S. B. SINHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 27. 2. 96 passed by the learned Judge, 12th Bench of the City Civil Court at Calcutta in Ejectment Suit No. 182 of 1993. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 27. 2. 96 passed by the learned Judge, 12th Bench of the City Civil Court at Calcutta in Ejectment Suit No. 182 of 1993. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff filed the aforementioned suit for eviction of the defendant/appellant on the ground of his reasonable requirement. The plaintiff in his plaint stated in details as to how many rooms are required by him. In paragraph 10 of the plaint, it has also been stated that he has no other suitable accommodation to accommodate his family save and except the premises referred to in the plaint in the city of Calcutta or elsewhere. The said statements have been traversed by the defendant in paragraph 15 of the written statement which is in the following terms :"that with regard to the statements made in paragraphs 7 to 20 this defendant emphatically denies and disputes each and every allegations averments and/or statements made therein and states that the paragraph 20 is the repetition of paragraph 13 of the plaint and the requirements with regard to the rooms as claimed in the plaint are all manufactured, colourful, motivated and harassing and not at all sustainable in law as well as fact. " ( 3 ) THE learned trial Judge upon taking into consideration the evidences adduced on behalf of the parties and the materials on record and in particular the report of the Advocate Commissioner appointed for that purpose, which was marked as Ext. 4, categorically held that the plaintiff has been able to prove his requirement. ( 4 ) MR. Majumdar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has raised only one contention in support of this appeal. Learned counsel submits that in terms of section 13 (1) (ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, it was obligatory on the part of the learned trial Judge to arrive at a finding that the plaintiff had no other suitable accommodation. Learned counsel in support of his aforementioned contention relied upon the decisions in Sm. Learned counsel submits that in terms of section 13 (1) (ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, it was obligatory on the part of the learned trial Judge to arrive at a finding that the plaintiff had no other suitable accommodation. Learned counsel in support of his aforementioned contention relied upon the decisions in Sm. Kausalya Devi v. K. L. Bansel reported in AIR 1970 SC 838 , Bhairab Chandra Nandan v. Ranadhir Chandra Dutta, reported in 1988 (1) SCC 383 and Provash Chandra Chatterji v. Chand Mohan Basak reported in 81 CWN 814. According to the learned counsel, in view of the aforementioned statutory requirement, it was obligatory on the part of the learned trial Judge to frame an issue so as to enable the parties to adduce evidence. ( 5 ) MR. De, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, however, has drawn our attention to the statements made in paragraph 10 of the plaint, as also paragraph 15 of the written statement and submitted on the basis thereof that as the allegations made in paragraph 10 of the plaint had not been specifically controverted in paragraph 15 of the written statement, the same would be deemed to have been admitted. ( 6 ) IT appears from the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Judge that he has considered the question as regards existence of bonafide requirement on the part of the plaintiff in great details. The learned trial Judge has also considered in great details the Commissioner's report and found that the requirement pleaded by the plaintiff stands proved. According to the learned trial Judge, 6 rooms were in occupation of the plaintiff and 2 rooms in occupation of the defendant. It has been found by the learned trial Judge on the basis of the Commissioner's report as also other materials that room No. 5 measures only 3' 7", which cannot be said to be a room, It has further been found that the ground floor room is also too small, and there is admission on the part of the defendant that the same is used for keeping building materials only, and as such, the said room cannot serve any purposes for habitation, study or otherwise. It has further been found that room No. 4 is also not a room, but the same appears to have a covered space being 5' 1" in length and 2' 1" in breadth only. Thus, the habitable rooms in occupation of the plaintiff are only 3. The plaintiff requires one room for his son Pradip, who was aged about 30 years and admittedly married. Other son also requires one room. The learned trial Judge has also found that the third son of the plaintiff also requires another room and the plaintiff and his wife requires one room. The learned trial Judge has further found that it is not possible for the plaintiff to separate his sons, and for that purpose he cannot afford to have a room for a few days stay of his married daughter and son-in-law. He however, found that the Thakur Ghar can be a accommodated in room No. 4. In this view of the matter, we are in complete agreement with the findings of the learned