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1997 DIGILAW 353 (CAL)

Gurinder Jit Singh v. Union of India

1997-09-05

BARIN GHOSH

body1997
JUDGMENT Barin Ghosh, J. 1. The subject matter of this writ petition is a Confidential Report of the writ petitioner dated 30.9.1993 for the period between 28.5.1993 to 15.9.1993. 2. The petitioner is an Officer in the Indian Army. He presently holds the rank of Colonel. In three Annual Confidential Reports for the years 1990, 1991 and 1992, the petitioner got eight marks which signifies high performance. In the Interim Confidential Report for the period 1.9.1992 to 27.5.1993. He was also graded with eight marks. However, in the impugned Confidential Report for the period between 28.5.1993 and 15.9.1993 the petitioner received six marks. Then again in the Annual Confidential Reports of the petitioner for the years 1994, 1995 and 1996 he received eight marks. 3. It was and still is the case of the petitioner that the Initiating Officer, who Initiated the impugned Confidential Report, was Incompetent to initiate the same He also sought to justify that be was wrongfully given six marks This aspect of the matter was, however, not pressed at the hearing and, therefore, the complaint of the petitioner remained restricted to the competence of the Initiating Officer to initiate the impugned Confidential Report the petitioner bas contended that his statutory complaint made under Section 27 of the Army Act, 1950 against the impugned Confidential Report was unceremoniously rejected by a non-speaking order dated 14.5.1996, which has also been challenged in this writ petition. 4. Therefore, in short the petitioner is seeking to contend that an Officer having no competence to initiate Confidential Report of the petitioner, brought on record the impugned Confidential Report, which hat lowered the estimation of the capability of the petitioner, and despite statutory complaint In regard thereto having been made, the impugned Confidential Report has been permitted to be kept on record by a non-speaking order rejecting the said statutory complaint. 5. The petitioner contends that he has no other forum where he can ventilate his grievance in regard to the impugned Confidential Report, which according to the petitioner, is though nonest, but is a stumbling block to the advancement of his career in the Indian Army. 6. 5. The petitioner contends that he has no other forum where he can ventilate his grievance in regard to the impugned Confidential Report, which according to the petitioner, is though nonest, but is a stumbling block to the advancement of his career in the Indian Army. 6. The undisputed facts giving rise to the challenge of the competence of the Initialing Officer to initiate the impugned Confidential Report are as follows:- (i) The petitioner and his Battalion left their old location at Ranchi, in the State of Bihar, on 27.5.1993 by rail; (ii) The petitioner physically reported to the Initiating Officer at Baramulla, in the State of Jammu and Kashmir on 3.6.1993 and since then started to physically serve under him; (iii) During the period between 23.7.1993 and 7.8.1993 the Initiating Officer was on leave; (iv) By Signal No. A 1309 the petitioner was informed by the Initiating Officer that the Confidential Report of the petitioner is due on 1.9.1993 and therefore, he was requested to forward details of physical service forthwith; (v) Under cover of a letter dated 1.9.1993 the petitioner forwarded to the Initiating Officer details of his physical service under the Initiating Officer Indicating that he has physically served under the Initiating Officer for 73 days, which was arrived at without taking Into account seven days between 28.5.1993 and 3.6.1993 spent in transit for movement from Ranchi to Baramulla; (vi) Thereafter, as directed by the Initiating Officer, the petitioner once again submitted details of his physical service under cover of a letter dated 10.9.1993, showing that the petitioner physically served under the Initiating Officer during the period between 28.5.1993 and 22.7.1993, i.e. 56 days and during the period between 8.8.1993 and 10.9.1993, i. e., 34 days, aggregating to 90 days; (vii) As directed by the Signal dated 9.9.1993 the petitioner reported at Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium, New Delhi on 12.9.1993 to act as an official in ITC Athletic Meet held on 13/14.9.1993; (viii) On 15.9.1993 the petitioner proceeded on his annual leave from New Delhi; (ix) On 8.10.1993 the petitioner received from the Initiating Officer the extracts of Paragraphs 11, 12 and 18 of the petitioner's impugned Confidential Report along with a letter dated 1.10.1993 (wrongly typed as 1.9.1993) addressed to and sent at the petitioner's residence at Jalandhar Cantonment for his signature and onward submission; (x) Under cover of his letter dated 12.10.1993, the petitioner forwarded the extracts of Paragraphs 11, 12 and 18 of the impugned Confidential Report to the appropriate Military Authority at New Delhi after signing the same; (xi) Latter on the Initiating Officer extended the period of physical service of the petitioner under him by erasing the number "10" by white Ink and by substituting the same by the number "15" before the words Sep. "93" and by altering the number of days present in the same fashion in the subject details of physical service without referring to the petitioner, but authenticated the same by putting his initial and as a result it was shown that the petitioner physically served under the Initiating Officer for 95 days. i.e., 56 days from 28.5.1993 to 22.7.1993 and 39 days from 8.8.1993 to 15.9.1993, without, however, altering the caption, which remained unchanged, i.e., from 28.5.1993 to 15.9.1993; (xii) On 20.2.1995 the petitioner lodged his statutory complaint under Section 27 of the Army Act, 1950 when he was posted at Jalapahar; Darjeeling, in the State of West Bengal; (xiii) By the order dated 14.5.1996 the statutory complaint of the petitioner was rejected which was sent to and served upon the petitioner at Jalapahar, Darjeeling, in the State of West Bengal. 7. The petitioner had complained in the statutory complaint that the petitioner did not serve physically under the Initiating Officer for 90 days during the period between 28.5.1993 and 15.9.1993 and therefore, the impugned Confidential Report could not be initiated by the Initiating Officer and though he has served for more than 90 days under the Reviewing Officer during that period, the Reviewing Officer could not review the impugned Confidential Report as the same could not be initiated by the Initiating Officer. The petitioner has repeated the self same complain in the present petition. 8. In support of the said contention the petitioner has relied on Clauses 16 and 73 of the Special Army Order dated 3.2.1989, which read as follows:- "Minimum Qualifying Service for Initiation of CRs 16. The Officer reported upon must have physically served under the Officer initiating a CR mentioned at para 6 of this order for at least 90 days during the period covered by that report. The physical service of 90 days need not be continuous. Any temporary absence due to leave or temporary duty upto a maximum of ten days at a time either of the Initiating Officer or of the Officer reported upon, will reckon towards the physical service." "Initiation of an ACR or ICR by the RO 73. If an IO is unable to Initiate an ACR or an ICR which is otherwise due, the report will be Initiated by the RO provided the rates has rendered 90 days physical service under him. If an IO is unable to Initiate an ACR or an ICR which is otherwise due, the report will be Initiated by the RO provided the rates has rendered 90 days physical service under him. However, if the if is posted out and unable to Initiate an ICR, NOICR will be Initiated by the RO. Approval for Initiation of an ACR or ICR by RO will be accorded by the SRO (or officiating Incumbent)." 9. The petitioner also relied on Clauses 13 and 14 of the Instructions for Rendition of Confidential Reports for Officers, 1989, which are as follows:- "Physical Service and its Computation 13. Whether a CR is initiated by IO, RO (under the provisions of para 73 of SAO) or by an officiating incumbent (under the provisions of para 23 of SAO), it is essential that the ratee has rendered 90 days physical service with the Officer initiating the CR. The limit of 90 days is relaxable only in the following cases:- (a) Special CRs-As and when specifically mentioned (Section 6 refers). (b) Adverse CRs-Section 7 refers. 14. Physical service commences from the day ratee physically, reports and start serving with the IO. The physical service of 90 days need not be continuous. Any temporary absence due to leave, hospitalization or temporary duty upto a maximum of ten days at a time, either of the IO or of the Officer reported upon, will reckon towards the physical service. Following clarifications are offered which may be taken note of while computing physical service for the purpose of initiation of confidential reports. (a) Period spent as Officer-in-Charge Advance Party at the New Station is to be counted towards physical service. The Officer while performing these duties, functions under the command of his Officer Commanding and is accountable to the latter for all his activities. Hence this period will count towards physical service. (b) Sundays/holidays which are allowed to be prefixed/suffixed to the period of leave duly sanctioned, will not Court toward physical service if total period of absence exceeds 10 days. (c) When absence of the ratee or the Officer Initiating the report is followed immediately by absence of the other and the total absence together (including concurrent periods, if any) is 10 days or more, such periods will need to be discounted for computing physical service." 