Honble SHARMA, J. – Core questions which arise in all these revisions are (1) as to whether `PRESCRIBED AUTHORITY under the Rajasthan Agricultural Credit Operations (Removal of Difficulties) Act, 1974 (for short the Act 1974) is subordinate to this Court and revision against the order of said authority is maintainable? and whether civil regular first appeal is competent against the order of the said authority passed u/s. 13(1) of the Act of 1974, before the District Judge? (2). These questions have emerged in the following circumstances :– BACKCGROUND FACTS (i) Respective proceedings bearing cases No. 37/90, 213/94 and 209/94 were initiated against the petitioners u/s. 13 of the Act of 1974 before the Prescribed Authority (Sub Divisional Officer) Kishangarh (Ajmer). The petitioner raised objections by submitting applications. The Prescribed Authority dismissed the applications and issued warrants of attachment of the properties. The petitioners preferred civil regular first appeals against the orders of the Prescribed Authority treating the orders as decrees of the Civil Court in view of Sec. 13(2) of the Act of 1974. (ii) The learned Additional District Judge, Kishangarh, dismissed the appeals as not maintainable. Said orders have been assailed in these revisions. As identical question of fact and law arise in all these revi- sions, they are being decided by a common order. STATUTORY BACK GROUND (3). The object behind the Act is to ensure that adequate proportion of Commercial Banks Credit goes to the agricultural sector. It was found that instead of amending various State laws, it would be preferable if a single consolidated legi- slation incorporated the various amendment suggested by experts. Therefore the restrictions put by other State laws which inhibit the entry of commercial Bank into the field of financing of agriculture have been removed from the Act 1974. (4). Chapter IV of the Act 1974 deals with the recovery of dues by Banks. Section 13 is relevant for the present adjudication which reads as under : ``13. Therefore the restrictions put by other State laws which inhibit the entry of commercial Bank into the field of financing of agriculture have been removed from the Act 1974. (4). Chapter IV of the Act 1974 deals with the recovery of dues by Banks. Section 13 is relevant for the present adjudication which reads as under : ``13. Recovery of dues of a Bank through a prescribed authority : (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, an official of the State Government notified by the State Govern- ment as the prescribed authority for the purpose of this section may, on the application of a Bank, make an order on or any agriculturist or his heir or legal representative or his guarantor, directing the payment of any sum due to the bank on account of financial assistance availed of by the agriculturist, by the sale of any land or interest therein or any other immovable property, upon which the payment of such money is charged or mortgaged or any other property in his possession; Provided that no order shall be made by prescribed authority under this sub-section for the sale of any land or any interest therein or any other immovable property upon which the payment of money is char- ged or mortgaged or any other property in his possession as the case may be, unless the agriculturist or the heir or legal representative or his guarantor of the agriculturist, as the case may be, has been given an opportunity of being heard and has been served with a notice by the prescribed authority calling upon him to pay the amount due and default has been made in payment thereof of three months after the determination of liabilities by such authority. 2. Every order passed by the prescribed authority in term of sub-sec. (1) shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court and shall be executed by him in the same manner as a decree of such Court. Explanation – For the purpose of exercising powers conferred by this sub-section, the prescribed authority shall be deemed to be a Civil Court. (3). Nothing in this section shall debar a Bank from seeking to enforce its rights in any other manner under any other law for the time being in force. (5). Explanation – For the purpose of exercising powers conferred by this sub-section, the prescribed authority shall be deemed to be a Civil Court. (3). Nothing in this section shall debar a Bank from seeking to enforce its rights in any other manner under any other law for the time being in force. (5). This Court (Honble J.R. Chopra, J. as he then was) in Daulat Ram vs. Punjab National Bank (1), held that any order passed by the Prescribed Authority in terms of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of the Act 1974 shall be deemed to be a decree of the Civil Court and an appeal is maintainable against such order before the Dis- trict Judge u/s. 3 r/w Sec. 