H. N. TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal arises from the Judgment and Order dated 7-9-1994, delivered by a learned single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 11763/94, whereby the Hon'ble single Judge allowed the Writ Petition and made the rule absolute. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case in brief are that the petitioner has alleged in the writ petition that he is the owner in possession of Sy. No. 143 of Cherala Sri Mangala Village of Somwarpet Taluk, of Kodagu District. According to the petitioner's case, the petitioner made an application under Section 8 of the Karnataka Preservation of Trees Act, 1976. The petitioner has annexed that application alleged to have been made on 9-12-92, along with the required documents. Petitioner's further case is that more than one year passed, but the application was not considered and no orders had been passed by the concerned officers and according to the petitioner as no orders were passed within a period of one year from the date of the application, the permission to cut the trees shall be deemed to have been granted under the provisions of Section 8 of the Act. The petitioner further averred that on the basis of deemed permission, petitioner engaged workers for cutting of the timber and also started felling operations. According to the petitioner, by the time petition had been filed, 25 per cent. of the trees have already been felled. The petitioner further averred that on the basis of deemed permission, petitioner engaged workers for cutting of the timber and also started felling operations. According to the petitioner, by the time petition had been filed, 25 per cent. of the trees have already been felled. The petitioner's further case is that he has approached respondent No. 2 in the writ petition namely the Deputy Conservator of Forests, for issuance of necessary Mafi Passes and he was informed latter on that no felling order or Mafi passes could be granted in view of oral instructions of the Chief Minister of Karnataka and so the petitioner approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for.-" (A) a declaration declaring that the permission sought by application made by the petitioner in Form No. I under Rule 4 (1) of the Karnataka Preservation of Trees Act dated 9-12-1992 has been deemed to have been granted by virtue of operation of Section 8 (4) of the Karnataka Preservation of Trees Act; (b) for a direction to issue an endorsement to the effect that the petitioner with effect from the date of his application has been deemed to have been granted necessary permission and consequently the petitioner is entitled to all other consequential benefits including the issuance of Mafe passes for transportation of timber and firewood made out of the trees cut by the petitioner. (c) Petitioner further prayed for issuance of a writ or direction in the nature of writ of mandamus, to issue Mafe passes for transportation of timber and firewood made out of the standing trees in land bearing No. 143 of Cherala Srimangala village of Somwarpet taluk. " ( 3 ) THAT the Hon'ble single Judge allowed the writ petition. The Hon'ble single Judge has taken the view that in view of Section 8 (4) (ii) of the Act, if the order contemplated under Section 8 (4) (ii) was not passed within the period fixed under Section 8 (4), the permission is to be deemed to have been granted whether the application made by the petitioner is defective or not and in that view of the matter, the respondents have got to issue the passes for transporting the trees cut by the petitioner, on the basis that the petitioner has the benefit of deemed provision. ( 4 ) HAVING felt aggrieved from the judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court, the State of Karnataka and Deputy Conservator of Forests, Madikeri Division, Madikeri District have come in appeal before this Court, under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961. ( 5 ) WE have heard Sri S. Vijaya Shankar learned Advocate General, assisted by Sri K. Vishwanath, Government Advocate for the appellant and M/s. Hegde Associates for the respondents. ( 6 ) IT has been contended by learned Advocate General on behalf of the appellant that the land and the trees grown on the said land belong to the Government and the permission for felling the trees was sought by the respondent with respect to the unredeemed land and the trees grown thereon and the respondent (that is the petitioner in the petition) was not at all entitled to cut the said trees grown and therefore there was no question of considering their application under the Preservation of Trees Act. Learned Advocate General contended that as for the unredeemed lands, right over the trees grown vests with the Government and respondent had no right to fell those trees if it belongs to the Government, as application was premature. Learned Advocate General further contended that the benefit of deemed provision under Section 8 (4) of the Act could not be extended and could not be made available to the respondent (petitioner in the writ petition) for the reason that the application which is alleged to have been made vide, Annexure B per se reveals that the trees did not belong to the respondent as tenure of land mentioned was unredeemed. He further contended that the application Annexure B which is alleged to have been made did not furnish the necessary information sought in the application, such as with respect to information required with reference to Column No. 5 namely purpose for which trees are to be felled. The true copy of the application did not contain any indication-purpose; Sl. No. 6 - query; At Sl. No. 8 right to land was with reference to many other items, such as Item Nos 9, 10 and 11. The true copy of the application did not contain any indication-purpose; Sl. No. 6 - query; At Sl. No. 8 right to land was with reference to many other items, such as Item Nos 9, 10 and 11. Learned Advocate General contended that the deeming clause can be applicable only