DALVEER BHANDARI ( 1 ) THE petitioner has approached this court with the prayer that the decision of the Managing Committee of respondent no. 1 School taken in its meeting held on 17. 3. 96. thereunder respondent no. 3 was appointed as Officiating Principal of respondent No 1 School in place of the petitioner, be set aside and the petitioner be appointed as the Officiating Principal of respondent no. 1 School till a regular person is appointed as its Principal. ( 2 ) THE petitioner was appointed in the post of Trained Graduate Teacher (TGT) of S. M. Jain Modem Sr. Secondary School, on 3. 1. 1966. In October, 1969, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Post Graduate Teacher and since then she has been discharging her functions and duties as a post graduate teacher. ( 3 ) IT is stated in the petition that the petitioner came to know for the first time, that the Managing Committee of respondent no. 1 School vide its meeting dated 17. 3. 96 decided to appoint one Mrs. Satish Jain,. a junior post-graduate teacher as Officiating principal, ignoring the legitimate claim of the petitioner to the said post on the basis of seniority. The petitioner immediately addressed a letter affirming her right to be appointed as the Officiating Principal being the senior-most post graduate teacher. It is stated that the petitioner had sent a copy of the order issued by the Director of Education Delhi dated 21. 4. 70 in support of her claim. ( 4 ) ON 26. 3. 1969 the petitioner addressed a representation to the Director of the Directorate of Education bringing all the relevant facts on records and praying for necessary directions as per the rules, on 29. 3. 1996, the Director of Education in response to the representation of the petitioner, issued an order bearing no. 18021 to 18041 wherein informing the managers of all the Government- aided Schools that the Officiating charge of a school should be given only to the senior-most teacher in normal course, this order was received by respondent no. 1 School. On 30. 8. 96, the petitioner was officially informed that Ms. Jain was being given the charge of Officiating Principal on the retirement of the Principal on 31. 3. 1996. It is alleged that the petitioner accepted the notice under protest. On 4. 4. 1 School. On 30. 8. 96, the petitioner was officially informed that Ms. Jain was being given the charge of Officiating Principal on the retirement of the Principal on 31. 3. 1996. It is alleged that the petitioner accepted the notice under protest. On 4. 4. 1996, another letter was sent by the Director of Education which is Annexure P-6 to the petition. Relevant portion of the letter reads as under:- "i am directed to inform you that the only senior-most lecturer of your school may act as Officiating Principal and not any junior seniormost lecturer of your school may act as Principal till the appointment of Principal in the school. A compliance to this effect may be sent to this office immediately. ( 5 ) AGAIN in pursuance of the representation to the Chief Minister by the petitioner, a letter was addressed to the Manager of respondent no. 1 School on 17. 4. 1996. The letter reads as under: "the senior-most lecturer of your school will act Officiating Principal of the school. The Orders in this regard have already been issued to you vide letter dated 4. 4. 1996. Non compliance will be taken seriously. Take immediate action and inform the undersigned immediately. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. N. N. Aggarwal had referred, to Notification dated 28. 1. 91 and also submitted that according to the notification for appointment of Principal, the precondition is 10 years experience of teaching as the Vice-Principal PGT in a Higher secondary/ senior secondary-school or inter college. It is also submitted by the petitioner that she being the senior-most teacher has more than 31 years of teaching experience and about 28 years experience of teaching post-graduate classes. Whereas respondent no. 3 who has been appointed as the officiating principal has only 8 years of teaching experience of post-graduate classes and, therefore, she is not even eligible for appointment as Officiating Principal according to the aforesaid notification which is applicable tothe aforesaid notification which is applicable for all institutions. ( 7 ) DESPITE a number of representations, when the management was bent upon permitting Ms. Satish Jain, respondent no. 3 to continue as Officiating Principal, the petitioner then approached this court. This court issued a show cause notice on June 21, 1996 and also appointed a court commissioner to visit respondent no. ( 7 ) DESPITE a number of representations, when the management was bent upon permitting Ms. Satish Jain, respondent no. 3 to continue as Officiating Principal, the petitioner then approached this court. This court issued a show cause notice on June 21, 1996 and also appointed a court commissioner to visit respondent no. 1 School to keep the service book and confidential papers concerning the petitioner in a sealed cover. The court made this direction when the apprehension was expressed by the petitioner that the respondents are likely to manipulate her service record. ( 8 ) IN the petition, the petitioner has mentioned that this extraordinary preferential treatment has been given to respondent no. 3 because she is the daughter of Mahaveer Prasad Jain, one of the members of the managing committee. She also mentioned that respondent no. 3 is closely, and distantly related to many of the members of the