those traders / dealers who had paid such fees at the time of making purchases of the oil-seeds. Therefore, by issuing Notification No. P-10(2)/Agr./Gr.11/ 75 S.O. No. 22 dated 23.4.1977 published in Rajasthan Gazette, Extra-ordinary Part 4, (Ga)(11) dated 23.4.1977 at page 28 (S.O. No. 22) the State Government amended and modified Schedule (Ka) of the earlier Notification dated 19.8.1975, referred to above, omitting "oil" from the details of agricultural produce mentioned at S.No. 4 of the said Schedule (Ka). The consequence of this amendment/modification was that payment of fees on the transactions of sale of oil, manufactured from the oil seeds in respect of which market fee under section 17 of the Act had already been paid was no longer necessary. In the complaints filed it is not the case of the respondents that the petitioners had effected sale of such oil which was not obtained by them from extraction of the oil seeds which they had purchased and paid market fees in respect thereto and that the oil sold by them had infact been purchased by them from others. 10. It is evident from the above discussion that whereas in the Schedule (Ka) of S.O. No. 103 dated 19.8.1975 the description of the agricultural produce at item No. 4 included both oil-seed and oil in respect of which the respondent was competent to charge market fee under section 17 of the Act, in S.O. No. 22 dated 23.4.1977 "oil-seeds" were taken out of the purview of the agricultural produce described as "Tilhan" at item No. (4). It means that with effect from 23.4.1977 the requirement of paying market fees on transactions of sale of oil by the dealers/traders, already paying market fee at the time of purchase of oil-seeds, with which the oil was manufactured, was done away with. It, therefore, follows that since 23.4.1977 onwards such dealers/traders were no longer liable to pay market fee under section 17 of the Act on the sale of oil in addition to the market fees payable and paid at the time of purchase of oil-seeds. Non- payment of fees on sale of manufactured oil was thus no longer an offence punishable u /s. 28 of the Act, with effect from 23.4.1977. But oil sold by the petitioners during the period between 19.8.1975 to 22.4.1977, during which period S.O. No. 103 dated 19.8.1975 was in force, attracted the liability of paying market fees u /s. 17 of the Act. Since the petitioners did not pay or paid less fees than that due from them, offence u /s. 17 of the Act was committed by them. The petitioners could have, therefore, been prosecuted for such offences committed during that period. At this stage the provisions contained in Section 28 may be noted. 11. The relevant part of Section 28 reads as under:- "Penalty for contravention of certain provisions:- (1) Whoever contravenes the provisions of Section 4 shall, on conviction, be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months and with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees and in case of a continuing contravention, with a further fine which may extend to five hundred rupees for every day during which the contravention is continued after the first conviction. (2) Any person who intentionally evades the payment of any market fee payable under section 17 shall, on conviction, be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months and with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. The Magistrate shall, in addition to any fine which may be imposed, recover summarily and pay to the market committee, the amount of market fees due and may, in his discretion, also recover summarily and pay to the market committee such amount, if any, as he may fix as the cost of prosecution. The Magistrate shall, in addition to any fine which may be imposed, recover summarily and pay to the market committee, the amount of market fees due and may, in his discretion, also recover summarily and pay to the market committee such amount, if any, as he may fix as the cost of prosecution. (3) xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx (4) Whoever contravenes any provision of this Act shall, if no other penalty is provided for the offence in this Act, be punished with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees." A plain reading of the above provision shows that the offence u /s. 17 is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months and with fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000/-. Looking to the nature of the offence and the quantum of sentence awarded-to-be for the commission of such offence, the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C. relating to the limitation for filing complaints in respect of certain offences, stand attracted to the offences committed, by the petitioners during the period between 19.8.1975 to 22.4.1977. Section 468-(b) Cr.P.C. prescribes a period of one year for filing complaints in respect to the offences punishable with three months imprisonment only. Since the offence under section 17 in relation to non-payment of market fee in respect of sale of oil ceased to be an offence after 23.4.1977 in terms of S.O. No. 22 dated 23.4.1977, reproduced above, the complaints, if any and if at all, could have been filed against the petitioners within the period prescribed under section 468 Cr.P.C. in that behalf. No complaint was admittedly filed during that period. In fact, the inspection itself was made by the Deputy Director in the year 1981-82, that is, almost 4 or 5 years after the offence of not paying market fees in respect of transactions of sale of oil manufactured by the petitioners had already ceased to be an offence. 