trial Judge that the plaintiff has been able to prove his bonafide requirement for his own occupation. The question which now arises for consideration is as to whether it was obligatory on the part of the learned trial Judge to frame a specific issue as to the fact that the plaintiff does not have any alternate accommodation. As noticed hereinbefore, plaintiff, in paragraph 10 of the plaint categorically state that he does not have any alternative accommodation in the town of Calcutta or anywhere else. The said statements have not been specifically denied or disputed by the defendant, as would be evident from the statements made in paragraph 15 of the written statement. In terms of Order 8 Rule 3 and Order 8 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that such evasive denial would be deemed to be an admission on the part of the defendant as regards the allegations made in paragraph 10 of the plaint, and in that view of the matter, it was not necessary for the learned trial Judge to frame any specific issue. In Kausalya Devi's case (supra), upon which Mr. Majumdar has placed strong reliance, the Supreme Court was considering a matter where a decree for eviction was passed on compromise. In Kausalya Devi's case (supra), upon which Mr. Majumdar has placed strong reliance, the Supreme Court was considering a matter where a decree for eviction was passed on compromise. According to the Supreme Court, as the civil court could pass a decree for eviction on arriving at a satisfaction that one or the other grounds mentioned in the Rent Act, is satisfied, such satisfaction should be recorded. It is now well settle that such satisfaction should be recorded not only from the terms of settlement but also from the materials on record. In the instant case, there is a finding that the plaintiff requires the suit premises bonafide. In Provash Chandra Chatterji's case (supra), a Division Bench of this court held that it was obligatory on he part of the plaintiff to prove that he requires the disputed premises for his own use and occupation if he is the owner, but he is also required to prove that he is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere apart from the present accommodation as required under the latter part of clause (ff) of sub-section (1) of section 13. There cannot be any dispute so far as the aforesaid position of law is concerned, but as indicated hereinbefore, in the facts of the present case as the defendant has admitted the statements made by the plaintiff in paragraph 10 of the plaint. It was neither required for the learned trial Judge to frame a specific issue nor it was obligatory on the part of the plaintiff to adduce any independent evidence. Furthermore, in Bhairab Chandra Nandan's case (supra), the apex court held that when the landlord is occupying a portion of the house and seeks possession of the demised premises only by way of additional accommodation, it was not necessary for the learned trial Judge to frame a specific issue as the parties had gone to the evidence with full knowledge about the questions raised by the plaintiff in the plaint. In that case, it was further found that even if the plaintiff has another premises, which is in occupation of tenants far off from the suit house where the landlord was residing, the question as to whether the landlord had another house become inconsequential. In that case, it was further found that even if the plaintiff has another premises, which is in occupation of tenants far off from the suit house where the landlord was residing, the question as to whether the landlord had another house become inconsequential. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that in view of the decision in Bhairab Chandra Nandan's case itself, non-framing of issue did not vitiate the judgment. It may be true that the learned trial Judge has not, in the impugned judgment, referred to the pleadings of the parties, but in our opinion, keeping in view the provision of Order 41 Rule 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, such a finding may be arrived at by this court on the basis of materials on record. ( 7 ) FOR the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in this appeal and the same be dismissed. ( 8 ) BEFORE parting, we may place on record that before us an affidavit has been filed on behalf of the plaintiff/respondent to the effect that one of his sons has since married, whereas an application has been filed on behalf of the defendant/appellant that one of the rooms has been renovated. In our opinion, it is not necessary keeping in view the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge to consider the said subsequent event, in as much as, even if the said subsequent events be taken into consideration, the requirement of the plaintiff would not efface. The appeal is dismissed. Advocate's fee quantified at 100 G. M. s. However, if the defendant/appellant gives an undertaking before this court within a fortnight from date, and goes on paying the current rent within the 15th of month next following, first of such deposit be made on 15. 11. 1997, he is given time to vacate the suit premises till the expiry of the month of March 1998. I agree. Appeal dismissed.