JUDGMENT Satyabrata Sinha, J. : These two appeals at the instance of the United India Insurance Co. Ltd. arise out of judgments dated 18.4.95 & 6.5.95 respectively passed by Sri S.S Sinha, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Judge, Dakshin Dinajpur, Balurghat. 2. The fact of the matter is as follows:- On 9.2.92 the applicants-respondents were coming from Islampur to Raiganj by tourist taxi bearing Registration No. WB-59/0129. It appears that the said taxi belonged to one Nilkamal Kundu but the same was hypothecated in favour of U.B.I. 3. The driver of the said vehicle allegedly was driving the vehicle rashly and negligently despite requests made by the Respondents and Ors. not to do so and dashed against a road side tree. As a result whereof the applicants together with one Ashok Chanda, the youngest son of the applicant Smt. Sipra Brahma and Kanan Kumar Kundu were severely injured. The applicant Smt. Sipra Brahma was initially admitted to Raigani S.D. Hospital. The applicant Kanan Kumar Kundu was admitted to Karandighi Hospital whereafter he was shifted to Raiganj Hospital and then again was shifted to Maldah Nursing Home for treatment. For better treatment the applicant Sipra Brahma had to be shifted to Harrington Nursing Home & Diagnostic Centre Pvt. Ltd., Calcutta whereas the applicant Kanan Kumar Kundu was shifted to Kothari Medical Centre and Research Institute, Calcutta. They underwent operations. 4. The applicant Smt. Sipra Brahma was running a business of brick kiln and she had to close down her business as her husband is a patient of high blood sugar and had resigned from the services. She suffered mental shock and disfigurement apart from suffering body, mental pain and agony. Both the applicants, Smt. Sipra Brahma and Kanan Kumar Kundu have become permanently disabled to the extent of 60% and 75% respectively. 5. The learned Tribunal below upon taking into consideration the evidence of the parties allowed the applicant Sipra Brahma compensation under the following heads:- 1. For loss of further earning @ Rs. 24,000/- P.A for 10 years. Rs. 2,40,000/- 2. For Medical Expenses Rs. 1,00,000/- 3. For pain & suffering Rs. 50,000/- 4. For loss of amenities of life Rs. 10,000/- 5. For disfiguration Rs. 15,000/- 6. For Transport Expenses Rs. 15,000/- 7. For loss of expectation of life Rs. 15,000/- ------------------ Rs. 4,45,000/- ------------------ Whereas applicant Kanan Kumar Kundu was awarded a compensation of Rs. Rs. 2,40,000/- 2. For Medical Expenses Rs. 1,00,000/- 3. For pain & suffering Rs. 50,000/- 4. For loss of amenities of life Rs. 10,000/- 5. For disfiguration Rs. 15,000/- 6. For Transport Expenses Rs. 15,000/- 7. For loss of expectation of life Rs. 15,000/- ------------------ Rs. 4,45,000/- ------------------ Whereas applicant Kanan Kumar Kundu was awarded a compensation of Rs. 1,95,000/- under the following heads : 1. For loss of future earning @ Rs. 12,000/- P.A for 15 years. Rs. 1,80,000/- 2. For medical expenses including Rs. 10,000/- conveyance charges 3. For pain and suffering Rs. 5,000/- ------------------ Rs. 1,95,000/- ------------------ 6. Mr. Biswajit Chowdhury, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has raised a number of contentions in support of these appeals. The learned Counsel firstly submitted that these appeals at the instance of the insurance company is maintainable in view of Division Bench decision of Patna High Court in Hindusthan General Society vs. Dayanath Jha reported in 1970 (40) Comp Cas 796. It was further submitted that reliable evidence had been placed before the learned Tribunal below by both the applicants as regard the damages allegedly suffered by them for their disability as the Doctor concerned has not been examined. It was submitted that it was incumbent upon the appellants to examine Dr. M. S. Ghosh whose certificate had been relied upon. The learned Counsel contends that in view of the decisions in Bengal Coal Co. Ltd. vs. Barhan Gape reported in 1983 Lab IC 685 and Bengal Coal Co. Ltd. vs. Sew Pujan Harijan reported in 1983 Lab. IC the medical certificate showing permanent incapacity of the appellants was not admissible in evidence. 7. It was next contended that in terms of r. 329(3) of the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules, it was obligatory on the part of the applicants to annex all the relevant documents together with their applications and as they failed to do so, their claim applications should not have been entertained. The learned counsel further took us through the evidence and the respective claim applications for the purpose of showing that on a comparison thereof it would appear that there exists a great deal of inconsistency. The learned counsel submits that this court should lay down a law that the amount of compensation being taxable, they should pay Income Tax under the Income Tax Act also. The learned counsel submits that this court should lay down a law that the amount of compensation being taxable, they should pay Income Tax under the Income Tax Act also. According to the learned counsel this court can legislate. 