JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel J.: Petitioner has filed this revision petition against the order dated 8.5.1.997 passed by the trial court whereby it has been ordered that there is sufficient evidence to frame. charts against him under Section 13 8 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and under Section 420 IPC and consequently charge was also framed on the same day. 2. Brief facts of the case which are within a narrow compass may be noticed. Rakesh Kumar respondent (hereinafter referred to as the complainant) filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Act, & 420 IPC in the court of Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate. Theog against the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the accused) alleging therein that the latter had issued three cheques for Rs.80,000/- Rs.50,000/- and Rs.20,000/- dated 2.9.1992, 25.11.1992 and 30.11.1992, respectively. AH these cheques were; issued from the Saving Bank Account No.4409 which the accused had with the H.P. State Cooperative Bank Limited at Kotkhai, When these cheques were presented on 12.2.1993 to the banker of the accused, they were dishonored. Further case of the complainant was that notice vide Ext.P-5 was issued calling upon the accused to pay the amount within the statutory period under Section 138 of the Act and on his failure to pay the amount, complaint was filed. Complainant appeared as PW-1 in his preliminary evidence on 12.4.1993 and closed his evidence. Trial Court after considering the preliminary evidence was” satisfied that there were pn]ma facie grounds to proceed against the accused under Section 138 of the Act as well as under Section 420 .IPC. Accordingly on 22.4.1993, process was ordered to be issued. After the. accused had appeared, evidence on behalf of the complainant was recorded. Complainant then appeared as PW -1, on 7.1.1994 and examined PW-2 Bhag Mull Thaltur, Manager of the aforesaid bank at its Kotkhai branch. As per the case of the complainant, cheques Exs. P-l to P-3 were issued by the accused and intimation regarding their dishonour was received by the complainant vide Ext. P-4. Thereafter within the period prescribed under Section 138 of the act, notice was issued vide Ext. P-5. Postal receipts Exts. P-6 and P-7 and A.Ds. Exts.P-8 and P-9 have been proved on record by this witness. In his cross-examination, PW-1 has admitted that he received a sum of Rs.41,500/- and another sum of Rs. 13,000/-besides Rs.500/-. P-4. Thereafter within the period prescribed under Section 138 of the act, notice was issued vide Ext. P-5. Postal receipts Exts. P-6 and P-7 and A.Ds. Exts.P-8 and P-9 have been proved on record by this witness. In his cross-examination, PW-1 has admitted that he received a sum of Rs.41,500/- and another sum of Rs. 13,000/-besides Rs.500/-. He denied having received a further sum of Rs.48,000/- and Rs. 5000/-, although it has come in the statement of PW-2 Branch Manager of Kotkhai branch of the H.P. State Cooperative Bank Limited that these two amounts were debited from the account of the accused and credited to the account of the complainant. He has placed on record Ext. D, certificate issued by the Kolkhai Branch of the aforesaid bank in that behalf. 3. On the other hand, the defence as spelt out from the cross-examination of the complainant as PW-1 appears to be that in addition to the admitted payments of two cheques, other two payments of Rs.48000/- and Rs. 5000/- were made by the accused. Besides this, further sum of Rs.54.OOO/, was paid in cash. According to the accused, produce or "he orchard was purchased by him in the year 1992 for Rs. 1.50.000/-. Whereas complainant alleged that the crop was sold for Rs.2.05.000/- and out this agreed sum an amount of Rs. 1.50.0O0/-was due and out standing. : 4. For what amount the orchard crop-.vas sold or what is the amount paid is not relent for the determination of the present case. Similarly, whether the accused had discharged his liability completely as was being urged partly by means of four cheques and partly by cash payment is also not relevant for the determination of the present case. As the-panics arc before the civil court, so the matter is being left here only because any observation made by this court may prejudice either of the parties in the civil litigation. However, it may be clarified that on the basis of the evidence recorded particularly of P W-2 as well as amounts, receipt whereof is admitted by the complainant, it is established that a sum of Rs.5,000/- and another sum of Rs.48.000- was also debited to the account of the accused and credited to the account of the complainant. 5. However, it may be clarified that on the basis of the evidence recorded particularly of P W-2 as well as amounts, receipt whereof is admitted by the complainant, it is established that a sum of Rs.5,000/- and another sum of Rs.48.000- was also debited to the account of the accused and credited to the account of the complainant. 