10. (c) When absence of the ratee or the Officer Initiating the report is followed immediately by absence of the other and the total absence together (including concurrent periods, if any) is 10 days or more, such periods will need to be discounted for computing physical service." 10. In addition to that, the petitioner has relied on the letter No. 32301/34/P/MS 4 Coord dated 29.1.1992 Issued on behalf of the Military Secretary's Branch, which is as follows:- "Headquarters Southern Command Eastern Command Western Command Central Command Northern Command ARTRAC COMPUTATION OF PHYSICAL SERVICE FOR INITIATION OF CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS: OFFICERS. 1. In accordance with para 16 of SAO 3/S/89 an Officer is required to physically serve under the Officer initiating a CR for a minimum of 90 day during the period covered by that report. The physical service commences from the day the ratee physically reports and starts serving with the Officer required to Initiate the CR. The physical service need not be continuous and any temporary absence due to leave, temporary duty or hospitalization for more than ten days, either of the Officer initiating the CR or the ratee will be discounted for computing physical service. The limit of 90 days is relatable only in case of adverse/special reports as contained. In para 18 of SAO 3/S/89. 2. Though paras 16 to 18 of SAO 3/S/89 and paras 13 to 16 of Instructions for Rendition of Confidential Reports for Officers, 1989 adequately explain the manner in which the 90 days physical service is to be computed, a number of doubts still persist in the minds of Officers. It has therefore become necessary to issue the following clarifications for computation of physical service:- (a) Sundays/holidays which are allowed to be prefixed/suffixed to the period of leave will not count towards physical service if the total period of absence exceeds 10 days. (b) The transit period spent by an Officer during the course of his journey from unit/ formation to transit camp, railhead or airhead and vice versa is required to be added to his period of absence on leave/temporary duty, and if the combined period exceeds 10 days it is to be discounted from physical service. (c) The handing/taking over period is not to be discounted for computation of physical service. (c) The handing/taking over period is not to be discounted for computation of physical service. (d) Absence of the ratee immediately followed by the absence of Initiating Officer or vice versa, will be discounted for computing physical service if the combined absence (including concurrent period, if any) is more than 10 days. (e) Period spent as Officer-in-Charge Advance Patty at the new station is to be counted towards physical service. 3. It is further clarified that in case the ratee has a difference of opinion with his Initiating Officer regarding the rule position for initiation of his CR, he will neither refuse nor delay submission of his CR form to his Initiating Officer. In such cases, he can formally represent to the higher authorities within the stipulated to days period against the admissibility of the CR on technical grounds. 4. It is requested that the contents of this letter may be disseminated to all concerned under lour jurisdiction." 11. Relying on the aforementioned regulations and clarifications the petitioner contended that he did not physically serve the Initiating Officer who initiated the impugned Confidential Report for a period of 90 days and therefore, the Initiating Officer had no competence or authority to initiate the impugned Confidential Report. In this connection, he relied on the following table showing his physical service under the Initiating Officer who had initiated the Impugned Confidential Report. 12. The petitioner has contended that he had a statutory right to complain against such wrongful action which is embodied in Section 27 of the Army Act, 1950. Section 27 of the Army Act, 1950 is as follows:- "27. Remedy of aggrieved Officers.-Army Officer who deems himself wronged by his Commanding Officer or any Superior Officer and who on due application made to his Commanding Officer does not receive the redress to which he considers himself entitled, may complain to the Central Government. In such manner as may from time to time be specified by the proper authority." 13. The petitioner contended that the proper authority has specified the manner of making statutory complaint 18 respect of Confidential Reports. In this connection the petitioner relied on Clauses 107, 108, 109, 110 and 111 contained in Part VIII of Special Army Order, 1989, which read as follows:- "REPRESENTATIONS AGAINST CRs AND SUPERSESSION 107. The petitioner contended that the proper authority has specified the manner of making statutory complaint 18 respect of Confidential Reports. In this connection the petitioner relied on Clauses 107, 108, 109, 110 and 111 contained in Part VIII of Special Army Order, 1989, which read as follows:- "REPRESENTATIONS AGAINST CRs AND SUPERSESSION 107. An Officer who considers himself wronged due to supersession or by any Reporting Officer in a CR may seek redress by making a representation to his superior military authorities, or a statutory complaint to the Central Government under Army Act Section 27 as the case may be in accordance with the procedure laid down. In para 361 of the Regulations for the Army (as amended) and Army Order, 137/77 and 119/80. 108. All representations and complaints will be submitted within 60 days after the date of communication of the remarks to the Officer concerned. Under exceptional circumstances, this period may extend to 90 days. A representation or complaint submitted more than 60 days after the communication of the remarks to the Officer concerned should be accompanied by reasons for delay. The intermediate authorities will not withhold a representation merely on account of delay in submission and will comment on the justification or otherwise of reasons for delay. In case of time barred non-statutory complaints, if the reasons for delay are not convincing, such complaints can be rejected on this count by the competent authority. 109. A representation or complaint must reach Army Headquarters not later than 60 days from the date of its submission by the Complainant. No intermediate authority will held up the complaint for more than 10 days. In case of delay a report explaining in detail, the reasons for delay will be forwarded to the next higher authority. Channel of Representation 110. All complaints against Supersession and CRs will be forwarded by the Officer's unit direct to the Command HQ in which he is presently serving. Each representation against CRs will be commented upon parawise by the Officer against whose remarks the representation is made and commented upon by all other Superior Reporting Officers in the chain of reporting while complaints against Supersession will be forwarded to, the MS Branch With the recommendations of the GOC-In-C. Requests are frequently received from Reporting Officers for copy of their assessment for giving parawise comments. As per the present policy CTCs of CRs are not sent to Reporting Officers. 111. In case an Officer wishes to represent against his Confidential Report earned from some previous unit. In a different command, the complaint will still be forwarded direct by the Officer's unit to the Command in which he is presently serving. The Command HQ will then be responsible for obtaining comments of the Reporting Officers In the chain. Before forwarding the complaint, the Commanding Officer or the Formation Commander will ensure that the complaint conforms to the procedure laid down in para 361 of the Regulations for the Army 1962 (as amended) and Army Orders 137/77 and 119/80. The complaint should not be unnecessarily held up due to this but forwarded with the necessary endorsement. On receipt of the complaint, the concerned command Headquarters will process it as per para 110 above. In case the complaint is required to be forwarded to the MS Branch, Army Headquarters the same will be accompanied by the recommendations of the GOC-in-C Command HQ concerned even though he was not holding the appointment during the subject reporting period." 