JUDGMENT : 1. On 7.7.1989 the Superintendent (Prosecution) Customs & Central Excise, Jaipur filed a complaint in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences), Jaipur against the present applicants and one Mala Ram (co-accused) alleging therein that on 9.5.1989 at Railway Station, Ladnoo, Distt. Churu the Customs Inspector, with the help of a G.R.P. constable caught hold of Mala Ram co-accused brought him to Ratangarh Railway Station where on the search of his person two packets, wrapped in Nirodh condoms and containing three gold biscuits each of foreign marking, weighing 699.900 gms. worth Rs. 2,16,969/- were recovered from his rectum. On being examined by the Customs Inspector under section 107 of the Customs Act, 1962 and later, in the course of inquiry, by the Superintendent under section 108 of the said Act. The said Mala Ram stated that after giving him training to keep foreign object in his rectum for sufficiently long time. Dal Chand Soni (Applicant No. 1) had made him insert a packet, containing American Dollars, in his rectum and then sent him along with his brother Santokh Chand (Applicant No. 2) to Nepal Ganj where Santokh Chand had given him the said two packets to be inserted in his rectum. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of offence under section 135(1)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 and under section 85(1)(a) of the Gold Control Act, 1968 and issued process under section 204 Criminal Procedure code summoning the present applicants and Mala Ram as accused. By this petition under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code the applicants have challenged Magistrate's order dated 28.7.1989 summoning them as accused in the case. 2. Mr. V.R. Bajwa, the learned counsel for the applicants vehemently urged that r the confessional statement of Mala Ram, co-accused, being the sole evidence in the case against the present applicants, cannot be made the basis of their prosecution and trial. In this behalf the learned counsel heavily relied upon the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Rashid Ghafoor Parkar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, Mool Chand Sampat Raj Shah & Ors. v. Daya Shankar, Asstt. Collector, Customs, (XII) 1987 (3) Crimes 24 , this Courts decision in Jagdish Soni v. A.K. Derashi, 1989 Criminal L.R. (Raj.) 49 and Supreme Court decision in Param Hans Yadav v. State of Bihar, 1987(2) SCC 197 . 3. Mr. v. State of Maharashtra, Mool Chand Sampat Raj Shah & Ors. v. Daya Shankar, Asstt. Collector, Customs, (XII) 1987 (3) Crimes 24 , this Courts decision in Jagdish Soni v. A.K. Derashi, 1989 Criminal L.R. (Raj.) 49 and Supreme Court decision in Param Hans Yadav v. State of Bihar, 1987(2) SCC 197 . 3. Mr. R.P. Meena, the learned counsel for the Customs Department, on the other hand, submitted that the contents of the complaint and documents filed along with it clearly disclosed the commission of offences under section 135 of Customs Act, 1962 and under section 85(1)(a) of Gold Control Act, 1968 in pursuance of a criminal conspiracy hatched and abetted by he present applicants and, therefore, the value and effect of the statement of Mala Ram co-accused recorded under sections 107, 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 should not be prejudged at this initial stage of the proceedings against them. I find force in Mr. Meena's submission. 4. It is by now fairly well settled that the powers of this Court under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code are quite exceptional and should be exercised in rarest of rare cases to prevent abuse of the process of Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Where the contents of a FIR or complaint disclose the commission of an offence and such contents are not absurd or inherently improbable, proceedings initiated on the basis of such FIR complaint should not be terminated in their inception. See State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 (1) Suppl. SCC 335 , Rupam Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill, 1995 (6) SCC 194 , State of H.P. v. Prithi Chand, 1996 (2) SCC 37 and State of Orissa v. Banshidhar, 1996 (2) SCC 194 . Even malafide of the complainant are not much relevant at that stage of the proceedings (vide State of Maharashtra v. Ishwar Peeraji Kalpatru, 1996 (1) SCC 542 . 5. In the instant case the contents of the complaint and the documents submitted therewith clearly disclosed that two packets, wrapped in Nirodh Condoms and containing three gold biscuits each with foreign markings were recorded from the rectum of Mala Ram co-accused. This prima facie discloses the commission of offences under section 135(1)(i) of Customs Act, 1962 and under section 85(1)(a) of Gold Control Act, 1968. This prima facie discloses the commission of offences under section 135(1)(i) of Customs Act, 1962 and under section 85(1)(a) of Gold Control Act, 1968. Then, there were the statements of Mala Ram recorded under sections 107 and 108 of the Customs Act, 1962. These statements prima facie disclosed that Mala Ram being the main bread earner for his three brothers, six sisters and two children besides parents from doing manual labour as 'Palleydar' was