in cases where an application as required under Section 8 (ii) of the Act read with Rule 4 of the Karnataka Preservation of Trees Act is made, as prescribed, in Form F. Learned Advocate General contended that the application did not conform with the requirements of Rule 4 and did not furnish or contain the necessary particulars of facts required to be disclosed. The application not having been in accordance with the requirements of law, the benefit of deemed permission could not be extended and that learned single Judge erred in opining that the benefit of deeming provision would be available even if the appli-cation was defective and even if the application did not conform with the requirements of law. These contentions of the learned Advocate Gene-ral have hotly been contested on behalf of the respondents. ( 7 ) ON behalf of the respondents, it was submitted that deeming clause is to be made applicable and its benefit is available to an applicant in cases where application has been made for permission under Section 8 and the officers have failed to dispose of that application and communicate the decision within the prescribed period of one year. In support of his contention the respondents Counsel placed reliance on the single Judge decision of this Court in the case of Ganapati Mankalu Gouda v. State of Karnataka, ILR 1990 Kant 1248. Learned Counsel emphasised that once law provides in certain circumstances as in the present case that the permission be deemed to have been granted, when one year has elapsed from the date of application, the legal fiction has got to be given its full effect. Learned Counsel emphasised that once law provides in certain circumstances as in the present case that the permission be deemed to have been granted, when one year has elapsed from the date of application, the legal fiction has got to be given its full effect. It was contended that no counter-affidavit having been filed, the fact of moving of the application not been denied or disputed, the permission was rightly deemed to have been granted and the learned single Judge was justified in allowing the writ petition and effort was made to assert that the petitioner was the owner of the land as has been asserted in para 1 of the writ petition as well and effort was made to contend that the respondent, that is the petitioner in the writ petition was entitled to cut the trees as permission is to be deemed to have been granted. ( 8 ) THE primary question for consideration in the present case is whether the benefit of deeming provision could be made available to the present respondent (the petitioner in the writ petition ). It will be profitable to refer and to quote S. 8 of the Karnataka Preservation of Trees Act, 1976 :-"8. Restriction on felling of Trees.- (1) With effect on and from the appointed day, notwithstanding any custom, usage, contract or law for the time being in force, no person shall fell any tree or cause any tree to be felled in any land, whether in his ownership or occupancy or otherwise, except with the previous permission of the Tree Officer. (2) Any person desiring to fell a tree, shall apply in writing to the concerned Tree Officer for permission in that behalf. The application shall be accompanied by a site plan or survey sketch specifying clearly the site or survey number, the number, kind and girth of the tree sought to be cut and the reasons therefor along with the consent of the owner or occupant. The application shall be accompanied by a site plan or survey sketch specifying clearly the site or survey number, the number, kind and girth of the tree sought to be cut and the reasons therefor along with the consent of the owner or occupant. (3) On receipt of the application, the Tree Officer may, after inspecting the tree and holding such inquiry as he deems necessary, either grant permission in whole or in part or refuse Permission :provided that permission shall not be refused, if the tree,- (i) is dead, diseased or wind-fallen; or (ii) has silviculturally matured; or (iii) constitutes a danger to life or property; or (iv) constitutes obstruction to traffic; or (v) is substantially damaged or destroyed by fire, lightning, rain or other natural causes; or (vi) is required in rural areas to be removed either for extension of the cultivation in areas specified in Schedule II or for the bona fide use of the applicant. (4) If the Tree Officer fails to inform the applicant of his decision- (i) in the case of an application in respect of a tree in an urban area and in a rural area of the kind specified in Schedule II, within sixty days; and (ii) in the case of an application in respect of a tree in a rural area of the kind specified in Schedule I, within one year from the date of receipt of the application by him or, if the receipt of the application has been acknowledged by him from the date of such acknowledgment,such permission shall be deemed to have been granted. (5) Where permission to fell a tree is granted, the Tree Officer may grant it subject to the condition that the applicant shall plant another tree or trees of the same or any other suitable species on the same site or other suitable place within thirty days from the date the tree is felled or within such extended time as the Tree Officer may allow. (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) to (5) but subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed, for bona fide domestic use of a family, one or more members of such family may, if they are otherwise entitled to do so, in the aggregate, fell, in a calendar year, such number of trees as would fetch not more than 2. 