14. the petitioner bas submitted that para 361 of the Regulations for the Army referred to in Clause 107 of the Special Army Order, 1989 is now para 364 of the Regulations for the Army and the same, as applicable, provides, inter alia, as follows:- 364. COMPLAINTS General 1. Complaints may be of two kinds: - (a) Statutory Complaints. These are made under the provisions of Army Act Sections 26 and 27 by the following. (ii) Any Officer who deems himself wronged by his Commanding Officer or any other Superior Officer. (b) Non-statutory Complaints. These can be made under the authority of the Army order on the subject when the complainant considers himself wronged by any authority, other than those mentioned in sub para (a) above and is not covered under Arm, Act Sections 26 and 27. Statutory Complaints 2. Number and Extent. An Officer bas the right to complain to the General Government, JCOs, WOs and OR can complain only to the COAS and not to the Central Government. Procedure for submission and Channel to be followed 3. Statutory complaints will be addressed to the following authorities:- (a) The Central Government by Officers. (b) The COAS by JCOs. WOs and OR. 4. An Officer bas the right to complain to the General Government, JCOs, WOs and OR can complain only to the COAS and not to the Central Government. Procedure for submission and Channel to be followed 3. Statutory complaints will be addressed to the following authorities:- (a) The Central Government by Officers. (b) The COAS by JCOs. WOs and OR. 4. All statutory complaints will be made through proper channel as given in para 5 below. In order to facilitate all Intermediary formations and Army Headquarters to closely monitor the progress of statutory complaints the Commanding Officer of the complainant shall forward an advance copy of the complaint to all the intermediary formation Headquarters and concerned Branches or Directorates and CAB (in respect of Officers only) at Army Headquarters immediately. Advance copy of complaints on DV matters will not be endorsed to CAB but only to D&V Dte (DV-4), Arm, Headquarters. The complainant must desist from writing directly to Army Headquarters or the Central Government with regard to progress of the case. However, If the final decision on the statutory complaint with or without accusations against any Superior Officer as mentioned in sub-para (9) below, is not taken within a period of 12 months or 9 months respectively, from the date such a complaint is submitted, the complainant will have a right to represent directly to Army Headquarters or the Central Government as the case may be after informing his Commanding Officer. 5. The following channels will be followed while forwarding statutory complaints:- (a) Company commander or other immediate superior. (b) Commanding Officer. (c) Brigade Commander or the Sub-Area Commander. (d) Divisional Commander or Area Commander. (e) GOC Corps where applicable. (f) GOC in-C Command. (g) COAS. (b) Central Government (in case of Officers only). Action by the Intermediary Authorities 10. The immediate superior authority in chain will offer his detailed parawise comments on the complaint. He will also ensure that the stipulations made in paras 8 and 9 above have been complied with. In case any of the conditions mentioned below is not satisfied he will withhold the complaint and Inform the next superior authority and the complainant the reasons for withholding the complaint:- (a) That the complaint is complete in all respects and is in correct form. (b) That the complaint is not couched in discourteous, disrespectful or improper language. In case any of the conditions mentioned below is not satisfied he will withhold the complaint and Inform the next superior authority and the complainant the reasons for withholding the complaint:- (a) That the complaint is complete in all respects and is in correct form. (b) That the complaint is not couched in discourteous, disrespectful or improper language. (c) That the complaint does not contain official documents and correspondence, access to which does not have any formal authority. 12. An Intermediary authority will examine the complaints set forth by the complainant and may take any of the following actions:- (a) Where the intermediary authorities arrive at the view, after due examination, that only a partial redress will meet the ends of Justice, the same may be granted by the authority concerned. In such cases, the Intermediary authority granting such redress will further call upon the complainant to express as to whether he desires to withdraw the complaint in view of the partial redress granted, within 90 days and if he gives such concurrence it will be communicated to all concerned and the complaint closed. (b) Where the intermediary authority decides to grant full redress sought by the complainant, he shall be suitably informed. The next higher authority to the authority granting such relief will be kept informed of the grant of redress. Such cases will not be forwarded to the authority to whom the complaint is addressed. (c) Where the redress prayed for is not given at all, the intermediary authority will forward the complaint along with his comments and recommendations through normal channels to the authority to whom the complaint is addressed for final disposal. Final disposal of Complaints 17. Orders of the authority disposing of the complaint will be communicated to the complainant through normal channels. However, a copy of the orders will also be endorsed direct to the complainant by the disposing authority which will be acknowledged by the individual directly to the authority disposing of the complaint. In addition, the formation/unit concerned will also. Inform the Branch concerned at Army Headquarters, in writing that a copy of the order has been handed over to the Individual Procedure for Processing Statutory Complaints at Army Headquarters 19. Officers. Central Government exercises the powers under Army Act Section 27. In addition, the formation/unit concerned will also. Inform the Branch concerned at Army Headquarters, in writing that a copy of the order has been handed over to the Individual Procedure for Processing Statutory Complaints at Army Headquarters 19. Officers. Central Government exercises the powers under Army Act Section 27. The statutory complaints of Officers are processed to the COAS through CAB (accept statutory Complaints on Dy matters) by the respective Directorate/Branches at Army Headquarters. In cage the COAS grants partial or full redress to the complainant, procedure as per paras 12 and 17 respectively will be followed. In other cases the complaint will be forwarded to the Central Government after obtaining the recommendations of the COAS." 15. The petitioner has contended that In accordance with the manner specified by the proper authority for making statutory complaints against Confidential Reports, he had submitted his statutory complaint against the Impugned Confidential Report this statutory complaint of the petitioner, It is contended, was forwarded to the Command in which the petitioner was serving at the time of making the complaint The Command Headquarter of the petitioner then processed and took further steps in respect of the said statutory complaint In terms of tile prescribed procedure. Ultimately the petitioner was served with the rejection order dated 14.5.1996, which reads as follows:- "No. 36501/1810/Inf/95/MS Comp/1996/D (MS) Government of India, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi, 14.5.1996 ORDER The Central Government, after considering the statutory complaint dated 20.2.1995 submitted by IC 32016Y, Col. G.J. Singh, Infantry against his CR 5/93-9/93 and after examination of relevant records, is satisfied that no injustice has been done to him In this regard. His statutory complaint is, therefore, rejected. By order and in the name of the President (R.K. Kalla) Under Secretary to the Government of India To, The Chief of the Army Staff (in quadruplicate) for communication to the Officer through the staff channels with the necessary administrative instructions and for further action In accordance with the existing procedure." 16. The petitioner has contended that the order of rejection of the statutory complaint of the petitioner do not contain any reason whatsoever. The petitioner bas further contended that the sentence The Central Government. The petitioner has contended that the order of rejection of the statutory complaint of the petitioner do not contain any reason whatsoever. The petitioner bas further contended that the sentence The Central Government. after considering the statutory complaint, and after examination of relevant records is satisfied that no injustice bas been done to him in this regard, is in fact, the conclusion and even assuming that the same is the reason for the order, it does not take Into account the most fundamental aspect of the complaint of the petitioner that is the very incompetence of the Initiating Officer to initiate the Impugned Confidential Report. It was contended by the petitioner that satisfaction as to no injustice can at the best be attributed to the substance of the remarks made in the impugned Confidential Report, but net as to the validity of the impugned Confidential Report, which was the main complain of the petitioner. 17. The petitioner contended that since the concerned Initiating Officer had no competence to initiate the impugned Confidential Report, the same is nonest and therefore, whether the comments made therein were justified or not are become irrelevant. It was contended that justifications as to the comments made in the Impugned Confidential Report could be investigated and the authority concerned could satisfy Itself In regard thereto only after concluding that the impugned Confidential Report was a valid Confidential Report. That having not been done, the petitioner con tended that the authorities concerned failed to discharge their statutory obligation. 18. The petitioner contended that he is entitled to the relief's prayed for in the petition Inasmuch as it is crystal clear that the Initiating Officer who initiate the impugned Confidential Report had no authority or competence to initiate the same and the statutory authority has utterly failed to consider that aspect of the matter. 19. On the other hand, the respondents, including the concerned Initiating Officer, in a joint affidavit-in-opposition have contended that the petitioner was not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in any event, the petitioner is guilty of delay and latches in approaching this Court. 