12. Here it may be pointed out that the offence contemplated by Section 17 of the Act was not a continuing offence within the meaning of Section 472 Cr.P.C. In a continuing offence the cause of action for filing a complaint continues to arise or accrue day after day or month after month, as the case may be, untill the default or facts constituting that offence disappear. For example, kidnapping is a continuing offence. For example, kidnapping is a continuing offence. It continues to remain an offence till the kidnapped lady is recovered from the possession of the kidnapper. But abduction is not a continuing offence because the threat to use or use of criminal force disappears as soon as such threat or use of criminal force leads to the abduction of the person threatened. In the case of abduction, the offence is complete at the point of time the person is abducted as a result of the threat to use or use of criminal force against him. In the present case the act of commission of the offence under section 17 by the petitioners was completed on the day they did not pay market fees in respect to the transactions of sale of oil by them. The right of the respondents to recover such market fee or the arrears thereof from the petitioners was a right independent of the commission of that offence and was enforceable at law. Such a right of the respondent was not dependent upon the commission of offence punishable under section 17 of the Act. It is altogether immaterial whether the same set of facts, which gave rise to civil rights and liabilities of the parties, did also give rise to penal action under section 17. The same set of facts may give rise to rights for civil as well as criminal actions. Even if the words in the penal statute say that sentence of fine shall be imposable for the period the default of non-payment of prescribed fees continues it simply indicates that a measure or scale to quantify the amount of fine has been provided. Such a provision would not make the offence, which has already been completed and hence committed, a "continuing offence". The dependence of quantification of the fine imposable for the period during which the default of not paying the fees or arrears thereof, continued would not make the offence under section 17 a "continuing offence" for the purposes of Section 472 of the Cr.P.C., 1973. The offence under section 17 was committed at the point of time the sale of oil was made and the prescribed fee was not paid within the stipulated period, if any. Non-payment of the prescribed fees gave a right to the respondent to realise such fee. It would be a civil right. The offence under section 17 was committed at the point of time the sale of oil was made and the prescribed fee was not paid within the stipulated period, if any. Non-payment of the prescribed fees gave a right to the respondent to realise such fee. It would be a civil right. Dishonest retention of the amount of fee payable, would make it a criminal offence as "mens rea" is an essential requirement to constitute an offence, unless provided otherwise by the relevant statute. 13. To sum up, the liability to pay the arrear of the market fees by the petitioners was a civil liability and cannot be considered to be making a part of their criminal liability so as to make the offence under section 17 of the Act a continuing offence. In that sense of the matter since offence under section 17/28 was not a continuing offence so as to attract the provisions of Section 472 Cr.P.C. the complaints filed against the petitioners were clearly barred by limitation prescribed u /s. 468 Cr.P.C. 14. It is no doubt true that Section 473 confers power on the Magistrate to condone delay in filing the complaints. But since expiry of the period of limitation for taking action against a person results in loss of right to prosecute and creates a right in favour of such person for not to be prosecuted such person is required to be heard before an action is taken or an order is made in a way which amounts to the taking away of the right created in his favour. Therefore, for condoning the delay under section 473 Cr.P.C. it is necessary that the party in whose favour a right has been created by the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for taking action against him should be heard before an order to his dis-advantage is passed. If such a course is not considered practicable the complaint may be entertained and/or cognizance of offence may be taken against him subject to his right to oppose his summoning as an accused in the case on the ground of expiry of the prescribed limitation. Such a party has, therefore, every right to raise an objection regarding limitation after putting in appearance before the Court/authority concerned. 15. Such a party has, therefore, every right to raise an objection regarding limitation after putting in appearance before the Court/authority concerned. 15. In the above view of the matter, the learned Magistrate, in my opinion, had committed no error in holding that the complaints against the petitioners were not maintainable, in the facts and circumstances of the cases. In my opinion the orders passed by the learned Magistrate were not bad in law and, therefore, should not have been disturbed by the learned Special Judge/Addl. Sessions Judge in exercise of their revisory powers. 16. In the result, I hold that the learned Special Judge/Addl. Sessions Judge did not exercise the jurisdiction vested in them under section 397 Cr.P.C. correctly. The impugned orders are, therefore, liable to be set aside and are accordingly set aside. All the petitions are allowed, the orders of the Magistrate in all these cases restored and the complaints against them dismissed.The stay applications in all the petitions become infructuous and are accordingly dismissed.Revision allowed. *******