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (6). In order to appreciate the observations made in Daulat Rams case (supra) it is necessary first to examine the provisions contained in Sec. 3 and Sec. 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure :– Section 3 reads as under :– ``Subordination of Court : For the purposes of this Code, the District Court is subordinate to the High Court and every Civil Court of grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court. Section 96 reads as follows : `Appeal from original decree : (1) Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorised to hear appeals from decisions of such Court. (2) An appeal may lie from an original decree passed exparte. (3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties. (4) No appeal shall lie, except on a question of law, from a decree in any suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of small cause, when the amount or value of the subject matter of the original suit does not exceed three thousand rupees. (4) No appeal shall lie, except on a question of law, from a decree in any suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of small cause, when the amount or value of the subject matter of the original suit does not exceed three thousand rupees. It was propounded in Dault Rams case (supra) that prescribed autho- rity is a Civil Court and it has to be treated as inferior to District Judge and appeal against an order passed u/s. 13(1) of the Act 1974 will lie to the Court of District Judge u/s. 96 r/w Sec. 3 CPC. (7). Section 2 (2) CPC which defines ``decree provides that in order to term a decision of a Court as `decree there must be the following essential elements – (i) There must be an adjudication, (ii) The adjudication must have been given in a suit. (iii) It must have determined the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. (iv) Such determination must be conclusive determination. (v) There must be a formal expression of the adjudication. (8). A perusal of the scheme of the Act 1974 shows that the Act itself does not provide for any appeal or revision. So to set at rest the controversy as to whether the order of Prescirbed Authority passed u/s. 13(1) of the Act 1974, is appealable or revisable, it is not necessary to consider what is the status of `Prescribed Authority? Whether it is a subordinate civil Court? If it is a civil Court inferior to District Court then there is no doubt about the maintainability of appeal u/s. 96 or revision u/s. 115 CPC against its order. DISTINCTION BETWEEN CIVIL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (9). The dictionary meaning of the word ``authority is clearly wide enough to include all bodies created by a statutes on which powers are conferred to carry out Governmental or quasi Governmental functions. In Jaswant Singh Mills Ltd. vs. Lakshmi Chand (2), the Apex Court observed thus – ``The duty to act judicially imposed upon an authority by statute does not necessarily clothe the authority with the judicial power. In Jaswant Singh Mills Ltd. vs. Lakshmi Chand (2), the Apex Court observed thus – ``The duty to act judicially imposed upon an authority by statute does not necessarily clothe the authority with the judicial power. Even ad- ministrative or executive authorities are often by virtue of their constitution, required to act judicially in dealing with question affecting the rights of citizens, Board of Revenue, Customs Authorities, Motor Vehicles Authorities, Income Tax and Sales Tax Officers are illustrations, prima facie of such administrative authorities, who though under a duty to act judicially, either by the express provisions of the statutes constituting them or by the rules framed thereunder or by implication either of the statutes or the power conferred upon them are still not delegated the judicial powers of the State. (10). The Apex Court in A.C. Companies vs. P.N. Sharma (3), made a distinc- tion between the ordinary Courts constituted to settle civil disputes and Tribunals established by the State for dealing with special matters, thus :– ``The expression ``court in the context denotes a Tribunal constituted by the State as a part of the ordinary hierarchy of Courts which are invested with the States inherent judicial powers. A sovereign State discharges legislative, executive and judicial functions and can legitimately claim corresponding powers which are described as legislative, executive and judicial powers. Under our Constitution, the judicial functions and powers of the State are primarily conferred on the ordinary Courts which have been constituted under its relevant provisions. The Constitution recognised a hierarchy of Courts and to them adjudication are normally entrusted all disputes between citizen and citizens as well as between the citizens and the