19. On the other hand, the respondents, including the concerned Initiating Officer, in a joint affidavit-in-opposition have contended that the petitioner was not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in any event, the petitioner is guilty of delay and latches in approaching this Court. On merits it was contended that the petitioner physically served under the Initiating Officer for 111 days from 28.5.1993 to 15.9.1993 of which 16 days from 23.7.1993 to 7.8.1993, when the Initiating Officer was on leave, can at the most be deducted and therefore, there is no doubt that the petitioner physically served under the Initiating Officer for 95 days. It was contended by the respondents that even if for argument sake if the period is to be calculated upto 10.9.1993 and not upto 15.9.1993 even then. It is crystal clear that the petitioner admittedly served physically for 90 days under the Initiating Officer and therefore, the Initiating Officer had full authority and competence to initiate the impugned Confidential Report. 20. On account of jurisdiction of this Court, it was urged on behalf of the respondents that the impugned Confidential Report was made at Baramulla in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This was forwarded ultimately to the Army Headquarter at New Delhi the impugned Confidential Report had been kept and still is lying at the Army Headquarter, New Delhi. None of the respondents are within the jurisdiction of this Court. The statutory complaint was made to the Central Government at New Delhi and mere communication of the decision of the Central Government on the statutory complaint to the petitioner at Jalapahar, Darjeeling in the State of West Bengal, is no part of the cause of action to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. 21. On the ground of delay and latches, it was contended that the impugned Confidential Report is dated 30.9.1993, the contents whereof was admittedly communicated to the petitioner on 8.10.1993 and the same was signed and forwarded by the petitioner on 12.10.1993, but the statutory complaint was made on 20.2.1995, i.e., after 18 months. Then again the statutory complaint was rejected by an order dated 14.5.1996 but the instant writ petition was filed in April 1997. There is no explanation for the delay in filling the instant writ petition. Then again the statutory complaint was rejected by an order dated 14.5.1996 but the instant writ petition was filed in April 1997. There is no explanation for the delay in filling the instant writ petition. It was urged that the conduct of the petitioner demonstrates that he had been negligent in pursuing the remedy. 22. On merits it was urged by the respondents that the period from 28.5.1993 to 3.6. 1993, i.e., 7 days should be taken to the physical service of the petitioner under the Initiating Officer in terms of Clause 2(b) of the letter No. 32301/34/P/MS 3 Coord dated 29.6.1993. 23. In support of the contention that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition, the learned Counsel for the respondents cited before me a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Swaika Properties, AIR 1985 SC 1289 , where it was held that mere service of notice under Rajasthan Act for acquisition of land situate in Rajasthan, does not give rise to any cause of action in West Bengal. 24. The learned Counsel for the respondents then cited a judgment of a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case of Lt. Col. K.C. Sinha vs. Union of India, 1996 Lab IC 2503, where the writ petitioner made a representation for setting aside the adverse remarks and for considering his case afresh for selection to a higher rank but the same was rejected and the Court held that since the adverse entry was made beyond the jurisdiction and since unjustified denial of promotion wall also occurred outside the jurisdiction the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. The Court repelled the contention that the effect of denial of promotion was felt at Bareilly within jurisdiction by saying that it is also without substance. However, the Court observed "the place where the effect of an action or inaction is felt is no part of the cause of action." The Court further observed that the petitioner is at present posted at Bareilly and therefore, be made representation from Bareilly and the communication about rejection of representation was also received at Bareilly are irrelevant since neither the posting, nor the discharge of representation and receipt of the communication regarding rejection of the representation forms essential part of the cause of action. 25. 25. The learned Counsel for the respondents then cited an unreported judgment of a Division Bench of Himachal Pradesh High Court dated 1.10.1996 delivered in the case of Brig. Malkia Singh Dullat vs. Union of India, CWP No. 506 of 1996, where the writ petitioner had approached the High Court for his non-selection for promotion to the rank of Major General by a Selection Board held on 21/22.1.1994, and where the petitioner had contended that the reason for his non selection was his ACRs for the period 30.12.1992 to 30.6.1996 and 1.7.1993 to 30.6.1994 which were initiated at Damana near Jammu, in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The facts of the case revealed that the writ petitioner therein filed a non statutory complaint against the 2nd ACR on 30.9.1994, which was partially accepted by an order dated 20.4.1995. He bad also preferred a statutory complaint against his supersession to the rank of Major General, which was rejected by an' order dated 11.10.1995. The petitioner had challenged both the aforementioned orders in the writ petition. The Court found that the impugned ACRs were for period when the petitioner was posted at Damana, wherefrom be bad preferred a non-statutory complaint and the order passed thereon was communicated to the petitioner before he had joined at Simla. It was also found by the Court that the petitioner was considered but not selected for promotion to the rank of Major General and the said decision was also conveyed to him before be had joined at Simla Similarly his statutory complaint against such decision was filed before he bad joined Simla, but the order rejecting his statutory complaint was communicated to him at Simla. In those factual background, the Court held that the service of the order rejecting the statutory complaint of the petitioner at Simla did not give fresh came of action and even subsequence reconsideration of the case by the Review Selection Board and communication of its order at Simla is not necessary for giving the petitioner relief sought for in respect of the disputed ACRs, the order rejecting thereon statutory complaint, non-selection for promotion to the rank of Major General and the order rejecting the statutory complaint. 26. 26. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents next cited a Single Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Yaqub Ali vs. Union of India, 1996 MLJ 12 , where the writ petitioner bad challenged an order discharging him from service on the ground of unlikely to become an efficient Officer. On facts the Court found that the petitioner was recruited at Kirkee in Maharashtra and was also discharged from service at Kirkee, Maharashtra. The information for discharge too was given in the State of Maharashtra the Court, thus, held simply because the petitioner has started residing in the State of Rajasthan the jurisdiction of Rajasthan Court cannot be invoked. The contention that the representation made by ex-soldier. In the State of Rajasthan will give jurisdiction to the Rajasthan Court was repelled by holding that giving of facility of filing petition of representation. In Rajasthan was only to facilitate transmission of the petition of representation to the appropriate place where the final decision is to be taken and such appropriate place was Maharashtra. 27. The learned Counsel for the respondents lastly cited a judgment of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Daya Shankar Bharadwaj vs. Chief of the Air Staff, AIR 1988 All 36 , where the writ petitioner had challenged an order of supersession and sought a direction to decide the representation made by him and to give him higher status As a fact It was found that the petitioner was posted at Madras when he was superseded. It was also found as a fact that the petitioner was never posted in the State of Uttar Pradesh. In those background, the Court held that no cause of action arose. In the State of Uttar Pradesh which could entitle the petitioner to approach Allahabad High Court to issue a direction to a patty whose office is situate in Delhi. 28. On the other hand on the point of jurisdiction, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner cited two Division Bench judgments of this Court delivered in the cafe of Umasankar Chatterjee vs. Union of India, 1982 (2) SLR 724, and in the case of Punjab National Bank vs. Dillp Kumar Dey, 1987 (1) Cal LJ 702. 