instigated and motivated by Dalchand to earn in 5 or 6 days what he was earning in a month, by doing work for him and for that purpose Dalchand first taught him to insert pencil cells in his rectum for three hours and then got a packet containing American Dollars inserted in his rectum and sent him to Nepal Ganj in the active supervision and company of his brother Sukhdeo Chand (applicant No. 2) and therefrom the two packets containing six gold biscuits of foreign make were made available to Mala Ram by Santokh Chand and got inserted in his rectum which were ultimately recovered from his person at Ratangarh Railway Station. Such statements prima facie disclosed the active involvement of the present petitioners in the commission of the aforementioned offences by Mala Ram. In view of the nature of the alleged offences and the mode and manner adopted in their commission it cannot be declared at this stage that the allegations made in the complaint against the petitioners were wholly absurd or inherently improbable. The common place of residence of the three accused and their social and economic disparities, as urged by Mr. Meena, may well probabilise the commission of those offences in that way. 6. At this stage Mr. Bajwa urged that there may be prima facie sufficient evidence on record to prosecute Mala Ram co-accused but as against the present applicants there was the sole evidence of confession of Mala Ram and it is trite law that the confessional statement of a co-accused under section 30 of the Evidence Act cannot make the basis for conviction of other co-accused, being jointly tried with him. Apparently this argument of Mr. Apparently this argument of Mr. Bajwa seems to be convincing and also finding support from the cases relied upon by the learned counsel but on a study of the relevant provisions of Customs Act, 1967 and the law laid down by the Apex Court on the subject the argument advanced is found misconceived. 7. Way back in 1949 the Privy Council in Bhabhooni Sahu's case AIR 1949 PC 257 had held that "it can be safely held that the statement of a co-accused alone cannot be the basis or the foundation to proceed against other co-accused" as the confession can be used only in support of other evidence and cannot be made the foundation of a conviction. This view has been endorsed with approval by the Supreme Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 159 , Hari Charan Kurmi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1184 , Param Hans Yadav v. State of Bihar (supra) and several others and followed by the Bombay High Court and this Court in the cases relied upon by Mr. Bajwa. But, as it appears to me, it seems to have escaped from the notice of Deshpanday, J. and Dr. Counto, J. of the Bombay High Court and Sharma, J. of this Court that the views on the value and effect of the confessional statement of a co-accused under section 30 rule with Sections 3, 24, 25 of the Evidence Act was expressed in Bhabuni Sahu's case (supra) by the Privy Council and in Kashmira Singh's, Har Charan's and Param Hans Yadav' s cases (supra) by the Supreme Court in the context of offences under the Penal Code with reference to the statements of such persons who were considered "accused" persons under sections 24, 25 Evidence Act and/or 164 Criminal Procedure Code or an accomplice under section 133 of the Evidence Act. The position of a statement recorded under sections 107, 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 by a gazetted Officer of Customs in the course of an enquiry is a bit different. 8. The position of a statement recorded under sections 107, 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 by a gazetted Officer of Customs in the course of an enquiry is a bit different. 8. Sections 108 & 138-B of Customs Act, 1962, which are relevant for the purpose, read as under : "Section 108: Power to summon persons to give evidence and produce documents:- (1) Any gazetted officer of customs shall have power to summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary either to give evidence or to produce a document or any other thing in any inquiry which such officer is making in connection with the smuggling of any goods. (2) A summons to produce documents or other things may be for the production of certain specified documents or things or for the production of all documents or things of a certain description in the possession or under the control of the person summoned. (3) All persons so summoned shall be bound to attend either in person or by an authorised agent, as such officer may direct; and all persons so summoned shall be bound to state the truth upon any subject respecting which they are examined or make statements and produce such documents and other things as may be required: Provided that the exemption under section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), shall be applicable to any requisition for attendance under this Section. (4) Every such inquiry as aforesaid shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Section 193 and Section 228 of the IPC (45 of 1860). (4) Every such inquiry as aforesaid shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Section 193 and Section 228 of the IPC (45 of 