1. The writ petitioners are the legal heirs of deceased K. Krishnakumar who died on 20th September 1989. He was an officer under the Plantation Corporation of Kerala Limited (hereinafter referred to as the 'Corporation'). First petitioner is his wife and petitioners 2 and 3 are his daughter and son respectively. They challenge Ext. P-1, order issued by the second respondent Managing Director of the Corporation terminating the service of Krishnakumar under R.11 of the Service Rules for officers of the Corporation and Ext. P-22 order of the appellate authority rejecting the appeal filed by him against the termination of his service. They also Dray for a declaration that the provisions contained in R.11 of Ext. P-24 Service Rules for officers are illegal and ultra vires the Constitution. There is a further prayer for a direction to the respondents to pay all the monetary benefits including salary, increment, wage revision benefits, gratuity and other allowances as if the deceased had continued in the service of the Corporation till his death on 20th September 1989. 2. The case of the petitioners is summarised below: Deceased Krishnakumar (hereinafter referred to as 'delinquent officer') was appointed as Assistant Superintendent in the 'Corporation' as per order dated 15th May 1965. After satisfactory completion of probation he was confirmed and became a permanent officer under the Corporation. However, his services were terminated after 14 years of service as per Ext. P-1 order issued by the Corporation on 19th February 1.979. Therefore he made a representation dated 28th February 1979 evidenced by Ext. P-2 to the second respondent. In reply to that he received Ext. P-3 letter from the second respondent expressing his inability to consider the representation. Therefore, he filed Ext. P-4 appeal to the Board of Directors. However, the Board failed to take an early decision on the appeal and the representation filed by the 'delinquent officer' for an early disposal of the appeal was not answered by the Board. Therefore, he filed O.P. No. 417 of 1981 before this court and this court by Ext. P-5 Judgment allowed it and directed the first respondent to dispose of Ext. P-4 appeal as expeditiously as possible, at any rate within a period of three months from the date of the order. However, the first respondent did not dispose of the appeal within the time allowed by this court. P-5 Judgment allowed it and directed the first respondent to dispose of Ext. P-4 appeal as expeditiously as possible, at any rate within a period of three months from the date of the order. However, the first respondent did not dispose of the appeal within the time allowed by this court. Ultimately the Board took up the appeal for hearing on 10th July 1981. But the delinquent officer did not receive any communication regarding the disposal of the appeal and therefore he wrote to the first respondent on 22nd September 1981 requesting to communicate the result of the appeal. Thereafter he received a letter dated 11th September 1982 from the second respondent enclosing therewith a copy of the order dated 19th August 1981. It was only then he came to know that his appeal had been dismissed. Ext. P-6 is the copy of the communication given to him by the Corporation on 19th August 1981. The delinquent officer thereafter challenged Exts.P-1 and P-6 orders before this court in O.P. No. 8430 of 1982. The said writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge against which he filed W. A. No. 813 of 1983. The Division Bench by Ext. P-7 Judgment allowed the writ appeal and set aside the Judgment of the Single Judge. The Division Bench also set aside the order of the appellate authority evidenced by Ext. P6 and remitted the case for fresh disposal after giving the delinquent officer an opportunity of being heard in the matter. In view of Ext. P-7 Judgment the delinquent officer was requested to appear before the Board of Directors for a personal hearing on 30th January 1988. He availed this opportunity of personal hearing and submitted Ext. P-11 argument notes during the hearing. Though the delinquent officer was expecting final orders on his appeal, he was served with Ext. F-12 notice dated 7th June 1988 directing to make representation, if any, on his alleged unsatisfactory performance during the years 1977 and 1978. In reply to that he sent Ext. P-13 representation pointing out that he was never asked to explain about or confronted with any adverse remarks in the confidential report (except one confidential record of 1969) before the termination of his service. Subsequently the delinquent officer was served with copies of the personal record (confidential) for the first and second half years of 1977 and 1978. Exts. P-13 representation pointing out that he was never asked to explain about or confronted with any adverse remarks in the confidential report (except one confidential record of 1969) before the termination of his service. Subsequently the delinquent officer was served with copies of the personal record (confidential) for the first and second half years of 1977 and 1978. Exts. P-14 series are copies of the personal records. By letter dated 25th July 1988 delinquent officer informed the respondents that he was put to mental agony and financial hardship due to the indefinite prolonging of the matter and requested