28. On the other hand on the point of jurisdiction, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner cited two Division Bench judgments of this Court delivered in the cafe of Umasankar Chatterjee vs. Union of India, 1982 (2) SLR 724, and in the case of Punjab National Bank vs. Dillp Kumar Dey, 1987 (1) Cal LJ 702. He also cited a judgment of a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court delivered In the case of Union of India vs. P. Kunhabdulla, 1984 (3) SLR 426, a judgment of a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court delivered. In the case of Modern Food Industries vs. M.D. Juvekar, 1988 (2) SLR 659, and a Single Bench judgment of the Rajasthan High Court In the case of Jaglal Singh vs. Union of India, 1996 Lab IC 905. He also cited a judgment of a Single Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Prabhu Dayal vs. State of Rajasthan, 1995 Lab IC 94. All these judgments were concerned with termination of service except the judgment in the case of Punjab National Bank It was held. In those judgments that the termination takes effect on service of the termination order and if such order is served within the jurisdiction of a High Court that High Court can entertain a writ petition challenging such termination In the case of Punjab National Bank, where an order of suspension was challenged which remained operative for about 12 years, the Division Bench held that according to the orders issued by the appropriate authority the Bank Administration was obliged to review the situation and to decide if continuation of suspension is desirable. The writ petitioner in that case, after having been suspended, was residing within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court to the knowledge of the Bank. He was entering into correspondence from his place of residence with the Head Office of the Bank in Delhi, which were being replied by the Bank at his address within the jurisdiction where the decision on his prayer for revocation of suspension were being communicated. He was also permitted to draw his suspension allowance from a Bank situate at Calcutta. In those circumstance this Court held that it had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the said writ. 29. He was also permitted to draw his suspension allowance from a Bank situate at Calcutta. In those circumstance this Court held that it had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the said writ. 29. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also cited a Division Bench judgment of the Mysore High Court delivered in the case of Dr. P.S. Rao vs. Union of India, 1972 SLR 791, where the writ petitioner prayed for a direction to promote him to the post of Director, Biological Research. In the Forest Research Institute and College situate at Dehara Dun. The respondents in that case were all outside the jurisdiction of the Mysore High Court. The main contention in the petition was that the holding of the post of Head of Utilization Research at the Forest Research Laboratory at Bangalore, which post the petitioner was holding, entitled the petitioner to t be relief sought for in the writ petition and therefore, the writ petition was maintainable In the High Court at Mysore. The High Court accepted the contention. 30. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also cited a judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court delivered in the case of L.V. Veeri Chettiar vs. Sales Tax Officer, Bombay, AIR 1971 Madras 155, where it was held that the Impact on the addressee caused by a notice of a Taxing Authority and his proposal to assess relate to that bundle of facts which entitle a party to make a legal proceeding and thus the writ petition was maintainable in the High Court at Madras sine: the writ petitioner received the notice of the Taxing Authority of Bombay to assess tax at Madras. 31. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also cited a Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court delivered in the case of Damomal Kausomal Raisinghani vs. Union of India, AIR 1967 Bombay 355, where tile Court held that if the effect of the order by governmental authority at Delhi falling on the petitioner at Bombay then the Bombay High Court can entertain the petition challenging the action of such authority. 32. 32. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also cited a Division Bench judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Management, K.V. Bank Ltd vs. K.V. Bank Employees Union, Bangalore, where It was held that the dispute in question relates to the payment of higher bonus to the employees of the Bank and such bonus covers the employees who were serving. In the Branch Offices at the Bank in Karnataka, who were also claiming the same, and as such part of the cause of action has arisen in the State of Karnataka and therefore, Karnataka High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the subject writ petition. 33. The learned Counsel for the petitioner last cited a judgment of a Single Bench of the Sikkim High Court delivered in the case of Lt. Col. Mahavir Singh vs. Union of India, 1996 Lab IC 2198, where the writ petitioner prayed for a direction to Include his name in the select category of Officers and to treat him at par with the Officers of 1972 batch and also to promote him to the rank of Colonel as well to expunge all adverse entries, if any, from the record of the petitioner. From the facts of that case it appears that the candidature of the writ petitioner in that case for promotion to the rank of Colonel was rejected whereupon his case was to be considered and reviewed again by the Selection Board but the same had to be withdrawn since a particular Confidential Report of the petitioner was not on record. Thereafter however the candidature of the petitioner was considered and reviewed by another Selection Board but was not approved for promotion and thereupon the petitioner was informed that since he had not been approved for promotion on three occasions, he was not eligible for further consideration for promotion, which meant that the petitioner would retire from his present status of Lt Col. The petitioner made a statutory complaint against his supersession but before any decision thereon was taken, he had filed the writ petition. That statutory complaint was rejected during the pendency of the writ petition. The petitioner made a statutory complaint against his supersession but before any decision thereon was taken, he had filed the writ petition. That statutory complaint was rejected during the pendency of the writ petition. the respondents in that writ petition challenged the territorial jurisdiction of Sikkim High Court to entertain the said writ petition which was repelled by the High Court by observing as follows:- "The petitioner is posted in Sikkim since April 1993 and it was here in Sikkim that he received orders of the various Selection Boards. He had filed the statutory complaint while he was posted in Sikkim and the rejection of the statutory complaint was also communicated to him in Sikkim. Therefore, considering the authorities relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. I am of the view that as a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court, this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition." 34. How relevant is part of the cause of action in the matter of entertainment of writ petitions is the question. I seek to answer the same in the manner following. 35. Clauses 1 and 2 of Article 226 of the Constitution of India are as follows:- "I. Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which It exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority Including in appropriate Cases, any Government, within those territories, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. 2. The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction In relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories." 36. Clause 2 of Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a subsequent insertion, which was originally inserted as Clause 1(A). Clause 2 of Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a subsequent insertion, which was originally inserted as Clause 1(A). The reason therefore is as follows:- "Under the existing Article 226 of the Constitution the only High Court which has jurisdiction with respect to the Central Government is the Punjab High Court. This Involves considerable hardship to litigants from distant places, It is, therefore, proposed to amend Article 226 so that when any relief is sought against any Government, authority or person for any action taken, the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises may also have jurisdiction to issue appropriate directions, orders or writs." 37. The effect of Clauses 1 and 2 of Article 226 of the constitution of India has been explained by the Supreme Court In the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu & other, 1994 (4) SCC 711 , in the manner as follows:- "On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the came of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order/or writ or issued is not within the said territories." 38. Therefore, there is no doubt that if a part of the cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court that High Court can entertain a writ petition seeking exercise of power by the High Court under Clause 1 of the Constitution against any governmental authority or person whose seat may not be within the jurisdiction of that High Court. 