managing committee. Some of them are her close relations. In view of thei relationship with respondent no. 3 the managing committee in collusion with each other have decided to defeat the legitimate claim of the petitioner and have appointed respondent no. 3 as the Officiating Principal. ( 9 ) MR. N. N. AGGARWAL, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent no. 1, School is bound by the provisions of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 and Rules framed thereunder. He placed reliance on Rule 64 which reads as under: "that no school shall be granted aid unless its managing committee gives an undertaking in writing that it shall comply with the provisions of the Act and these rules. ( 10 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner had also drawn my attention to Rule 100. This Rule prescribes the minimum qualification for appointment of teachers. Rule 100 reads as under: "until separate rules specifying the minimum qualifications of teachers of schools, whether aided or not, are made by the Administrator in consultation with the Advisory Board and after giving the Affiliating Board or the appropriate authority, as the case may be a reasonable opportunity of being heard, the minimum qualifications for employment as a teacher. Rule 100 reads as under: "until separate rules specifying the minimum qualifications of teachers of schools, whether aided or not, are made by the Administrator in consultation with the Advisory Board and after giving the Affiliating Board or the appropriate authority, as the case may be a reasonable opportunity of being heard, the minimum qualifications for employment as a teacher. a) In a recognised unaided school shall not be lower than those specified by the Affiliating Board; Provided that where no minimum qualifications have been specified by the Affiliating Board, the minimum qualifications shall be such as have been specified by the appropriate authority; Provided further that me managing committee of such school may specify qualification higher than those or in addition to those specified by the Affiliating Board or the appropriate authority, as the case may be, but no such higher or additional qualification shall be specified in relation to a teacher who is already serving the school; (b) In an aided school, shall be those as have been specified by the Administrator for appointment to corresponding posts in Government schools; (c) Where a post (other than of a teacher) in a school whether aided or not, corresponds to any post in the Government Schools, the minimum qualifications for recruitment to such post shall be such as has been specified for such corresponding post in the Government school. " ( 11 ) HE also relied on Rule 104. this rule deals with minimum and maximum age limit for recruitment of recognised private schools whether it is aided or not? ( 12 ) SIMILARLY, he placed reliance on Rule 110. According to this rule, the age of retirement would be the same whether it is an aided school or not. Mr. Aggarwal also placed reliance on Rule 128, this rule deals with the minimum qualification for appointment as a teacher of an un-aided minority institution and says that it shall not be less than those as are specified by the affiliating board. Mr. Aggarwal submitted that according to various rules, notification and the letters issued from the Directorate of Education, the petitioner being the senior-most teacher ought to have been given the charge of Officiating Principal. ( 13 ) MR. Mr. Aggarwal submitted that according to various rules, notification and the letters issued from the Directorate of Education, the petitioner being the senior-most teacher ought to have been given the charge of Officiating Principal. ( 13 ) MR. AGGARWAL learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that after the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court except section 8 (2) of the Act, all sections and rules are uniformally applicable to all the schools aided and unaided. ( 14 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of the said Rules, respondent No. 1 is also bound by instructions which are issued by the Directorate of Education or other officials from time to time. He specifically referred to Rul3 43 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973. Rule 43 reads as under: 49. POWER TO ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS The Administrator may, if he is of opinion that in the interest of school education in Delhi, it is necessary so to do, issue such instructions in relation to any matter, not covered by these rules, as he may deem fit. Therefore, it becomes abundantly clear by bare reading of Rule 43 and 64 (1) that even the instructions issued by the Administrator are binding in nature. He also placed reliance on rule 23. Rule 23 reads as under: 23. DELEGATION OF POWERS: (1) The administrator may delegate all or any of his powers, duties and functions under this Act to the Director or any other Officer. (2) Every person to whom any power if delegated under sub section (1), may exercise that power in the same manner and with the same effect as if such power had been conferred on him directly by this Act and not by way of delegation. ( 15 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner Submitted that in view of this Rule, the Administrator could legitimately delegate his powers to the Director and to other officials. ( 16 ) MR. Aggarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported as Frank Anthony School Employees association vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1987 S. C. 311. In this case, the Supreme Court had examined various provisions of the Delhi School inapplicable to un-aided minority institutions is discriminatory and void except to the extent that it makes section 8 (2) inapplicable to un-aided minority institutions. In this case, the Supreme Court had examined various provisions of the Delhi School inapplicable to un-aided minority institutions is discriminatory and void except to the extent that it makes section 8 (2) inapplicable to un-aided minority institutions. Section 12 which makes the provision of Chapter IV inapplicable to un-aided minority school is discriminatory not only because it makes Chapter 10inapplicable to the minority institution but also because it makes, Section 8 (1), 8 (3), 8 (4), 8 (5), 9 and 11 inapplicable to un-aided minority institutions. Mr. Aggarwal submitted that respondent no. 1 is admittedly an aided institution. Even for un-aided institution, the apex court had gone to the extent of declaring section 12 of the Act as discriminatory and void except to the extent it makes Section 8 (2) inapplicable tp im-aided minorit nstitution. ( 17 ) ACCORDING to Mr. Aggarwal, learned general for the petitioner, the provisions of the Act are clearly applicable to respondent no. 1 School in view of mis judgment. In the case of Frank Anthony (supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under:- "the management of a minority educational institution cannot be permitted under the guise of the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 30 (1) to oppress or exploit its employees any more than any other private employee. Oppression or exploitation of the teaching staff of an educational institution is bound to lead, inevitably, to discontent and deterioration of the standard of instructions imparted in the institution affecting adversely the object of making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it. The management of minority institution cannot complain of invasion of the fundamental right to administer the institution when it denies the members of its staff the opportunity to achieve the very object of Art. 30 (1) which is to make the institution an effective vehicle of education. " ( 18 ) IN order to properly comprehend aforesaid case it is necessary to comprehend article 30 (1) Article 30 (1) of the Constitution, which reads as under: "30 Right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions - (1) All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. [ (IA)In making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of any property of an educational institution established and administered by a minority, referred to in clause (1), the State shall ensure that the amount fixed by or determined under such law for the acquisition of such property is such as would not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed under that clause. } (2) The State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language. " ( 19 ) ARTICLE 30 (1) of the Constitution has been subject matter of decision of the Supreme Court in number of cases. In Kerala Educational, Bill, 1957 reported as AIR 1958 SC 956 , S. R. Das, Chief justice, explained Article 30 (1) as follows:- the first point to note is that the article gives certain rights riot only to religious minorities but also to linguistic minorities. In the next place, the right conferred on such minorities is to establish educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their language only. What the article says and means is that the religious and the linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. There is no limitation placed on the subjects to be taught in such educational institutions. As such minorities will ordinarily desire that their children should be brought up properly and efficiently and be eligible for higher university education and go out in the world fully equipped with such intellectual attainments as will make them fit for entering the public services, educational institutions of their choice will necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education also. In other Words, the article leaves it to their choice to establish such educational - institutions as will serve both purposes, namely, the purpose of conserving their religion, language or culture, and also the purpose of giving a thorough, good general education to their children. The next thing to not is that the article, in terms, gives all minorities whether based on religion or language, two rights, namely, the right to establish and the right to administer educational institutions or their choice. The next thing to not is that the article, in terms, gives all minorities whether based on religion or language, two rights, namely, the right to establish and the right to administer educational institutions or their choice. The key to the understanding of the true meaning and implication of the article under consideration are the words of their own choice. It is said that the dominant words is choice and the content of that article is as wide as the choice of the particular minority community may make it. The ambit of the rights conferred by Article 30 (1) has therefore, to be determined on a consideration of the matter from the points of view of the educational institutions themselves. "in the same judgment, Das C. J. observed as under: "the right to administer cannot obviously include the right to maladminister. The minority cannot surely ask for aid or recognition for an educational institution