to pass early order? on the appeal. Ultimately delinquent officer was requested to appear before the Board of Directors on 10th December 1988 as per Ext. P-15. During the hearing the Board offered to take back the deceased employee in service on certain conditions. However, it did not materialise in view of the objection raised from certain quarters. Subsequently the delinquent officer submitted Ext. P-19 additional written statement before the Board of Directors with regard to the new allegation relating to the confidential reports. In the meantime, illness of the delinquent officer became worse and he was admitted to the hospital in April 1989. It was found that he was suffering from cancer and he succumbed to that disease on 20th September 1989. After his death petitioners came to know that Ext. P-14 appeal filed by the deceased employee before the Board has been dismissed. The petitioners did not get any communication with regard to the disposal of the appeal. At last the first petitioner sent a lawyer's notice evidenced by Ext. P-21. Ultimately the petitioners received Ext. P-22 copy of the appellate order which was forwarded to the petitioner's lawyer. Thereafter this writ petition has been filed on 12th April 1991. 3. On behalf of the respondents a counter affidavit has been filed by the .Managing Director of the Corporation, The contentions raised in the counter affidavit can be summarised thus: The 'Corporation' is not a 'State' coming within the purview of Art.12 of the Constitution and therefore the writ petition is not maintainable. The Corporation' is a company incorporated under the Companies Act engaged in the business of planting rubber and cashew. The service conditions of the employees of the Corporation are purely contractual. Ext. The Corporation' is a company incorporated under the Companies Act engaged in the business of planting rubber and cashew. The service conditions of the employees of the Corporation are purely contractual. Ext. P-22 final order rejecting the appeal was passed on 16th May 1989 and it was received by the officer on 22nd May 1989. Therefore the Original Petition is highly belated. During the earlier years of service, the delinquent officer's work was more or less satisfactory and in fact he was considered to be a good officer and reports upto the end of 1974 were generally good. However, he appears to have started taking alcoholic drinks from about the end of 1974 and he progressively became an addict to alcohol. Consequently from the end of 1974 onwards there was drastic change in his performance and attitude to work. Exts. R-1(a) to R-1(g) are copies of adverse remarks in his confidential records for the period from the second quarter of 1975 upto the second half of 1978. However, the first respondent took a lenient view and finally decided to terminate the service of the delinquent officer under R.11 of the Service Rules instead of inflicting the stigma of punishment. If his service had been terminated by way of punishment his prospects for other employment would have been permanently affected. Pursuant to the Judgment of this court in W.A. No. 812 of 1983 dated 28th September 1987 the delinquent officer was heard and decision thereon was communicated to him on 22nd May 1989. The services were terminated for valid reasons and it was perfectly valid and legal. The continuance of the deceased employee in service would have been highly prejudicial to the interest of the Corporation since he had practically became a 'dead wood' on account of his addiction to alcohol. The contention that Clause.11 of Ext. P-24 is arbitrary and unconstitutional and the termination of service is illegal is not correct. The services of the delinquent officer were terminated for sufficient reasons and simply because Clause.11 is invoked, the termination does not become arbitrary or illegal. The above entries in the confidential records were communicated to the officer and it was on the basis of such confidential records that the services were terminated. The services of the delinquent officer were terminated for sufficient reasons and simply because Clause.11 is invoked, the termination does not become arbitrary or illegal. The above entries in the confidential records were communicated to the officer and it was on the basis of such confidential records that the services were terminated. The mere fact that at one time there was some discussion regarding the terms in the event of the Board of Directors deciding to reinstate the delinquent officer does not by itself mean that the Board of Directors was convinced about the suitability of the deceased employee to continue in service. The relevant documents for adjudication of the appeal were supplied to him and he hid filed representation. The Board of Directors meets only once in a few months and there was no deliberate delay in disposing the appeal as directed by this court. There is delay of more than one and a half years after the death of the delinquent officer in initiating the present proceeding and hence the Original Petition be dismissed on the ground of laches. 