JUDGMENT 'The judgment of the Court was as follows : Bhattacharya, J.: This First Misc. Appeal Is at the instance of the plaintiff and is directed against Order No.11 dated May 30, 1997 passed by the learned Trial Judge. 2nd Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta, in Title Suit No. 2883 of 1996 thereby disposing of an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the appellant as also the one under Order 39 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the respondent. By the aforesaid order the learned Trial Judge has partly granted temporary injunction in favour of the present appellant. 2. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid order passed by the learned Trial Judge, the plaintiff has preferred the instant First Misc. Appeal. 3, The appellant has filed the aforesaid suit for declaration that the respondent has no right to obstruct and resist the appellant, her men and employees in peaceful men and occupation of the wit premises as a bonafide tenant thereof and also for permanent Injunction restraining the respondent and her men and agent from obstructing the appellant, her men and employees In using and occupying the suit premises and from interfering with the appellant's peaceful use and occupation of the suit premises. It may be mentioned here that the suit property consists of two Schedules, viz. Schedule• A and Schedule-B. Schedule A consists of one shop room and one godown and Schedule-B consists of bath and privy situated in a portion of the said building. 4. The case of the appellant is that she is a tenant in respect of shop room and a god own under the respondent at a monthly rental of Rs 80/- and Rs. 451- respectively and her tenancy Includes the right to use the bath and privy situated In Schedule-B property. 4. The case of the appellant is that she is a tenant in respect of shop room and a god own under the respondent at a monthly rental of Rs 80/- and Rs. 451- respectively and her tenancy Includes the right to use the bath and privy situated In Schedule-B property. On the allegation that the respondent and her men and agents were obstructing the employees of the appellant in using the bath and privy mentioned In 'B' Schedule property, the appellant came up with an application Under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure then by praying for temporary Injunction restraining the respondent, her men and agents and/or servants from obstructing and restring tile appellant and her man and employees from occupying and enjoying the suit premises and also from Interfering with the appellant’s peaceful use and occupation of the suit premises till the disposal of the suit. Initially the learned Trial Judge granted an ad interim order in terms of the aforesaid prayer. After service of notice, the respondent entered appearance and filed an application under Order 39 Rule 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure for vacating the interim injunction granted by the learned Trial Court. By the order Impugned, the learned Trial Judge has disposed of both the applications, namely, the one filed by the appellant ,under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and the other filed by the respondent under Order 39 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure thereby granting temporary injunction restraining the respondent find her men and agents from disturbing the possession of the appellant In respect of the A' Schedule property only. The prayer of the appellant for Injunction In respect of 'B' Schedule property has, however, been refused. 5. The prayer of the appellant for Injunction In respect of 'B' Schedule property has, however, been refused. 5. It appears from the application for temporary Injunction filed by the appellant that the appellant annexed with the said application, rent receipts granted by the respond, fits, the rent control challan showing deposit of rent for the month of August 1996, a General Diary lodged before the local Police Station complaining obstruction by the respondent's men and agent in the user of bath and privy and an affidavit affirmed by one Styam Sundar Seal, a son of the previous landlord of the appellant, stating that the husband of the appellant was a tenant and his men and employees regularly need the bath and privy as part of tenancy. In the application under Order 39 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the respondents, the respondent annexed the letters of attornment issued by the previous owners of the suit property at the time of the sale of the suit property in favour of the present respondent. 6. The learned Trial Judge, on consideration of all the aforesaid materials, arrived at a conclusion that from the rent receipts and the letters of attornment issued by the previous owners of the suit property the appellant had failed to prove a prima facie case that her Tenancy includes 'B' Schedule property. The learned Trial Judge further opined that the description of the tenancy given by the appellant herself. In the rent control challan for the month of August 1996 cannot bind the respondent. It will not be out of place to mention that the defence of the respondent was that after she had given a notice for eviction, as counter blust the appellant had filed the instant suit. 7. Mr. Mukherjee, appearing on behalf of the appellant has submitted before us that while rejecting the prayer of the appellant for temporary injunction in respect of 'B' Schedule