5. Learned counsel for the accused submitted that in the instant case, all the three cheques were initially presented by the complainant on 16.12.1992 and 29.12.1992 when they. were dishonoured and notice had since been issued vide Ext.R-1 on 4.1.1992 and complaint having not been filed within the stipulated period on first dishonour, as such on subsequent dishonour on 12.2.1993, the complaint was not maintainable because subsequent dishonour did not give cause to the complainant for filing the complaint. According to him, cause of action having arising once which was complete and conclusive action having hot been initiated under Section 138 of the Act. subsequent dishonour is of no consequence. Since it was not a continuing offence. therefore, trial court had fallen into error by holding that there were prima facie circumstances to proceed against the accused. In support of his this submission. Shri Lath placed reliance on 1994(1) Crimes 382; Chellakkannu Nadar v. Simon, 1994(1)Crimes 845,Ms. Chahal Engineering and construction vs. Verma Plywood Co. 1993(2) Chandigarh Law Reporter 36.M s. K.P.V.V. Textiles and another Vs. M/s. Malook Chand Naresh Chand. AIR 1973 SC 90X. Slate of Bihar Vs. Deokaran Nenshi and another. 6. On the other hand, Shri Negi learned counsel for the complainant has controverted all the pleas and has urged that in the instant case the only thing that was required to-be seen by the trial Court was whether there was ground for presuming that the accused had committed offence and once having come to that conclusion, the trial court was justified in holding that a prima facie case existed against the accused. So, the impugned order as well as framing of charge were legal and call for no interference. 7. It may be appropriate to mention here that at the time of framing of the charge, probative value of the record cannot be gone into. Accepting the material brought on record by the complainant has to be examined and then tested whether a case for making out charge is there or not. 7. It may be appropriate to mention here that at the time of framing of the charge, probative value of the record cannot be gone into. Accepting the material brought on record by the complainant has to be examined and then tested whether a case for making out charge is there or not. In support of his submission, reliance was placed by Shri Negi on 1995 Criminal Law Journal 1931 M/s. S.K.D.I. Fireworks vs K.V. Sivram Krishnon. 1992 Criminal Law Journal 4048,M/s. Syed Rasool and sows Vs. M/s. Aildas & Co.. 1994 (3) Crimes l986, M/s Konark Cables Pvt Ltd Vs. M/s. Premier Engg & Electrical Corporation and another and AIR SC 1996 1744, State of Maharashtra vs. Som Nath thapa. 8. 1992 Criminal Law Journal 4048,M/s. Syed Rasool and sows Vs. M/s. Aildas & Co.. 1994 (3) Crimes l986, M/s Konark Cables Pvt Ltd Vs. M/s. Premier Engg & Electrical Corporation and another and AIR SC 1996 1744, State of Maharashtra vs. Som Nath thapa. 8. Before considering the respective submission it may be appropriate to refer to the provisions of Section I38 of the Act which is to the following effect:- "138 Dishononr of cheques for insufficient, etc., of funds in the account.- Where any cheques drown by a person on an account maintained by hint with a banker for payment of any mi omit of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge m whole or in part, of any debt or taker liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money Sanding to the credit of that account is insufficient to honor the cheque or that it exceeds me amount arrange to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an affiance and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act be punished-witl imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both : Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless- (a) The cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder in due coarse of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him front the bank regarding the ream of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) The drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to As payee or as the case may be, to me bolder in due coarse of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice." 9. The object of incorporation of this section by means of the Banking, Public Financial Institution and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) act I988 (Act No.66 of I988) in respect of Negotiable Instruments Act was to enhance die acceptability of cheques in settlement of liabilities by making the drawer liable for penalty in case bouncing of the cheques due to insufficiency of with adequate safeguard to prevent the harassment of honest drawers. 