Judgment 1. The petitioners in this writ application have prayed for quashing the order dated 4-7-1984, contained in Annexure 5, passed by the Dy. Director, Consolidation (headquarter), Patna in Revision No. 2270/81 under Sec. 35 of the Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), by which he has allowed the revision filed by the husband of respondent No. 5 with a direction to record the name of Rajeswar Ojha (deceased) and other respondents after removing the names of Ugrasen Pandey and Gaya Pandey in the Khatian. 2. In short, the case of the petitioners is that the land in dispute, measuring about 5 acres are situated in mouza Hathilpur in Brahampur Anchal in the district of Bhojpur, over which the petitioners as well as respondents second set lay their claim on various grounds and also over which Dy. Director of Consolidation (Hd. qurs.) respondent No. 3) has declared title of Rajeshwar Ojha (deceased) and others on the basis of an order passed in a Title suit which abated under Sec. 4(c) of the Act. It is further stated that Rajeshwar Ojha and others, who are respondents Nos. 6 to 9 filed a Title Suit No. 104 of 1971 for partition of the disputed land between the parties, which was decreed and Ramkailash Pandey, ancestor of the petitioners, being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree passed in the aforesaid Title suit filed an appeal being Title Appeal No. 6 of 1978. 3. It is the further case of the petitioners that the consolidation operation in the aforesaid village was taken up in the year 1970, wherein a notification under Sec. 3 of the Act was made by the State Government declaring its intention to make scheme for consolidation of holdings in the area. In spite of the notification under Sec. 3 of the Act the respondents filed Title partition suit as mentioned above in the Court of Ist Addl. Subordinate Judge, Buxar, for partitioning the land in dispute to the extent of respective shares as per the branch in the family. The respondents neither filed any application under Sec. 4(c) for abatement of the suit, nor did he file any application under Sec. 12(2) of the Act for partition or regarding their entry of names in the consolidation registers. Subordinate Judge, Buxar, for partitioning the land in dispute to the extent of respective shares as per the branch in the family. The respondents neither filed any application under Sec. 4(c) for abatement of the suit, nor did he file any application under Sec. 12(2) of the Act for partition or regarding their entry of names in the consolidation registers. The petitioners ancestor filed appeal against the aforesaid judgment and decree and then only the respondents filed a petition under Sec. 4(1)(c) of the Act, upon which the learned civil Court passed an order of abatement on 27-9-1978. Thereafter the respondents filed a petition after lapse of more than the statutory period under Sec. 12(2) of the Act which was dismissed by the learned Consolidation Officer, Brahampur as the mauza was already confirmed on 14-2-1978 and delivery of possession was already affected on 15-5-1978. The certificate of transfer was also distributed on 1-11-1978 to all the raiyats, which is the conclusive proof of the right, title and possession of the properties. The respondents, against that order of the Consolidation Officer directly filed a revision application being Revision No. 150 of 1979 under Sec. 35 of the Act before the Director of Consolidation, who, while disposing of the said revision application, without any notice to the petitioners observed that the respondents should better move the lower Court under Sec. 10-B of the Act. The respondents then moved the Consolidation Officer under Sec. 10-B, which was rejected by the Consolidation Officer on the ground that the mauza was already confirmed and he had no jurisdiciton to pass any order. Rajeshwar Ojha (deceased) thereafter filed a Misc. case No. 1 of 1981-82 before the Dy. Director of Consolidation, Bhojpur inter alia, praying that the Consolidation Officer was sitting tight over the matter and had not been passing any order. The Dy. Director thereafter called for a report from the Consolidation Officer, Brahampur and on perusal of the order and other papers, rejected the Misc. case on 31-10-1981. The petitioner, thereafter filed a revision application being Revision No. 2270/1981 before the Director of Consolidation, Bihar, Patna against the said order dated 31-10-1981 in which respondent No. 3 the Dy. The Dy. Director thereafter called for a report from the Consolidation Officer, Brahampur and on perusal of the order and other papers, rejected the Misc. case on 31-10-1981. The petitioner, thereafter filed a revision application being Revision No. 2270/1981 before the Director of Consolidation, Bihar, Patna against the said order dated 31-10-1981 in which respondent No. 3 the Dy. Director of Consolidation, by his order dated 4-7-1984 (Annexure 5) rejected the claim of the petitioners and allowed the revision case relying solely on the judgment and decree and evidence adduced in Title Suit No. 104 of 1971 which had already abated under Sec. 4(1)(c) much earlier. 