1860). Section 138-B: Relevancy of statements under certain circumstances:- (1) A statement made and signed by a person before any gazetted officer of Customs during the course of any inquiry or proceeding under this Act shall be relevant, for the purpose of proving, in any prosecution for an offence under this Act, the truth of the facts which it contains,- (a) when the person who made the statement is dead or cannot be found, or is incapable of giving evidence, or is kept out of the way by the adverse party, or whose presence cannot be obtained without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, the Court considers unreasonable; or (b) when the person who made the statement is examined as a witness in the case before the Court and the Court is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the statement should be admitted in evidence in the interests of justice. (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to any proceeding under this Act, other than a proceeding before a Court, as they apply in relation to a proceeding before a Court." 9. A combined reading of the above provisions in the Customs Act, 1962 makes it clear that the statement of a person recorded under section 108 of Customs Act, 1962 by a gazetted officer of customs in the course of an inquiry under the said Act has been placed on a footing somewhat different from that of a statement of an accused made under sections 24, 25 of the Evidence Act or recorded under section 164 or 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Sub-section (1) of Section 11 empowers a gazetted officer of customs to summon any person to give evidence or to produce a document or other thing in any enquiry being made in connection with the smuggling of any goods. Sub-section (3) makes it obligatory on the person summoned under sub-section. (1) to attend in person or by an authorised agent the Gazetted Officer and to state the truth upon any subject respecting which he is examined. Sub-section (3) makes it obligatory on the person summoned under sub-section. (1) to attend in person or by an authorised agent the Gazetted Officer and to state the truth upon any subject respecting which he is examined. Sub-section (4) makes the proceedings of enquiry under sub-section (3) a judicial proceeding for the purposes of offences under sections 193 & 228 of the IPC. It may be appreciated that though sub-section (3) does not speak of recording the statement on oath yet the statement recorded by the gazetted officer seems to have been placed on the pedestal of a statement recorded in a judicial proceedings which may attract the offences under section 193 & 228 Criminal Procedure Code. 10. Section 138-B makes the statement recorded under section 108 relevant for the purpose of proving, in any prosecution for an offence under the Customs Act, 1962, the truth of the facts contained therein in the eventualities visualised in Cl. (a) & (b). It may further be noted that Cl. (a) is almost couched in the language of Section 32 of the Evidence Act and Cl. (b) makes the maker of the statement a competent witness and his testimony, which may or may not be of confessional character, admissible in evidence. 11. It is, therefore, clear that the purpose and scope of a statement of a person recorded by a gazetted officer of Customs under section 108 of Customs Act, 1962 is basically different from that of a statement made by an accused under sections 24, 25 of Evidence Act and Sections 164 & 306 of the Criminal Procedure Code A statement made under section 108 of Customs Act, 1962 may incriminate the maker thereof as also others and hence may be relevant and admissible under section 21 of the Evidence Act but nonetheless, it is not the statement of an accused at that stage of the proceedings. (See. Ramesh Chandra v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 940 ), as neither the maker thereof makes it in the character of an accused nor the gazetted officer of Customs records it in the capacity of a police officer. (See. Ramesh Chandra v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 940 ), as neither the maker thereof makes it in the character of an accused nor the gazetted officer of Customs records it in the capacity of a police officer. It, therefore, follows that irrespective of the fact whether the statement made under section 108 is inculpatory or exculpatory, incriminating other persons only in the commission of an offence under the Customs Act, 1962, it is relevant and may be proved as admissible evidence in the circumstances contemplated u /Cis. (a) & (b) of Section 138-B independently of the provisions contained in the Evidence Act. It means that in a case wherein the maker makes a self exculpatory but incriminatory of others statement under section 108 the same may be proved as substantive evidence u /C1. (a) of Section 138-B and the evidence contained in such statement may be led as substantive evidence u/Cl. (b) by examining the maker thereof as a witness at the trial of the other persons. For, under section 108 the examination of a prospective accused only is not contemplated. Any person whose attendance the gazetted officer of customs considers necessary in connection with the smuggling