4. In view of the above respective pleadings of the petitioners as well as the respondents, the first and foremost question that arises for determination is whether the 'Corporation' is 'State' coming within its definition contained in Art.12 of the Constitution, so that it is amenable to writ jurisdiction of this court under Art.226 and 227. Art.12 provides that 'State' includes Government and Parliament of India and the Government and legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. This Article gives and extended meaning to the words 'the State' wherever they occur in Part III of the Constitution. Unless the context otherwise requires, 'the State' will include not only the executive and legislative organizations of the Union and the States but also local bodies as well as 'other authorities' which include 'instrumentalities or agencies' of the State or bodies or institutions which discharge public function of a Governmental character. This is an expanding concept of 'State' in a 'welfare State'. This concept has been propounded by the Supreme Court in R. D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India. 5. This is an expanding concept of 'State' in a 'welfare State'. This concept has been propounded by the Supreme Court in R. D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India. 5. It is a settled proposition that a constitutional or statutory authority would be within the meaning of expression 'other authorities' under Art.12 if it has been invested with statutory power to issue binding directions to third parties, the disobedience of which would entail penal consequence or it has the sovereign power to make rules and regulations having the force of law. See Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal and others AIR 1967 SC 1857 and Sukhdev v. Bhagatram 1975 (1) SCC 421 . However, there is a broader test namely, whether the statutory Corporation or other body or authority, claimed to fall within the definition of 'State' is an instrumentality or agency of Government, if it is, it would fall within the meaning of the expression 'other authorities' in Art.12 and would be 'State'. So laid down in R. D. Shetty v. International, Airport Authority of India and others. It is further held that a finding of extensive and unusual financial assistance plus an unusual degree of control over the management and policies might lead one to characterise an operation as State action. Moreover the existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the Corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioners pointed out that there is a direct decision of this court in Mathew v, Plantation Corporation of Kerala 1994 (2) KLT 874 where after examining the question at some length observed thus: "....... following the decision reported in 1984 KLT 403 (FB) (Kunju Mohmmed v. State of Kerala) held that the first respondent/ Plantation Corporation which is a wholly State owned Corporation is an authority which comes within the meaning of Art.12 of the Constitution as it is an instrumentality of the State. The writ does lie against the Plantation Corporation." Therefore the learned Judge held that the writ is maintainable against the Corporation. The writ does lie against the Plantation Corporation." Therefore the learned Judge held that the writ is maintainable against the Corporation. However, the counsel appearing for the Corporation has brought to my notice that as against the said Judgment of the learned Single Judge, Writ Appeal No. 249 of 1995 is pending before the Division Bench and therefore it cannot be said that the finding in the said Judgment is conclusive in the matter. In view of this submission, it is necessary to consider the question independently by this court. 7. A Full Bench of five Judges of this court in Kunju Mohammed v. State of Kerala 1984 KLT 403 dealt with the question whether Kerala State Industrial Development and Employment Corporation Limited (SIDECO) is an 'other authority' coming within the definition of Art.12. After analysing the Articles of Association of the Company, the court came to the conclusion that SIDECO is an 'instrumentality' of the State coming within the meaning of Art.12 of the Constitution. The Plantation Corporation of Kerala Limited is a company incorporated under the Companies Act in which the entire shares are held by the Government of Kerala. The company Is engaged in the business of planting rubber and cashew in its various estates throughout the State. The contention of the Corporation is that the business which is being carried on by the Corporation is similar to the one carried on by numerous other individuals and private companies in the whole of India. Therefore it is pleaded that the company is not exercising any public function. When the entire shares are held by the Government of Kerala it becomes a company fully owned by the Government. Therefore the Corporation cannot contend that it is not exercising any public function. The business carried on by the company may be planting rubber and cashew in various estate? but that will not take away the fundamental trait of the company. When the company is fully owned by the Government it becomes an 'instrumentality' of the State and consequently all the functions including the commercial activities carried on by it are public functions. In Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal and others AIR 1967 SC 1857 the Supreme Court observed: "These decisions of the Court support our view that the expression 'other authorities' in Art.12 will include all constitutional or statutory