JUDGMENT The Court : Very briefly the facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows. The first respondent filed a suit on the Original Side of this Court in 1987 impleading the appellant as the first defendant and the second and the third respondents as the second and the third defendants. 2. A decree was claimed against the first defendant, but as against the insurers, being the second and the' third defendants, no relief was claimed and it was specifically pleaded in the plaint that those defendants were impleaded for their presence only, which was necessary for complete and effectual adjudication of the issues involved. 3. The claim of the plaintiff arose out of loss of 31 drums of goods which were warehoused and which were insured. The claim was a claim for damages, a claim in tort. 4. The drums contained Crude Iodine imported from Japan and, admittedly the loss occurred due to burglary. 5. The suit was disposed of without taking any oral evidence. 6. The brief of documents was marked as Ext. ‘A’ but those were only documentary evidence. The insurance policy was not taken out by or in the name of the plaintiff-first respondent but it was in the name of the appellant-first defendant. The premium, however, was paid by the plaintiff. 7. On 25.4.90, on an application made by way of a Master's summons, it was recorded that the insurance company had no objection to making payment of Rs. 1,55,766.80 p. to the appellant. The said insurance company, being the Oriental Insurance Company was then directed to pay the said sum by 30.4.90 to the appellant, who was to pay Rs. 1,45,000/- out of the said sum to the plaintiff. 8. The judgment and decree appealed from were passed thereafter on 7.6.91. 9. It is there recorded that during the pendency of the suit the insurers paid a total sum of Rs. 1,82,385/- and the said amount was paid to the plaintiff towards pro tanto satisfaction of its claim. 10. It will be noticed that though in the order of 25.4.90 the plaintiff was directed to be paid Rs. 1,45,000/- yet the insurers paid the warehousing corporation the larger sum mentioned above and that larger sum was paid to the plaintiff. 11. So far the parties before us are not in dispute at all. 12. 10. It will be noticed that though in the order of 25.4.90 the plaintiff was directed to be paid Rs. 1,45,000/- yet the insurers paid the warehousing corporation the larger sum mentioned above and that larger sum was paid to the plaintiff. 11. So far the parties before us are not in dispute at all. 12. They are in dispute over what happened subsequently to the recording of the above payment on 7.6.91 and that was when the Hon'ble Judge disposing of the suit directed the appellant to pay interest for the period from 22.3.85 to the dates of payment of the respective sums aggregating Rs. 1,82,385/-, @ 9% per annum. 13. The point before us is whether under these facts and circumstances a decree for payment of interest can be supported. 14. The commencement date for running of interest i.e. 22.3.85 is the date of a notice served under the Interest Act, 1978. The sums aggregating Rs. 1,82,385/- had already been paid by 7.6.91, which was four years after the institution of the suit, and most assuredly none of the payments had been made prior to the passing of the order of 25.4.90. 15. There is, therefore, in the decree for interest both an element comprising of the pre-suit period and an element comprising of the post-suit period. 16. So far as the pre-suit period is concerned, the Interest Act, 1978 would have to be considered and so far as the post-suit period is concerned the relevant law is section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 17. We have carefully perused the entirety of the judgment dated 7.6.91 and in our opinion, neither on that date nor on any date anterior thereto did the court below pass any decree in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant No.1-appellant for any sum as damages payable by the first defendant to the plaintiff and thus it never passed a decree on such assessment. 18. If the court were to pass such a decree for damages against the first defendant, the court would necessarily first have to conclude that the first defendant was liable in damages to the plaintiff because of the burglary which had occurred in the warehouse. 18. If the court were to pass such a decree for damages against the first defendant, the court would necessarily first have to conclude that the first defendant was liable in damages to the plaintiff because of the burglary which had occurred in the warehouse. Such a finding would not depend upon whether the goods were insured or not, or whether the insurance company paid any money or not Such finding in favour of the plaintiff as against the defendant No.1, irrespective of any insurance of the goods, was never entered and the court did not address its mind to the matter in this respect. 