M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner's learned Advocate has raised a two-fold contention the first one being that the Secretary of the R. T. A. was not delegated with the powers to revoke the permit that had earlier been granted. As far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, though there is considerable substance in the contention I do not need to examine it in detail because even assuming it is held that the Officer did not have the power to revoke the permit, the learned Government Advocate has pointed out that the permit stands revoked through efflux of time and that therefore, whether the Authority has specifically said so in the order or not is totally academic. I do find considerable substance in what is pointed out by the learned government Advocate because he has fortified his submission by pointing out the dates in question. The permit in this case was granted in the year 1992 and the petitioner was granted time of thirty days to comply with certain requirements the most important being that he had to produce a vehicle of a particular model within a period of thirty days. The petitioner states that he was unable to procure such a vehicle and therefore, that the same was not produced. The Advocate has however pointed out that he did produce the requisite vehicle of 1994 model and that he applied for extension of time. Learned Advocate points out to me that the Supreme Court had occasion to deal with a similar situation and to hold that in the interest of fairness that it is open to the Authority to grant extension of time and that there are no specific limitations with regard to the exercise of this power. This position may be correct but again, the learned government Advocate very rightly points out to me that such an application must be made within the period when the permit was alive. His submission is that where a time-limit is prescribed for compliance and where the compliance is not reported within that time-limit, that the permit automatically lapses unless an application has been made and the time period has been extended. His submission is that where a time-limit is prescribed for compliance and where the compliance is not reported within that time-limit, that the permit automatically lapses unless an application has been made and the time period has been extended. I see considerable justification in the submission because the Court is required to test the reverse position whereby if this is not held to be the result in law of a default, the specification of a time period would become meaningless and it cannot be assumed that these permits can be acted on indefinitely. It is a well known fact that with the passage of time, the number and type of permits that are issued begin to change. The effect of upholding the petitioner's contention would be that even in the year 1997, the permit Will have to be deemed to be alive and operable whereas in fact due to congestion various restrictions have been placed by the concerned authorities on the grant and use of permits in the subsequent years. ( 2 ) ON the facts of the present case, it is imperative that the Court must uphold the objection raised by the learned government Advocate because the compliance in cases of this type must be time bound. If there is any valid reason and if the grantee is serious and if he is vigilant in appropriate cases provided good ground is shown, the Authority may extend the time period but in the absence of this being done, the permit must be taken to have lapsed. Once the permit has lapsed, there can be no question of acting on it. It necessarily follows that at this late stage the lapsed permit cannot be revived or resurrected. ( 3 ) HAVING regard to the aforesaid situation, the writ petition fails and stands disposed of. --- *** --- .