8. Mr. Jiban Ratan Chatterjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents on the other hand, submitted that the evidence adduced on behalf of the applicant before the learned Accident Claims Tribunal would show that both the respondents have suffered a great deal and they would continue to suffer throughout their lives and as such it is a case where not only the appeal should be dismissed but the same should be enhanced. The learned counsel submits that while awarding the compensation the social status of the applicant should also be taken into consideration, which would be evident from the fact that whereas the claimant Smt. Sipra Brahma was owner of a brick klin, the other claimant Kanan Kumar Kundu is an educated man and has a telephone and scooter. Both of them suffered extensive injuries and became permanently handicapped. According to the learned counsel the amount of compensation, in such an event would have a great impact on the victims throughout their lives and should be much more than in case of death. 9. In view of the rival submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties the following questions arise for determination in these appeals : 1. Whether the appeals at the instance of the appellants are maintainable? 2. Whether if the appeals are held to be not maintainable the cross-objection; would be maintainable? 3. What amount of compensation would be payable to the respondents-cross-objectors. 10. Re. Question No. 1. :–– It is not in dispute that a vehicle is compulsorily insurable, covering risks against third parties in terms of Chapter-II of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 11. Section 147 of the said Act provides for requirements of policy and limits of liability. Sections 149(1) and 149(2) correspond to section 96(1) and 6(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which read thus:- "149(1). 11. Section 147 of the said Act provides for requirements of policy and limits of liability. Sections 149(1) and 149(2) correspond to section 96(1) and 6(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which read thus:- "149(1). If, after a certificate of insurance has been issued under sub-section (3) of section 147 in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment or award in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 147 (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) is obtained against any person insured by the policy then, notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of this section pay to the person entitled to be benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment debtor, in respect of the liability, together with any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments. 149(2). 149(2). No sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment or award unless before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment or award is given, the insurer had notice through the court or, as the case may be, the Claims Tribunal of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of such judgment or award so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal; and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely,- (a) that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy, being one of the following conditions, namely :- (i) a condition excluding the use of the vehicle :- (a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contract of insurance a vehicle not covered by permit to ply for hire or reward, or (b) for organised racing and speed testing, or (c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or (d) without side-car being attached where the vehicle is a motorcycle; or (ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification; or (iii) a conditions excluding liability for injury caused or contributed to by conditions of war, civil war, riot or civil commotion; or (b) that the policy is void on ground that it was obtained by the nondisclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular." 12. Despite the fact that in terms of sub-s. (2) of s. 149 an insurer is not required to be impleaded as a party except for the purposes enumerated therein; the Parliament in its wisdom has thought it fit to make a provision for such impleadment in the event it is found that the owner of the vehicle is in collusion with the person making the claim, or the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, in which event the court in exercise of its power under s. 170 of the said Act, if in the course of the enquiry is satisfied about the conditions mentioned therein may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of such claim, shall be impleaded as a party to the proceedings and the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon have, without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-s. (2) of S. 149, the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made. 13. The Supreme Court of India in British General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Captain Ithar Singh and Ors. reported in 1958-65 ACJ 1 : AIR 1959 SC 1331 stated the law in the following term : "Now the language of