10.. In this context, it may be appropriate to mention here that as per pro visions of Section 138 of the Act, after the receipt of notice of dishonour within fifteen days, the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, is to make a demand within fifteen days, of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding return of the cheque as unpaid. Thereafter the drawer of the-cheque is still given a chance to make payment within the next fifteen days thereafter to payee or holder is due course of the cheque. This arrangement appears to have been enacted m tike statute so as to enable a bonafide drawer to rectify the consequences of dishonour of a cheque, it is also evident that after dishonour of the cheque, there is clear cut opportunity available to a drawer to ensure that in case due to unforeseen circumstances or for any other reason when the cheque was presented and it could not be got encashed, still he is in a position to do the needful within fifteen days of the receipt of intimation of the dishonour of the cheque in accordance with the scheme of Section 13 8 of the Act. 11. It may also be noticed here that Chapter XVII has been added to Act No.66 of 1988 as it is essential for economic life of the developing countries. Besides this, in the commercial transactions, payments by means of cheques are by now a universally acknowledged and accepted node of payment. In order to ensure that a party does not play any truant on the drawer or the holder in due course of cheque, Legislature in its wisdom had introduced the aforesaid chapter to the Act supra. Another purpose that appears to be there for enacting Section 133 of the Act is to inculcate a sense of efficacy in the banking operations. , 12. Another purpose that appears to be there for enacting Section 133 of the Act is to inculcate a sense of efficacy in the banking operations. , 12. It may also be appropriate to mention here that in none of Sections 138 to 142 of the Act there is any provision which requires that a complaint or prosecution has to be launched on dishonour of the cheque for the first time after issuing of statutory notice. There is no prohibition that a cheque when presented during its validity on subsequent occasions, an action cannot be initiated by drawn or holder of the cheque. 13. In 1994(1) Crimes 382 supra, a learned Single Judge of Kerala High Court has found that on dishonour of cheque and on notice having been issued and thereafter on the failure to pay the amount within the prescribed period, subsequent presentment of cheque after a period of four months when again presented, it was dishonoured and the accused did not make the payment within the period prescribed under law even after receipt of second notice, complaint which was filed on this second dishonour of cheque and issuance of notice was held not maintainable. While taking this view, learned Single Judge has followed a Division Bench judgment of that Court reported in 1991(1), Crimes 23(Ker.) Kumaresan vs. Ameerappa. 14. In 1994(1) Crimes 845 Supra, a learned Single Judge of Punjab & Haryana High Court has taken a similar view and has held that once cause of action arises on first notice, limitation starts and could not be stopped by presenting the cheque again so as to have fresh cause of action and fresh limitation. Thus, the complaint was ordered to be quashed accordingly, in 1993 (2) Chandigarh Law Reporter 36 supra, similar view has been taken by another learned Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court and had followed Division Bench judgment of Kerala High Court in Kumaresan s case supra. 15. So far the view taken by the Kerala High Court in its Division Bench judgment in the case of Kumaresans cave supra is concerned, it does not hold the field in view of the Full Bench decision of that court in the case of M/s S.K.. D.L. Fireworks Industries supra. In this judgment it was held as under: - "14. So far the view taken by the Kerala High Court in its Division Bench judgment in the case of Kumaresans cave supra is concerned, it does not hold the field in view of the Full Bench decision of that court in the case of M/s S.K.. D.L. Fireworks Industries supra. In this judgment it was held as under: - "14. Deferment of prosecution or even omission to prosecute the offender at the earliest opportunity and availing a cause of action which accrues to him subsequently may not in any way be considered as an act prejudicial to the interest of the drawer or an act intended to harass of embarrass the dawer of the cheque. If at all such an act can only be considered as an action advantageous to the drawer who if not in a position to pay. Repeated presentation and creation of fresh cause of action cannot also be considered as an action intended to embarrass or harass the drawer as he can at any time pay and avoid the threat of prosecution effectively if he chooses to do so. So long as cheque remains unpaid, attempts made to claim payment and to keep alive the criminal remedy to the maximum period by creating a fresh cause of action if possible cannot be considered as tantalising the drawer or keeping a Dammocles sword over him indefinitely. We do not find any justification to take such a view so as to hold that creation of successive causes of action is impermissible or that there is an implied bar created by the provisions against the creation of successive cause of actions. In para -19 of this judgment it has been further held as under :- "19. Even if successive causes of action arise, only one prosecution and conviction