19. What happened clearly was that the insurance companies were willing to pay a certain sum and the warehousing corporation-appellant was willing to act as a conduit pipe for passing that sum on to the loser of the goods, viz. the plaintiff. The court, on 25.4.90 directed the insurance company to pay and surely such a direction could never have been passed as a decree since the insurance companies were proforma defendants and no decrees had even been claimed against them in the first place. 20. The point before us, therefore is, whether a court is entitled to pass a decree for interest in respect of a certain principal sum either for the pre-suit period or for the post-suit period, without first haying adjudicated that principal sum as payable to the plaintiff by the defendant, and without first having passed a decree in regard to such principal sum. 21. We take the pre-suit period first. The beginning of section 3(1) of the Interest Act, 1978 is important in this regard, and that is set out below :- “Section 3(1) : Power of Court to allow interest. – In any proceedings for the recovery of any debt or damages or in any proceedings in which a claim for interest in respect of any debt or damages already paid is made, the court may, if it thinks fit, allow interest to the person entitled to the debt or damages or to the person making such claim, as the case may be at a rate not exceeding the current rate of interest, ........” 22. It is to be observed that under that section interest can be claimed and awarded not only in suits for liquidated sums but also in suits where unliquidated damages are claimed. 23. It is to be observed that under that section interest can be claimed and awarded not only in suits for liquidated sums but also in suits where unliquidated damages are claimed. 23. It is also noteworthy that a suit can be filed only upon a claim for interest even where the debt itself, or the concerned damages have already been paid. 24. We are not concerned that such a claim for interest alone. The suit was filed for damages and interest. 25. Where the proceedings are for the recovery of damages, under the above section, the court may at its discretion award interest in favour of “the person entitled to the .............. damages”. 26. In our opinion, in so far as a suit is concerned, such an entitlement to damages can arise in one or the other of two ways. First, the defendant might come forward and admit the entitlement in favour of the plaintiff as against himself. Secondly, the court might declare such an entitlement in spite of denial of the defendant, and hold in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. In both these cases the entitlement must ultimately result in a decree for payment of money. 27. Different cases and situations might arise. A decree might be passed and immediately recorded as satisfied because the defendant has already made the payment previously. Or, as is normally and ordinarily the case, a decree might be passed and it might be left to the plaintiff to execute it later on. There must be words, clear and unequivocal, from which it can be spelt out that the court has passed a decree against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiff before it can be said that the person, viz. the plaintiff, is entitled to the assessed damages from and as against the defendant. 28. Without the entitlement, the Court cannot pass a decree; and where the Court finds the entitlement, the Court cannot leave the matter there and go no further, because the law does not allow the mere making of a declaration of entilement to damages, without the consequential decree, whether satisfied already or to be satisfied later. 29. A plaintiff does not become a person entitled to damages within the meaning of section 3(1), merely because he alleges himself to be so entitled in the plaint. 30. 29. A plaintiff does not become a person entitled to damages within the meaning of section 3(1), merely because he alleges himself to be so entitled in the plaint. 30. In our case, this declaration of entitlement, made by the Court, and the passing of decree against the first defendant never happened. No doubt, the first defendant passed on more than Rs. 1,80,000/- to the plaintiff, but that was done without any adjudication by Court on the issue of the liability of the appellant to compensate for theft, which was the only issue regarding liability for damages as between the plaintiff and the first defendant. Thus, in our opinion, the pre-suit grant of interest was without jurisdiction as the power of the court to allow interest in a suit for damages cannot arise unless a declaration of entitlement is made and a decree for damages is passed irrespective of whether the decree is already satisfied at the date of its passing or still remains to be satisfied in future. 