JUDGMENT M.Srinivasan, C.J. (Oral) CMPNo.J07/97 This petition is filed for setting aside the order passed by me in Civil Review No 88 of 1996 in Civil Revision No.34/90 on 4.7.1997 and permitting the petitioner to contest the review petition. The ground on which the prayer is made is that the petitioner was not served in the review petition. I find from the records that it is true. Though I had ordered notice in the review petition, the mistake was committed by the Registry by sending notice to the review, petitioner himself and not to the present petitioner, who was the contesting party. The mistake occurred on account of the confusing cause title in the review petition and the petitioner in the review petition cannot also be blamed for that because that appears to be. the practice in this court to give such cause title. The cause title does not clearly show, who is the applicant in the review petition aid who is the respondent. Unfortunately, this practice has been in vogue for a long time. But, not the Appellate Side Rules have been framed and as per those Rules cause title must clearly show that as to who is the applicant in the miscellaneous application and who is the respondent in the miscellaneous application. According to those Rules, the cause title in the main case may also be stated, so that a mistake may not occur. 2. In view of the fact that the petitioner was not served in the review petition, he is entitled to be heard. Consequently. I have heard him today in the review petition. Hence, the order passed by me on. 4.7.1997 in Civil Review i No.88/96 is set aside and it is restored to file. The application is ordered accordingly. Civil Review N0 88’96: 3. This petition for a review has been filed by die respondent in Civil Revision No.34/90, who obtained an order of eviction under Section 14 of die Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act against the petitioner in the revision petition. There vision petition has been disposed of by an order dated 26.7.1996 on the footing that both the parties have agreed to certain terms. The challenge by the petitioner herein is that he never agreed to the same. There vision petition has been disposed of by an order dated 26.7.1996 on the footing that both the parties have agreed to certain terms. The challenge by the petitioner herein is that he never agreed to the same. It is seen from the records that he was not present in court and his counsel on record was also not in court The Advocate on record was represented by another counsel and the Court has passed the order as if the terms set out in the order were agreed to by both the parties. On the face of it, the order is erroneous inasmuch as there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner here in., had given hit consent or his counsel on record had given his consent. Secondly, the order is not workable and, therefore, it is not in accordance with law. The revision arose out of an order of eviction and the order of eviction has not been set aside by the order passed in the revision. The order merely disposes of the revision petition directing the parties to act in accordance with the compromise. Such an order is unsustainable. 4. The following contentions are urged by the learned counsel for the respondent petitioner herein. . 5. The order passed in die Civil Revision is based on a compromise of which die respondent in the Civil Revision was fully aware and it was only with his consent die orders were passed by die Court. In support of this contention, my attention is drawn to the order dated 26.4.1996. The Court stated in die order that according to learned counsel for die petitioner in the revision, there was a chance of compromise and, therefore, adjourned the matter to 17.5.1996. The Court recorded the presence of both the parties on that date in die court on 17.5.1996, die matter was adjourned by three weeks for compromise. On 19.7.1996 when die matter came up, die Court passed die following order "Learned counsel for respondent No.l states that respondent No.l is willing to compromise the matter by selling the house in question to die ., petitioner at a sum of Rs. 10 lacs plus stamp duty and registration charges. Learned counsel for die petitioner prays for time. Adjourned for a week." 6. 10 lacs plus stamp duty and registration charges. Learned counsel for die petitioner prays for time. Adjourned for a week." 6. On 26.7.1996, die respondent in die Civil Revision was admittedly not present in the Court The counsel, who was on record for the said respondent could not also be present in that Court. Some other counsel represented die counsel on record. The Court passed the order on 26.7.1996 as follows: "According to die learned counsel for the petitioner, die terms offered by respondent No.l, as recorded on 19.7.1996, are acceptable to the petitioner subject to the following conditions: 1. For die purpose of land and building in die name of St Stephens Ed. Society Mandi, we require we permission of die State Government, Society being non-agriculturist. 2. We will apply to the Govt. of H.P. for permission within 90 days of the agreement signing by both parties, after completing all codal formalities. 