State. These Courts can be described as ordinary Courts of civil judicature. They are governed by their prescribed rules of procedure and they deal with questions of fact and law raised before them by adopting a process which is described as judicial process. The powers which these Courts exercise are judicial powers, the functions they discharge are judicial functions and the decisions they reach and pro- nounce are judicial decision. Tribunals, occupy a special position of their own under the scheme of our Constitution. The powers which these Courts exercise are judicial powers, the functions they discharge are judicial functions and the decisions they reach and pro- nounce are judicial decision. Tribunals, occupy a special position of their own under the scheme of our Constitution. Special matters and questions are entrusted to them for their decision and in that sense, they share with the Courts one common charactersistic, both the Courts and the Tribunals are constituted by the State and are invested with judicial functions as distinguished from purely administrative or executive function. Vide Durga Shanker Mehta vs. Raghuraj,(4). They are both adjudicating bodies and they deal with and finally determine disputes between parties which are entrusted to their jurisdiction. The procedure follo- wed by the Courts in regularly prescribed and in discharging their function and exercising their powers, the Courts have to conform to that procedure. The procedure which the tribunals have to follow may not always be so strictly prescribed, but the approach adoptedby both the Courts and the tribunals is substantially the same and there is no essential difference between the function that they discharge. As in the case of Courts, so in the case of tribunals it is the States inherent judicial function which they discharge. Judicial function and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign State,and on consideration of policy the State transfers, its judicial functions and powers mainly to the Courts established by the Constitution, but that does not affect the competence of the State, by appropriate measures to transfer a part of its judicial power and functions to tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between parties. It is really not possible or even expedient to attempt to describe exhaustive features which are common to the tribunals and the Courts and features which are distinct and separate. The basic and fundamental feature which is common to both the Courts and the tribunals is that they discharge judicial fun-ctions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in sovereign State. (11). Placing reliance on the observations made in A.C. Companies Ltd. case (supra) the Division Bench of this Court (Honble the Chief Justice Mr. The basic and fundamental feature which is common to both the Courts and the tribunals is that they discharge judicial fun-ctions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in sovereign State. (11). Placing reliance on the observations made in A.C. Companies Ltd. case (supra) the Division Bench of this Court (Honble the Chief Justice Mr. Gokal Chand Mital and R.S. Verma,J. as they then were) in Bashir Khan vs. Ranger Social Vaniki & Ors.(5) , propounded that expression `Any Court Subordinate to High Court in Sec. 115 CPC is used in narrow sense meaning only a civil Court in normal hierarchy of Courts. This expression does not cover Tribunals established under Special Acts to exercise jurisdiction under in special matters Workmens Compensation Commissioner, was held to be a tribunal established under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 and is not amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court u/s. 115 CPC. (12). Full Bench of Madras High Court in Parthasarathi Naidu vs. Koleshwara Rao (6), defined `persona designatae as ``persons selected to act in their private capacity and not in their capacity as Judges. (13). Hans Kumar vs. U.O.I. (7), was the case where the Apex Court indicated thus : ``The position therefore is that if the reference is to a Court as persona designata, its decision will not be open to appeal except to the extent that the statute so provides; but that if, on the other hand, it is to a Court as Court, its decision will be appealable under the general law, unless there is something in the statutes which abridges or takes away that incident. (14). Sainiks Motors vs. S.T. Authority (8), was the case where the Division Bench of this Court held that appeals are creations of statute and unless a person can bring himself within the four corners of the statute law prescribing appeals he cannot go before any appellate authority. (15). Smt. Ganga Bai vs. Vijay Kumar & Ors. (9), was the case where the Supreme Court laid down thus : ``A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough that no statute bars the suit. But the position in regard to appeals is quite the opposite. The right of appeal inheres in no one and therefore an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law. But the position in regard to appeals is quite the opposite. The right of appeal inheres in no one and therefore an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law. That explains why the right of appeal is described as a creature of statute. (16). In Munshi Ram & Ors. vs. Hukam Singh & Anr. (10), this Court held that tribunal appointed under Displaced Persons Debts Adjustment Act is not a Court subject to revisional jurisdiction of High Court. It was observed that ``a perusal of the scheme of the Act shows that the matters mentioned in the Act were to be dealt with by the Tribunals and not by ordinary Courts. SCHEME OF THE ACT 1974 (17). I now, proceed to examine the scheme of the Rajasthan Agricultural Credit Operation (Removal of Difficulties) Act, 1974, to ascertain if `Prescribed Authority functioning u/s. 13 of the said Act is a Tribunal or is a civil Court amenable to appellate or revisional jurisdiction u/s. 96 & 115 of the CPC. The preamble of the Act reads as under : ``An Act to make provisions to facilitate adequate flow of credit for agricultural production and development through banks and other institutional credit agencies and for matters connected therewith and/or incidental thereto. A perusal of the preamble demonstrates that the Act provides for `special matters, namely to make provisions to facilitate adequate flow of credit for agricultural production and development through banks and other institutional credit agencies. `Prescribed Authority has not been defined in the Act but in Sec. 13(1) it has been special that ``Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, an official of the State Government notified by the State government as the Prescribed Authority for the purpose of this section may, on the application of a bank, make an order on or any agriculturist or his heir or legal representative, directing by payment of any sum due to the bank on account of financial assistance availed of the the agriculturist, by the sale of any land or interest therein or any other immovable property upon which the payment of such money is charged or mort- gaged. A dispute, touching the constitution, management or the business of a cooperative society between a bank financing a cooperative soceity, and the cooperative society so financed shall be referred to the Registrar of the Cooperative Societies for decision, u/s. 20 of the Act. The Registrar u/s. 21 of the Act, shall decide the dispute himself or refer it for disposal to a nominee or a Board of nominees appointed by him. The Registrar, u/s. 21(3) of the Act may suspend proceedings in regard to any dispute if involves complicated questions of law and fact, until the question has been tried by a regular suit instituted by one of the parties to thedispute. If any such suit is not instituted within two months from the Registrars order suspending proceedings, the Registrar shall decide the said dispute himself or refer it for disposal to a nominee of a Board of nominees. Section 23 of the Act provides that when the dispute is referred, the Registrar, after giving a reasonable opportunity to the parties to the dispute to be heard, make an award on the dispute. Such an award shall, subject to appeal or review or revision by the Cooperative Tribunal of the State, be binding to the dispute. Section 27 of the Act indicates that ``No law for the time being in force dealing with money lending or agriculturists debt relief shall apply the financial assistanceavailed of by an agriculturist from a bank. This section specially excludes the opera- tion of the provisions of the Rajasthan Money Lenders Act, 1965 and the Rajasthan Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness Act, 1957. Under Sec. 5(3) of the Act, a Bank may distrain and sell through an official of the State Government, designated in this behalf by the State Government, the crop or other produce or other movable charged to that bank. According to Rule 4 of the Rajasthan Agriculture Credit Operations (Removal of Difficulties) Rules, 1976 (for short the Rules 1976), the District Collector/Additional Collector of the District/Sub Divisional Officer of the sub division within whose jurisdiction the bank or its branch which disburse the loan is situated, shall be the official designated by the State Government for exercising powers for the purpose of Sec. 5(3) of the Act. According to Rule 5 of the Rules, 1976, the District Collector/Additional Collector/Sub-Divisional Officer having jurisdiction in the area wherein the immovable property is situated shall exercise the powers of the prescribed authority u/s. 13(1) of the Act, 1976. It implies that if the bank