authorities on whom powers are conferred by law. In Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal and others AIR 1967 SC 1857 the Supreme Court observed: "These decisions of the Court support our view that the expression 'other authorities' in Art.12 will include all constitutional or statutory authorities on whom powers are conferred by law. It is not at all material that some of the powers conferred may be for the purpose of carrying on commercial activities. Under the Constitution, the State is itself envisaged as having the right to carry on trade or business as mentioned in Art.19(1)(g). In Part IV, the State has been given the same meaning as in Art.12 and one of Directive Principles laid down in Art.46 is that the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people. The State as defined in Art.12 is thus comprehended to include bodies created for the purpose of promoting the educational and economic interests of the people. The State, as constituted by our Constitution, is further specifically empowered under Art.298 to carry on any trade or business. The circumstance that the Board under the Electricity Supply Act is required to carry on some activities of the nature of trade or commerce does not, therefore, give any indication that the Board must be excluded from the scope of the word 'State' as used in Art.12". (emphasis supplied) 8. The petitioners raised a contention that R.11 of Ext. P-24 Rules is invalid and inoperative. R.11 of the Service Rules for officers of the Corporation is as follows: "11. Termination. The Corporation may at any time terminate the service of an officer giving three months notice or by payment of wages in lieu of such notice. The services of a probationer and a trainee may be terminated without notice and without assigning any reason therefore." It is not disputed that the service of the delinquent officer had been terminated invoking the above rule. In Ext. P-10 notes of the Board it is averred as below: "Sri K. Krishnakumar joined the service of the corporation as , Assistant Superintendent on,22nd May 1965. He continued in our service till 26th May 1979, on which date his services were terminated in accordance with R.11 of the Service Rules for the officers of the Corporation and also on consideration of all the circumstances relating to his performance and conduct. He continued in our service till 26th May 1979, on which date his services were terminated in accordance with R.11 of the Service Rules for the officers of the Corporation and also on consideration of all the circumstances relating to his performance and conduct. The termination was not by way of disciplinary action, but a 'discharge simpliciter." In this context it is pertinent to note that though R.18, 19, 20 etc. authorise the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an employee for the misconducts specified in R.18 no such disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against the delinquent officer. Therefore the question that arises for decision is whether an officer or an employee of the Corporation can be thrown out from its service by giving three months notice or by payment of wages in lieu of such notice invoking R.11. What is contended here is this rule is invalid as being arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory and thus violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. 9. In Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another AIR 1988 SC 1571 clause (i) of R.9 of the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited Service. Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1979 came up for consideration. Clause (i) of R.9 of the said Rules is as follows: "9. Termination of Employment for Acts other than Misdemeanour. (i) The employment of a permanent employee shall be subject to termination on three months' notice on either side. The company may pay the equivalent of three months' basic pay and dearness allowance, if any, in lieu of notice or may deduct a like amount when the employee has failed to give due notice." While considering the validity of the above rule, the court observed that the said rule constitutes a part of the contract of employment between the Corporation and its employees to whom the said rules will apply and they thus form part of the contract of employment between the Corporation and each of the two contesting respondents. The court after analysing S.9 and 16 of the Contract Act observed: "The types of contracts to which the principle formulated by us above applies are not contracts which are tainted with illegality but are contracts which contain terms which are so unfair and unreasonable that they shock the conscience of the court. The court after analysing S.9 and 16 of the Contract Act observed: "The types of contracts to which the principle formulated by us above applies are not contracts which are tainted with illegality but are contracts which contain terms which are so unfair and unreasonable that they shock the conscience of the court. They are opposed to public policy and require to be adjudged void.'' (emphasis supplied) Finally the Supreme Court said: "A clause such as clause (i) of R.9 is against right and reason. It is wholly unconscionable. It has been entered into between parties between whom there is gross inequality of bargaining power. R.9(i) is a term of the contract between the Corporation and all its officers. It affects a large number of persons and it squarely falls within the principle formulated by us above. Several statutory authorities have a clause similar to R.9(i) in their contracts of employment................................ The Government and its agencies and instrumentalities constitute the largest employer in the country. A clause such as R.9 (i) in a contract of employment affecting large sections of the public is harmful and injuries to the public interest for it tends to create a sense of insecurity in the minds of those to whom it applies and consequently it is against public good. Such a clause, therefore, is opposed to public policy and being opposed to public policy, it is void wider S.23 of the Indian Contract Act." (emphasis supplied) 10. In O. P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Limited AIR 1987 SC 111 the Supreme Court was considering the validity of R.31(v) of the Indian Tourism Development Corporation (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1978. The said provision is as follows: "31. Termination of Services. The Services of an employee may be terminated by giving such notice or notice pay as may be prescribed in the contract of service in the following manner (f) to (iv).............. (v) of an employee who has completed his probationary period and who has been confirmed or deemed to be confirmed by giving him 90 days' notice or pay in lieu thereof." After interpreting the above rule the Supreme Court observed: "This rule cannot co-exist with Art.14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India. The said rule must therefore die, so that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the aforesaid constitutional provision remain alive. The said rule must therefore die, so that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the aforesaid constitutional provision remain alive. For, otherwise, the guarantee enshrined in Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution can be set at naught simply by framing a rule authorising termination of an employee by merely giving a notice. In order to uphold the validity of the rule in question it will have to be held that the tenure of service of a citizen who takes up employment with the State will depend on the pleasure or whim of the competent authority unguided by any principle or policy...................... Such a rule is capable of robbing an employee of his dignity, and making him a supine person whose destiny is at the mercy of the concerned authority (whom he must honour) notwithstanding the constitutional guarantee enshrined in Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. To hold otherwise is to hold that the fundamental right embedded in Art.14 and 16(1) is a mere paper tiger and that it is so ethereal that it can be nullified or eschewed by a simple device of framing a rule which authorises termination of the service of an employee by merely giving a notice of termination. Under the circumstances the rule in question must be held to be unconstitutional and void." 11. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Delhi Transport Corporation v. D. T. C. Mazdoor Congress AIR 1991 SC 101 had occasion to consider Regulation.9(b) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952. There the question was regarding the termination of service of a permanent employee without holding an enquiry. The court said to the following effect: "Regulation 9(b) which confers powers on the authority to terminate the services of a permanent and confirmed employee by issuing a notice without assigning any reasons in the order and without giving any opportunity of hearing to the employee before passing the impugned order is wholly arbitrary, uncanalised and unrestricted violating principles of natural justice as well as Art.14 of the Constitution. Government company or Public Corporation being State instrumentalities are State within the meaning of Art.12 of the Constitution and as such they are subject to the observance of fundamental rights embodied in Part III as well as to conform to the directive principles in Part IV of the Constitution. Government company or Public Corporation being State instrumentalities are State within the meaning of Art.12 of the Constitution and as such they are subject to the observance of fundamental rights embodied in Part III as well as to conform to the directive principles in Part IV of the Constitution. The Service Regulations or rules framed by them are to be tested by the touchstone of Art.14. Furthermore the procedure prescribed by their Rules or Regulations must be reasonable, fair and just and not arbitrary, fanciful and unjust. Regulation.9(b), therefore, confers unbridled, uncanalised and arbitrary power on the authority to terminate the services of a permanent employee without recording any reasons and without conforming to the principles of natural justice. There is no guideline in the Regulations or in the Act as to when or in which cases and circumstances this power of termination by giving notice or pay in lieu of notice can be exercised." Finally the court observed: "Rules of natural justice do not supplant but supplement the Rules and Regulations. Moreover, the Rule of Law which permeates our Constitution demands that it has to be observed both substantially and procedurely. Considering from all aspects Regulation.9(b) is illegal and void as it is arbitrary, discriminatory and without any guidelines for exercise of the power. 