8 cubic metres of timber and five tonnes of firewood. (7) Nothing in this section shall apply to felling of Casuraina, Coconut, Erythrina, Eucalyptus, lyrecidia, Hopea Wightina, Prosipis, Rubber, Sesbania, Silver Oak and Subabul trees. " ( 9 ) KARNATAKA Preservation of Trees act, 1976 has been enacted with a purpose and object of the preservation of trees and regulating the felling of the trees and planting of adequate number of trees to restore the ecological balance and matters connected therewith. We have to keep in view that preservation and protection of ecology, trees and forests has also been made the fundamental duty of every citizen vide Article 51a (g) of the Constitution. ( 10 ) SECTION 8 of the Karnataka Preservation of Trees Act, 1976 puts a bar against felling the trees or causing the felling of trees in any land, whether the land belongs to him as a owner or it is in his occupancy or otherwise. Section 8 provide that irrespective of any custom, usage contract or law for the time being in force, no person shall fell any tree nor cause it to be felled. The only exception provided to this general bar, which has been provided under Section 8 (1) is to the effect that it is with the previous permission of the Tree Officer, one can fell or cause a tree to be felled. The barrier created or bar created against the exercise of right to cut the tree or fell the tree would stand removed only on the grant of a permission to such person by the Tree Officer. Sub-section (2) of Section 8 makes it obligatory for the person desiring to fell a tree to apply in writing to the Tree Officer concerned for the permission that is the application for permission can only be made in writing. What papers the application has to accompany has been specifically specified in sub-section (2 ). What will be the contents of the application and what material facts have to be disclosed and stated in the application for consideration by the authority, having been specified as per schedule to the rules, which contains the form of the application and Rule (4) provides that every application under sub-section (2) of Section 8 for permission to fell a tree shall be in Form 1. The rules have been framed under Karnataka Act No. 76 of 76. The rules have been framed under Karnataka Act No. 76 of 76. It is well settled principle of law that rules framed under the provisions of an Act have got some force as the provisions of law and the provisions of the Statute, without loosing their character as Rules subordinate to Act. ( 11 ) THUS application for permission is required by Section 8 sub-section (2) read with Rule 4 of the Rules in the prescribed form requiring furnishing certain particulars required to be furnished as indicated in the pro forma and it is required to be accompanied by sight plan, survey sketch, specifying clearly the site of survey number, the number, kind and girth of the tree sought to be cut and reason for cutting those trees along with the consent of the owner or occupant. Under sub-section (3) of Section 8 it is provided that on receipt of the application the tree officer has been given the authority to pass necessary order either granting permission in whole or in part or refusing the permission. It also provides that this has to be done after inspecting the tree and holding such inquiry as deemed fit. The proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 8 specifies the circumstances and conditions in which permission shall not be refused. Sub-section (4) which is material for our consideration provides that if the officer fails to inform the applicant his decision, in cases covered by clause (i), within 60 days and in cases covered by clause (ii) within a period of 1 year from the date of receipt of the application by him or if receipt of application has been acknowledged, from the date of such acknowledgment, such permission shall be deemed to have been granted. ( 12 ) LEARNED single Judge has given the benefit of the deeming clause or the deemed permission to the respondent taking the view that it is immaterial whether an application is defective or not, the respondent would be entitled to the benefit of the deeming clause. ( 12 ) LEARNED single Judge has given the benefit of the deeming clause or the deemed permission to the respondent taking the view that it is immaterial whether an application is defective or not, the respondent would be entitled to the benefit of the deeming clause. No doubt it is well settled principle of law that when a statute enacts something shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and in truth was not done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what person the statutory fiction is to be resorted to and once the purpose has been ascertained full effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion. In the case of East End Dwelling Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, (1951) 2 All ER 587, lord Asquith observed.-"if you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequence and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs. "see State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak ( AIR 1953 SC 244 . See also Harish Tandon v. Addl. District Magistrate Allahabad. (1995) 1 SCC 537 : ( AIR 1995 SC 676 ). ( 13 ) IN order to avail the deeming clause, the necessary conditions precedent as required under the relevant section; which makes provision for the deeming clause, no doubt to be prima facie shown to be exist or to be established. District Magistrate Allahabad. (1995) 1 SCC 537 : ( AIR 1995 SC 676 ). ( 13 ) IN order to avail the deeming clause, the necessary conditions precedent as required under the relevant section; which makes provision for the deeming clause, no doubt to be prima facie shown to be exist or to be established. Section 8 (4) of the Act of 1976, requires that if an application has been made in accordance with the law to the Tree Officer and Tree Officer fails to indicate his decision of such application, in cases covered by the circumstances indicated in either clause (i) or clause (ii), permission shall be deemed to have been granted, that is case of an application in respect of a tree in urban area or rural area of the kind specified in Schedule II within 60 days and in case of trees in rural area of a kind specified in Schedule I within 1 year then the permission will be deemed to have been granted from the date of receipt of the application by