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1997 DIGILAW 364 (RAJ)

Uma Shankar v. State of Rajasthan

1997-03-12

M.A.A.KHAN

body1997
Honble KHAN, J.–This is the second petition u/S. 482 Cr.P.C. raising almost the same issues as were raised about twelve years back in S.B. Cr. Misc. Petition No. 444/84 Kailash Prasad vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. decided by this court on 29.10.85. The controversy between the parties is about the right of the prosecution about and mode and manner of leading the secondary evidence of a document,which by its nature, happens to be in possession of petitioner party, which is facing trial before the lower court on charges for offences u/Ss. 427, 457 IPC. The facts and circumstances leading to this petition may be briefly referred to as under : (2). There situates at Jhunjhunu an old `Haveli known as ``Chinaniyon Ki Haveli. There are eight shops in it. Half portion of this Haveli on the eastern sidealongwith some shops thereof is stated to be on the tenancy of Balchand respondent No.2 and his father Radha Kishan on a monthly rent of Rs. 15/- under a rent note dated 3.2.1971. The tenants allegedly used to carry on their business in grain in the shops. (3). It is alleged that Balkishan informant had kept 140 bags of wheat, 100 bags of salt and other merchandise in the shops of the Haveli but when he reached the Haveli at 10.00 a.m. on 18.10.80 he found the locks of the shops broken, his goods lying outside and the petitioners and Kailash Prasad (deceased co-accused) carrying on some construction inside the Haveli. Bal Chand reported the matter to thepolice. Crime No. 177/80 u/Ss. 448, 454, 427 IPC was registered at Police Station, Jhunjhunu. After investigation the police charge-sheeted the present petitioners and Kailash Prasad, the deceased co-accused for offences u/Ss. 448, 427 IPC. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the case on 6.11.80 and framed charges for offences u/Ss. 427, 457 IPC against the accused on 17.7.82. Though Balchand, Nath-mal and Amar Chand witnesses were produced on 16.9.82 but they could not be examined due to absence of the accused who were granted exemption from personal attendance through their counsel. On subsequent dates the accused prayed for and were granted exemption from personal attandance. Any way, PW 1 Nathmal was examined on 27.6.83 and PW 2 Amar Chand on 19.1.84. On subsequent dates the accused prayed for and were granted exemption from personal attandance. Any way, PW 1 Nathmal was examined on 27.6.83 and PW 2 Amar Chand on 19.1.84. Though onthe dates fixed i.e. on 22.3.84, 12.4.84, 16.5.84 Balchand was produced in court but he was not examined due to the absence of one or other accused. (4). On 12.7.84 the examination of Balch and was commenced but could not be completed as the prosecutor tried to get a document exhibited but the defence counsel object to the exhibition thereof and the statement of Balchand had to bedeferred. This document was the copy of the rent note, which was allegedly got executed by Ram Kumar and Chotey Lal, grand father and father respectively of Kailash co-accused, from the tenants and kept in their possession. Balchand informant-tenant had allegedly made a copy of the said rent note in his ``Bahi which he had delivered to the police during the investigation of the case and thepolice, after retaining the copy thereof had returned the Bahi to Balchand. The copy so obtained by the police was made part of the documents submitted u/S. 173 Cr.P.C. On the objection having been raised by the defence at the exhibition of the copy of the document contained in the Bahi, Bal Chand produced the original Bahi alongwith his application dated 16.7.84 which was duly supported with his affidavit.The objection raised by the learned defence counsel against the exhibition of the rent note in the Bahi was rejected by the learned Magistrate on 5.9.84. In S.B. Cr. Misc. Petition No. 444/84, preferred by the petitioner u/S. 482 Cr.P.C., this Court set aside the said order of the Magistrate on 29.10.85 and directed the trial court to first determine the admissibility of the Bahi for the purposes of secondary evidence.