of acquittal is possible in view of S.3GO of the Cr.P.C. since the compliant is bound to be on the basis of the dishonoured cheque which is bound to be produced in court as the basis for the prosecution. The cause of action may get barred or become ineffective if no complaint is filed in time. So long as cheque remains unpaid and the payee or holder in due course is able, to establish all the ingredients of the offence and satisfy the other requirements of the provisions contained in Ss. The cause of action may get barred or become ineffective if no complaint is filed in time. So long as cheque remains unpaid and the payee or holder in due course is able, to establish all the ingredients of the offence and satisfy the other requirements of the provisions contained in Ss. 138 and 142 of the Act, a- complaint will be maintainable in spite of the fact that he has not filed any complaint in time on the basis of one or more cause of actions accrued to him earlier." in the case of M/s Syed Rasool and sons Vs. M/s. Aildas & Co. (supra), a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court held as under :- "Cheque can be presented to the bank within a period of six months from* the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. So, when a cheque, which has been presented to the Bank is returned, die payee or the holder in due course of the cheque has to give a notice, in writing, to the drawer within fifteen days of the receipt of in formation from the bank and the drawer of such cheque must make the payment of the amount to the payee or the holder of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. The person who issued the cheque may approach the payee in whose favour the cheque was issued and convince him that he will pay the amount or he will arrange to see that the amount will be paid and request for postponement of time. The cheque can be presented to the bank within the period of six months from the date or which it is drawn or within the period of its - validity, whichever is earlier. During the validity period the cheque can be presented any number of times but the action by filing a complaint under Section 138 road with S.142 can be taken only once. When the statute has not laid down any limitation on the number of times that a cheque may be presented within the period of six months or any shorter period under Clause (a) of the proviso to Section 138 it will not be desirable (o read into the said clause any such restriction as to number of times a cheque may be presented. It is common knowledge that in commercial practice a cheque may be presented any number of times within the period of its validity. The principle of autrefois acquits or autrefois convict will also come into play and the drawer of the cheque cannot be subjected to repeated prosecutions and convictions on the strength of one cheque. So as there is no restriction with regard to the presentation of the cheque, any number or times within its validity period and it is not open to the court by adding anything more that the cheque cannot be presented for a second time, the theory of double prosecution on the same cheque does not arise. There is no prohibition for presentation of the cheque any number of times within its validity period because the presentation may be in most of the times at the request of the drawer either in writing or orally but the right to present the cheque within the six months period is not taken away as that right has already been given to the payee in whose favour the cheque has been given." 16. Identical view, has been taken in Criminal Law Journal 1995. 715. Mallappa Sangappa Desai Vs. Laxmanappa Basappa Whoii by the Karnalaka High Court, wherein it has been held that since the complainant did not issue notice of demand within fifteen days after the cheque was first returned, the offence under Section 138 of the Act cannot be said to have been committed and accordingly this contention .vas rejected by the said Court. Besides this in the case of Konark Cables Private Limited (supra), Delhi High Court has also taken the same view as that of Full Bench of Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka High Courts. Similar view has been taken by the Madras High Court in Sivasankar vs. Santhakumari, 1994(79) Company cases 412, Sashiknla Vs. Integrated Finance Co. Ltd. 1994 (80) Company Cases 875, Bombay High Court in Rakesh Podwal vs. Narayan Joglekar. 1993 Cr.L.J. 1980 (Bom.), Calcutta High Court in Sekhar Gupta vs. Subhash Mandal 1992(73), Com Cases 590 (Cal). has taken the identical view. 17. Integrated Finance Co. Ltd. 1994 (80) Company Cases 875, Bombay High Court in Rakesh Podwal vs. Narayan Joglekar. 