State of Kerala v. Leelamani — 1997 DIGILAW 353 (KER)

JUDGMENT V.V. Kamat, J. 1. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellants in these two proceedings, we are convinced that neither there is a case for condonation of delay nor is there any material to interfere with the impugned award dt. April 7, 1995 in O .P. (MV) 33/91 of the MACT, Alappuzha. This order will decide the two proceedings. The first one is a petition for condonation of delay of as many as 415 days. 2. As far back as on January 2, 1990 at about 3 p.m. one Maniyan, a coolie and / or a headload worker, when proceeding on his cycle by the southern extremity of Thiruvampady - Pazhaveedu Public Road from east to west, he became the victim of a police jeep bearing No. KRC 4384 which was driven by one Prathapachandran (R2). The dash had thrown the victim down on the ground and he breathed his last. His widow presented the claim petition. 3. The Tribunal had no difficulty in recording the finding of rashness and negligence, firstly, on the principle of res ipsa loquitur, and secondly, on a positive statement recorded that even all the respondents did not deny the accident. In fact it is recorded that the respondent No. 2 did not file the written statement. It is further recorded that respondent No. 1 - one of the appellants before us admitted the accident, but attributed it to the negligence of the deceased. The matter was taken up to the Criminal Court by the Circle Inspector of Police, Alappuzha under S.279 & 304A IPC. Therefore this was not a difficulty in the context of the required rashness and / or negligence in the context. 4. On the question of quantum - point No. 4 in the context - the Tribunal has determined the amount of compensation at Rs. 1,00,900/-. 5. The discussion reveals that the deceased was taken by a special conveyance to the hospital. An amount of Rs. 500/- is granted on that count. On the count of pain and suffering, as unusual, as determined by the apex court, a notional amount of Rs. 5000/- is awarded. The funeral expenses of Rs. 2000/- are also granted. 6. The victim was about 47 years of age as against the claimant, being his widow, of 33 years of age on the date of the filing of the petition (2.1.1991). 5000/- is awarded. The funeral expenses of Rs. 2000/- are also granted. 6. The victim was about 47 years of age as against the claimant, being his widow, of 33 years of age on the date of the filing of the petition (2.1.1991). In this context for the loss of consortium Rs. 7000/- has been granted. 7. Although the Tribunal has observed that the victim was a headload worker, at the same time the Tribunal has observed that beyond the claimants word there is no evidence of exact income. The Tribunal has proceeded to determine the monthly income and, it will have to be said, in a modest way at Rs. 800/- in the circumstances. The Tribunal proceeds further to observe that the victim would have spent an amount of Rs. 600/- per month for the benefit of the petitioner who is his widow. The yearly loss of dependency is arithmetically calculated at Rs. 7,200/-. Multiplier of 12 has been adopted in the nature of the situation that the claimant was 33 years as against the victim to be of 47 years. It is in this process the total loss of dependency is estimated to be Rs. 86400/- and adding the claims already granted, referred to hereinbefore, the compensation of Rs. 1,00,900/- is determined. 8. The learned Government Pleader made a feeble attempt to submit that the determination of the monthly income of Rs. 800/-, that too in the case of a headload worker in regard to which there is no other evidence, would have to be understood to be on the higher side. The submission needs only to be mentioned for its rejection on the face of it. We do not find anything to interfere with the amount because we have before us a victim who has left a widow and the widow has told the court that he was a headload worker and the court has proceeded on the basis that he was a daily wage earner earning Rs. 800/- per month as a whole. 9. We would have appreciated the acceptance of the award considering the reasons that appear in the judgment under consideration. However, that is not to be. On such facts we have before us the appeal of the State and that too along with a prayer for condonation of delay of as many as 415 days. 10. 9. We would have appreciated the acceptance of the award considering the reasons that appear in the judgment under consideration. However, that is not to be. On such facts we have before us the appeal of the State and that too along with a prayer for condonation of delay of as many as 415 days. 10. We are compelled to appreciate the nature of the proceedings relating to compensation before the Tribunal. The provisions have emerged with a sense . of purpose behind them. The accident victims are the misfortunes of the situations wholly unintended and not meant for by anyone in the context. The accident is a situation of a human pathos and it is therefore that the idea of the establishment of the Tribunal will have to be understood to have emerged in the context. This is in regard to an expected litigation with a sense of avoiding time in the process and the purpose of the sense of avoiding time in the process will have