S. P. SRIVASTAVA, J. These four writ petitions, referred to above, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India have been filed by the petitioners against the judgment of the competent authority and appellate authority declaring certain area of the petitioners as excess vacant land. In all these writ petitions the petitioners wanted to take benefit on the ground that the land is agricultural holding, therefore, it cannot be treated to be urban and vacant land on the commencement of the Act. In all the peti tions it is stated that the competent authority held that as the land used has been shown to the master plan prepared by the Development Authority for the purpose other than the agriculture, therefore, it can not be held to be an agricultural land. The petitioners have also taken the plea of exist ence of farm house and constructions etc. 2. As the common question of law is involved in all the four writ petitions, there fore, the learned Counsel for the parties have agreed that these petitions may be con solidated and decided by a common judg ment. After going through the judgments of the appellate authority as well as competent authority in all the cases, I am of the view that all the four petitions can be con solidated and decided together by delivering a common judgment. I, therefore, con solidate all these petitions and decide the same by a common judgment treating writ petition No. 11287 of 1990, Tej Ram v. Dis trict Judge, Meerut, as leading case. A copy of this judgment shall be kept on the file of other three writ petitions, referred to above. 3. It would be worthwhile to mention here that in all the four petitions the judg ments of the competent authority are of different dates, but they have been affirmed by the appellate authority and since the learned counsel for the parties have agreed that common question of law is involved in these petitions, though the facts and area of land are different, but as the legal point is common in all the writ petitions can be disposed of by one and a common judgment. 4. 4. The brief facts for the purpose of disposal of present writ petitions are that all the petitioners filed a statement under Sec tion 6 (1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred as Act only ). In their statements they gave details of the properties situated in the Urban agglomeration and declared that there is no land which can be declared excess vacant land with the petitioners. 5. A survey was made by the Ceiling Department as provided under the Act. Notices under Section 8 (3) of the Act alongwith a draft statement were served upon the petitioners proposing to declare certain areas as excess vacant land with the petitioners. The petitioners filed their ob jections mainly on the ground that certain areas which are agricultural holding of the petitioners may be exempted as that area is not the urban land and vacant land as defined in the Act. 6. The Competent Authority under the Act held that in Master Plan the land use of entire land of the petitioners has been proposed for urbanisation, therefore, even if the land was of agriculture nature, it shall be treated to be urban land as provided under the Act and the competent authority accordingly declared certain area as excess vacant land with the petitioners. 7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the competent authority the petitioners filed an appeal under Section 33 of the Act. The learned District Judge held that in master plan prepared by Meerut Develop ment Authority the land belonging to the tenure holders was reserved for the pur poses other than the agriculture, therefore, the said land cannot be treated to be agricul tural land. 8. All the appeals filed by the petitioners were dismissed by the appellate authority, hence the petitioners have filed present writ petitions in this Court. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that under Section 2 (C), the "urban land" has been defined which does not include any land which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture. He placed before the Court the definition of urban land in the aforesaid Section 2 (o ). 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that under Section 2 (C), the "urban land" has been defined which does not include any land which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture. He placed before the Court the definition of urban land in the aforesaid Section 2 (o ). which reads as under: (0) "urban land" means- (1) any land situated within the limits of an urban agglomeration referred to as such in the master plan; or (ii) in case where there is no Master Plan, or where the mater plan does not refer to any land as urban land any land within the limits of an urban agglomeration and situated in any area included within the local limits of a municipality (by what ever name called), a notified area committee, a city and town committee a small town Committee, a cantonment board or a Panchayat. But does not include any such land/which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture". His contention is that the Act came into force on 17th February, 1975 and in view of Section 6 of the Act every person holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit at the commencement of this Act was required to file the statement before the competent authority. Therefore, if the petitioner had no excess urban vacant land on the commencement of the Act and sub sequently the master plan was prepared by the Meerut Development Authority in 1978 the land used to be shown in the master plan should not be taken into consideration for determining the ceiling limit of the petitioner under the Act. He has placed reliance on Section 6 itself, which is quoted herein below: 6. He has placed reliance on Section 6 itself, which is quoted herein below: 6. Person holding vacant land in excess of ceiling limit to file statement- (1) Every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at the commencement of this