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1997 DIGILAW 355 (RAJ)

Manak Chand v. State of Rajasthan

1997-03-11

M.A.A.KHAN

body1997
Honble KHAN, J. – On 21.5.1975 PW 1 Laxmi Narain, Food Inspector purchased for analysis the sample cow-milk from the petitioner at his business premises being run in the name of `Jain Dairy, Madar Gate, Ajmer (Raj.). On analysis of the sample milk the Public Analyst reported the same to be adulterated due to its containing fat contents at 2.5% and solids non-fat contents at 5.3.% as against 3.5% and 8.5.% respectively prescribed under the relevant rules and having 37% of added water therein. On a complaint filed by the Food Inspector the Addl. Civil Judge cum Magistrate 1st Class, Ajmer tried the petitioner on charge u/S. 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (the Act) and by his judgment and order dated18.1.1978 found him guilty of the same. He therefore, convicted the petitioner accor- dingly and sentenced him 6 months R.I. and fine of Rs. 1,000/-. The petitioner challenged the order of his conviction and sentence before the learned Sessions Judge, Ajmer who, accepting petitioners only objection that in absence of any notification, during the period from 1.4.1976 to February 1977, conferring powers of summary trial u/S. 16A upon the Chief Judicial Magistrates/Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrates to try cases under the Act, the trial of the petitioner was bad, set aside the judgment and order of the learned Magistrate dated 18.1.1978 and sent the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ajmer for trial of the petitioner according to law. The learned C.J.M. adopted the procedure of a warrant case on request of the petitioner and after holding the trial de novo again convicted him of the offence u/S. 7/16 of the Act. But this time he imposed a punishment of one year R.I. and Rs. 2,000/- fine vide his judgment and order dated 13.12.1982. In appeal the learned Special Judge SC/ST Cases/Addl. Sessions Judge, Ajmer vide his impugned judgment and order dated 28.4.1992 upheld the order of conviction of the petitioner but reduced the sentence of imprisonment from 1 year to six months R.I. and of fine of Rs. 2,000/- to Rs. 1,000/- only. Hence this revision petition u/S. 397 Cr.P.C. (2). The only point raised before me by Mr. M.K. Kaushik Advocate appearing for Mr. Onkar Singh Lakhawat, the learned counsel for the petitioner, was that the Asstt. Public Prosecutor had no authority to conduct the present case before the learned trial Court. 2,000/- to Rs. 1,000/- only. Hence this revision petition u/S. 397 Cr.P.C. (2). The only point raised before me by Mr. M.K. Kaushik Advocate appearing for Mr. Onkar Singh Lakhawat, the learned counsel for the petitioner, was that the Asstt. Public Prosecutor had no authority to conduct the present case before the learned trial Court. I find no merits in this argument. (3). A point of law which goes to the very root of the case and strikes at the jurisdiction of the Court to try such case may be raised at any stage of the proceedings including the proceedings before the appellate/revisional Courts. But the point to be raised must be such which, if not allowed to be raised, would cause damage to the principles of natural justice and defeat the ends of justice. Mere technicalities and irregularities which do not cause failure of justice are not allowed to defeat the ends of justice. For, principles of natural justice are but the means to achieve the ends of justice. They cannot be perverted to achieve the very opposite end. That would be counter productive, see State Bank of Patiala vs. S.K. Sharma (1). (4). In the instant case the offence, the petitioner was charged with, was an offence committed against the society at large. The State being the protector of peoples health was duty bound to have taken cognizance of such an offence and brought the offender to books. Collector, Ajmer, therefore, granted written consent to the Food Inspector to initiate prosecution against the petitioner. Section 25(1) Cr.P.C. obliges the State Government to appoint one or more Asstt. Public Prosecutors in every District for conducting prosecutions before the Courts of Magistrates. The Asstt. Public Prosecutor, who conducted the prosecution in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate was, undisputedly a person duly appointed as such u/S. 25. He could have, therefore, legally conducted the prosecution against the petitioner for and on behalf of the State. Sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. Cr.P.C. conferred a discretion also on the Distt. Magistrate to appoint any other person as well to con- duct the prosecution as it was his function to see that the State case is properly conducted. The conduct of the prosecution against the petitioner in the Court of the C.J.M. by the duly appointed Asstt. Public Prosecutor u/S. 25 was neither illegal nor irregular. Magistrate to appoint any other person as well to con- duct the prosecution as it was his function to see that the State case is properly conducted. The conduct of the prosecution against the petitioner in the Court of the C.J.M. by the duly appointed Asstt. Public Prosecutor u/S. 25 was neither illegal nor irregular. Were it to be an irregularity, if one assumes so, it was curable u/S. 465 Cr.P.C. as it occasioned in no failure of justice, in any manner. No such objec- tion was ever raised at any stage of proceedings before either of the two inferior Courts despite the case going a second round. The objection raised has no merits at all. It is accordingly rejected. (5). Though no other point was raised by Mr. Kaushik before me yet with a view to satisfy myself as to the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and