of any goods may be summoned and examined by him to know the truth. Therefore, until and unless the maker of the statement becomes accused, (which he may be made only after filing a complaint under section 137) he has the character of a witness like any other witness in the case and may be examined at the trial of other persons, who are made accused in the case. In that case the evidence led by him at the trial would not only be relevant and admissible under section 138-B(b) giving an opportunity to such other persons to cross-examine him but would also have the character of "evidence" in the case within the meaning of the term defined in Section 3 of Evidence Act. That would undoubtedly be the position when the maker himself is not a co-accused in the case. 12. That would undoubtedly be the position when the maker himself is not a co-accused in the case. 12. Here it may be remembered that holding of a joint trial of all the persons involved in the commission of an offence under section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962 is not a mandatory requirement under section 223 Criminal Procedure Code If a separate complaint was filed against the petitioners and Mala Ram was cited as a witness therein on the basis of his statement under section 108 his examination in Court would be making substantive evidence against the petitioners under section 3 of the Evidence Act rule with under section 138-B(b) of the Customs Act, 1962. 13. The position, however, undergone a change when the maker of the statement under section 108 becomes an accused on the filing of a complaint under section 137 against him. In that case the statement under section 108 may be proved under section 138-B against him at his trial under section 21 as admission of certain incriminating facts and not under section 25 of the Evidence Act. 14. The position undergoes a further change when some other persons are also arrayed as co-accused with him. In that case in so far as the value and effect of his statement under section 108 against the co-accused is concerned Section 30 of the Evidence Act may be pressed into service. Trial against the maker of the statement and other persons being joint, the maker cannot be examined as a witness against himself and others unless he himself offers to be examined under section 313 Criminal Procedure Code in which case the co-accused may or may not choose to cross-examine him. A confession made by a co-accused at any stage of a joint trial would have corroborative value only. That would also be the position of his confession, made during pretrial stage in his character as an "accused" of an offence. In that case the confession of the co-accused, may simply be taken into consideration as against the other co-accused. The discretion given to the Court to take the confession of the co-accused simply into consideration makes the evidence of confessional statement of corroborative value only and does not confer upon it the character of substantive evidence. In that case the confession of the co-accused, may simply be taken into consideration as against the other co-accused. The discretion given to the Court to take the confession of the co-accused simply into consideration makes the evidence of confessional statement of corroborative value only and does not confer upon it the character of substantive evidence. In the absence of the substantive evidence, the evidence having corroborative value only can have no worth and effect and, therefore, can not be made the basis of prosecution and conviction of the other co-accused. The value and effect of the confession of the co-accused being of corroborative character only the Court should start to find out the substantive evidence in the case and then it may, if it thinks proper, take into consideration to find corroboration to the already existing substantive evidence. If Court is not to start with the contession of the co-accused which has no character of substantive evidence. Such confession is to be taken into consideration if thought proper by the Court, only after having considered the worth and value of other substantive evidence. If substantive evidence does not incriminate the other co-accused, the confession of a co-accused cannot be made the basis for his conviction. 15. The views, as expressed by me in the preceding paragraphs, compel me to accept the arguments advanced by Mr. Namjoshi, the learned Special Prosecutor appearing for the Customs Deptt. before Coute, J. of the Bombay High Court in the case of Mool Chand Sampat Raj (supra) and are, I think, supported by the ratio in the decisions of the Apex Court in Ramesh Chand Mehta v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 940 and Veera Ibrahim v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1976 SC 1167 which both, unlike other cases, were the direct cases under the Customs Act, 1962. 