sub-s. (2) seems to us to be perfectly plain and to admit of no doubt or confusion. It is that an insurer to whom the requisite notice of the action has been given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely, after which comes an enumeration of the grounds. It would follow that an insurer is entitled to defend on any of the grounds enumerated and no others. If it were not so, then of course no grounds need have been enumerated. When the grounds of defence have been specified, they cannot be added to. To do that would be adding words to the statute. (Emphasis supplied) 14. The Apex Court considered the submissions to the effect that sub-section (2) of section 96 does not restrict the defences of an insurer and held: "We think that this contention is without foundation. Sub-s. (2) in fact deals with defences other than those based on the conditions of a policy. (Emphasis supplied) 14. The Apex Court considered the submissions to the effect that sub-section (2) of section 96 does not restrict the defences of an insurer and held: "We think that this contention is without foundation. Sub-s. (2) in fact deals with defences other than those based on the conditions of a policy. Thus clause (a) of that sub-section permits an insurer to defend an action on the ground that the policy has been duly cancelled provided the conditions set out in that clause have been satisfied. Clause (c) gives him the right to defend the action on the ground that the policy is void as having been obtained by non-disclosure of a material fact or a material false representation of fact. Therefore, it cannot be said that in enacting sub-s. (2) the legislature was contemplating only those defences which were based on the conditions of the policy. It also seems to us that even if sub-s. (2) and sub-s. (3) were confined only to defences based on the conditions of the policy that would not have led to the conclusion that the legislature thought that other defences not based in such conditions, would be open to an insurer. If that was what the legislature intended, then there was nothing to prevent it from expressing its intention, what the legislature has done is to enumerate in sub-s. (2) the defences available to an insurer and to provide by sub-S. (6) that he cannot avoid his liability excepting by means of such defences. In order that sub-s. (2) may be interpreted in the way the learned Solicitor-General suggests we have to add words to it. The learned Solicitor-General concedes this and says that the only word that has to be added is the word 'also' after the word 'grounds'. But even this the rules of interpretation do not permit us to do unless the section as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning, neither of which we think it is. The addition suggested will, in our view, make the language used unhappy and further effect a complete change in the meaning of the words use in the sub-section." 15. The addition suggested will, in our view, make the language used unhappy and further effect a complete change in the meaning of the words use in the sub-section." 15. If the defences apart from those enumerated were not available to the insurer in terms of sub-s. (2) of S. 96 of the Act before the learned Tribunal below, it is axiomatic that an appeal shall not lie on the basis of some defence and, thus, the appellant cannot question the quantum of compensation unless the same is inter alia contrary to law. This aspect of the matter has been considered by a Full Bench of Orissa High Court in National Insurance Co. vs. Maqikhaia Das reported in AIR 1976 Ori 175 as also by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in 1985 ACJ 749. 16. Following the aforementioned decisions in The Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. vs. Smt. Panapati Devi & Ors. reported in AIR 1989 Pat 183 , I have held that an appeal is not maintainable, inter alia, at the instance of Insurance Company on the questions of adequacy of the compensation awarded or that the accident had not taken place because of rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver. The question raised in this appeals is also covered by a Division Bench decision of this court in National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Sm. Tarak Bala Das & Anr. reported in 1987(1) CHN 17 and decision of other High Courts. 17. In Hindusthan General Insurance Society Ltd vs. Dayanath Jha (supra) before Untwalia, J. although the decision of the British Oxygen was referred but the bench failed to take into consideration the same. It merely did not agree with the decision of the Madras High Court in Gopalakrishnan vs. Sankara Narayanan reported in AIR 1968 Mad 436 . The decision, therefore, must be held to have been rendered per incurium. In any event, this court is not bound by the aforementioned decision of the Patna High Court keeping in view the fact that the other High Courts and in particular this High Court also taken the same view. Our finding on the aforementioned question is buttressed by the fact that s. 170 itself curves out an exception in favour of the Insurance Company. An exception has to be construed strictly. Our finding on the aforementioned question is buttressed by the fact that s. 170 itself curves out an exception in favour of the Insurance Company. An exception has to be construed strictly. Such an exception can be taken recourse to only in the event, the ingredients therefor are fulfilled. The very fact that the Parliament in its wisdom has allowed the Insurance Company to be impleaded as a party in proceeding under the Motor Vehicles Act in a particular situation clearly goes to show that unless and until the factors enumerated therein are not satisfied and the court does not record its reasons in writing upon arriving at its satisfaction, the Insurance Company cannot be impleaded as a party. 