orders recorded or passed by the inferior Courts and the regularity of the proceedings therefore them I closely studied their records. The testimony of PW 1 Laxmi Narain fully established that he had purchased the sample milk from the petitioner for value and prepared, packed and sealed three samples thereof as per relevant rules. PW 2 Dixon John and PW 3 Ram Dutta had fully supported the testimony of the Food Inspector. PW 3 Ram Dutta had further stated that he had delivered the sample bottle to the Public Analyst in sealed condition - a fact which was asserted by the Food Inspector and the recitals in the report of the Public Analyst and the Director, Central Food Laboratory, Calcutta fully corroborated such an assertion. The written consent given by the Collector, Ajmer is also found to have been validly granted. The defence evidence led through DW 1 Johri Lal and DW 2 Kalyan and which was to the effect that the petitioner runs a Kirana Shop only and not a milk dairy in the name of ``Jain Dairy did not at all adversely effect prosecution evidence of running a milk dairy by the petitioner and selling the sample milk to the Food Inspector. The concurrent findings of the Courts below on all these issues of fact are not only based on satisfactory and reliable evidence on record but also fully and satisfactorily answer the various grounds raised in the petition filed before this Court. The concurrent findings of the Courts below on all these issues of fact are not only based on satisfactory and reliable evidence on record but also fully and satisfactorily answer the various grounds raised in the petition filed before this Court. The petitioner had exercised his right u/S. 13(2) of the Act and the certificate of the Director Central Laboratory, Calcutta not only superseded the report of the Public Analyst and the fanciful objections against that but also con- clusively established that the sample milk was adulterated for its not conforming with the prescribed standard as it contained fat contents at 2.1% and solids non-fat contents at 5.3% only. The material evidence that on analysis the sample milk sold by the petitioner to the Food Inspector was found adulterated was duly put to the petitioner in his examination u/S. 313 Cr.P.C. on two occasions. I am thus satisfied of the regularity of proceedings and hold that all the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder were fully complied with and no prejudice was caused to the petitioner in any way. I accordingly uphold the order of his conviction for offence u/S. 7/16 of the Act. (6). Looking to the long life of this protracted litigation I examined the question of the propriety of the sentence imposed on the petitioner with reference to the provisions contained in Sec. 16(1), as it stood prior to the amendment made by Act No. 34 of 1976. In the case of Nand Kishore vs. State of Raj. (2) and several other cases I have taken the view that the discretion of the Court to impose penalties in such socio-economic offences now stands statutorily restricted and limited to three months imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- minimum for adequate and special reasons. I find no adequate and special reasons to impose punishment less than the prescribed six months imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- as already reduced by the appellate Court in this case. I fail to overlook that the life of this protracted litigation was unduly and deliberately prolonged by the petitioner himself. The complaint was filed on 30.7.1975 but the petitioner took one year to put in appearance on 2.7.1976. 1,000/- as already reduced by the appellate Court in this case. I fail to overlook that the life of this protracted litigation was unduly and deliberately prolonged by the petitioner himself. The complaint was filed on 30.7.1975 but the petitioner took one year to put in appearance on 2.7.1976. Thereafter, though he applied u/S. 13(2) on 20.8.1976 but took another six months to complete the necessary formality of paying fees and furnishing packing material for the bottle to be sent to the Director Central Food Labora- tory. Prosecution evidence, in the first round commenced on 21.4.1977 and ended on 20.8.1977. Thereafter, the petitioner desired to examine the Director, Central Laboratory, Calcutta but when permitted by Court, did not take steps to summon him and closed his evidence on 15.11.1977. In appeal the only objection taken by him against the order of his conviction and sentence was that of the desirability of summary trial procedure in accordance with the amended provisions of Sec. 16A but when the case was remitted to the C.J.M. after accepting his objection he claimed the procedure of warrant case in his trial. Thus delay in the trial was caused by the delaying tactics of the petitioner himself. (7). In the case of D.D.A. vs. Skipper Construction Pvt. Ltd. (3), the Apex Court ruled that ``the rules of procedure and/or principles of natural justice are not meant to enable the guilty to delay and defeat the just retribution. The wheels of justice may appear to grind slowly but it is the duty of all of us to ensure that they do grind steadily and grind well and truly. The justice system cannot be allowed to become soft supine and spineless. These observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court apply, to my mind, on all fours to the facts of the present case. The petitioner cannot therefore, be permitted to get benefited by his own faults and misadventures. The sentence, as already reduced by the learned Sessions Judge, is quite just, proper and appropriate in this case and calls for no further leniency. In the result this petition has no merits and is accordingly dismissed.