12. It is axiomatic that impugned R.11, is similar to the rules which were declared by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative. The inevitable consequence is that the impugned rule is also liable to be declared unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative for the very same reasons set out in the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court. I therefore declare R.11 of the rules unconstitutional, invalid, inoperative and void as being opposed to S.23 of the Contract Act, Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution and also violative of the principles of audi alteram partem. Consequently I quash Ext. P-1 order of termination of service and Ext. P-22 appellate order issued by the first respondent. 13. The next question relates to 'the benefits available to the petitioners who are the legal heirs of the delinquent officer. In view of the finding entered herein before, he shall be deemed to have been continuing in service till the date of his death on 20th September 1989. P-22 appellate order issued by the first respondent. 13. The next question relates to 'the benefits available to the petitioners who are the legal heirs of the delinquent officer. In view of the finding entered herein before, he shall be deemed to have been continuing in service till the date of his death on 20th September 1989. The petitioners claim for a direction to the respondents to make available all benefits to him as if he had been in service. Since the termination of the delinquent officer has been declared illegal, petitioners are undoubtedly entitled to receive all benefits available to him as if he was continuing in service till his death on 20th September 1989. 14. However, a plea has been raised on behalf of the Corporation on the basis of Para.5 of the decision in O. P. Bhandari's case AIR 1987 SC 111 , supra. The relevant portion of Para.5 of the above decision is extracted below: "There is, under the circumstances, no escape from the conclusion that R.31(v) of the aforesaid I.T.D.C. rules which provides for termination of the services of the employees of the respondent Corporation simply by giving 90 days' notice or by payment of salary for the notice period in lieu of such notice, deserves to be quashed. As the occasion so demands, we feel constrained to place in focus and highlight an important dimension of the matter. The impugned regulation is extremely wide in its coverage in the sense that it embraces the 'blue collar' workmen, the 'white collar' employees, as also the 'gold collar' (managerial cadre) employees are concerned, the consequence of quashing of the regulation calls for some reflection. In the private sector, the managerial cadre of employees is altogether excluded from the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act and similar labour legislations. The private sector can cut the dead wood and can get rid of a managerial cadre employee in case he is considered to be wanting in performance or in integrity. Not so the public sector under a rule similar to the impugned rule. Public sector undertakings may under the circumstances be exposed to irreversible damage at the hands of a 'gold collar' employee (belonging to a high managerial cadre) on account of the faulty policy decisions or on account of lack of efficiency or probity of such an employee. Not so the public sector under a rule similar to the impugned rule. Public sector undertakings may under the circumstances be exposed to irreversible damage at the hands of a 'gold collar' employee (belonging to a high managerial cadre) on account of the faulty policy decisions or on account of lack of efficiency or probity of such an employee. The very existence of the undertaking may be endangered beyond recall." After discussing the various aspects of the problem, the Supreme Court finally in this regard addressed itself to the question whether that was a fit case for granting compensation in lieu of reinstatement. The court said: ".......... it cannot be said that the apprehension voiced by the respondent Corporation as regards the negative consequences of reinstatement is unreasonable. We do not propose to pronounce on the validity or otherwise of the allegations and counter allegations made by the parties in their respective affidavits. Suffice it to say that the relations between the parties appear to have been strained beyond the point of no return. The Trade Union of the employees has lodged a strong protest and even held out a threat of strike, in the context of some acts of the appellant. Such unrest among the workmen is likely to have a prejudicial effect on the working of the undertaking which would prima facie be detrimental to the larger national interest, not to speak of detriment to the interest of concerned undertaking." It was in the above circumstances the Supreme Court observed that the reinstatement is not even in the interest of the appellant as he cannot give his best in the less than cordial atmosphere and it will also result in misery to him, let alone the other side. Neither the undertaking nor the appellant can improve their image or performance, or, achieve