31. We next come to section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The starting words of that section, (which we need not requote because of its easy and wide availability) make it clear that for the section to operate, there must first be a decree for payment of money. There can be no award of interest under section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure where the court has not passed a decree at all. 32. We have already come to the conclusion that in the instant case the Court did not pass a decree as against the first defendant because even before adjudication of liability or entitlement, the pro forma insurer defendants obliged by making payment which was passed on to the plaintiff. Why the sums were passed on to the plaintiff, or why the plaintiff took the sums, we need not tarry to consider. Why a pro forma defendant should be the source of satisfaction of the claim of the plaintiff, and why the satisfaction of the claim should not originate from the defendant against whom decree is claimed, these are questions with which we do not feel called upon to be concerned at all. Why a pro forma defendant should be the source of satisfaction of the claim of the plaintiff, and why the satisfaction of the claim should not originate from the defendant against whom decree is claimed, these are questions with which we do not feel called upon to be concerned at all. There is no doubt however, that a declaration of plaintiffs entitlement against the first defendant and a passing of decree against the first defendant never took place on the basis of a determination of some tortuous liability on the part of the first defendant at all to pay damages to the plaintiff. 33. Mr. Dutt submitted that we should in any event uphold the decree for payment of interest On the basis of certain dicta of the Supreme Court. First, Mr. Dutt gave us the case of Hirachand Kothari, reported at AIR 1985 SC 998 . He showed us especially paragraph 11 of the said judgment. We find from that paragraph that the Court opined that when the plaintiff had been deprived of the property, which was real property, the plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable rate of interest on the amount of compensation found due to him. The case was one of take-over of land by the State. The Supreme Court relied in that paragraph on another earlier Supreme Court decision in Satinder Singh's case, reported at AIR 1961 SC 908 . In that case a quotation from a speech by Viscount Cave, L.C. is quoted. We find that there also the taking of possession of immovable property is talked of. We are unable in the present case to import principles which have been found applicable regarding compensation payable to a person who has been deprived of land or real property. 34. We note, that if compensation is found payable by any adjudicating authority, such sum of compensation might well serve as the principal amount for the calculation of a fair interest by the same adjudicating authority. But if adjudication by the authority is totally by-passed and never insisted upon, we do not see how the principles regarding grant of interest alone can be invoked in isolation, altogether ignoring the primary adjudication of the principal compensation payable. 35. Mr. But if adjudication by the authority is totally by-passed and never insisted upon, we do not see how the principles regarding grant of interest alone can be invoked in isolation, altogether ignoring the primary adjudication of the principal compensation payable. 35. Mr. Dutt submitted that even another Supreme Court case is referred to in the above paragraph 11 which is the case of Umrao Singh, reported at AIR 1961 SC 908 . The Supreme Court opined there that under section 1 of the Interest Act of 1839 the Court has ample power to award interest on equitable grounds. 36. No doubt when a notice is served under section 1 of the old Interest Act or is served under the new section 3(1)(b) of the new Act of 1978 (this portion is not quoted above) whether the court will grant interest at all or not from the date of service of that notice will depend upon considerations of justice and fairness. There is not and there cannot be any dispute with this proposition. We are, however, not concerned with whether the plaintiff should in justice and fairness be awarded interest. We are rather concerned with the proposition whether in law the plaintiff can be granted any interest at all, there being no decree for any principal sum passed in favour of the plaintiff in the first place. 37. The Interest Act cannot operate unless the adjudication regarding the entitlement to the principal sum on which the interest is to be computed is made by the Court. We have already held that the pro tanto satisfaction of the plaintiffs monetary claim made in the plaint to the extent of Rs. 1,82,000 and odd came rather by way of a Court conciliation with the helpful intervention of the insurance companies, than as a matter of determination of the insurance companies, than as a matter of determination of entitlement and passing of a decree. Where such is the case, there is no principal sum which has been shaped by the court in the form of a decree and when there is no such principal sum awarded or decreed, there can be no question of applying principles