16. In Ramesh Chandra's case (supra), the Supreme Court, disposing four different appeals under the Customs Act, 1962 and Sea Customs Act 1878 by a combined judgment considered the scheme of the Customs Act in sufficient detail and held that 'a custom officer is under the Act of 1962 not a police officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act and the statements made before him by a person who is arrested or against whom an inquiry is made are not covered by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. In para 27 their Lordships observed, inter alia as under:- "(27). Section 167 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, contained a large number of clauses which described different kinds of infractions and different penalties or punishments liable to be imposed in respect of those infractions. Under the Customs Act, 1962 the Customs Officer is authorised to confiscate goods improperly imported into India and to impose penalties in cases contemplated by Sections 112 & 113. But on that account the basic scheme of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, is not altered. The Customs Officer even under the Act of 1962 continues to remain a revenue officer primarily concerned with the detection of smuggling and enforcement and levy of proper duties and prevention of entry into India of dutiable goods without payment of duty and of goods of which the entry is prohibited, he does not on that account become either a police officer, nor does the information conveyed by him, when the person guilty of an infraction of the law is arrested amount to making of an accusation of an offence against the person so guilty of infraction. Even under the Act of 1962 a formal accusation can only be deemed to be made when a compliant is made before a Magistrate competent to try the person guilty of the infraction under sections 132, 133, 134 & 135 of the Act. Any statement made under sections 107 & 108 of the Customs Act by a person against whom an enquiry is made by a Customs Officer is not a statement made by a person accused of an offence." 17. Dealing with the contrary views held by Calcutta High Court on the one hand and the Madras & Bombay High Courts on the other on almost the same point, as is involved in the present case', the Apex Court observed in para Nos. 16 & 17 of the report as under : "(16). In our judgment the view expressed by Sinha, J., in Calcutta Motor and Cycle Co. v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1956 Cal. 253 that a proceeding under section 171-A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, being preliminary to a criminal trial any statement procured would be inadmissible u /Art. 20(3) there being a formal accusation relating to the commission of an offence within the normal course may result in prosecution, is not correct. v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1956 Cal. 253 that a proceeding under section 171-A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, being preliminary to a criminal trial any statement procured would be inadmissible u /Art. 20(3) there being a formal accusation relating to the commission of an offence within the normal course may result in prosecution, is not correct. Opinion of the Court recorded in appeal from that judgment in Collector of Customs v. Calcutta Motor & Cycle Co., AIR 1958 Cal. 682 in which Chakravartti, C.J., observed that the protection of Art. 20(3) avails even where a person is not formally accused or charged is inconsistent with the judgments of the Court already referred, cannot also be accepted as correct. (17). The views expressed by the Madras High Court in Collector of Customs, Madras v. Kotumal Bhirutuai Pihlajani, AIR 1967 Mad. 263 (FB) at p. 275 that:- "....the bar u/Art. 20(3) of the Constitution will not be avail able to the statements in the case, since it is not in dispute that they have been recorded only during an investigation undertaken by the Customs Officer under sections 107 & 108 of the Customs Act, 1952 and at a time when the deponents did not stand in the position of accused in the light of the principles stated in the decisions cited above." and by the Bombay High Court in Laxman Padtna Bhagat v. State, 67 Bom. LR 317, AIR 1965 Bombay 195, that a person examined under section. 171-A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, does not stand in the character of an accused person in as much as there is no formal accusation made against him by any person at that time are, in our judgment, substantially correct." 18. It may be stated that in the cases before the Apex Court the admissibility and effect of the statements recorded under sections 107, 108 of Customs Act, 1962 and /or under section 171-A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 were objected to by the accused persons when the complainant had sought to tender them in evidence. The trial Courts as well as High Courts had rejected the objections. Dismissing the appeals against the decisions of the High Courts the Apex Court observed in para 28 as under:- "(28). The trial Courts as well as High Courts had rejected the objections. Dismissing the appeals against the decisions of the High Courts the Apex Court observed in para 28 as under:- "(28). Before parting with the case, we must observe that this Court has been invited in this group of appeals to consider the question of admissibility of evidence before the trial was completed. At various stages of argument counsel asked us to make several assumptions on matters of evidence which were not before this Court. In some cases the statements made by the accused before the Customs officers were tendered in evidence and were objected to; in other cases even before the statements were tendered in evidence, objections were raised. We may also observe that we are not concerned in these appeals to decide whether the statements relied upon were obtained from persons charged with infraction of the provisions of the Customs Act by officers having authority over them, by inducement, threat or promise having reference to the inquiry made against them. These questions, if raised, have to be decided at the trial of the appellants. The appeals fail and are dismissed." 