1993 Cr.L.J. 1980 (Bom.), Calcutta High Court in Sekhar Gupta vs. Subhash Mandal 1992(73), Com Cases 590 (Cal). has taken the identical view. 17. Now, next question that needs to be examined is whether the view of Kerala High court in the case of Kumarasan’s case supra as well as two decisions of Punjab and Haryana High Court arc in consonance with the enactment of Section 138 of the Act and do these decisions achieve the purpose that was sought to be achieved as well as the mischief that was intended to be curbed or not. As already noticed, a Full Bench or Kerala High Court in the case of S.K. D.L Fireworks Industries supra has over -ruled the two decisions i.e. Kumaresans and Chettakkannu Nadar’s cases supra. In this view of the matter, no benefit can be derived by the accused from these two decisions. 18. It may also be noticed here that a cheque remains valid for a period of six months. In Negotiable Instruments Act or for that matter, in Section 138 to 142 thereof, there is no prohibition that the cheque cannot be presented during the period of its validity. This Court is of the view *hat even, dishonour of the cheque during its validity gives a right to the drawee/ holder in due course to prosecute this drawer on the basis of each dishonour. Needless to point out that in the absence of there being any prohibition, it cairn be said that the cause of action is complete once and for all as observed in the State of Bihar Vs. Deokaran Nenshi (supra). Here, during the validity of the cheque, drawee/ holder of the cheque in due course has every right to make an attempt to get the same encashed. 19. In this context, it may be appropriate to notice that for achieving the object with which Chapter XVII was added to the Act, the Legislature has used comprehensive terminology to achieve the purpose as aforesaid. It would not be appropriate to limit the content by construction when particularly the spirit of the statute is in accord with the words used there. It would not be appropriate to limit the content by construction when particularly the spirit of the statute is in accord with the words used there. In AIR 1955 SC, 661, Bengal Immunity Companies vs. State of Bihar at page 674, it was observed as under :- "for the sure and true interpretation of all Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered : 1st. What was the common law before the Waking of the Act. 2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide 3rd. What remedy the Parliament had resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth, and: 4th. The true reason of the remedy: and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and Pro private comodo and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act "Probono Publico". (Extract from Hbydons case)". 20. In the face of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the view that the view taken by the Full Bench of Kerala High Court, Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court, as well as by Karaataka, Bombay, Madras and Delhi High Courts appears to be more in consonance with the legislative purpose as well as intention with which Chapter XVII was enacted, and also curbs the mischief that was aimed to be done by the said provisions of law. 21. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am in respectful agreement with the views expressed by these decisions and the contrary view, if followed, would in my opinion, defeat the object with which Sections 138 to 142 of the Act were enacted. That being so, the contentions raised on behalf of the accused that the subsequent dishonour of the cheque on 12.2.1993 would not authorise the complainant to file the complaint out of which the present case has arisen, is rejected. However; it is clarified that after the first or subsequent dishonour of cheque, a drawee/holder in due course can only maintain one complaint so long such a cheque is presented and it is dishonored during the period of its validity. However; it is clarified that after the first or subsequent dishonour of cheque, a drawee/holder in due course can only maintain one complaint so long such a cheque is presented and it is dishonored during the period of its validity. . 22. Now, coming to the question of charge under Section 4201.P.C. From the evidence on record, there is no question of complainant having been induced by the accused so as to part with something to bring home the offence under Section 420 I.P.C. against the accused That being so, the charge under Section 420 I.P.C. has been wrongly framed by the trial Court and to that extent, the impugned order as well as the impugned charge both are quashed and set aside to that extant Consequently, only charge under Section 138 of the Act survives and the accused will be tried by the Court below for the said offence only. Oh the basis of the decision in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Som Nath Thapa (supra) as well as m the facts and circumstances of this case, it is held that the trial Court was right in ordering the framing of charge in the instant case on the basis of the evidence recorded and the submissions to the contrary on behalf of the accused are hereby rejected. This revision petition is partly allowed and the impugned order to the extent of ordering the framing of charge and consequential framing of charge under Section 420 IPC is hereby quashed and set aside and it is ordered accordingly. Parties are directed to appear before the court below on 20th October, 1997.