Judgment : 1. Tenant was asked to surrender vacant possession of the building by the Authorities below, and he has come before this Court challenging the correctness of the same. 2. Landlord sought eviction on the ground that he has to keep his motor vehicles in the Schedule premises, and that he has no other building of his own in his possession. The petition was filed under Section 10(3)(a)(ii) of the Pondicherry Rent Control Act. 3. Tenant who is conducting a barber shop, seriously disputed the requirement of the landlord. He said that the landlord seeks eviction only for letting out the building for a higher rent. 4. Both the authorities below held that the objection raised by the tenant cannot be sustained, that the landlord who has a motor-cycle and a scooter, has to keep the same safely, and the building in question is the only place available for him, and the claim was found to be bona fide. The further contention that the landlord was receiving higher rent, and the present petition was also filed only to get an enhanced rent was also found against. Rent Controller found that even as per the rental arrangement, the tenant was bound to pay enhanced rent, and that alone was received by the landlord. The landlord was only acting in terms of the agreement. The finding of the Rent Controller was confirmed in appeal. 5. Before the appellate authority, additional evidence was also sought to be adduced, both by tenant and landlord, of course, on a different ground. It is seen that the tenant became a paralytic and the entire shop was handed over to one Vijayan, who used to pay rent. An additional ground was taken before the appellate authority that the sublease was unauthorised and without written consent. Though evidence was taken regarding the same by the appellate authority, no finding was entered, since that was not a ground for eviction initially. But the appellate authority confirmed the finding that the building is bona fide required for the occupation of the landlord. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner questioned the correctness, and the main argument that was put forward by learned counsel was that the building which is sought to be surrendered cannot be used as a shed or garage. The building as it stands is only a non-residential building, and, therefore, the claim for eviction is not maintainable. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner questioned the correctness, and the main argument that was put forward by learned counsel was that the building which is sought to be surrendered cannot be used as a shed or garage. The building as it stands is only a non-residential building, and, therefore, the claim for eviction is not maintainable. .7. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the following decisions ; the applicability of which I will consider later V. Balakrishna Menon v. MA.K. Govindan, 1979 (92) LW 56 , Lakshmanan v. Hajee Alavudeen Saheb Sons, 1980 (I) MLJ 9; L.R. Padmavathi Ammal v. E.R Manickam, 1981 (94) LW 206 . On the basis of these decisions, an argument was advanced that since the building is not suitable, or from its inherent nature, it is non- residential, eviction for own use cannot be allowed. The argument was further elaborated by saying that if the eviction is in respect of a non-residential building, the subsequent user or the requirement of the landlord must also be non-residential purpose. The requirement to keep a vehicle is neither residential nor non- residential and, therefore, the application under Section 10 (3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Control Act is misconceived. .8. I do not think the said contention can be accepted, in view of the provisions contained in Section 10(3)(a)(ii) of the Act where the wordings are entirely different. In fact, the different nature of the building or initial character of the building that need not be considered. The relevant portion of the Act reads thus :- ."A landlord may, subject to the provisions of cl. (d) apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. In case, it is a nonresidential building, which is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use, if the landlord requires it for his own use or for the use of any member of his family and if he or any member of his family is not occupying any such building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own." 9. From a reading of that Section, it is clear that if the building is adaptable for keeping the vehicle, eviction could be ordered. While considering the same, Gokulakrishnan, J., as he t hen was, discussed the entire law. From a reading of that Section, it is clear that if the building is adaptable for keeping the vehicle, eviction could be ordered. While considering the same, Gokulakrishnan, J., as he t hen was, discussed the entire law. In paragraphs 4 and 5, the learned Judge held thus :- "It is clear from Section 10(3)(a)(ii) of the Act, extracted above, that the benefit of that section is available to a landlord for keeping the vehicles. The