the officer that is period of 60 days or a period of 1 year as the case may be is to be counted from the date of receipt of the application by the Tree Officer or in other words from the date of filing and furnishing of the application to the Tree Officer. The expression "application" here means and refers to an application made in accordance with the requirements of law namely sub-section (2) of Section 8, read with Rule 4 of the rules framed under the Act and the form given in the Schedule, that is Form I. It is one of the trite principles of law that when authority or power is given to do certain thing and the manner or mode is prescribed for doing that thing, then that act has got to be done in that manner alone and not otherwise. It really indicates the legislature's intention that act has got to be done in that manner alone. It really indicates the legislature's intention that act has got to be done in that manner alone. Thus reading Section 8 (2) a long with Rule 4 (1), which provides that every application under sub-section (2) of Section 8 for permission to fell a tree shall be in Form No. 1, makes it mandatory that an application has to be made in Form No. 1 and must furnish information regarding particulars which are required to be furnished or mentioned in the application and further it has to be accompanied by the documents referred to in sub-section (2 ). An application not made in accordance with the requirements of Section 8 (2) read with Rule 4 and the form prescribed requiring furnishing of the particulars to be furnished, cannot be treated in the eye of law to be an application under Section 8 (2) and a person claiming the benefit of deeming clause has prima facie to show that he made the application in accordance with the requirements of law and the same has been served and delivered to the Tree Officer or it has been received by him on a particular date. The date on which it has been received by the Tree Officer has to be indicated or shown in order to enable the calculation of the period of 60 days or one year, as the case may be, to see if there has been failure on the part of the Tree Officer to take decision and to communicate the said decision to the applicant, within the period so prescribed. ( 14 ) WITH due respect to the learned single Judge, we are of the opinion that the learned single Judge was wrong in taking the view that permission is to be deemed to have been granted irrespective of application being defective and lacking material particulars. We are of the opinion that an application made not in accordance with the requirements of Section 8 (2) read with Rule 4 cannot be treated to be an application for the purpose of Section 8 or 8 (4) of the Act. We are of the opinion that an application made not in accordance with the requirements of Section 8 (2) read with Rule 4 cannot be treated to be an application for the purpose of Section 8 or 8 (4) of the Act. ( 15 ) IN our opinion that the view expressed by the learned single Judge in the case of Ganapati Mankalu Gouda v. State of Karnataka, ILR 1990 Kant 1248 as well does not lay down the correct law, when it says that the benefit of deeming clause will be available irrespective of the fact that the application does not conform with the requirements of law under S. 8 (2) and Rule 4. ( 16 ) IN the present case Annexure B has been stated to be the copy of the form filed. Annexure B indicates it is dated 9-12-92. In the application firstly it is not indicated whether the applicant was the owner or occupant or owner and occupant. Nothing is mentioned with reference to right to land or year or grant, period or condition. In Column No. 7 tenure of land, it is mentioned unredeemed. With reference to Column No. 9, whether certificate issued by the revenue officer to the effect that the applicant has right to the tree is enclosed or not, nothing is indicated. A perusal of Annexure B reveal that with respect to many columns there is no particulars furnished. Tenure has been mentioned to be unredeemed. ( 17 ) IN the case of State of Karnataka v. P. V. Ramaraju Naidu, reported in (1975) 2 Kant LJ 205, this Court observed that the use of words 'redemption' and 'redeem' in connection with the payment to be made by the bane holder for cutting and removing the timber, does not make him the owner of the bane land and the trees thereon and the State Government on encumbrancer. The act of redemption is not attributed always to a owner-mortgager. The expression 'redeem' also means 'to atone for' or 'to compensate for'. In the context of law governing bane lands the above meaning appeals to be apposite, because while redeeming timber on bane land the holder of bane compensates for something which belongs to the Government and not to himself. The expression 'redeem' also means 'to atone for' or 'to compensate for'. In the context of law governing bane lands the above meaning appeals to be apposite, because while redeeming timber on bane land the holder of bane compensates for something which belongs to the Government and not to himself. The Government is therefore the owner of the bane lands along with the trees thereon and the holders of bane lands have the limited rights referred to above. " ( 18 ) THESE observations per se reveal that when the land is unredeemed, it means that land and the trees belong to the Government. The owner of the trees and the land has been none-else but the Government. In such a case the applicant had to also indicate and furnish the certificate whether the applicant had a right to cut or fell the trees. The application does not contain any indication that grant of land does not carry with it the grant of trees standing thereon, nor grant of land does cover nor does it amount to ownership of trees standing on it, the State continues to be the owner of the trees See ILR 1989 Kant 1228, Adiveppa Babappa Hulashera v. Divisional Forest Officer. Unless the applicant indicates the right to trees or right to cut the trees, whether as a owner or occupier or otherwise confirmed