19. In the instant case the petitioners without raising such objections before the trial Court chose to approach this Court under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code at a time when the complainant has yet to tender substantive as well as corroborative evidence on he guilt of the three accused. In the complaint the names of as many as nine persons were given as witnesses to be examined at the trial of the accused persons. As stated at S.No. 10 of the list of witnesses some more evidence may also be led with the permission of the trial Court. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the prima facie case put forth by the complainant through oral and documentary evidence to be adduced at the trial of the petitioners and Mala Ram, it would be too early a stage to hold that the complainant has no substantive evidence against the petitioner or that the evidence to be led through the confession of Mala Ram accused, being of corroborative character only, is irrelevant and inadmissible or even insufficient in the absence of other substantive evidence. As stated above, the case of the complainant at this initial stage, when the alleged corroborative evidence has not yet even been tendered in evidence against the petitioner, cannot be started with the consideration of the effect of the statement of Mala Ram accused under section 107/108 of the Customs Act, 1962 against the present petitioners. The effect of that statement can be considered after other evidence in the case has been adduced and the statements under section 107/108 of the Customs Act, 1962 are tendered in evidence against the petitioners. At this stage of the proceedings since the allegations made in the complaint and the contents of the documents filed along with it prima facie disclose active and positive participation of the petitioners by abetting the commission of the offences under section 135(1)(i) of the Gold Control Act, 1968, the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate of those offences and summoning the petitioner as co-accused along with Mala Ram accused do not amount to abuse of the process of the Court. 20. In view of the discussion, as made above,, I find the cases relied upon by Mr. Bajwa distinguishable in law in as much as those cases proceeded on the footing that the statements recorded under sections 107, 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 were made by persons who were either "accused of an offence" or "accomplices" and therefore such statements amounted to "confession" covered by 25 of the Evidence Act which footing is not approved of by the Apex Court in Ramesh Chandra's case (supra). It seems to me that the specific provisions contained in Section 138-B of the Customs Act, 1962, which made the statements recorded by the gazetted officer of Customs and signed by the makers thereof (which is the position obtaining in the present case) relevant and admissible evidence for the purpose of proving, in any prosecution for an offence under the Act, the truth of the facts contained therein, escaped the notice of their Lordships of the Bombay High Court and Sharma, J. of this Court. Similarly direct decisions of the Apex Court in Ratnesh Chandra & Veera Ibrahint's cases (supra) on the point also appear to have escaped from the study of their Lordships. Similarly direct decisions of the Apex Court in Ratnesh Chandra & Veera Ibrahint's cases (supra) on the point also appear to have escaped from the study of their Lordships. With utmost respect to their Lordships and for the reasons given above, I am of the opinion that the quashing of the proceedings of the prosecution of the petitioners at this stage is not, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the requirement of the interest of justice. 21. In the result this petition lacks merits and is accordingly dismissed. The point raised and decided in this petition shall not be allowed by the trial Court to be re-agitated before it and the worth and value of the statements of Mala Ram, recorded under sections 107/108 of the Customs Act, 1962, if tendered and proved in evidence by the complainant at the trial of the petitioners and Mala Ram, shall be considered only at the time of final decision of the case. Since the trial has already been considerably delayed and such delay is attributable to the petitioners, the trial Court shall complete the trial as early as possible preferably by hearing the case day to day till its disposal.The parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 28.3.1997.Petition dismissed.