JUDGMENT 1. - This second appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Nimbahera dated 11.2.1997 confirming the judgment and decree dated 5.8.1982 passed by the learned Munsif, Nimbahera in the suit for specific performance of contract. 2. The plaintiff's case was that the defendant had agreed to sell his "Bara" to plaintiff on 26.3.1978 for Rs. 2,000/- and he had paid Rs. 1,500/- to the defendant on that very date and it was agreed that the remaining amount of Rs. 500/- would be paid at the time of registration. However, the defendant did not take steps for the registration of the sale deed despite repeated requests of the plaintiff. Defendant's case was that of denial. The learned Munsif framed two issues. After recording the oral evidence and hearing the parties, the learned Munsif held that document dated 26.3.1978 (agreement to sell) was executed by the defendant after obtaining Rs. 1,500/- consideration money. He also found that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract. He, therefore decreed the suit. The learned Additional Dist. Judge has upheld the judgment and decree. 3. The contention of Mr. Singhal is that both the Courts have not considered the mandatory requirement as to whether compensation was not the adequate relief in the instant case. He pointed out that both the parties are near relations but they were not even on speaking terms for the last about 20 years and there was no occasion for the defendant to enter into agreement with the plaintiff. He submits that the possession was not handed over to the plaintiff and, therefore, the intention of the defendant was not to sell the land. He has referred to the cases of Kanshi Ram v. Om Prakash,1996 AIR SCW 2606 , Rangaraju Naidu v. S. Thiruvarakkarasu, AIR 1995 SC 1769 , M. Satyanarayana v. G. Yelloji, AIR 1965 SC 1405 , Ruda Ram v. Mehar Singh, 1996 DNJ (Raj.) 263 and Vuppalapati Butchairaju v. Rajah Sri Ranga Satyanarayana, AIR 1967 A.P. 69 , in support of his contention that decree for specific performance of contract should not have been passed in the case. 4. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 gives discretion to the Court to grant or refuse the decree of specific performance of the contract. Sub-sec. 4. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 gives discretion to the Court to grant or refuse the decree of specific performance of the contract. Sub-sec. (2) of Section 20 lists the circumstances in which the Court should refuse the decree of specific performance. Section 21 of the Act provides that Court can grant compensation in lieu of specific performance. In the instant case, it was amply proved by the plaintiff's evidence that the defendant had agreed to sell his "Bara" and he had received Rs. 1,500/- as part consideration. The defendant's case that he did not execute the document has not been believed by the two Courts below as eve he denied the signatures on the written statement. 5. The defendant did not rely on any circumstance on which the trial Court or the first Appellate Court could have exercised discretion to refuse the decree for specific performance. It is not a case where it is pleaded that the contract has given unfair advantage to the plaintiff than the defendant, or that the defendant could not foresee the hardship which was causing to him. It is also not a case where considerable delay has been caused in bringing the suit against the defendant. The agreement was executed on 26.3.1978. When the defendant did not perform his part of the contract a notice was given on 2.7.1978 and the plaintiff filed the suit immediately thereafter. There are no circumstance on record which it can be said that the decree of specific performance would cause much hardship to the defendant. The discretion exercised by the Courts below cannot be said to be arbitrary. It is true that the discretion should be exercised on sound and reasonable judicial principles in granting or refusing the decree for specific performance of contract. In the instant case, as already observed, the defendant could not bring any circumstance on record on which the discretion to refuse the decree for specific performance of contract could be exercised. The appellant cannot be allowed to say in this regard in this second appeal. 6. In the case of Kanshiram (supra) the facts were that the plaintiff himself had claimed compensation in the alternative and there were circumstances to hold that the decree for specific performance would be unrealistic and unfair. In these circumstances, the Hon'ble Apex Court had granted compensation in lieu of decree for specific performance. 6. In the case of Kanshiram (supra) the facts were that the plaintiff himself had claimed compensation in the alternative and there were circumstances to hold that the decree for specific performance would be unrealistic and unfair. In these circumstances, the Hon'ble Apex Court had granted compensation in lieu of decree for specific performance. In the instant case, there is nothing on record to find that the plaintiff had claimed such relief in the alternative. There are no circumstances on which it can be said that it is unrealistic or unfair to grant specific performance. 7. In the case of S. Rangaraju Naidu (supra) it was found that pre-dominant object in executing the agreement to sell was the recovery of dues with interest. It is in these circumstances the Hon'ble Apex Court granted compensation and refused specific performance. 8. In the case of M. Satyanarayana (supra) the Apex Court has dealt with the factum of delay in bringing the suit for specific performance. In that case decree for specific performance was granted. As already stated, in the instant case there was no delay in bringing the action against the defendant. The conduct of the plaintiff had not been such as to deny him the exercise of discretion the decree for specific performance of contract. 9. In the case of Ruda Ram (supra) this Court had granted decree for specific performance. This case has been cited to show that possession is the important factor to be considered and as the possession was not given in the instant case it should be inferred that the defendant had not intended to sell his land. It may be true that possession is one of the factor which is relevant in the decree for specific performance but this is not the sole criteria. In the instant case the parties are near relations, therefore, it is not material that the possession was not handed over at the time of executing the document. 10. In the case of Yuppalapati Butchairaju (supra) it has been observed that the equitable relief can be refused on the ground of delay even if time is not essence of the contract. 10. In the case of Yuppalapati Butchairaju (supra) it has been observed that the equitable relief can be refused on the ground of delay even if time is not essence of the contract. In this case it has been further held that where delay does not amount to waiver, abandonment or acquiescence does not alter the position of the parties, equitable relief of specific performance ought not to be refused on the ground of delay. This case thus in no way helps the appellant. 11. There is thus no substantial question of law involved in the case. There are concurrent findings of fact of both the Courts below. No case of interference under section 100 CPC is made out. 12. Consequently, this appeal is dismissed in limine.Appeal dismissed. *******