run by them in unhealthy surroundings, without any competent teachers possessing any semblance of qualification, and which does not maintain even a fair standard of teaching or which teaches matters subversive of the welfare of the scholars. It stands to reason, then that the constitutional right to administer an educational institution of their choice does not necessarily militate against the claim of the State to insist that in order to grant aid, the State may prescribe reasonable regulations to ensure the excellence of the institutions to be aided. "in the same judgment, the Court observed as under: SERIOUS inroads on the right of administration and that they came: perilously near violating their right nevertheless held, but considering that these provisions are applicable to all educational institutions and that the impugned parts of Cls, 9,11, and 12 are designed to give protection and security to the ill paid teachers who are engaged in rendering service to the nation and protect and backward classes, we are prepared as at present advised, to treat these clause 9, 11 (2) and 12 (4) as permissible regulations which the State may impose on the minorities as a condition for granting aid to their educational institutions. " ( 20 ) IN Ahmedabad St. " ( 20 ) IN Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389 , khanna, J observed as under:- "the idea of giving special rights to, the minorities is not to have a kind of a privileged or pampered section of the population but to give to the minorities a sense of security and a feeling of confidence. Later dealing with the scope and ambit of the right guaranteed by Article 30 (1), he said: "the clause confers a right on all minorities whether they are based on religion or language, to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, the right conferred by the clause is nin absolute terms and is not subject to restrictions, as in the case of rights conferred by Article 19 of the Constitution. The right of the minorities to administer educational institutions does not, however, prevent the making of reasonable regulations in respect of those institutions. The regulations have necessarily a minority educational institution. They have to be so designed as to make it an effective vehicle for imparting education. The right to administer educational institutions can plainly-not include the right to maladminister. Regulations can be made to present the housing of an educational institution in Unhealthy surroundings as also to prevent the setting up or continuation of an educational institution without qualified teachers. The State can prescribe regulations to ensure the excellence of the institution. Prescription of standards for educational institutions does not militate against the right of the minority to administer the institutions. Regulations made in the true interests of efficiency of instruction, discipline, health, sanitation, morality public order and the like may undoubtedly be imposed. Such regulations are not restrictions on the substance of the right which is guaranteed; they secure the proper functioning of the institution, in matters educational. " ( 21 ) THE court also observed that: "the management of a minority Educational Institution cannot be permitted under the guise of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30 (1) of the Constitution, to oppress or exploit its employees any more than any other private employee. " ( 21 ) THE court also observed that: "the management of a minority Educational Institution cannot be permitted under the guise of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30 (1) of the Constitution, to oppress or exploit its employees any more than any other private employee. Oppression or exploitation of the teaching staff of an educational institution is bound to lead, inevitably to discontent and deterioration of the standard of instructions imparted in the institution affecting adversely the object of making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it. The management of minority institution cannot complain of invasion of the fundamental right to administer the institution when it denies the members of its staff the opportunity to achieve the very object of Article 30 (1) which is to make the institution an effective vehicle of education. " ( 22 ) IN another case ofthe Supreme court, Very Rey, Mother provincial, AIR 1970 SC 2079 , it has been observed that: "the minority institutions cannot be allowed to fall below the standards of excellence expected of educational institutions, or under the guise of exclusive right of management, to decline to follow the general pattern.-While the management must be left to them, they may be compelled to keep in step with others. : It is in my opinion, permissible to make regulations for ensuring the regular payment of salaries before a particular date of the month. Regulations may well provide that the funds of the institution should be spent for the purposes of education or for the betterment of the institution and not for extraneous purposes. Regulations may also contain provisions to prevent the diversion of funds of institutions to the pockets of those in charge of management or their embezzlement in any other manner. Provisions for audit of the accounts of me institution would be permissible regulation. Likewise, regulations may provide that no antinational activity would be permitted in the educational institutions and that those employed as members of the staff should not have been guilty of any activities against