(5). Complying with the order of this court dated 29.10.85 the learned Magistrate in his well discussed and well reasoned impugned order has held that the document contained in the Bahi and marked as Ex.P.4 through the statement of PW 3 Balchand was the copy of the original rent note dated 3.2.71 and was admissible in evidence u/S. 65 Evidence Act as a secondary evidence of the originalrent note, which, by it very nature was in possession of the petitioners. At the same time the learned Magistrate gave further opportunity to the petitioners to produce the original rent note by the next date failing which they would be debarred u/S. 64 of the Evidence Act from producing the original document at a subsequent stage of proceedings. (6). Arguing the petition for days together Mr.M.M. Ranjan, the learned counsel for the petitioner first urged that the application seeking permission for leading secondary evidence of the alleged rent note was not maintainable as that was moved by a private person, Balchand informant, in a case instituted on police report. The argument is rejected for thereason that not only such an application was moved through the Assistant Public Prosecutor as observed by this court in its order dated 29.10.85 but also that, in the facts and circumstances, even Balchand who was actually the aggrieved person in this case, could have moved such an application with the permission of the court. (7). It was next urged by Mr. Ranjan that since the very existence of the original rent note was not established no secondary evidence thereof could be led. This argument too is misconceived. (8). By the very nature of the alleged relationship between Balchand and his father as tenant and deceased co-accused Kailash Prasad and his father and grandfather as owner-landlords of the premises in question the existence of a rent note, creating such relationship between then, was highly probable. Such a rent note, by its very nature, should be in possession of the petitioners and since the prosecution was based on such rent note, from the nature of the case, the petitioners must have known that they would be required to produce the same. Added to these facts, thelearned Magistrate has taken note of the fact that in Civil Suit No. 145 of 1980 Anjani Kumar vs. Chotey Lal a copy of the disputed rent note was produced as a secondary evidence and in the main suit the civil court approved of the existence of the original rent note and allowed the secondary evidence thereof to be admitted in evidence. The order of the civil court dated 5.9.84 was approved of by this court inCivil Revision No. 582 of 1984. The plaintiff in that suit was the firm of Balchand informant. The objection raised in the misc. The order of the civil court dated 5.9.84 was approved of by this court inCivil Revision No. 582 of 1984. The plaintiff in that suit was the firm of Balchand informant. The objection raised in the misc. proceedings in that suit against the admissibility of the copy of the rent note, prepared in red ink, was based on the footing that the said copy was prepared from the copy of the rent note in the Bahi and, therefore, a copy of a copy was not admissible in evidence as a secondary evi-dence of the original u/S. 65 Evidence Act, was not accepted in the main suit as in the main suit the Bahi itself, containing the copy made from the original rent note (which was marked as Ex.P. 4 in the present case through the statement of Balchand recorded by the Magistrate on 17.10.84) was produced and proved. All these facts clearly proved the existence of the original rent note and make the copythereof, as contained in the Bahi (Ex.P.4), admissible as secondary evidence u/S. 65 of Evidence Act. I am of the opinion that the learned Magistrate has rightly approved of the existence of the original rent note and possession thereof with the petitioners as also the right of the petitioner to adduce the secondary evidence thereof, in the nature and under the circumstances of the case. (9). It was next urged by Mr. Ranjan that since the original rent note was insufficiently stamped and un-registered also, and as such not admissible in evidence, the secondary evidence thereof was also not admissible. I find that such an objection was decided by the learned Magistrate against the petitioners in his order dated 5.9.84 but does not appear to have been stressed before this court in the ear-lier similar petition. No such objection appears to have been raised before the learned Magistrate at the time of rendering the impugned order by him. I would therefore, not allow such an objection to be raised now, particularly when the original rent note has not been produced by the petitioners despite a specific order of and reasonable opportunity given by the court of the learned Magistrate. This ar-gument is dismissed. (10). I would therefore, not allow such an objection to be raised now, particularly when the original rent note has not been produced by the petitioners despite a specific order of and reasonable opportunity given by the court of the learned Magistrate. This ar-gument is dismissed. (10). In view of the above discussion in the factual and legal matrix of this case there is not the least substance in any of the arguments raised in this second petition, and the reliance by the petitioners on Patel Maganbhai Bapujibhai & Ors. vs. Patel Ishwarbhai Motibhai & Ors. (1), Moolchand & Anr. vs. Lachman & Anr. (2),Ram Pratap vs. Nar Singh Lal (3) and Kadiresan vs. Kasim & Ors. (4) is not at all appropriate. The learned Magistrate in compliance of the order of this court dated 29.10.85 passed in the earlier petition, discussed at length all the points and decided various issues of fact and law correctly. His direction to the petitioners to produce the original rent note was quite just and judicious and challenge to such directions through this petition was designedly made only to delay the already delayed proceedings of the case. The petition, for the reasons recorded above, deserves dismissed and is hereby given on outright dismissal. (11). The deliberate attempt of the petitioners in this case to prolong the life of this criminal litigation by way of preferring this second petition u/S. 482 Cr.P.C. compels me to levy exemplary costs on the petitioners in order to curb the increasing tendency of wasting the time of this court in such frivolous litigation and prolonging the life of criminal litigation. I entertain no doubt that this petition and not the order made by the learned Magistrate, amounts to the abuse of the process of court. I fail to overlook the fact that though the trial of the petitioners had comm-enced on 17.7.82 with the framing of charges against the petitioners and prosecution witnesses particularly Balchand appeared on 16.9.82, 5.11.82 and 18.3.83, once or the other petitioners sought and were given exemption from personal appearance yet the statement of PW 1 Balchand which was commenced to be recorded on 12.7.84 but deferred on the request to defence counsel, resumed on 17.10.84but once again deferred on that date and again resumed on 22.1.85 but once again deferred. This state of affairs is required to be read in the context of the statement made on behalf of the petitioner at Bar on the first day of hearing of this petition that Balchand had died which statement was refuted by the counsel for Balchand by putting in appearance on the following day. It is true that the question relatingto the admissibility of a particular evidence should be decided as and when such an objection is made but in the course of recording oral evidence in a criminal case deferment of recording the statement of other witnesses for that reason may hardly be justified. I am, on the perusal of the proceedings of this case in the trial as well as in this court, satisfied that the petitioners have abused and are abusing the pro-cess of courts with a view to delay the decision of the case in the vain hope that material evidence may dispappear in the meanwhile and/or they may get benefit of such a situation and that the same time may raise the plea of infringement of their fundamental right for speedy trial. The situation, which the criminal litigation has come to in this state, is that almost each and every order passed by the trialcourts is being challenged before this court and experience shows that it has almost become impossible to decide a criminal case either by way of sessions warrant, summons or summary trials before the expiry of about a decade, demands that the increasing tendency of adopting delaying tactics be curbed with iron hand. I am of the view that the present case attracts exemplary costs. In the decision of the Sup-reme Court in the case of Tamil Nadu Electricity Board & Anr. vs. N. Raju Raddiar & Anr. (5) I read the anxiety and anguish of the Apex Court about the threat posed to the administration of criminal justice by the abuse of the process of courts and the necessity to meet the threat by imposing exemplary costs in deserving case. I would therefore, impose cost of Rs. 10,000/- on the petitioners and direct that suchcosts be realised according to law and be given to by the Legal Aid Committee of this court for the purposes it is meant for. (12). The petition is dismissed with costs at Rs. 10,000/-. I would therefore, impose cost of Rs. 10,000/- on the petitioners and direct that suchcosts be realised according to law and be given to by the Legal Aid Committee of this court for the purposes it is meant for. (12). The petition is dismissed with costs at Rs. 10,000/-. The amount shall be paid to the High Court Legal Aid Service Committee within four months from today. If the amount is not paid, it shall be recovered treating this direction as decree ofthe court by the High Court Legal Aid Services Committee. The Registry is directed to communicate this order to the High Court Legal Aid Service Committee. The record of the lower court shall be sent to the trial court as per special messanger. The trial court shall proceed to record the oral evidence of the parties on day to day basis and dispose of the case as early as possible preferably within three months.Parties are directed to appear before the trial court on 28.3.97.