Judgment :- P.K. Balasubramanyan, J. This second Appeal is by the first defendant. The suit by the plaintiff was one for a prohibitory injunction restraining the first defendant from initiating proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act, for recovery of the amount due to the first defendant from the plaintiffs. The essential plea on behalf of the plaintiff was that since three years have elapsed after the suit, the claim for recovery by the first defendant was barred by limitation and consequently, the amount could not be recovered by recourse to the Revenue Recovery Act. The trial court negatived that contention and found that the suit itself was haired by limitation, that the suit was hit by S.72 of the Re venue Recovery Act and going by the decision reported in Harikumaran Nair v. Kerala State Financial Enterprises (1993 (2) KLT 463), even if the recovery was barred By limitation through a civil court, the amount could be recovered by recourse to the Revenue Recovery Act. The plaintiffs filed an appeal. The lower appellate court purporting to follow the decision of the Division Benchin Nanu v. State of Kerala (1987 (2) KLT 921) reversed the decree of the trial court and held that the recovery was barred by limitation and consequently, the plaintiff was entitled to a perpetual injunction restraining the first defendant from initiating proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act. The decision of the lower appellate court was rendered on 12.4.1996. But on 10.4.1996 a Full Bench of this Court in Kerala Fisheries Corporation v. P.S. John (1996 (1) KLT 814) (but reported subsequently) had overruled the incision in Nanu and had held that proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act can be initiated even in a case where the recovery of the debt may be said to be barred through the civil court in view of the relevant Article of the Limitation Act. It is therefore, clear that the decision of the lower appellate court is clearly unsustainable. 2. It is therefore, clear that the decision of the lower appellate court is clearly unsustainable. 2. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs contended that in Kerala Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. v. U. Gopalakrishna Kunikullaya (1997 (2) KLT 310) it has been held by a learned single judge of this Court that the decision of the Full Bench has operation only from 10.4.1996 the date of that judgment and contracts entered into prior to the date of that decision and in which recoveries should have been initiated before the date of that decision, would be still governed by the principle in Nanu's case specifically and clearly overruled by the Full Bench. I am afraid that I cannot see the decision in Kerala Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. (1997 (2) KLT 310) as an authority. First of all, when a Full Bench overrules a prior precedent, the effect of the same is that it is a declaration of the law as it always has been. There is no question of the declaration of law by the Full Bench having operation only from the date of such declaration. Quoting from People v. Graves (273 NYS 582) Bodenheimer in his text book on jurisprudence has stated: "....when a precedent is over thrown, the overruling decision must be viewed as enunciating the law as it always has been and that the discarded decision must be treated as a nullity. " A judicial decision is the evidence of the law. An overruling decision does not change law, it impeaches the overruled decision as evidence of law. Adopting the theory that Courts merely declare pre-existing law, illogically follows that an overruling decision operates retro-actively"' The Supreme Court in Suresfi Chandra Verma v. Chancellor, Nagpur University (AIR 1990 SC 2023) has authoritatively explained the position thus: "It is unnecessary to point out that when the Court decides that the interpretation of a particular provision as given earlier was not legal, it in effect declares that there was it stood from the beginning was as per its decision, and that it was never the law otherwise. This being the case, since the Full Bench and now this Court have taken the view that the interpretation placed on the provisions of law by the Division Bench in Bhaskara' s case was erroneous, it will have to be held that the appointments made by the University on March 3 0,1985 pursuant to the law laid down in Bhakare's case were not according to law". In GolakNath v. State of Punjab (AIR 1967 SC 1643) the Supreme Court, when it for the first time adopted the principle of prospective overruling earlier recognised by the Supreme Court of United States, had specifically set down the limitation of that doctrine. Their Lordships have clearly held that the power of prospective overruling is vestal only with the Supreme Court and that too only in constitutional matters. It is therefore clear that the High Court has no authority or jurisdiction to declare that its decision will have only prospective operation. Even assuming that the High Court has such a power, that power ought to have been exercised by the Full Bench which rendered the decision in Kerala Fisheries Corporation (1996 (1) KLT 814) and not by a learned judge subsequently, that too, sitting single. Any doubt about the correctness of a Full Bench could be resolved only by getting an appropriate reference made. It is not as if the learned judge was making obiter observations to aid a further examination of the question when the proper occasion arises. With respect, I hold that a Single Judge cannot later decide mat the decision of the Full Bench earlier rendered will have only prospective operation and will not affect transactions that were entered into prior to the decision of the Full Bench, The observations can only be said to be per incuriam. By dismissing the Second Appeal against the ratio of the decision of the Full Bench, I feel with regret that the learned judge has created unnecessary and avoidable confusion in the subordinate judiciary which ought to have been avoided. With great respect, I am also not able to comprehend the principle on which the decision in Kerala Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd. (1997 (2) KLT 310) has been rendered. With great respect, I am also not able to comprehend the principle on which the decision in Kerala Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd. (1997 (2) KLT 310) has been rendered. If we accept the theory that when a precedent is overruled, what the overruling decision does is to declare the law as it always has been, there cannot be any difficulty in holding that what was decided by the Full Bench is the law and the decision in Nanu's case cannot be resurrected so long as the decision of the Full Bench is not reversed or overruled by a competent Court or by a competent Bench. In this view of the matter, the decision of the lower appellate court calls for reversal. I therefore allow this Second Appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court and dismiss the suit. The appellant will be entitled to its costs in this court.