the national interest. Provisions for audit of the accounts of me institution would be permissible regulation. Likewise, regulations may provide that no antinational activity would be permitted in the educational institutions and that those employed as members of the staff should not have been guilty of any activities against the national interest. Minorities are as much part of the nation as the majority, and anything that impinges upon national interest must necessarily in its ultimate operation affect the interests of all those who inhibit this vast land irrespective of the fact whether they belong to the majority or minority sections of the population, it is, therefore, as much in the interest of minorities as that of the majority to ensure that the protection afforded to minority institutions is not used as a cloak for doing something which is subversive of national interest. Regulations to prevent antinational activities in educational institutions can, therefore, be considered to be reasonable. In this judgment, Mathew, J speaking for himself and Chandrachud, J. observed that: "it is a total misconception to say that because the right is couched in absolute terms, the exercise of the right cannot be regulated or that even regulation of that right would bean abridgement of the right. "it is further observed in this very judgment that: "the heart of the matter as observed is that no educational institution established by a religious or linguistic minority can claim total immunity from regulations by the legislature or the university if it wants affiliation or recognition; but the character of the permissible regulations must depend upon their purpose. " ( 23 ) THE learned counsel for the petition placed or reliance on Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and others. AIR 1967 SCV 1910. The Constitution bench in this judgment observed that it is true that the Government cannot amend or supersede. "till statutory rules are framed in this behalf the Government cannot issue administrative instructions regarding the principle to be followed in promotions of the officers concerned to selection grade posts. It is true that Government cannot amend or supersede statutory Rules by administrative instructions, but if the rules are silent on any particular point Government can fill up the gaps and supplement. the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed. " ( 24 ) THE counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent no. It is true that Government cannot amend or supersede statutory Rules by administrative instructions, but if the rules are silent on any particular point Government can fill up the gaps and supplement. the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed. " ( 24 ) THE counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent no. 1 School by the Manager of the managing committee. In the affidavit, it is mentioned that the committee has taken steps to fail, the post of Principal and Vice-Principal in the school and is going to hold a meeting of the departmental Promotion Committee for filling up both the posts in the month of June, 1996. However, before the meeting of the Departmental Promotion Committee could be held, the service record and annual confidential reports of the petitioner were not sealed under the orders of the court. That is how there has been some delay in filling the costs of the Principal and the Vice-Principal. ( 25 ) IT is also mentioned that respondent no. 1 is a minority institution and Acts and the Rules of the Delhi School education Act, 1973 are not applicable to this institution. It is also mentioned that this court should, not act as a court of appeal over the decision of the managing committee of respondent no. 1. It is contended that respondent no. 1 is not bound to follow the guidelines issued by respondent no 2 It is also mentioned hat the Education Officer or the Director of Education has no power of jurisdiction to interfere in the management and the affairs of respondent no. 1 School. It is mentioned that the managing committee has appointed respondent no. 3 as the Officiating Principal in exercise of its power as recognised by the judgment of the Division Bench in the case of S. S. Jain Sabha of Rawalpindi (Delhi) and others vs. Union of India and others, ILR 1976 (2) Delhi, 61. ( 26 ) MR. G. N. Aggarwal, learned counsel for the respondent school has also placed reliance on the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court St. Stephens College etc. etc. Vs. The University of Delhi etc, etc. AIR 1992 SC 1630 . ( 26 ) MR. G. N. Aggarwal, learned counsel for the respondent school has also placed reliance on the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court St. Stephens College etc. etc. Vs. The University of Delhi etc, etc. AIR 1992 SC 1630 . The majority view of this judgment is as under "the State or any instrumentality of the State cannot deprive the character of the institution founded by a minority community by compulsory affiliation since Article 30 (1) is a special right to minorities to establish educational institutions of their choice. The minority institution has a distinct identity and the right to administer with continuance of such identity cannot be denied by coercive action. Any such coercive action would be void being contrary to the constitutional guarantee. The right to administration is the right to conduct and manage the affairs of the institution. This right is exercise by a body of persons in whom the founders have faith and confidence. Such a