property the learned Judge has not followed the well accepted principles which are required to be followed by a Court while disposing of an application for temporary injunction. In support of such contention. Mr. Mukherjee has relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in (1) Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. reported in 19S5(3) SCC 33; (2) Gujarat Bottlings Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co. and Ors. In support of such contention. Mr. Mukherjee has relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in (1) Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. reported in 19S5(3) SCC 33; (2) Gujarat Bottlings Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co. and Ors. reported in 1995 (5) SCC 545 and a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in (3) Larsen & Toubro Limited v. Kanok Project Ltd. reported In 1995(2) CLJ 506 . 8. So far as the decision reported in 1995(3) SCC 33 , Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. is concerned, It appears that after suffering a decree for eviction the appellant therein filed a fresh suit for permanent injunction restraining the respondent Corporation from disturbing his possession. The Trial Court refused to grant ad-Interim injunction but the First Appellate Court granted the same. The High Court in its revisional power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India set aside the order of the appellate Court granting interim injunction in favour of the appellant. The Supreme Court while dismissing the said appeal reiterated the well settled principles which are required to be followed by a Court while disposing of an application for temporary Injunction. 9. In the decision reported in 1995 (5) SCC 545 , Gujarat Bottlings Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co. & Ors. there was an agreement for grant of franchise of Coca Cola to Gujarat Bottlings Co. Ltd. to manufacture, bottle sell and distribute beverage under Coca Cola Trade Mark. In the said agreement there was a negative convenant restraining the Gujarat Bottlings Co. Ltd. not to deal beverage of any other brand. It appears that shares of Gujarat Bottlings Co. Ltd. were transferred to Pepsi, a rival of Coca Cola. In a suit filed by Coca Cola, High Court issued injunction restraining the transferee of the shares from using the paint and machinery of Gujarat Bottlings Co. Ltd. for bottling for sale of beverage of any other company. The Supreme Court while dismissing the said appeal held that in the fact of the said case High Court rightly granted interim injunction. 10. In the decision reported in 1995(2) CLJ 506 . Larsen & Toubro Limited v. Kanak Project Limited, a Division Bench of this Court disposed of a First Misc. The Supreme Court while dismissing the said appeal held that in the fact of the said case High Court rightly granted interim injunction. 10. In the decision reported in 1995(2) CLJ 506 . Larsen & Toubro Limited v. Kanak Project Limited, a Division Bench of this Court disposed of a First Misc. Appeal against an order disposing of an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and Order 39 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the respective parties. In that case admittedly the ownership of the suit property belonged to plaintiff and the defendant's lease had' a long period to run. There were allegations and counter-allegations of leakage being causted. In the roof due to action of the defendants. The repair proposed to be carried on by defendants resulted in conferring better amenities to it as a tenant than those available at the Inception of the tenancy. In the said case according to the terms of the lease, primarily the owners were liable to keep the roof and main walls and exteriors of the premises amongst others in good and tenantable order and condition. Under the aforesaid circumstances, this Court held that It would not be proper to allow the prayer of either of the parties as made for which adjudication of the respective right will have to be made. Thus, giving a direction for expeditious bearing of the suit, this Court disposed of the said appeal after setting aside the order impugned by giving a direction of repair of the premises in the light of the observation made in the body of the said judgment. 11. The principles laid down in those decisions are well settled. But we fail to appreciate how those decisions can be of any assistance to Mr.Mukherjee's client. 12. The scope of a First Misc. Appeal against an order granting or refusing an order of temporary injunction is now beyond any doubt. There is no dispute that an order of injunction is a discretionary one. In an appeal against such an order, the appellate Court generally does not Interfere with the discretion exercised by the Trial Judge unless it appears that while exercising such discretion the learned. Trial Judge has wrongly applied the principles for grant of such discretion or unless. It is established that such discretion has been unreasonably or capriciously used. In an appeal against such an order, the appellate Court generally does not Interfere with the discretion exercised by the Trial Judge unless it appears that while exercising such discretion the learned. Trial Judge has wrongly applied the principles for grant of such discretion or unless. It is established that such discretion has been unreasonably or capriciously used. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of Supreme Court in (4) Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Federation Ltd. v. Sunder Bros., Delhi reported in AIR 1967 SC 249 . In that decision Supreme Court was dealing with an appeal against an order granting stay in exercise of power under Section 34 of the Arbitration 'Act, which is undoubtedly a discretionary power. While discussing the scope of the said appeal the Apex Court held that where the discretion vested in the Court has been exercised by the lower Court the appellate Court would be slow to Interfere with the exercise of its discretion. In dealing with the matter raised before it at the' appellate state, the appellate Court would not be justified in interfering with the discretion under appeal solely on the ground that If it had considered the matter at the trial stage it might have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial Court reasonably and In a judicial manner the fact that the appellate Court could have taken a different view may not justify such Interference with the trial Court's exercise 'of discretion, If it appears to the appellate Court that in exercise of its discretion the trial Court had acted unreasonably or capriciously or bas ignored the relevant fact then it would be open to the appellate Court to Interfere with the trial Court's exercise of discretion. 13. In the decision reported in (5) AIR 1980 SC 1896 , Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd v. Its Mozdur Sabha. while considering the scope of an appeal against discretionary order, the Apex Court held that the appellate power interferes not when the order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly wrong. The difference is real though fine. 14. In this connection it will be appropriate to mention a case reported in (6) AIR 1934 Cal 694. while considering the scope of an appeal against discretionary order, the Apex Court held that the appellate power interferes not when the order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly wrong. The difference is real though fine. 14. In this connection it will be appropriate to mention a case reported in (6) AIR 1934 Cal 694. Durga Das v. Nalin Chandra Nandan, where a Bench consisting of 3 Judges of this Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of temporary injunction and attachment before judgment, which are undoubtedly discretionary in nature, held that if the Trial Judge rightly appreciates the fact and applies to those facts, the correct principle while exercising such discretion that will be a sound exercise of discretion. (Per Majority, Buckland, Acj and Tort William, J.). 15. Keeping in view the aforesaid guidelines, if we consider the present case it will appear that the learned Trial Judge considered rent receipts granted by the respondent in favour of the appellant which do not indicate that Schedule ‘B’ viz, bath and privy, was a part of tenancy. The Learned Trial Judge also considered the letters of attornment issued by the previous owners which also do not show that the tenancy consisted of any bath or privy as alleged by the plaintiff-appellant. In our statement made in the challan before the Rent Controller for the month of August 1996, just before the institution of the suit, as the statements made by the appellant herself in the said challan cannot bind the respondent. We are also of the view that the learned Trial Judge rightly ignored the affidavit affirmed by one Shyam Sundar Seal, the son of one of the co-owners of the property wherein he stated that in the year 1969 his predecessor sold the suit property to the respondent and the husband of the present appellant was a tenant in the said premises in respect of one shop room with bath and privy on the ground floor. Suffice it to say the father of this gentleman who was actually one of the landlords of the present appellant's husband in the letters of attornment did not mention that the bath and privy were included in the tenancy of the appellant. Suffice it to say the father of this gentleman who was actually one of the landlords of the present appellant's husband in the letters of attornment did not mention that the bath and privy were included in the tenancy of the appellant. Therefore, on consideration of the aforesaid documents when the learned Trial Judge has arrived at a finding that the plaintiff-appellant had failed to prove prima facie case, sitting in a First Misc. Appeal against such discretionary order it would not be proper on our put to interfere with such finding even if it is possible for us to arrive at a different conclusion. As indicated above, we are also satisfied that from the above materials which were placed before the learned Trial Judge, only conclusion that can be arrived at prima facie is that 'B' Schedule property was not included within the tenancy of the appellant 16. The appellant having failed to prove prima facie case, the other two factors viz because of convenience and inconvenience and the question of irreparable loss and injury become insignificant. 17. Thus, we find no merit in the instant First Misc. Appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed. 18. There will be however no order as to costs. Since the respondent bas already entered appearance in view of the nature of allegations made in the suit, it is desirable that the suit should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of one year from the date of communication of this order to the learned Trial Judge. Sinha, J.: I agree.