of justice and fairness or determining what is the percentage of interest that should be allowed, if at all, on such principal sum. 38. Mr. 38. Mr. Dutt then referred us to the case of Irrigation Department, reported at AIR 1992 SC 732 . It is a decision of a Bench of strength five and it is the ruling decision in regard to the arbitrator's power to grant interest and the applicability of section 34 of the Code to references. Mr. Dutt, however, gave us passages from paragraphs 43 and 45 of the judgment. He said on the basis of the dicta contained there that a person who is deprived of the use of money should be entitled to compensation, by whatever name called. We find from paragraph 43 that the Court specifically referred to section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Court opined that there is no reason or principle to hold why the arbitrator should not be exercising powers on the same principles. 39. The Irrigation Department case was not concerned with the power of an arbitrator to pass an award for interest without passing an award for any principal sum and without considering whether a compulsive award for a principal sum can at all be passed. When the Supreme Court was not concerned with this question, which is the main question before us, it would be wrong in our opinion to apply dicta of the Supreme Court, extracting those from here and there from the body of this ruling and binding judgment. 40. It is a cardinal principle of the reading of judgments, that those are not to be read or construed like Act of Parliament. It is of the utmost importance to read judgments as a whole for the purpose of extracting the ratio of the judgment. A judgment must always be read in the light of the facts which are mentioned in the judgment or even those others which might be available, on an undisputed basis, from other permitted sources. 41. When interpreting and construing the judgment appealed from we have applied this principle too and we have come to the conclusion that a decree for a principal sum was neither deliberated upon by the Court nor actually passed. 41. When interpreting and construing the judgment appealed from we have applied this principle too and we have come to the conclusion that a decree for a principal sum was neither deliberated upon by the Court nor actually passed. We have respectfully applied the same principle in reading and applying (or, if you please not applying) the Irrigation Department case, to the best of our ability, and we have no hesitation in concluding that their Lordships nowhere opined in that case, that the arbitrator (or the court) would be entitled simply to pass an award (or decree) for interest without first applying its mind with equal, if not more case, to the point of adjudication of the principal sum to be awarded (or decreed), or already paid up as debt or damages. 42. We find from the decree drawn up the same infirmity (with respect) as is to be found in the judgment itself. The decree is drawn up granting as against the first defendant payment of interest at the rate of 9% on the sum of Rs. 1,82,385/- on and from 28.3.85 until the date or dates on which the respective payments were made to the plaintiff. It is significant that there is no corresponding principal sum mentioned in the drawn up decree. There is no decree even of a mere declaration of entitlement to receive Rs. 1,82,385/- from the defendant No.1 (assuming that the sums were already paid). The Court never applied its mind to the aspect of liability as between the plaintiff and the first defendant irrespective of the question of insurance. 43. Thus, the decree for interest appealed from is set aside and cancelled. The Appeal is allowed. As the plaintiffs have succeeded in obtaining money, by whatever means, in the Court below but have not succeeded as the respondent in the appeal, the parties will pay and bear their own costs throughout. Interim orders, if any, passed in the appeal will stand vacated with immediate effect. 44. The amount of security money which has been deposited by Mr. Rudra and which, now with interest, stands at a figure somewhat near Rs. 2 lacs shall be unconditionally released and it is to be returned to the source from which the deposit was initially made. 45. Undertakings, if any given at the time of admission of the appeal, if not already satisfied, are discharged. 46. Rudra and which, now with interest, stands at a figure somewhat near Rs. 2 lacs shall be unconditionally released and it is to be returned to the source from which the deposit was initially made. 45. Undertakings, if any given at the time of admission of the appeal, if not already satisfied, are discharged. 46. Authenticated photocopies of this judgment be made available to the parties on the undertaking of the appellant to have the orders made herein and the appellate decree appropriately perfected. 47. Stay of operation of these orders and the appellate decree is prayed for but is refused. Appeal allowed and decree for interest set aside.