management body of the institution cannot be displaced or reorganised if the right is to recognised and maintained. Reasonable regulations however, are permissible about regulations should be regulatory nature and not of abridgment of the right guaranteed underarticle 30 (1 ). ( 27 ) IT is also mentioned in the counter-affidavit that respondent no. 1 was not duty bound to appoint the petitioner as the Offciating Principal. The petitioner has specifically levelled allegations in para (xxiii) of the petition. In a parawise counter-affidavit, respondent no. 1 denied para 3 (xviii) of the writ petition. ( 28 ) A separate counter-affidavit has been filed by Ms. Satish Jain, respondent no. 3. In reply to para (xviii ). she has admitted that Mahaveer Prasad Jain who is a member of the managing committee of the school is her father. ( 29 ) MR. G. N. Aggarwal, learned counsel for the respondent School submitted that according to the judgment of S. S. Jain Sabha (supra), provisions of the Act and rules framed thereunder are not applicable to respondent no. 1. He submitted that the managing committee was well within its jurisdiction to appoint any one from the teachers of the school as the Officiating Principal. They were not under an obligation to appoint only the senior -most teacher as the Officiating Principal. 1. He submitted that the managing committee was well within its jurisdiction to appoint any one from the teachers of the school as the Officiating Principal. They were not under an obligation to appoint only the senior -most teacher as the Officiating Principal. He also submitted that the Director of Education or anyone else has no power to issue any instructions or to make any appointmeny. He further submitted that for officiating appointment, no approval of the direct is necessary and the managing committee was justified in appointing respondent no. 3 as the Officiating Principal. Mr. Agarwal, learned counsel for the respondent placd reliance on Rule 98. Rule 98 reads as under:- "98. Appointing Authority (1) The appointment of every employee of a school shall be made by its managing committee. (2) [every appointment made by the managing committee of an aided school shall initially, e provisional and shall require the approval of the Dierctor. Provided that the approval of the Director will be required only where Director s nominee was not present in the Selection Committee/dpc or in case their difference of opinion among the members of teh Selection committee. Provided furtjher taht the provision of this sub-rule shall not apply to a minority aided school. } (3) The particulars of every appointment made by the managing committee of an aided school shall be communicated by such committee to the Director (either by registered post acknowledgement of the receipt thereof), within seven days from the date on which the appointment is made. (4) The Director shall be deemed to have approved an appointment made by the managing committee of an aided school if within fifteen days from the date on which the particulars of teh appointment are communicated to him under sub-rule. (3) he does not intimate to the managing committee his disapproval of the appointment, and the person so appointed shall be entitled for his salary and allowance from the date of his apointment} (5) Where any appointment made by the managing committee of an aided school is not approved by the Director, such appointment may (pending the regular appointment to the post) be continued on an adhoc basis for a period not exceeding three months and the salary and allowances of the person so continued on an ad hoc basis shall qualify for the computation of the aid to be given to such school. " ( 30 ) ACCORDING to this rule, the managing committee has a right to appoint any employee of the school therefore, they were justified in appointing respondent no. 3 as the Officiating Principal of the School. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in the notification dated 29. 1. 91, relied upon by the petitioner, though there is a requirement of 10 years experience, there is a note appended to this notification that the competent authority may relax any essential qualification is case the person belongs to the same school after recording the reasons. Therefore, though respondent no. 3 has only 8 years experience, but the qualification could be relaxed by the committee and me committee has appointed respondent no. 3 as officiating principal after relaxing the condition. ( 31 ) HE further submitted that even in the frank Anthony Judgment (supra) the court recognised the right of the managing committee in substantial measure. Therefore, the decision of the managing committee of appointing respondent no. 3 as Officiating Principal cannot be questioned. ( 32 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent also placed reliance on the Constitution Bench Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of St. Stephen s College (supra) to demonstrate that the St. Stephen college is not bound by the circulars dated 5. 6. 80 and 9. 6. 