18. Specialia generilibus non-derogant is a well know proposition which means a special provision shall prevail over a general provision. Keeping in view the fact that an exclusion clause has been incorporated, the general provision, thus, evidently has no application. In this view of the matter I have no other alternative but to hold that the appeal preferred by the appellant is not mainatainable. 19. The submission of Mr. Chowdhury to the effect that keeping in view the fact that not only the appellant was impleaded as a party but was allowed to cross-examine the witnesses by the court it would be deemed to have exercised its jurisdiction under s. 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act is wholly misconceived. As noticed hereinbefore, for the purpose of granting leave to Insurance Company to be impleaded as party so as to enable it to take all defences and participate in the proceedings the court has to apply its mind and record its reasons. The satisfaction about the existence of the condition precedent and recording of reasons are necessary for exercising of jurisdiction under s. 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In the instant case neither any application was filed by the appellant nor the court had recorded any reason satisfying itself about the conditions precedent prescribed therefor. 20. Actus Curaie Nememim Gravabit is a well known proposition of law. Nobody can suffer by reason of any mistake on the part of the court. If by reason of ignorance in law, such participation of the Insurance Company had been allowed, .the appellant cannot take advantage of the same. 21. 20. Actus Curaie Nememim Gravabit is a well known proposition of law. Nobody can suffer by reason of any mistake on the part of the court. If by reason of ignorance in law, such participation of the Insurance Company had been allowed, .the appellant cannot take advantage of the same. 21. Furthermore, admittedly in one of the cases the owner of the vehicle had participated in the proceedings. Only because the appellant was permitted to cross-examine the witnesses, in my opinion the same by itself would not entitle the Insurance Company to raise the contention which it is forbidden from raising in terms of sub-s. (2) of S. 149 of the said Act. If a statute prescribes that a litigant is only entitled to take a limited defence, the Tribunal below and consequently this court had absolutely no jurisdiction to permit appellant to raise any other question to which it is not entitled to raise in law. 22. In this view of the matter it must be held that these appeals are not maintainable. 23. For the foregoing reasons it has also to be held that the appellant is not entitled to question the admissibility or otherwise of the medical certificates. The disability certificates had been granted by a Medical Board. At least in one of the cases namely, in the case of Kanan Kumar Kundu the Superintendent of Raiganj S.D Hospital who was one of the members of the Medical Board had granted certificates have been examined. It is true that in Bengal Coal Co. Ltd. vs. Barkan Gape reported in 1983 LIC 685, a Division Bench of this court while considering the provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act, observed: "The medical evidence as to physical capacity or diminution of physical capacity is an important factor in the assessment of loss of earning capacity. In the absence of medical evidence by doctors examining the claimant on behalf of either side, it is difficult and, thus, also the diminution or otherwise of the earning capacity. The medical certificates which have been tendered in the absence of evidence of the doctors issuing them are the mere hearsay evidence. Thus in the instant case, it is impossible to arrive at any conclusion as to the extent of loss of earning capacity of the claimant. The award of the Commissioner is vitiated in that respect and must be set aside." 24. Thus in the instant case, it is impossible to arrive at any conclusion as to the extent of loss of earning capacity of the claimant. The award of the Commissioner is vitiated in that respect and must be set aside." 24. In Bengal Coal Co. Ltd. Girimint Colliery vs. Sew Pujan Harijan reported in 1983 Lab IC 1285 the same Bench followed its earlier decision. 