39. The words cause of action have not been defined in or by the Constitution of India or by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 39. The words cause of action have not been defined in or by the Constitution of India or by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In the case of State of Rajasthan (supra) (at Paragraph 8) the Supreme Court has expressed what is a cause of action in the manner as follows:- "In other words it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a tight to relief against the defendant." The Supreme Court in that case considered the facts of the case and at Paragraph 7 of the Report observed as follows:- "Upon these facts we are satisfied that the cause of action neither wholly or in part arose within the territorial limits of the Calcutta High Court and therefore, the learned Single Judge bad no jurisdiction to issue a rule nisi on the petition filed by the respondents under Article 226 of the Constitution." The Supreme Court thereupon observed at Paragraph 8 of the Report as follows:- "The more service of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents at the registered office at 18/B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta, i.e., within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal could not give rise to the cause of action within that territory unless the service of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land under Section 52(2) of the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan, i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench. The answer to the question whether service of notice is an integral part of the cause of action within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to the cause of action. The notification dated 8.2.1994 issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act became effective the moment it was published in the official gazettee as thereupon the notified land became vested. In the State Government free from all encumbrances. The notification dated 8.2.1994 issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act became effective the moment it was published in the official gazettee as thereupon the notified land became vested. In the State Government free from all encumbrances. It was not necessary for the respondents to plead the service or-notice on them by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur under Section 52(2) for the ground of an appropriate writ, direction or order under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notification passed by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act. If the respondents felt aggrieved by the acquisition of their land situate at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the validity of the notification issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under Section 52(1) of the Act by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the remedy of the respondents for the ground of such relief had to be sought by filing such a petition before the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the cause of action wholly or in part arose." 40. Similarly in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission (supra), the Supreme Court held:- "Therefore, merely because it read the advertisement in Calcutta and submitted offer from Calcutta and made representations from Calcutta would not, in our opinion, constitute facts forming an Integral part of the cause of action. So also the mere fact that it sent FAX messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action." 41. In the same paragraph the Supreme Court further held:- "Besides the FAX messages of 15.1.1993, cannot be construed as conveying rejection of the offer as that fact occurred on 27.1 1993." 42. In ascertaining cause of action one has always to bear in mind that there is a difference between "right of action" and "cause of action". A right or action, i.e. right to seek remedy arises as soon as there is an invasion of rights to enforce a cause of action, i.e. the inaction or action giving rise to the invasion. An integral part of the cause of action is a part of such inaction or action. 43. A right or action, i.e. right to seek remedy arises as soon as there is an invasion of rights to enforce a cause of action, i.e. the inaction or action giving rise to the invasion. An integral part of the cause of action is a part of such inaction or action. 43. There is no doubt that in the case at hand the rejection of the statutory notice gave a right of action to the petitioner, but the question is whether while exercising such right of action by filing the present petition, is the petitioner enforcing a cause of action a part of which arose within the jurisdiction of it is Court? 44. The subject matter of the present writ petition is the Impugned Confidential Report. In other words, the subject matter of complaint. In the present writ petition is the action or inaction of the concerned authorities in relation to or in respect of the concerned Confidential Report. A Confidential Report is an assessment of an Officer by his superiors to be kept and maintained. In the dossier of the concerned Officer to be looked at on any future date or dates to evaluate the efficiency of that Officer. A Confidential Report is a mere paper and remains so until. It is looked at by someone else for the purpose of evaluating the efficiency of the Officer concerned. It, however, remains a part of the concerned Officer wherever he may be and in what position he may be until he retires from the active service during the performance of which such Confidential Report came into being. Therefore, a Confidential Report always remains a great concern for the Officer concerned. The making of the same by an incompetent person will certainly invade the rights of the Officer concerned. 45. In the instant case the Confidential Report was initiated at Baramulla in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which got authenticated at Jalandhar, in the State of Punjab, when the same was signed by the petitioner and it became perfected when it reached Army Headquarters at New Delhi and was put in the dossier of the petitioner maintained threat. 46. Mere making of the Confidential Report did not give any right of action to the petitioner. 46. Mere making of the Confidential Report did not give any right of action to the petitioner. The moment the petitioner thought that the very making of the Confidential Report interfered with any right or interest of the petitioner, that thought gave a right of action to the petitioner this thought could give rise only when the Confidential Report was sent to him for signature and authentication At that stage, however, he could not refuse to sign and authenticate the Confidential Report since the same would have been contrary to rules and regulations and would have tantamounted to rebellion. Therefore, although knowledge of making of the Confidential Report gave a right of action to the petitioner but that right of action was not a right to commence an action in any writ Court. That only gave a right to the petitioner to commence an action by making a statutory complaint. 47. In order to make such statutory complaint the petitioner was bound by the manner of making such complaint as specified. In accordance with the manner so prescribed by the Special Army Order, 1989 the petitioner was obliged to take certain steps and the authorities concerned were required to take certain steps. In accordance with para 364 of the Regulations for Army as revised upto 1987 the petitioner was required to forward his statutory complaint to Brigade Commander or the Sub area Commander. In terms of para 111 of the Special Army Order, 1989 the statutory complaint was required to be forwarded to the Command Headquarters in which he was serving at the time of making such statutory complaint and not to the Command Headquarter where he was serving when the concerned Confidential Report was made. The Command Headquarter, to which the statutory complaint was to be forwarded, then became obliged to obtain para wise comment of the officer against whose remarks the complaint has been made as well as comments from an other superior Reporting Officers in the chain of reporting and thereupon to forward the same to the Commanding Officer or the Formation Commander and before doing so to ensure that the complaint conforms to the procedure laid down in para 364 of the Regulations for the Army, 1937. In discharging such obligation the Command Headquarter will not act as a mere post office, but will be required, by the manner prescribed, to be involved in the matter by not only ensuring that the complaint is in form but also by culling out the scope and reason of the complaint and what answers have to be obtained to dispel the complain. 48. After the complaint wag processed in the manner as specified in Clauses 110 and 111 of the Special Army Order, 1989 and in terms of para 364 of the Regulations for Army as amended upto 1987, the same had to be dealt with in the manner as specified if Clauses 124 and 125 of the Special Army Order, 1989, which read as follows:- "124. The Complaints (Statutory or Non-Statutory) from Lt. Cols and above and those which cannot be disposed of by the authorities mentioned in paras 121 and 123 above, will be forwarded to MS Branch for further disposal." "125. All cases which are being forwarded to the MS Branch for disposal must invariably be accompanied with specific comments and recommendations of the GOC-in-Cs Command concerned, even if the Impugned ACR were earned by the Officers during a period when the present incumbent (GOC-in-C) was not in the chain/appointment." 