4. Mr. R.S. Pradhan, learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that after the order of abatement was passed in Title Appeal No. 6 of 1978 the steps taken by Rajeshwar Ojha on behalf of the other respondents of the second set are all misconceived and not maintainable in the eye of law, and that Case No. 3 of 1979-80 filed under Sec. 10-B of the Act before the Consolidation Officer, Brahampur against the petitioners for declaration of title and partition of shares was not maintainable as it was barred by limitation and also barred under Sec. 10-A of the Act. It was also contended by him that the Consolidation Officer as well as the Dy. Director of Consolidation had no jurisdiction inasmuch as any order passed by the Dy. Director of Consolidation in Revision case No. 150 of 1978 cannot confer jurisdiction and they rightly rejected the petition filed by the respondents. The revisional Courts cannot go beyond their jurisdiction by providing a remedy which is expressly barred under the Statute and more so in view of the provisions contained under Sec. 10-A of the Act. He further contended that any order passed by the Dy. Director of Consolidation in the said Revision Case No. 150 of 1978 behind the back of the petitioners directing to file petition under Sec. 10-B of the Act is void in the eye of law as the powers conferred under Sec. 135 of the Act cannot give jurisdiction to a revisional Court to widen the provisions of the Act framed by the legislature. The learned Counsel also pointed out that in spite of all these contentions raised by them before the revisional Court, the Dy. The learned Counsel also pointed out that in spite of all these contentions raised by them before the revisional Court, the Dy. Director of Consolidation empowered under Sec. 35, relying solely on the judgment and decree passed by the civil Court and also on the deposition made in that suit and wrongly interpreting illegally held that Rajeshwar Ojha was entitled to the share indicated in the impugned order. According to him, the Dy. Director of Consolidation has wrongly held that the papers and the judgment even if the suit abates, can be used for the purpose of deciding a case in a consolidation Court, which is completely an error and contrary to the provisions of law. 5. In course of argument a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution read with Order 22, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure was also filed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on 4-9-1996 after serving a copy of the same on the learned Counsel for the respondents, stating therein that the first petitioner namely, Ram Dutt Pandey died on 1-10-1985 during the pendency of this case leaving behind no heir or issue to be substituted in his place and that the claimants of the lands in dispute are already on the records of this case as petitioners Nos. 2, 3 and 4, who are wife and sons of Ram Kailash Pandey in whose favour the gift deed of 1961 was executed and registered by Ugrasen Pandey, who died issuless. He therefore, requested to expunge the name of petitioner No. 1 There was no opposition to this by the other side. Accordingly, the learned Counsel for the petitioner was permitted to expunge the name of Ram Dutta Pandey. 6. A counter-affidavit has been filed by respondent No. 6 , who has claimed to have the authority from respondents Nos. 5 and 7 to is to swear the affidavit and to make submissions in this case on their behalf also. In the counter-affidavit it is stated that though it is true that Title Appeal No. 6 of 1978 abated under Sec. 4(1)(c) of the Act, but it is wrong to say that the Dy. Director of Consolidation (head quarter), Bihar, Patna (respondent No. 3) has passed the order contained in Annexure 5, on the basis of the judgment and decree in the Title Suit No. 104 of 1971. Director of Consolidation (head quarter), Bihar, Patna (respondent No. 3) has passed the order contained in Annexure 5, on the basis of the judgment and decree in the Title Suit No. 104 of 1971. It is submitted that the respondent No. 3 has passed the correct order on the basis of independent findings based on evidence of the parties. 7. It was further argued by the learned Counsel for the respondents that the filing of Partition Suit No. 104 of 1971 was not barred after the notification made under Sec. 3 of the Act in the year 1970. It was also asserted that the Title suit which stood abated on 27-9-1978 did not bar the respondents to file an application under Sec. 10-B of the Act in the year 1978 and 1979, as there was no statutory period of limitation for filing a petition for the relief as claimed in the Title suit and hence, Rajeshwar Ojha filed petition for reliefs as claimed by him in T.S. No. 104 of 1971 which was illegally dismissed by the Consolidation Officer, as it was based on refusal to exercise the jurisdiction under Sec. 10-B, although Rajeshwar Ojha moved in Revision case No. 150 of 1979 under Sec. 35 of the Act before