success. Therefore the court said, that both sides will be unhappy and miserable. Thus these are valid reasons for conclusive that compensation in lieu of reinstatement and not reinstatement, is warranted in the circumstances of that case. I do not think the above observation will in any way help the corporation to plead awarding compensation in lieu of reinstatement. Various reasons envisaged by the Supreme Court for ordering compensation in lieu of reinstatement in that case are totally absent here. I do not think the above observation will in any way help the corporation to plead awarding compensation in lieu of reinstatement. Various reasons envisaged by the Supreme Court for ordering compensation in lieu of reinstatement in that case are totally absent here. Adverse consequence that may follow on ordering reinstatement as visualised by the Supreme Court are of no relevance in the present case because the delinquent officer is no more. Therefore there is no question of reinstatement. The only direction that can be issued in this case is that all the benefits available to the deceased officer as if he had been in service till the date of his death shall be awarded to the legal heirs as compensation. The benefits available to him shall not in any case be reduced in any manner while fixing the compensation. 15. It is well settled that when termination of an employee is found to be illegal he is normally entitled to full back wages as if he has been continuing in service. The Supreme Court in Narotam Chopra v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court (1988) 4 SLR 388 held that when the order of termination is rendered ab initio void the employee would be entitled to continuity of service along with his backwages. In Manorama Verma v. State of Bihar 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 671 the Supreme Court held: ''We do not see any justification for the High Court not allowing the appellant back wages after it came to the conclusion that the termination was illegal. Ordinarily, the consequential order of grant of back wages must follow, unless there are reasons on record which would justify a departure from the normal order. We do not see any reasons on record to come to the conclusion that the appellant was not entitled to back wages." See also Gammon India Limited v. Niranjan Dass 1984 (1) SCC 509 . However, in Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. v. The Employees of M/s. Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1979 SC 75 the Supreme Court held to the following effect. "Ordinarily, a workman whose Service has been illegally terminated either by dismissal, discharge or retrenchment will be entitled to full back wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness. That is the normal rule. "Ordinarily, a workman whose Service has been illegally terminated either by dismissal, discharge or retrenchment will be entitled to full back wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness. That is the normal rule. When the termination of services was found to be "neither proper nor justified, it would not only show that the workmen were always willing to serve but if they rendered services they would legitimately be entitled to the wage for the same. If the workmen were always ready to work but they were kept away therefrom on account of invalid act of the employer, there is no justification for not awarding them full back wages which were very legitimately due to them." The respondents have no case that the delinquent officer was gainfully employed during the period he was kept out of service. This is a case where he was ready and willing to work but he was kept away therefrom on account of the invalid act of the respondents. 16. However, the counsel for the Corporation finally pointed out in the course of his argument that a reasonable compensation may be fixed instead of awarding the entire arrears of salary and other benefits available to the delinquent officer as if he was continuing in service. By Ext. P-17 the delinquent officer had undertaken to forgo his legal claim for arrears of wages and therefore, while fixing the compensation, arrears of pay payable to him shall be deducted and all the benefits available to him shall be calculated minus the arrears of pay. In this context it is necessary to examine whether there was any unconditional surrender of claim for arrears of wages. Ext. P-17 had been sent on the basis of the discussion took place during the hearing of the Board on 18th December 1988 when the delinquent officer was present. What is stated in Ext. P-17 is that in order to avoid further delay in the proceedings of the Board, the delinquent officer was advised to convey through post his acceptance of the following terms and conditions offered to him by the Board at their meeting on 10th December 1988. 1. What is stated in Ext. P-17 is that in order to avoid further delay in the proceedings of the Board, the delinquent officer was advised to convey through post his acceptance of the following terms and conditions offered to him by the Board at their meeting on 10th December 1988. 1. That the Corporation will re-instate me in Service with retrospective effect from 26th May 1979 with seniority and continuity of service with annual increments, pay revisions, till date and gratuity and other benefits as if there was no break in my service. 