on him by any contract, custom or under any law, vesting in him, the deeming clause cannot be made applicable because the purpose of the deeming clause only is that no person should be made to suffer or no applicant should be made to suffer because of the default or failure of Tree Officer to discharge its obligation to give a decision, but before a decision has to be given, the condition precedent is that an application in accordance with the requirements of Section 8 (2) read with Rule 4 has been made. The person must show his right to tree and his right to ordinarily cut the tree, with reference to which a bar has been created by sub-section (i) of Section 8. The person must show his right to tree and his right to ordinarily cut the tree, with reference to which a bar has been created by sub-section (i) of Section 8. In other words, if a person had a right to the trees, right to fell the trees in the ordinary course under some law custom or contract or under some authority, but as the bar has been created directing him not to cut the trees irrespective of the right vesting in him and the bar is removed only on a permission being granted by the Tree Officer on a application being made before him, to save the applicant from the consequences of failure of the Tree officer to dispose of the application which has been made before him in accordance with law, within the period specified, the deeming clause has been enacted. But the purpose of deeming clause is not to confer a right to cut a tree or remove a tree which ordinarily the person concerned never had. If an application is made without a right having accrued to the person concerned to the tree or to cut or remove the tree, such an application will be of no value in the eye of law and it will amount to no application and if it does not amount to be an application but it amounts to be a waste paper, then the benefit of deeming clause under Section 8 (4) of the Act would not be available to such person in such case and the permission cannot be deemed to have been granted. ( 19 ) AS the application in the present case did not indicate the right of the applicant with respect to the land and tree, instead indicated that it was unredeemed land, the respondent-petitioner could not be said to have made the application in accordance with law and further the trees being the Government property being on unredeemed land, the provisions of Section 8 (4) and the benefit thereof could not be available to the respondent, so as to confer a right on the respondent (the petitioner), to cut the trees or to fell the trees. The purpose and scope of deeming clause is only to remove the barrier created by sub-section (1) of Section 8 with reference to the right of a person to the trees including the right to cut the trees. The purpose and scope of deeming clause is only to remove the barrier created by sub-section (1) of Section 8 with reference to the right of a person to the trees including the right to cut the trees. As such sub-section (1) create, barrier or bar against the right to cut the trees or fell the trees. Bar or restriction was provided to be removed by the grant of permission by the Tree Officer to cut the tree, but that does not confer by itself the right to cut the tree not inherent, nor vested in the owner. The bar or rider having been put on the exercise of right to cut vesting on the owner etc. , of trees, the law provided the rider was removable only on the grant of permission for the purpose by the Tree Officer. The deeming clause was provided to cover those cases in which a person having the right with respect to the trees standing on the land including the right to cut the trees, where in spite of the applicants having such a right under ordinary law or under contract, they cannot cut the trees, and their purpose is likely to suffer simply because of failure to take action on the part of the Tree Officer, irrespective of the fact that such a person or applicant has done whatever was within his power under the law by moving the application before Tree Officer, after complying with the terms and requirements of Section 8 (2) and Rule 4 of the Rules framed under the Karnataka Act 76 of 1976. ( 20 ) IN the present case no right to land or trees having been indicated in the application, instead land is shown as unredeemed and as found trees in such case belong to the State Government and applicant could not have any right over the trees, the application being not maintainable the deeming clause under Section 8 (4) could not be applied and did not apply to the present case and on the basis of deeming clause, present respondent that is the writ petitioner could not be held to be entitled to cut the trees as scope and purpose of the deeming clause under Section 8 (4) is not to confer a right which the person did not possess. The purpose has been only limited as indicated above namely, to save a genuine applicant having right to cut the trees from the consequences of failure of the Tree Officer to pass suitable orders or to take decision in the matter of grant of permission, within the prescribed time and in respect of only those cases, the deeming clause under Section 8 (4) could be applicable and permission could be deemed to have been granted. The view we have taken as above subserves the purpose and object of the Act itself. ( 21 ) THUS considered in the present case, the petitioner-respondent had not been entitled to the relief claimed in the writ petition and the order passed by the learned single Judge, allowing the writ petition, with all due respect to the learned single Judge, in our opinion, suffers from substantial error of law and as such deserves to be set aside. We are of the opinion, the appeal be allowed and the appeal is hereby allowed, setting aside the order passed by the learned single Judge, whereby the learned single Judge, granted the relief claimed by the petitioner. Appeal is allowed with costs and the writ petition giving rise to the appeal is dismissed. Appeal allowed. --- *** --- .