vehicles in question are in the possession of the landlord. The ownership of the vehicles need not come in the way of asking the portion in question for his own use under Section 10(3)(a)(ii) of the Act. Hence, the prayer for keeping the car and the motor cycle in the premises in question can be sustained even assuming that the ownership of the vehicle is not in the name of the landlord. As regards the second contention put forth by Mr. S. Sampathkumar, learned counsel for the tenant, regarding the building in question this being adapted for such use a single Judge of this Court in Jawanthraj Mehta v Ramachandra Chetti, C.R.P. 1294 and 1893 of 1962, dated 4th August, 1965, had occasion to consider the word adapt occurring in this section. The learned Judge has observed as follows :- " Adapt ordinarily means suitable. If the premises in question could be remodeled or converted for made fit for the purpose of keeping a vehicle, it can be said to be adapted for such use." This definition is wider in concept and definitely the present case can easily come under the definition of garage visualised under Section 10(3)(a)(ii) of the Act". 10. If this is the law that has to be applied there is no disqualification for the landlord to get possession of the building. 11. A further argument was taken by learned counsel that no evidence has been let in to show that the landlord is the owner of any vehicle. I do not think that fact was disputed by the tenant at any time. In fact in paragraph 1 of the eviction petition, a specific averment was made that the landlord was having two vehicles, and he has no other building of his own to keep the same in safe custody. This allegation was never denied. Even in the examination of the petitioner, the same was reiterated. There was no effective cross-examination. In fact in paragraph 1 of the eviction petition, a specific averment was made that the landlord was having two vehicles, and he has no other building of his own to keep the same in safe custody. This allegation was never denied. Even in the examination of the petitioner, the same was reiterated. There was no effective cross-examination. Both the authorities below have taken it for granted that the landlord is having vehicles and he has no space to keep the same. 12. In fact, in the Memorandum of Revision also, no such ground has been taken. That apart, the Act also does not say that the landlord should be the owner of the vehicle. What it says is that the landlord must have a place to keep the vehicles. The question of ownership or custody is not material. In fact, this point is also explained in the decision reported in 97 LW 555. 13. Now I will consider the decisions cited by learned counsel for the petitioner. In V. Balakrishna Menon v. M.A.K. Govindan, 92 LW 56, their Lordships only considered the definition of building, residential or non-residential. In paragraph 8 of that judgment, their Lordships considered the types of building and said that a building coming under Section 10(3)(a)(ii) of the Act, it is a non-residential building, if it can be adapted for keeping a vehicle. Of course, in that case, their Lordships did not consider whether building is adapted for such use. The provision of Section 10(3)(a)(ii) of the Act alone was reiterated. I do not find that even there is any observation as contended by learned counsel for the petitioner. Therefore, the same has no application to the facts of this case. 14. In Lakshmanan v. Hajee Alavudeen Saheb Sons, 1980 (I) MLJ 9, their Lordships were considering the difference between occupation for own use and eviction on the ground of additional accommodation. On the basis of this decision, an argument was taken that the eviction petition itself should have been for additional accommodation. I find, that is a ground for the first time before this Court. Even on merits, that ground will not stand. 15. The tenant has no case that the landlord has got any building to keep his vehicle. On the basis of this decision, an argument was taken that the eviction petition itself should have been for additional accommodation. I find, that is a ground for the first time before this Court. Even on merits, that ground will not stand. 15. The tenant has no case that the landlord has got any building to keep his vehicle. If that be so, it can never be for an additional accommodation or for own use which could be only for the purpose for which the building was originally let out. In either way, mere is no disqualification for the landlord for seeking eviction under Section 10(3)(a)(ii). The last decision cited is the one reported inL.R Padmavathi Ammal v. E.R. Manickam, 94 LW 206.1 do not think that the said decision has any relevance to this case. That was a case of conversion of a building, i.e., from residential to non-residential. The same has also no application. 16. All the grounds raised by learned counsel for the petitioner are, therefore, rejected. 17. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed, however, without any order as to costs.