and the immovable property is situated in the same area then the District Collector/Additional Collector/Sub-Divisional Officer of the said area shall be the official through whom the crop or other movables charged to the bank, may be distrained and sold u/s. 5(3) of the Act, 1976 and the said District Collector/Additional Collector/Sub-Divisional Officer shall be the `Prescribed Authority u/s. 13(1) of the Act. 1976. Rule 6 of the Rules 1976 provides, that all notices, summons and proclamations required to be issued for the purpose of the Act, shall be issued, as far as possible in the manner laid down in the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act and Rules framed thereunder for notice, summons and proclamation. CONCLUSION (18). There is nothing in the Act, 1976 and the Rules 1976 which provides that the `prescribed authority shall have all the powers of the civil Courts under the CPC. As already indicated the `prescribed authority has only been clothed with the powers provided in Sec. 13(1) of the Act 1976 only. Disputes between a bank financing a cooperative society and the cooperative society so financed shall not be referred to the `prescribed authority but shall be referred to the Registrar of the Cooperative Societies, whose award shall further be subject of appeal or review by the Cooperative Tribunal of the State. Even the notices, summons and proclamations required to be issued for the purpose of the Act 1976, are not subjected to the provisions contained in the CPC. The `prescribed authority u/s. 13(1) of the Act, 1976, thus is a Tribunal with limited jurisdiction established by the State of Rajasthan for dealing with special matters. It has not been constituted in a hierarchy to settle civil disputes and cannot be termed as subordinate civil court inferior to the District Court as defined u/s. 3 of the CPC. (19). In Mangilal vs. Chunnilal (11), learned Single Judge of this Court took a view that Sec. 115 of the CPC empowered the High Court to call for the record of any case which had been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court. (19). In Mangilal vs. Chunnilal (11), learned Single Judge of this Court took a view that Sec. 115 of the CPC empowered the High Court to call for the record of any case which had been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court. He was further of the view that Compensation Commissioner was a Court subordinate to High Court so far as Sec. 115 CPC is concerned. In taking this view he was mainly influenced by the fact that an appeal lay down from the decision of the Workmens Compensation Commissioner to the High Court. (20). The Division Bench of this Court in Bashir Khan vs. Ranger, Social Vaniki & Ors. (supra) overruled the decision given by the learned single Judge in Mangilal vs. Chunnilal (supra). The Division Bench observed as under :– ``In our opinion, with respect to the learned Single Judge, the argument does not take into consideration the distinction between a Tribunal and a Civil Court, recognised by the Apex Court in A.C. Companies vs. P.N. Sharma (supra). To our mind, the Compensation Commissioner under Workmens Compensation Act is not a `Court in the normal hierarchy of Courts; it does not deal with general disputes but deals with only specified matters, it is governed by CPC. Rest of the procedure settled by it. It was further observed :– ``In view of aforesaid legal position, we are of the view that revision petition u/s. 115 of the CPC was not maintainable against the order passed by learned Workmens Compensation Commissioner and the Commissioner was not a Court subordinate to the High Court for purposes of Sec. 115 of the CPC. We answer the reference accordingly and overrule Mangilal vs. Chunnilal (supra). (21). In Smt. Gulab Kanwar vs. U.Co. Bank (12), this Court (Honble R.R. Yadav, J.) propounded as under :– ``Indisputably the order passed by the prescribed authority on 3.3.1981 had attained finality as the revisionist has not approached to the higher Court challenging the legality and validity of the said order by way of judicial review of the said order which has a colour of a decree passed by a Civil Court for a limited purposes of execution. It was further indicated that by Amending Act, 1976 the rejection of objection filed u/s. 47 CPC, was revisable therefore against the order rejecting the objection by the prescribed authority, revision was maintainable. (22). It was further indicated that by Amending Act, 1976 the rejection of objection filed u/s. 47 CPC, was revisable therefore against the order rejecting the objection by the prescribed authority, revision was maintainable. (22). In Smt. Maina Kanwar vs. P.N.B. Chittorgarh (13), this Court (Honble R.R. Yadav, J.) in para 13 laid down as follows :– ``Secondly I am of the opinion that the prescribed authority notified by the State