2. That the Corporation will promote me as Manager with retrospective effect from the date on which my next junior was promoted, for which I would also have been eligible but for the expunged appellate order of the Board dated 10th August 1981 with subsequent continuity and seniority of service, gratuity and annual increments till date. 3. That the Corporation shall not take a vindictive attitude towards me and shall rehabilitate me with honour and consideration to enable me to resume service in good faith. 4. In return for which conditions I hereby agree to forego my legal claims for arrears of pay. However, this settlement did not take place because there was some objection against granting promotion to the delinquent officer with retrospective effect. Ultimately by Ext. P-20 letter dated 13th February 1989 the Corporation informed the delinquent officer that all matters contained in Ext. P-17 letter and the telegram sent on 15th May 1989 were not correct. That means the offer made by the delinquent officer had not been accepted by the Board. Even otherwise the said proposal was ineffective because in the meanwhile the officer died on 20th September 1989. Thus there was no question of his continuance as Manager of the Corporation. The Supreme Court in O. P. Bhandari's case AIR 1987 SC 111 supra has fixed the compensation in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances available in that case. Such circumstances for fixing the compensation in lieu of reinstatement in that case, are totally absent here. Therefore the contention urged on behalf of the Corporation that this court shall order compensation in lieu of reinstatement cannot be accepted. Such circumstances for fixing the compensation in lieu of reinstatement in that case, are totally absent here. Therefore the contention urged on behalf of the Corporation that this court shall order compensation in lieu of reinstatement cannot be accepted. I therefore declare that the legal heirs of the delinquent officer are entitled to all the monetary benefits including salary, increments, wage revision benefits, gratuity and other allowances, etc., as if he had continued in service of the Corporation till his death on 20th September 1989. 17. The delinquent officer had been unlawfully kept out of service with effect from 19th February 1979 and while he was out of employment he died on 20th September 1989. Considering all the aspects of the case including the pathetic condition in which his widow and two children are now put the Corporation shall pay interest at the rate of 12 per cent on the total amount payable from the date the amount became due till realisation. In this context the observation of the Supreme Court in Gammon Indict, Ltd. v. Niranjan Dass 1984 (1) SCC 509 is relevant. "It appears that the respondent has been unlawfully kept out of service, therefore it is but just that the appellant company shall pay all the arrears as calculated according to the directions herein given with 12 per cent interest from the date the amount became due and payable till realisation." 18. It is also contended that the present writ petition cannot be entertained in view of the delay in filing it. The delay with regard to the filing of the petition has been explained in the writ petition. The petitioners have mainly challenged Ext. P-22 appellate order passed by the Corporation. It has to be observed that petitioners are the legal heirs of the delinquent officer. The delinquent officer was admitted in the hospital in April 1989 and he succumbed to the fatal disease in the midst of his decade old legal battle. The petitioners came to know of the dismissal of Ext. P-14 appeal only after his death. They did not get any communication in that regard from the respondents. No copy of the order was served on them by the respondents despite several requests made on behalf of them. The petitioners came to know of the dismissal of Ext. P-14 appeal only after his death. They did not get any communication in that regard from the respondents. No copy of the order was served on them by the respondents despite several requests made on behalf of them. At last on behalf of the first petitioner a lawyer notice was issued on 1st December 1990 to the first respondent calling upon them to furnish the order disposing the appeal filed by her deceased husband. Ext. P-21 dated 11th February 1990 is the copy of the notice so issued by the advocate to the Corporation. However, they sent - a reply letter dated 20th December 1990 along with a copy of the order in appeal. Ext. P-23 is the copy of the said covering letter. It was along with the said letter Ext. P-22 appellate order was sent to the counsel. Thereafter the writ petition had been filed on 12th April 1991 by the legal heirs of the delinquent officer. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, I do not think there is inordinate delay in filing the present writ petition. In view of the above sufficient explanation and also for the reasons stated in the reply affidavit filed by the petitioners on 28th November 1996, I am satisfied that the writ petition is not liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay. 19. In view of my findings recorded in Para.12, 13, 16 and 17 above, this Original Petition is allowed. No order as to costs.