25. The appellant did not question the admissibility of the said documents. Had such objection been taken, the applicants respondents could have summoned the Doctors and got the medical certificates proved in accordance with law. It is useful to notice that in Parmanand Katara vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 1989 ACJ 1000, the Supreme Court of India while entertaining a writ application under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India as regards apathy shown by the Medical Practitioners in attending a patient by avoiding a medico legal case forthwith unless the formalities are complied with observed that a medical practitioner keeping in view the mode of medical ethics should attend to such patients and the police during investigation need not examine them nor the law courts should summon a medical professional to give evidence unless the same is necessary and even if he is summoned attempt should be made to see that the men of the professional are not made to wait and waste time unnecessary and it is known that our law courts always have respect for the men in the medical profession and are called to give evidence when necessary and attempts are made so that they may not have to wait for long. The Supreme Court also expressed a hope that members of the legal profession would honour the person in the medical profession and see that they are not called to give evidence so long as it is not necessary. Their Lordship also expected that the facts are so clear that unnecessary harassment of the members of the medical profession either by way of requests for adjournment Or by cross-examination should be avoided so that the apprehension that which prevents them from discharging their duty to a suffering person who needs their assistance utmost, is removed and a citizen needing the assistance of a man in the medical profession receives it. Reference in this connection may also be made to United India Insurance Co. Reference in this connection may also be made to United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Sethu Madhavan reported in 1993 ACJ 1035. 26. In any event, if the appellants were not entitled to raise the aforementioned defences, they cannot be allowed to question the admissibility of the same. When a document has been admitted in evidence without objection upon formal proof being dispensed with, the right of the concerned party is to cross-examine. Reference in this connection may be made to M/s. Lionel Edwards Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 1967 Cal 191 , It has been held:- "Documents are either proved by witnesses or marked on admission. When it is marked on admission without reservation, the contents are not only evidence but are taken as admitted the result being, the contents cannot be challenged either by way of cross-examination or otherwise. In respect of documents marked on admission dispensing with formal proof, the contents are evidence, although the party admitting does not thereby accept the truth of the contents and is free to challenge the contents by way of cross-examination or otherwise." 27. Reference in this connection may also be made to PC Purushothama Reddiar vs. S. Perumal, reported in AIR 1972 SC page 608 (Paragraphs 18 and 19). 28. As regard non-observance of the provisions of r. 329(3) of the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules, we are of the opinion that the said provisions are directory in nature. The court at the time of considering the application may point out the defect which may be removed by the applicants. But if no such defects had been pointed, the appellant without taking any ground (which it was not entitled to take) before the learned Tribunal below cannot be permitted to urge non-observance of the said formalities, before this court for the first time. 29. At this juncture we may also deal with the contention of Mr. Chowdhury to the effect that an award having been passed on an application under s. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claim applications were not maintainable. the said contention cannot be accepted in view of a clear and ambiguous intention of the Parliament as reflected from Ss. 140, 141, 166, 168, 171, 173 and 174 of the said Act. 30. In Oriental Insurance Co. the said contention cannot be accepted in view of a clear and ambiguous intention of the Parliament as reflected from Ss. 140, 141, 166, 168, 171, 173 and 174 of the said Act. 30. In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Mohiuddin Kureshi reported in 1944(1) PLJR 79, speaking for the Division Bench, I have held:- "From a conjoint reading of the aforementioned provisions, there cannot be any doubt that an application under s. 140 of the said Act can be filed separately. However, s. 166 of the said Act contemplates filing of a composite application, as is evident from the proviso appended to sub-s. (2) of s. 167 of the said Act. It is true that while passing an order u/s. 140 of the said Act, one is neither required to plead or to establish any wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned, nor such a claim shall be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement, a claim has been made. In terms of sub-s. (4) of S. 140 even an amount fixed by the statute in terms of sub-s. (2) of s. 140 can be reduced if any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person for whose death or permanent disablement his claim lay is proved." 