49. The concerned statutory complaint was made by the petitioner when he was posted in Jalapahar, Darjeeling, in the State or West Bengal. The statutory complaint was forwarded to the Command Headquarter, Eastern Command through the Headquarter, North Bengal Sub-area, both within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court in terms of Clauses 110 and 111 of the Special Army Order, 1989. The Command Headquarter within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court processed the complaint and discharged obligations in regard thereto as mentioned above. It was than forwarded to the Military Secretary's Branch at New Delhi in terms of Clause 124 of the Special Army Order, 1989 with the specific comment and recommendations of the GOC-in-C of the Eastern Command in terms of Clause 125 of the Special Army Order, 1989, although the concerned GOC-in-C was not present in the chain when the subject Confidential Report was earned by the petitioner. Thereafter, the complaint was considered by the appropriate authority at New Delhi. 50. The decision on the statutory complaint was taken by the appropriate authority without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Thereafter, the complaint was considered by the appropriate authority at New Delhi. 50. The decision on the statutory complaint was taken by the appropriate authority without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. In taking such decision, the authority concerned looked at the impugned Confidential Report, the complaint of the petitioner, the parawise comment upon the complaint of the petitioner given by the initiating Officer against whose remarks the complaint had been made as obtained and processed by the Command Headquarter, Eastern Command and the specific comments and recommendations of the GOC-in-C, Eastern Command. The decision of the appropriate authority thereupon was transmitted to the petitioner through the Command Headquarter, Eastern Command. Therefore, in the matter of deciding the complaint, the processing of the complaint by the matter of deciding the complaint, the processing of the complaint by the Command Headquarter, Eastern Command and the comments of the GOC-in-C, Eastern Command played an important part. The processing of the complaint was made by Command Headquarter, Eastern Command within the jurisdiction of this Court and the specific comments and recommendations in regard thereto was given by the GOC-in-C, Eastern Command within the jurisdiction of this Court. The complaint of the petitioner could be accepted on the basis of such processing made by the Command Headquarter. Eastern Command or on the basis of the specific comments and recommendation of the GOC-in-C, Eastern Command and in such circumstances the matter would have rested there, but when it was not so done and the petitioner felt aggrieved thereby, it give a further right of action to the petitioner. This right of action was a right to move a Writ Court since no other remedy is available to the petitioner. When he exercised such a right of action, he bought to enforce his cause of action, i.e. a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gave the petitioner a right to relief against the respondents, which facts included processing of the statutory complaint of the petitioner by the Command Headquarter, Eastern Command within the jurisdiction of this Court and comments made and recommendations given by the GOC-in-C, Eastern Command within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court on the complaint of the petitioner. In other words, the right of action against the order of rejection of the statutory complaint is that the statutory complaint had not been considered fairly, which consideration was dependent upon the processing of the statutory complaint by the Command Headquarter, Eastern Command within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and on the specific comments and recommendations made by the GOC-in-C, Eastern Command within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court on the statutory complaint. Therefore, it cannot be said that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court. A complaint that the concerned statutory complaint was unfairly rejected inheres in itself a complaint that the processing thereof was not done properly and that the recommendations given and comments made thereupon were unfair, both of which were done within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 51. I, therefore, hold that a part of the integral cause of action for the present writ petition arose within the jurisdiction of this High Court and as such I have every authority to exercise the powers conferred upon me by Clause 1 of Article 226 of the Constitution, although the respondents are outside the jurisdiction of this Court. 52. At this juncture it is my duty to point out that in the body of the writ petition the petitioner had averred that the order rejecting the statutory complaint of the petitioner was received within the jurisdiction of this Court, but not that the statutory complaint was made from the local limits of this Court and the same was processed and commented upon from the local limits of this Court. A copy of the statutory complaint of the writ petitioner has been annexed to the writ petition, from where it is crystal clear that the same was made from the local limits of this Court and was processed and commented upon from the local limits of this Court. The writ petitioner in his affidavit-in-reply has pointed out the fact that the statutory complaint was made from the local limits of this Court. 53. It is because the petitioner had not pleaded making of the statutory complaint from the local limits of this Court will render the writ petition not maintainable in this Court on the ground of jurisdiction, would be a travesty of Justice. 53. It is because the petitioner had not pleaded making of the statutory complaint from the local limits of this Court will render the writ petition not maintainable in this Court on the ground of jurisdiction, would be a travesty of Justice. Even in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu & other, 1994 (4) SCC 711 , where the Supreme Court at Paragraph 6 of the report observed the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition the Supreme Court considered the significance of the FAX message of 15.1.1993, which was received by the writ petitioner in that case within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court and which was not pleaded, to find out whether the same constituted an integral part of the cause of action for maintaining the writ petition in the Calcutta High Court. 54. It is nobody's case that after making of the impugned Confidential Report the same had been looked at anyone to evaluate the efficiency of the writ petitioner. In those circumstances, I am of the view, that there cannot be any plea of latches and negligence against the petitioner in pursuing his remedy against the Impugned Confidential Report the petitioner in terms of the Rules made a statutory complaint against the impugned Confidential Report. Though this statutory complaint was made beyond 60 days from the date of making thereof but that it self did not debar the petitioner from making the statutory complaint. Under Clause 108 of the Special Army Order, 1989 a statutory complaint made after expiry of 60 days is to be processed with comments on the justification or otherwise reasons for the delay. The statutory complaint was admittedly processed. Till such time the statutory complaint was not rejected, the petitioner had no right of action. Even assuming that right of action is barred by the residuary clause of the Limitation Act, the petitioner approached this Court well within three years from the date of communication of the rejection of his statutory complaint. Therefore, the second ground of attack on behalf of the respondents as to the maintainability of the writ petition fails. 55. Now I venture to deal with the merit of the case. Therefore, the second ground of attack on behalf of the respondents as to the maintainability of the writ petition fails. 55. Now I venture to deal with the merit of the case. It is clear from Clause 13 of the Instructions for Rendition of Confidential Reports for Officers, 1989 that the ratee bas to render at least 90 days physical service under an Officer to entitle such Officer to Initiate the Confidential Report of the ratee. From Clause 14 of the Instructions for Rendition of Confidential Reports for Officers, 1989, it is clear that physical service commences from the day the ratee physically reports and starts serving under the Initiating Officer. One of the documents to be taken note of for computing physical service, as provided In Clause 15 of Instructions for Rendition of Confidential Reports for Officers, 1989, is the arrival report of the ratee and the Officer initiating the report. There is no dispute in the present case and as appears from the arrival reports of the petitioner that the petitioner reported to the Initiating Officer on 3.6.1993 Therefore, the physical service of the petitioner under the Initiating Officer who initiated the Impugned Confidential Report, commenced from 3.6.1993. 