to be understood that the claimant should received the amount of compensation as early as possible and without any kind of delay in regard thereto, much less at the instance of participating parties in the process. It would be seen that the entire process gets a perfect understanding of the purpose thereof that it is the intention of the legislature that the claimants who suffer for no fault of theirs in any sense of the term should see the colour of the coin of the compensation as early as possible. In fact realising this difficulty which is available in the eternal saying in the context that it is the decree of the court that is really the commencement of the difficulties of the decree holder in the context.", the award of the Tribunal is, in this process, not to be the difficulty of the person who gets the award in his favour. To get over the said difficulty, the insurance company came into existence. Various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act is the context would show that it is the insurance company which has been understood to be the guarantee of payment of the amount awarded by the Tribunal towards compensation as expeditiously as possible without any kind of hindrance in regard thereto. S.149 of the Act is an illustration in the context. Various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act is the context would show that it is the insurance company which has been understood to be the guarantee of payment of the amount awarded by the Tribunal towards compensation as expeditiously as possible without any kind of hindrance in regard thereto. S.149 of the Act is an illustration in the context. Insurance company has a bar to challenge the quantum with certain situations of exceptions. At the same time the insurance company having given freedom to proceed against the owner who is also vicariously liable for the payment of the award of compensation. The law has taken a step ahead in the process by clearing the difficulty of the driver being ruled as unnecessary party in the process, though directly responsible for the act of negligence. All these, if meaningfully understood, would convey that the real intention of the legislature is to recognise that the person who is the victim or injured in the process, and that too in the context of a need of the situation, should see the colour of the money as early as possible in the context. 11. The above facets require appreciation in the context of occasions wherever there is a need to be conscious in regard to them. 12. In our judgment these aspects assume importance, in spite of the liberal approach in the matter condonation of delay, because proceeding to condone the delay with a liberal approach will be acting contrary to the intention of the legislature and the result would be that the compensation would he delayed to the person who really deserves in accordance with the system. It is not that delay is not to be condoned. But condonation of delay will have to be appreciated in the context of the legislative intent of seeing that the victim gets his dues which are determined. In the same process the situation will have to he appreciated in the context of consideration of appeals in regard to such orders of the Tribunal. It is not that the parties do not have any right to approach, but consideration of the acceptance or rejection of these rights would necessarily have consideration of the above features of the legislation in the process of determination thereof. It is not that the parties do not have any right to approach, but consideration of the acceptance or rejection of these rights would necessarily have consideration of the above features of the legislation in the process of determination thereof. In this context there is need to have note of caution that any act in the process should not result in nullifying the benevolent provision which would result in the consequences of dealing with it by a non benevolent eye and with a mind not turned to the purpose and philosophy of the legislation and that too without being informed in regard thereto of the true goals sought to be achieved in the process of the award under the provision. It will have to he borne in mind that even if one were to make a strictly doctrinaire approach, it would lead to the same conclusion and would result in losing the light of the main purpose of the provision. We feel that in the process of dealing with the proceedings relating to the award of compensation, this paramount intention of the legislature needs to accompany the judicial mind at every stage in the course of application of the relevant provisions and stages in regard thereto. The judicial activity, learning from the spirit of the statutory provisions in the context, gets with a closer concern to protect the members of the community travelling in vehicles of using the made from the risk attendant upon the user of motor vehicles on the roads. The courts are very much concerned with a consequential situation that the awards of the Tribunal would not remain a mere protection on paper and the court concerned has to see the situation of guarantee that the compensation awarded would not only he recoverable as early as possible, but also becomes payable to the victim from the persons held liable for the consequences of the accident. 