3. We will pay a sum of R.S.50,000/- to Rs.70,000/- as advance (Biyana) on signing of agreement and the balance amount will be paid at the time of registration of the sale deed. 4. As the Govt. of H.P. permission may require an unspecified period of time no time limit for the final registration will be fixed. It has to be unspecified as and when the permission by the State Government is granted. 5. We will get the registration completed and final payment made within a period of 90 days of the date of permission by the State Government. The above conditions are acceptable to the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.l. Therefore, the petition is disposed of with the direction that the compromise shall be effected as per order dated 19.7.1996 and the conditions quoted above." 7. The order does not disclose that the conditions and terms set out therein were agreed to by the respondent himself or by the counsel on record. Though there is a sentence in die order, which says that the conditions are acceptable to the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.l, there is nothing to show that the said consent was given by the learned-counsel on record and not by the counsel who was appearing on behalf of the counsel on record. Though there is a sentence in die order, which says that the conditions are acceptable to the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.l, there is nothing to show that the said consent was given by the learned-counsel on record and not by the counsel who was appearing on behalf of the counsel on record. Obviously, the court proceeded on the footing that the counsel on record would agree to the said conditions as the counsel who represented him did not probably raise any objection thereto. 8. Whatever it may be the orders referred to above to do not show that the respondent had agreed to the terms and conditions imposed by the petitioner in the revisional petition. The only matter to which the respondent therein agreed was that he would sell the property for a sum of Rs. 10 lacs plus stamp duty and registration charges. If there was any charge with regard to the same, the consent of the respondent ought to have been obtained before any order was passed. Hence, I am unable to accept the first contention of the learned counsel for the respondent petitioner herein. 9. The Second contention is that .the Advocate is entitled to represent another Advocate by virtue of Order 3 Rules 4 and 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Jayant Madhav Chitale v. Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1997 Bombay, 126. The Court held that an Advocate duly appointed by a party to act and plead on his behalf can authorise another Advocate to act and plead on behalf of such part}- and such other Advocate need not file Memo of appearance. There can be no quarrel with to the proposition laid down by the Bombay High Court. But that will not help the petitioner herein. The Bombay High Court has not gone to the extent of saying that the Advocate who is representing the Advocate on record can enter into a compromise on behalf of the party or give consent to the particular terms imposed by the other part} when he has no such authority given by the Advocate on record. I have grave doubt whether an Advocate on record can delegate that function of giving consent to a compromise to another Advocate, who is not on record. I have grave doubt whether an Advocate on record can delegate that function of giving consent to a compromise to another Advocate, who is not on record. If at all the other Advocate can be authorised only to argue the matter before the court and not enter into a compromise. 10. Thirdly, it is contended that the order passed by this Court in the Civil Revision does not suffer from any infirmity and in law it would only mean that the order of eviction passed against the revision petitioner was set aside by this Court. According to learned counsel there would have been no difficulty if the respondent in the Civil Revision had attempted to execute the order of eviction and that the revision petitioner could have successfully resisted the same with the help of the order passed in the Civil Revision.-1 am unable to accept this contention. The executing Court cannot go behind the order of the eviction. What all this court has done in the revision petition is only to dispose of the revision petition with a direction that the compromise shall be-effected as per the order dated 19.7.1996 and the conditions quoted in the order dated 26.7.1996. Such effecting of the compromise can only be as between the parties and not by any Court. Hence, the disposal of the revision petition will not automatically mean that the order of eviction \vas set aside. It is not necessary form to imagine what could have happened if the execution petition was filed by the respondent in the civil revision for executing the order of eviction. Suffice it to point out that the order in the revision petition would be unworkable and it would not have the effect of setting aside the order of eviction obtained by the respondent therein against the petitioner therein. 11. In such circumstances, I have no alternative but to review the order passed in the Civil Revision dated 26.7.1996 and set aside the same. 12. In the result, all the contentions urged by learned counsel for die respondent are rejected. The Civil Review is allowed. The order passed in the Civil Revision on 26.7.1996 is set aside and the revision petition, namely, Civil Revision No.34/90 is restored to file.