56. It is also clear from Clause 14 of the Instructions for Rendition of Confidential Reports for Officers, 1989 read with the instructions contained in the letter No. 32301/34/P/MS 3 Coord dated 29.1.1992 that the physical service of 90 days should be computed from the date the ratee physically reports and starts serving under the Initiating Officer. This service under the Initiating Officer need not be continuous and if the same breaks due to any temporary absence for a period less than 10 days shall be taken to be such service under the Initiating Officer. These temporary absence may be due to leave or hospitalization or temporary duty. The transit period spent by an Officer as mentioned in Paragraph 2(b) of the letter dated 29.1.1992, as mentioned above, is to be treated as absence on account of leave or temporary duty. It is therefore clear that any times spent by the ratee in transit, as mentioned in the said paragraph of the said letter is referable to any temporary absence after the ratee has physically reported. It is therefore clear that any times spent by the ratee in transit, as mentioned in the said paragraph of the said letter is referable to any temporary absence after the ratee has physically reported. Therefore, under no stretch of imagination the period from 27.5.1993 to 2.6.1993 could be treated to be physical service under the concerned Initiating Officer for the purpose of computation of 90 days of physical service under him. 57. In the instant case for the purpose of making the impugned Confidential Report, the Initialing Officer counted the period from 28.5.1993 to 15.9.1993. i.e., 111 days of which he could not take into account six days from 28.5.1993 to 2.6.1993 (both days inclusive). Admittedly the Initiating Officer was on leave for 16 days during the aforementioned period from 23.7.1993 to 7.8.1993. In accordance with Clause 14 of the Instructions for Rendition of Confidential Reports for Officers, 1989 read with aforementioned letter dated 29.1.1992, this period is to be discounted as physical service of the petitioner under the Initiating Officer. Therefore, out of 111 days from 28.5.1993 to 15.9.1993, 22 days, i.e. 6 days from 28.5.1993 to 2.6.1993 and 16 days from 23.7.1993 to 7.8.1993 should have been discounted to compute 90 days. If that had been done the petitioner had served only for 89 days and not the mandatory minimum of 90 days under the Initiating Officer during the period concerned to entitle the Initiating Officer to initiate the impugned Confidential Report. On that score alone the impugned Confidential Report is incurably bad. 58. That apart, it is a very serious matter that the Initiating Officer without referring to the petitioner enlarged the period of consideration from 10.9.1993 to 15.9.1993 and in doing so altered the very document by white ink which contained the signature of the petitioner. In other words, to extend the period of consideration the Initiating Officer altered the dates in a document which contained the signature of the petitioner without referring to him and surprisingly such document was accepted in the dossier of the petitioner despite a clear Instruction having been given in the forms of such reports not to after the same in the manner it was done. If the period from 10.9.1993 to 15.9.1993 is knocked off then the period of physical service under the Initiating Officer would stand reduce to 84 days. 59. If the period from 10.9.1993 to 15.9.1993 is knocked off then the period of physical service under the Initiating Officer would stand reduce to 84 days. 59. In those circumstances, I have no option but to hold that as on the date when the impugned Confidential Report was initiated by the Initiating Officer, he had no competence to initiate the same. In this connection, it is my duty to point out that the impugned Confidential Report is dated 30.9.1993 and admittedly from 15.9.1993 until the date of that report the petitioner was on leave, which period was to be discounted for the purpose of computation of physical service under the Initiating Officer. 60. I, therefore, hold that the impugned Confidential Report is nonest the same having been initiated by an Officer who did not have competence to initiate the same. 61. The last issue in this matter has a great significance. It is on account of whether the statutory complaint records reason and if not whether the same ought to have recorded reason. 62. The words the Central Government is satisfied that no Injustice has been done to him in this regard conveyed decision rather than any reason for the decision. It does not appear from the order that the authority concerned who passed that order or the authority concerned, who processed the statutory complaint of the petitioner or the authority concerned, who commented upon the statutory complaint of the petitioner or made recommendations thereon at all noted that the main plank of complaint of the petitioner was that the Initiating Officer who initiated the impugned Confidential Report had no competence to initiate the same. If they had taken note of the same then the order would not have conveyed that no justice has been done to the petitioner and rather would have conveyed that there is no substance in the complaint of the petitioner. 63. At the hearing a sealed file was produced before me by the respondents. In that there was a very long reasoning running into 15 pages in support of the order rejecting the statutory complaint. In a small paragraph of that reasoning at page 14 the competence of the Initiating Officer who initiate the impugned Confidential Report had been discussed, where nothing has been taken note of in regard to mandatory physical service of 90 days, commencement thereof as well as continuance of the same. In a small paragraph of that reasoning at page 14 the competence of the Initiating Officer who initiate the impugned Confidential Report had been discussed, where nothing has been taken note of in regard to mandatory physical service of 90 days, commencement thereof as well as continuance of the same. It was observed very wrongly that since the petitioner had obtained a Confidential Report for the period ending with 27.5.1993, the concerned Initiating Officer because competent to initiate the report for the period commencing with 28.5.1993. It was not noted that until 3.6.1993 the petitioner had not physically reported to the concerned Initiating Officer and therefore the period between 28.5.1993 to 2.6.1993 cannot be taken into account for computation of mandatory 90 days of physical service under the Initiating Officer. 64. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that there is no prescribed Rule or Regulation requiring the authority concerned to give reasons in support of an order rejecting a statutory complaint and therefore the same is not mandatory. In support of the said contention the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court delivered in the case of Union of India vs. E.G. Namhudin, AIR 1991 SC 1216 , where the Supreme Court was dealing with a matter arising out of rejection of a non-statutory representation of a Central Government employee against adverse entries. It was admitted by the parties in that case that there was no statutory rule regulating the award of entries. In the character rule of a Central Government employee or providing for filing of representation against adverse entries or for the disposal of such representation. Therefore, the entire field in that regard was regulated by the administrative directions issued from time to time, which, however, did not contain any provision requiring the authority to record reasons. In that background the Supreme Court held that no exception could be taken to the order rejecting representation merely on the ground of absence of reasons. 65. In the Instant case, we are concerned with a statutory complaint. Here, the statute itself gives a right to lodge the complaint. That complaint would be disposed of without giving any hearing to the complainant. He must, therefore, at least be entitled to know why his complaint has been rejected. 65. In the Instant case, we are concerned with a statutory complaint. Here, the statute itself gives a right to lodge the complaint. That complaint would be disposed of without giving any hearing to the complainant. He must, therefore, at least be entitled to know why his complaint has been rejected. This aspect of the matter was considered by a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case of Ramesh Singh Rathose vs. Union of India, 1997 Lab IC 791, where it was held that a statutory complaint made under Section 27 of the Army Act, 1950 cannot be rejected without disclosing reasons. I am in full agreement with the reasoning in the said judgment of the Allahabad High Court. In the case of Ramesh Singh Rathose vs. Union of India, 1997 Lab IC 791, the Allahabad High Court considered the judgment of the 5 Judges Bench of the Supreme Court delivered in the case of S.N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 , where it was held, inter alia, that one of the reasons for giving reason is to make the aggrieved person know the reason why he is suffering. 66. In those circumstances the order of the authority concerned rejecting the statutory complaint of the petitioner is bad not only on account of total non-application of mind but also on account of non-furnishing of reasons. 67. In the result the writ petition succeeds. The order rejecting the statutory complaint dated 14.5.1996 as well as the impugned Confidential Report dated 30.9.1993 for the period between 28.5.1993 and 15.9.1993 are set aside. 68. There shall be no order as to costs. 69. The learned Advocates for the parties are entitled to note down the gist of the order and to communicate the same to their respective clients. If requisition is supplied for certified xerox copy of this order by any of the parties, the Department is directed to issue the same forthwith and not latter than 10 days from the date of such requisition.