the Director of Consolidation at Patna, who directed to move the lower Court under Sec. 10-B. It was further submitted that Rajeshwar Ojha initially moved before the Consolidation Officer and then before the Dy. Director of Consolidation by way of appeal against the order contained in Annexure 3 which was rejected illegally and both the orders were based on refusal to exercise jurisdiction conferred on them under Sec. 10-B of the Act. In this connection, the learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Shyam Bihari Upadhyay V/s. State of Bihar reported in 1985 Pat LJR 43 : ( AIR 1985 Pat 275 ) and contended that even if objection was not filed by the respondents under Sec. 10(2) of the Act, the Director of Consolidation has got wide power under Sec. 35 of the Act as a revisional Court to entertain the grievance of the parties either on their filing petition or even suo motu. 8. I do not accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents. 8. I do not accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents. In a recent judgment of Division Bench comprising of the t hen Hon ble the Chief Justice Mr. D.P. Wadhwa (as he then was) and myself in C.W.J.C. No. 205 of 1986 (Hari Narain Singh V/s. State of Bihar ) disposed of on 18th Feb. 1997 (reported in 1997 AIHC 3340), all these aspects were elaborately discussed and held that the Director cannot assume jurisdiction of the authorities, which is barred. The relevant extract from the aforementioned judgment is quoted below :- "17. It is difficult to construe that the provision of Sec. 35 vests wide power in the Director of Consolidation to exercise the powers of various authorities. If the power of the Director under Sec. 35 of the Act is construed to be so wide as is contended by the learned Counsel for the respondents, it would amount to giving him sanction to usurp the jurisdiction of the original authority, as a fact finding authority by appreciating for itself all the facts de novo, even though it is completely barred by Sec. 10A of the Act. In fact, Sec. 35 of the Act does not contain any non obstante clause like the one con-tained in Sec. 10D, nor does it deal with any changed circumstances, as contemplated under Secs. 10B, 10C, 10D and 12B, of the Act. There being no non obstante clause in Sec. 35, it is difficult to infer that the legislauture purported to give such a wide power in the Director of Consolidation to ignore any bar or limitation provided for filing objection, appeal etc. at different stages and to give it an overriding effect even on Sec. 10A providing bar from raising any objection at any subsequent stage of proceeding, if not raised within the stipulated time. Any other interpretation would, in my opinion, lead to absurdity inasmuch as under such circumstances, the Consolidation scheme shall never come to an end and even after long lapse of finality of a consolidation proceeding an objection can be raised directly before the Director in revision , which can be entertained by the Director in the garb of revisional power. This in my opinion cannot be the intention of the legislature. This in my opinion cannot be the intention of the legislature. In my opinion, the object of Sec. 35 of the Act is to empower the Director of Consolidation to see that the subordinate Courts are not acting arbitrarily and illegally in exercise of their jurisdiction but not to assume to itself the jurisdiction on the original authority as a fact finding authority by appreciating for itself all the facts de novo, as has been held by th Apex Court in the aforementioned case of Ramdular (1994 (3) JT (SC) 341) (supra) whereafter the afore-mentioned Division Bench judgment of this Court are per incuriam." 9. In the instant case the respondents having not raised any objection at the stage provided under Sec. 10(2) of the Act, they cannot be allowed to raise such objection at any subsequent stage in view of the bar under Sec. 10A of the Act and the revisional Court was also not legally justified to entertain such objection in the purported power under Sec. 35 of the Act in view of the decision aforementioned of the Division Bench in the case of Hari Narain Singh, (1997 AIHC 3040) (supra). Moreover, the facts of this case do not warrant any interference with final decision in the consolidation proceeding. 10. In this regard the learned Counsel for the petitioner has rightly submitted that any order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in revision case No. 150/78 and that too behind the back of the petitioner directing the respondents to file petition under Sec. 10(2) was not justified and cannot confer jurisdiction on the authorities contrary to the provisions of the Act of the Legislature. 11. In the result, the writ application is allowed and the orders contained in Annexure 5, passed by the Dy. Director, Consolidation, (head quarters), Bihar, Patna passed in Revision Case No. 22 70 of 1981 under Sec. 35 of the Act is hereby quashed. In the facts and circumstances, however, there shall be no order as to costs.Petition allowed.