31. In that judgment it has also been held that an appeal would be maintainable from an interim award passed under S. 140 of the Act. 32. It is true that it would have been better for the Tribunal below to arrive at a conclusion as regards the actual quantum of compensation payable to the applicant-respondent under each head and then pass a formal award after taking the sum which is already covered under the interim award but such an opinion must be deemed to have been formed by the learned Tribunal below by necessary implication. 33. We are also unable to agree with the submission of Mr. Chowdury to the effect that on a comparison of the allegations made in the different application and the evidence adduced therein it would appear that there exist certain discrepancies. Both the claim cases were heard separately. Evidences were independently adduced in each case. 33. We are also unable to agree with the submission of Mr. Chowdury to the effect that on a comparison of the allegations made in the different application and the evidence adduced therein it would appear that there exist certain discrepancies. Both the claim cases were heard separately. Evidences were independently adduced in each case. As noticed hereinbefore, the learned Tribunal below had passed two separate awards upon taking into consideration the material; on records. In that view of the matter unless the attention of the witness who has been examined in both the cases is drawn to a statement made in earlier case in terms of s. 145 of the Indian Evidence Act; this court cannot look to the same with a view to find out the inconsistencies in such statements. This court had jurisdiction to do so only in a case of an applicant whose earlier statement made in a court of law is admissible proprio vigore. 34. For the reasons aforementioned the contention of Mr. C40wdhury to the effect that some of the claims have been allowed without their being any proper document also cannot be entertained. 35. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Bhagaban Bhuyan and Anr. reported in 1991 ACJ 726 upon which strong reliance had been placed by Mr. Chowdhury, does not help his contention inasmuch as in the said decision, the decision of the Supreme Court in British Oxygen (supra) had not been taken into consideration. Even in that case it has been held that a court cannot remain a mute spectator and allow perpetration of a fraud on justice when parties collude to draw red herrings across the course of justice. 36. In H. West & Son Ltd. and Anr. vs. Shephard reported in 1958-65 ACJ 504, it is not a case where there is absolutely no evidence. If a fraud is practised or if a case is based on no evidence, this court in an appropriate case exercises its power of superintendence under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India but unless such a case is made out, the appellant cannot be heard to say that the awarded amount is excessive. 37. The submission of Mr. Chowdhury to the effect that the court cannot go beyond the relevant claim may not be in strict sense applicable. 37. The submission of Mr. Chowdhury to the effect that the court cannot go beyond the relevant claim may not be in strict sense applicable. In the case of J.K. Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. Kanpur vs. The Iron and Steel Mazdoor Union, Kanpur reported in AIR 1956 SC 231 , the Supreme Court was considering a provision of Industrial Disputes Act, and held that the scope of an adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act is much wider than that of an arbitrator making an award. It is true that the statutory authorities must function within the limits imposed under the Act as they, although are not courts, have the trappings of a court. In that case on fact it was found that the adjudicator and the Labour Appellate Tribunal had adopted the attitude of benevolent despots and have based their conclusions on irrelevant considerations and have ignored the real questions that arose for decision and the issues that arose out of the pleadings of the parties. 38. However, in a case of Motor Vehicles the position may be different. A person has to file a claim within the prescribed period or immediately after the occurrence of the accident so as to enable him to pray for an interim award in terms of s. 140 of the Act. During pendency of the said Application it may be brought to the notice of the Court that he had to spend much more by way of medical expenses. In fact even the death of the victim may occur. Various other complications may also arise owing to passage of time which might not have been detected at the initial stage. During pendency of the proceeding, the court may find that the sufferance of the victim is much more what was originally thought of. There is no prescribed mode of pleading. An applicant has to merely file a form in terms of the rules. Thus, in a given case even the High Court may enhance the amount of compensation. Reference in this connection may be made to Vijay Singh vs. Haryana Roadways and Anr. reported in AIR 1990 P&H 334 , Sruti Shekhar Singh Samanta vs. Managing Director, Orissa Road Transport, Berhampur, Ganjam reported in AIR 1991 Ori 225 and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. K.T. Josh reported in AIR 1991 Ker 324. 