13. We have already said that the appeal is devoid of merits. 14. However, the above discussion would have to be understood as a prolegomena to place on record the slow motion picture of the appellants before us in taking the mater before this court with a delay of 415 days staring in the face of the record. 15. 13. We have already said that the appeal is devoid of merits. 14. However, the above discussion would have to be understood as a prolegomena to place on record the slow motion picture of the appellants before us in taking the mater before this court with a delay of 415 days staring in the face of the record. 15. With the above discussion if we say that an appeal without any ostensible merits has been brought before this Court after a period of 414 days, the unaccepted and unfortunate consequence is that the widow has been deprived of the award passed on April 7, 1995. We are perplexed to find out that this period from April 7, 1995 down to this day is attributable to whom? The award states that the amount will carry interest as specified in Para.13. The interest is obviously payable under the provisions of the Act. All that we can say is that this could have been avoided in the above circumstances. 16. Apart therefrom Para.2 of the petition for condonation of delay gives the slow motion picture of the movements in regard thereto. It is as follows:- "The judgment in the above case was pronounced on 7.4.1995. An application for the certified copy was filed on 8.5.1995. Stamp papers were called on 25.11.1995 and the same was produced on 28.11.1995. Certified copy of the judgment was ready on 4.12.1995 notified to receive on 7.12.1995. Certified copy of the judgment was received on 21.12.1995 which was forwarded to the office of the Chief Secretary on 23.12.1995. The judgment was received in the office of the Chief Secretary on 3.1.1996 and the same was forwarded to the Law Department for getting opinion on 12.1.1996. The opinion of the Law Department was received on 6.51996. On 16.5.1996 the Government directed the Director General of Police to take necessary steps for filing the appeal. Director General of Police informed the Superintendent of Police, Alappuzha to take necessary steps for filing the appeal on 22.5.1996. The Superintendent of Police requested the District Government Pleader, Alappuzha to take necessary steps for filing the appeal on 30.5.1996, again on 24.7.1996 he was reminded. The Inspector of Police requested the District Government Pleader to take necessary steps for filing appeal and also swear an affidavit with petition to condone the delay. The Additional Government Pleader by a letter dt. The Inspector of Police requested the District Government Pleader to take necessary steps for filing appeal and also swear an affidavit with petition to condone the delay. The Additional Government Pleader by a letter dt. l.1.1997 informed the Chief Secretary that he has already . forwarded the certified copy of the decree and the judgment with opinion to file an appeal and also informed that the appeal has to be filed before the High Court and therefore to take necessary steps for filing the appeal. On the basis of the letter from the Addl. District Govt. Pleader, the Addl. Director General of Police informed the Addl. Chief Secretary that necessary information has been given to the Superintendent of Police, Alappuzha to take necessary steps for filing the appeal, on 31.1.1997, and on the basis of the direction the concerned officer came to the office of the Advocate General and filed the appeal on 6.2.1997. The appeal ought to have been filed on or before 31.1.1996. Hence there is a delay of 415 days in filing the appeal." It is thereafter we find that beyond saying that there is no willful negligence or latches on the part of the appellants, there is no compliance with S.5 of the Limitation Act. Again we are at pains to record that although the approach is liberal, it does not do away with the statutory requirement of S.5 of the Limitation Act. 17. Be that as it may, it is not possible, especially in the circumstances relating to the legislative intent, to entertain the proceedings which would result in the undesired and unexpected result in the context of the claimant who is the widow before us. The delay is not possible to be condoned. On the contrary as a consequence of disaster to the claimant who lost her husband as far back as in the year 1990, whose award is determined in 1995, and is even today far away from its realisation because the misfortune of the situation is that she has no insurance company to demand in regard to which the provisions of law provide minimum period. We hope that the State will look after the need of the hour because a widow of the State is expecting her legitimate dues which should not be denied to her. With the above observations we dismiss the. We hope that the State will look after the need of the hour because a widow of the State is expecting her legitimate dues which should not be denied to her. With the above observations we dismiss the. appeal at the stage of admission along with the dismissal of CMP 1719/1997 which is a petition for condonation of delay of 415 days in filing the appeal. Order accordingly.