Act shall, within such period as may be prescribed, file statement before the com petent authority having jurisdiction specify ing the location, extent, value and such other particulars as may be prescribed of all vacant lands and of any other land on which there is building, whether or not with a dwelling unit therein, held by him (includ ing the nature of his right, title or interest therein) and also specifying the vacant lands within the ceiling limit which he desires to retain; Providing that in relation to any State to which this Act applies in the first in stance, the provision of this sub-section shall have effect as if for the words "every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at the commencement of this Act. " the words figures and letters "every person who held vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit on or after the 17th day of February, 1975 and before the commence ment of this Act and every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at such commencement "had been sub stituted". 10. The learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the case reported in 1993 AI. R. S. C. , 2465, Smt. Alia Mohammadi Begum v. State of U. P. and Others. , wherein it has been laid down that "the scheme of the Act supports the construction that the Explanation (c) to Section 2 (o) means that if the land has been specified in the master plan existing at the time of com mencement of the Act for a purpose other than agriculture, then the land shall not be deemed to be mainly sued for the purpose of agriculture by virtue of the Explanation and not if the land is specified in a master plan prepared after the commencement of the Act. The plain language of Explanation (c) bears this constructions and requires it to be so construed in order to harmonies it with the other provisions and scheme of the Act. The plain language of Explanation (c) bears this constructions and requires it to be so construed in order to harmonies it with the other provisions and scheme of the Act. Just as the holder of the land cannot by his consequent actions reduce the area of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit, the authorities too cannot by any subsequent action increase the area of excess vacant land by a similar action. " 11. The master plan defined in Section 2 (h) and referred in the definition of urban Land in Section 2 (o), including Explana tion (c) therein obviously a master plan prepared and existence at the time of com mencement of the Act when by virtue of Section 2 of the Act, rights of the holder of the land under the Act get crystalised and extinguish his right to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit according to the machinery provisions in the Act merely for quantification, and to effectuate the rights and liabilities which have crystalised at the time of commencement of the Act. " 12. His contention is that the date of commencement of the Act is material for determination of the nature of the land, therefore, if the Master Plan was prepared subsequent to the commencement of the Act by the Development Authority then the Competent Authority as well as the District Judge has committed an error in law in taking account the entry of the land use shown in the master plan. He has also placed reliance for this purpose on the case reported in 1995, ALJ, 1885 1995 (1) JCLR 578 (All), Prem Nath Agarwal v. State of U. P. In this judgment also this court placing reliance on AIR 1993 SC, 2465 (supra) took the same view. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has also urged that in view of Section 2 (o), Explanation, that where on any land which is entered in the revenue record or land record before the appointed day as for agricultural purpose, there is building which is not in the nature of farm house then so much extent of such land as is occupied by the building shall not be deemed to be used mainly for the purpose of agriculture. He has also urged that the land shall not be deemed to be used mainly for the purpose of the agriculture, if such land is not entered in the revenue or land records, before the appointed days as for the purpose of agriculture. In nutshell his contention is that the revenue entries are the relevant documents to be considered while deter mining the urban land under the provisions of the Act. He has placed reliance on the case reported in 1984, Allahabad, page 386. Bhudev Singh v. State of U. P. , wherein this court held "explanation (B) to Section 2 (o) refers to revenue or land records if the land is entered as agricultural land in any of the records maintained by the State that would be enough for the purpose of Explanation (B ). The petitioners name was entered as Sirdar at the relevant time Sirdari land can only be used for the purpose of agriculture". He has submitted that as the land was entered in the revenue record as agricul tural land, therefore, this revenue record which will be a good piece of evidence for determining the nature and use of the land and not the land used as shown in the master plan prepared subsequent to the commen cement of the Act. His further contention is that if the land which was mainly used for agriculture but for some reason it was not cultivated on the appointed day, would not change the nature 01 the land from agricul ture to urban for that purpose he has placed reliance on a case reported in AIR 1982, All 145 Abdul Gafoor v. State of Uttar Pradesh, where this Court held "in view of the facts that petitioners access to land had been stopped, the fact of non-cultivation by petitioners as on the appointed day could not change the nature of land from agricul ture to urban. " There may be circumstances in which the cultivator may be unable to cultivate the land. 13. " There may be circumstances in which the cultivator may be unable to cultivate the land. 13. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the main question before the competent authority as well as before the Appellate Court is as to whether the land was agricultural land or not, therefore, it was incumbent on the competent authority to have perused the revenue records or the land records also on this point, but as it has not been considered and reliance has only been placed on the master plan, therefore, the judgments and orders are vitiated in law and should be quashed. 14. Learned Standing Counsel has urged that explanation added to Section 6 of the Act has defined the word commence ment of the Act, which firstly means the date on which this Act came into force in any State, secondly were any land not being vacant land situate in a State in which this Act is in force has become vacant land by any reasons whatsoever the date on which such land becomes vacant land. Thirdly where a notification has been issued under clause (N) of Section 2 in respect of any area in State in which this Act is in force from the date of publication of such notification. His contention is that in view of Section 2 (o) the explanation that the land shall not be deemed to be mainly used for the purpose of agriculture if the land has been specified in the master plan for the purpose other than the agriculture. His contention is that the vacant land has been defined under Section 2 (0) means the land not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture in an agglomeration. Therefore, if any land was not urban vacant land on the date of com mencement of the Act, but on any other day which such land becomes land by any reason whatsoever that date shall be treated to be the date of commencement of the Act. Therefore, if any land was not urban vacant land on the date of com mencement of the Act, but on any other day which such land becomes land by any reason whatsoever that date shall be treated to be the date of commencement of the Act. His contention is that though on 17th February, 1975 when the Act came into force, the land was not vacant land or the land as defined under Section 2 (o), but subsequently its use was shown in the master plan prepared by the Development Authority, other than the agriculture, it became vacant land, there fore, the petitioner cannot say that the land was not vacant land on the enforcement of the Act. His further contention is that in view of Section 15, even after the commen cement of the Act any person acquires by inheritance, settlement or request from any other person or by sale in execution of a decree or order of Civil Court or of an award or order of any other authority or by pur chase or otherwise any vacant land the ex tent of which to give such extent of the land if any already held by him exceeding ag gregate ceiling limit, then he shall within three months from the date of such applica tion filed a statement before the competent authority. His contention is that the acquisi tion or otherwise getting a vacant land after commencement of the Act is also subject- matter of the ceiling proceedings and the provisions of Section 6 to 14 (both exclusive)shall apply, therefore, when the land use was shown as other than the agriculture in the master plan after commencement of the Act that shall be deemed to have been held by the tenure-holder as vacant land and the entry of the master plan is relevant for consideration of the ceiling area of the tenure-holder. According to the learned Standing Counsel the finding given by the competent authority and that of the appel late authority is correct in the eyes of law. 15. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and going through the record it appears that before the competent authority there was no entries of revenue record or land record, nor this was a point of preparation of master plan subsequent to the date of commencement of the Act or its effect. 15. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and going through the record it appears that before the competent authority there was no entries of revenue record or land record, nor this was a point of preparation of master plan subsequent to the date of commencement of the Act or its effect. Keeping in view the various other provisions of the Act I am of the view as the matter was not considered either by the competent authority or by the Appellate Court according to law rather they only con sidered the entry of the master plan, there fore, the judgment and order passed by the competent authority as well as Appellate Court cannot be sustained. 16. The ceiling proceedings either under the Rural Ceiling Act or under the Urban Ceiling Act is in the shape of compul sory acquisition of excess surplus land and excess vacant land for which the owners will be paid compensation, but from all time to come in future they shall be deprived of their right and title in the property and it will vest in the State. In view of such aim and object of these ceiling Acts, I am of the view that the competent authority as well as the Appellate Court must exercise their juris diction and pass orders after considering the relevant provisions of the Act and after seeing the relevant evidence as is required by law. Since none of the authorities have considered this aspect of the case, I, there fore, quash the orders passed by the Com petent Authority, as well as by Appellate Court and remand the case to the com petent authority to decide it afresh after giving opportunity to the parties concerned for producing the relevant revenue extracts and lad record extracts and considering the fact of the preparation of master plan, sub sequent to the enforcement of the Act. 17. The writ petitions are allowed and the judgment and orders passed by the com petent authority and that of Appellate Court are hereby quashed. The cases are remanded to the competent authority to decide them afresh, keeping in view the ob servations made by this Court in the body of this judgment, but there will be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this judgment be place in other, writ petitions which have been decided by me with this. Petition allowed. .