39. In Sait Tarajee Khimchand and Ors. reported in AIR 1990 P&H 334 , Sruti Shekhar Singh Samanta vs. Managing Director, Orissa Road Transport, Berhampur, Ganjam reported in AIR 1991 Ori 225 and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. K.T. Josh reported in AIR 1991 Ker 324. 39. In Sait Tarajee Khimchand and Ors. vs. Yelamarti Sat yam & Ors. reported in AIR 1971 SC 1865 upon which also reliance has been placed by Mr. Chowdhury is not relevant. In the instant case the points raised in this appeal had not been taken before the learned Tribunal below even assuming that it could raise the said question. 40. Re. Question No.2. This brings upon to the question as to whether the cross-objection is maintainable. In our opinion the same is maintainable in view of the fact that the Insurance Company could prefer an appeal in terms of s. 173 of Motor Vehicles Act. The question as to whether the points raised in this appeal could be allowed to be urged in view of the bar imposed in terms of s. 149(2) of the Act is a different matter. 41. In M/s. Kantilal & Bros. & Anr. vs. Ramarani Debi & Ors. reported in AIR 1979 Cal 152 , it has been held that a Cross-objection would be maintainable in terms of Or. 41 r. 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, even if the appeal is not maintainable. 42. Re. Question No.3. Having regard to the amount paid in favour of Smt. Sipra Brahma we are not inclined to alter the said awarded amount. 43. The court in all cases has to consider the justness of the amount of compensation. It is true that where claims are made under different heads, evidence must be held in respect of each head and in those cases the court may require strict proof under each head. While awarding such compensation the court has to take into consideration the normal expectancy of life which according to the Apex Court is 65 years. In awarding the compensation the court has also to consider the question of loss of future promotion if the applicant is in service or loss in business or similar such matters where the victim becomes permanently disabled to the extent of 75% as a result whereof undoubtedly the loss in the earning capacity would occur. In awarding the compensation the court has also to consider the question of loss of future promotion if the applicant is in service or loss in business or similar such matters where the victim becomes permanently disabled to the extent of 75% as a result whereof undoubtedly the loss in the earning capacity would occur. The respondent of F.M.A 450/95 after filing of the application had already undergone treatment at Korondighi Hospital, Raiganj and at Maldah Hospital. He stated that from 13.2.92 to 1.3.92 he had been undergoing treatment in Kothari Medical Centre and Research Institute and still the treatment is going on and he had already incurred a sum of Rs. 35,237.10 P. on account of treatment. The certificate of his permanent disablement was granted later on as only during pendency of the application the same was detected. The applicant was a businessman. He admittedly had suffered multiple severe injuries. He at the Kothari Medical Centre was being treated by Dr. D. Bose. He claimed the following amount:- "A. Pecuniary Loss:–– For treatment and other charges Medical Medicine, Special Diet, Doctor Charges, Conveyance Etc. Rs. 50,000.00 Loss of earnings for the period 9.2.92 to 7.8.92 Rs.12,000.00 Loss of future earnings B. Non-pecuniary damages:–– Mental & Physical shock pain Suffering Rs. 20,000.00 Loss of amentipled of life Rs. 15,000.00 Short & expectation of life Rs. 25,000.00 Others Rs. 20,000.00 -------------------- Rs. 3,83,000.00 -------------------- (Rupees Three lakh and Eighty Three Thousand only) plus int. 44. He examined himself as P.W.1. He stated that immediately after the accident he lost his sense which he regained on the next date at Maldah Nursing Home whereafter on 12.2.92 he was shifted to Calcutta Medical Centre as Indoor Patient and had undergone treatment from 13.2.92 to 11.3.92. As per advise of the Doctor despite his discharge he was required to attend the said Institute once in a month. He was again admitted to the Kothari Medical Institution on three other occasions for 21 days. In July 1993 he was treated by the Doctor and was further directed to attend the Hospital further after 6/7 months. At the time of accident he was aged only 28 years. He used to earn Rs. 2,000/- P.M. He had two daughters, aged 9 years and 6 years respectively besides wife. He sustained fracture on two sides of both legs and in the right leg below tibia. At the time of accident he was aged only 28 years. He used to earn Rs. 2,000/- P.M. He had two daughters, aged 9 years and 6 years