Government under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of (Act No. 22 of 1974 cannot be said to be a civil Court within the meaning of Sec. 3 of CPC. The prescribed authority under the aforesaid section can not be termed to be even a Court. In this regard, suffice it to say that at the most the prescribed authority can be said to be either an Arbitrator or a Tribunal within the meaning of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of the Act No. 22 of 1974. The prescribed authority notified under the aforesaid section by the State Government is meant to discharge only a quasi judicial function which cannot be termed as a civil Court within the meaning of Sec. 3 CPC. Hence, such orders passed by prescribed authorities are not amenable to appeals as contemplated u/s. 96 CPC and also not amenable to second appeals u/s. 100 CPC. (23). Three points were formulated in Maina Kanwars case (supra) by the Honble Single Judge and the said case was placed before Honble the Chief Justice for constituting a Larger Bench to reconsider the decision rendered by another Honble Single Judge of this Court in Daulat Rams case (supra). (24). Had the ratio of A.C. Companies case (supra) and Bashir Khans case escaped my attention too, I would have also formulated points for constituting larger Bench to reconsider Daulat Rams case (supra) and Gulab Kanwars case (supra). But, as already stated by me, the Supreme Court in A.C. Companys case (supra) made a clear cut distinction between the ordinary Courts constituted to settle civil disputes and Tribunals established by the State for dealing with special matters. Placing reliance on the ratio of A.C. Companies case (supra) the Division Bench of this Court indicated that expression `Any Court subordinate to High Court in Sec. 115 CPC is used in narrow sense meaning only a civil Court in normal hierarchy of Courts. Placing reliance on the ratio of A.C. Companies case (supra) the Division Bench of this Court indicated that expression `Any Court subordinate to High Court in Sec. 115 CPC is used in narrow sense meaning only a civil Court in normal hierarchy of Courts. This expression does not cover Tribunals established under Special Acts to exercise jurisdiction in special matters. (25). Judged in the context of the principles of law laid down in the cases referred to above the conclusion is inevitable that the ``Prescribed Authority u/s. 13(1) of the Act, 1976 is a Tribunal with limited jurisdiction established by the State of Rajasthan for dealing with special matters. It has not been constituted in a hierarchy to settle civil disputes and cannot be termed as subordinate Civil Court inferior to the District Court as defined u/s. 3 of the CPC. Therefore it can safely be held that against an order passed by the `prescribed authority u/s. 13(1) of the Act, no appeal u/s. 96 or revision u/s. 115 CPC is maintainable. No doubt that framers of the Act, 1976 incorporated sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 13 that ``Every order passed by the prescribed authority in terms of sub-sec. (1) shall be deemed to be a decree, of a civil Court and shall be executed by him in the same manner as a decree of such Court but neither the prescribed authority is a civil Court u/s. 3 of the CPC nor the order passed in term of sub-sec. (1) shall be deemed to be a decree as defined u/s. 2 (2) of CPC. Only decrees or orders passed by subordinate civil Courts are appealable u/s. 96 CPC or revisable u/s. 115 CPC. The `Prescribed authority u/s. 13(1) of the Act, 1976 is a `Tribunal with limited jurisdiction; and its orders are neither appealable nor revisable. (26). The observations made in Bashir Khans case (supra) by the Division Bench of this Court impliedly overruled the decision made by learned Single Judge in Daulat Rams case (supra). While deciding Smt. Gulab Kanwars case (supra) and Smt. Maina Kanwars case (supra) the learned Single Judge did not consider the observations made by the Apex Court in A.C. Companies case (supra) and by the Division Bench of this Court in Bashir Khans case (supra). (27). While deciding Smt. Gulab Kanwars case (supra) and Smt. Maina Kanwars case (supra) the learned Single Judge did not consider the observations made by the Apex Court in A.C. Companies case (supra) and by the Division Bench of this Court in Bashir Khans case (supra). (27). In view of the Division Bench decision in Bashir Khans case I hold that appeals before the Additional District Judge Kishangarh (Ajmer) were not maintainable. EVen revision as against the orders of prescribed authority are not maintainable. (28). Consequently, all these revisions are dismissed with no order as to costs. However, I may observe that if the petitioners are advised that they are able to seek relief u/Art. 226/227 of the Constitution, they are at liberty to make the applications. _