80 of the Delhi University being a minority institution. The college need not follow the programme for admission laid down by the University nor need admit any student solely on the basis of merit determined by the percentage of marks secured by the student in the qualifying examination. ( 33 ) ON the same analogy, it is submitted that respondent no. 1 is also a minority institution and it is not bound by the notification and letters issued by the Director of Education, Delhi. ( 34 ) MR. G. N. AGGARWAL, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that Rule 64 and 69 only require respondent No. 1 to follow the provisions of Rules and Regulations and not the instructions issued by the Director, of Education. He farther submitted that according to Section 8 (1) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 the Administrator may make rules regulating the minimum qualifications for recruitment, and the conditions of service, of employees of recognised private schools. He farther submitted that according to Section 8 (1) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 the Administrator may make rules regulating the minimum qualifications for recruitment, and the conditions of service, of employees of recognised private schools. These powers have not been delegated to the Director of Education or to any one else. Therefore, the instructions issued by the Director or other officials are not binding on the respondent No. 1 School. ( 35 ) MR. AGGARWAL also submitted that respondent No. 1 is a minority institution and any direction issued by the Director of Education or other Officials of the Directorate of Education are clearly violative of the respondent No I is powers emanating from Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. ( 36 ) MR. AGGARWAL also submitted that the Managing Committee of respondent No. 1 was well within its rights to appoint an Officiating Principal. He also submitted that for appointment of the Officiating Principal till a permanent vacancy is filled, respondent No. 1 is not bound to follow the normal Rules and Regulations of appointment of the Principal. ( 37 ) MR. AGGARWAL also submitted that respondent No. 1 s fundamental rights are not dependent on the Rules, regulations or instructions of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973. He referred to Article 30 (i) and submitted that no limit whatsoever has been placed in the exercise of Article 30 (i) of the Constitution. He also submitted that this petition raises disputed questions of law which cannot be adjudicated in these proceedings under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution. He submitted that this Court should not exercise the power of Appellate Court on the decision of the Managing Committee. ( 38 ) MR. AGGANVAL in reply to the allegations of malafides had submitted that Mahavir Prasad Jain (father of respondent No. 3) was, of course, a Member of the Managing committee but he did not participate in the meeting of the Managing Committee held on 17. 3. 1996 in which respondent No. 3 was appointed as the Officiating Principal. ( 39 ) I have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and have perusedthe judgments cited at bar by the learned counsel for the parties. 3. 1996 in which respondent No. 3 was appointed as the Officiating Principal. ( 39 ) I have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and have perusedthe judgments cited at bar by the learned counsel for the parties. On analysis of aforesaid judgments the irresistible conclusion is that while maintaining the character of a minority institution, the State is under an obligation to ensure that these minority institutions also adhere to minimum educational and other qualifications at the time of recruitment and appointment of teachers and other employees. It is also the duty of the State to ensure that these minority institutions also pay minimum pay scale to the teachers and other employees of these institutions and adhere to the provisions of the Delhi Education Act and rules framed thereunder and instructions issued from time, to time. This is absolutely imperative in the larger interest of education and all those who are associated with these organisations. These regulations do not abridge the constitutional protection granted to these institutions under Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. ( 40 ) THE Supreme Court in the Frank Anthony Public School (supra) has gone to the extent of saying that the management of a minority educational institution cannot be permitted under the guise of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 30 (1) to oppress or exploit its employees any more than any other private employees. In the instant case, the petitioner who is admittedly the senior most post graduate teacher in the institution with more than 28 years experience of teaching post graduate classes and fulfil all requisite qualifications for the appointment of the Principal could not have been denied her legitimate claim of being appointed as Officiating Principal. Under the guise of Article 30 (1), the School Management was not justified in appointing respondent no. 3 as the Officiating Principal who was far junior to the petitioner and did not fulfil the basic requisite qualification for appointment as the Officiating Principal because she did not have 10 years experience of teaching postgraduate classes. ( 41 ) CONSEQUENTLY the respondent school is directed to appoint the petitioner as Officiating Principal forthwith till duly selected Principal is appointed by the school. ( 42 ) IN this view of the matter, the writ petition deserves to be allowed in the aforesaid terms. ( 41 ) CONSEQUENTLY the respondent school is directed to appoint the petitioner as Officiating Principal forthwith till duly selected Principal is appointed by the school. ( 42 ) IN this view of the matter, the writ petition deserves to be allowed in the aforesaid terms. In the facts and circumstances of this case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.