respectively besides wife. He sustained fracture on two sides of both legs and in the right leg below tibia. He also sustained injury on his head as also on his hands. The bone of his left leg had to be grafted and iron plate was to be on the left side of his leg. On his right leg near tibia was plastered twice. He cannot walk even without the help of a stick. He cannot stand up for long time. Evidently he suffered great pain throughout the period. He would not be able to ride on his scooter which he owned. According to him he cannot sit normally. He had also suffered mental and economic loss as also has been deprived of from enjoying his conjugal life. He had appeared before the Handicapped Board and a certificate was issued showing that he is handicapped to the extent of 75 per cent. He had filed receipts showing payment of money to Kothari Medical Centre and Maldah Nursing Home. He has proved also the expenses incurred by him during journey. No cross-examination on the aforementioned aspects has been made and, thus, all the statements must be accepted as correct. 45. P.W.2 is a superintendent who had granted the Handicap certificate. 46. P.W.3 is a co-passenger and. also suffered injuries. 47. The learned Tribunal below unfortunately has granted compensation only under 3 heads. There is no reason as to why we should interfere with the amount of compensation of Rs.1,80,000/- awarded in his favour keeping in view the fact that his monthly income was admittedly Rs. 2,000/- p.m. However, the learned Tribunal below did not at all consider the evidence which were on record regarding the medical expenses. From the records it appears that he paid a sum of Rs. 10,000/- by way of medical expenses. Therefore, he is entitled to the aforementioned sum plus Rs. 5,000/-. He is also entitled to the expenses incurred for coming and going from his native place to Calcutta for treatment which is assessed at Rs. 5,000/-. Keeping in view the fact that he had to be in hospital for such a long time. The amount of Rs. Therefore, he is entitled to the aforementioned sum plus Rs. 5,000/-. He is also entitled to the expenses incurred for coming and going from his native place to Calcutta for treatment which is assessed at Rs. 5,000/-. Keeping in view the fact that he had to be in hospital for such a long time. The amount of Rs. 5,000/- paid towards pain and suffering appears to be wholly unjust and which is, thus raised Rs. 50,000/- keeping in view the fact that he became permanently disabled to the extent of 75 per cent. 48. In H. West & Son Ltd. & Anr. vs. Shephard reported in 1958-65 ACJ 504, the House of Lords held:- "In the process of assessing damages judges endeavour to take into account all the relevant changes in a claimant's circumstances which have been caused by the tortfeasor. These are often conveniently described as 'heads of damage'. In his judgment in the much-litigated cause of Philips vs. London & South Western Rly. Cp. Cockburn, C.J., referred to some of these. He mentioned at page 407 the bodily injury sustained as well as the pain undergone the effect on the health of the sufferer and items of expense incurred and pecuniary lossed suffered. If there has been some serious physical injury which, as the result of skilled medical attention has happily not necessitated the enduring of pain, then it will follow that there be no question of including in an award any sum as compensation for the enduring of pain. If someone has been made unconscious so that pain is not felt the like result will follow. Damages are awarded as a fair compensation for that which has in fact happened and will not arise in respect of anything that has not happened." 49. The injuries, in this case, has resulted in the material suffering of the claimant for a long time. 50. The petitioner is, thus, entitled both to the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, particularly his non-ability to walk and even to stand for a long time. He will have to be depended on various other persons. He deprived of enjoyment of conjugal life. Following the said decision and keeping in view the evidences on record we awarded Rs. 1,50,000/- towards the pain and mental suffering and loss of amenities of life. He will have to be depended on various other persons. He deprived of enjoyment of conjugal life. Following the said decision and keeping in view the evidences on record we awarded Rs. 1,50,000/- towards the pain and mental suffering and loss of amenities of life. We should also take into consideration the fact that keeping in view the nature of injuries the respondent may have to undergo physiotherapy we award a sum of Rs. 25,000/- by way of future medical expenses. In total the claimant is entitled to an award of a further sum of Rs. 2,35,000/-. 51. For the reasons aforementioned the appeals are dismissed and the cross objection is allowed to the extent mentioned hereinbefore. The respondents are also entitled to costs of these appeals. Counsels fee assessed at 100 Gms. in each appeal. 52. Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J.: I agree. Appeals dismissed. Cross objections allowed.