Honble KOKJE, J. – Heard Mr. Dinesh Maheshwari on admission. (2). This is a petition challenging an Order allowing an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as `the Code) filed by the plaintiff proposing an amendment in the plaint adding new ground of eviction or the basis of need of the Grand son of plaintiff No. 1 and son of plaintiff No. 2 who had come of age during the pendency of the suit. (3). The amendment was opposed by the defendant-petitioner on the ground that the nature of the suit would be changed by the amendment as originally the suit was only on the ground of default of payment of rent. It was also contended that instead of filing a fresh suit, the original cause of action itself was being substituted by a different cause of action. (4). Normally, such revision petitions against allowing an amendment in the plaint are disposed of by passing a short Order that it is within the jurisdiction of the trial Court to allow or not to allow an amendment application and the discretion exercised by the trial Court is not normally interfered with. However, as the learned counsel for the petitioner has raised a legal point, I am passing this Order in detail. (5). The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that such amendments were being allowed on the basis of a Division Bench decision of this Court in Prem Lal vs. Jadav Chand (1), which needs reconsideration in the light of a later decision of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar vs. Yesodai Ammal (2). (6). It is seriously contended that the very basis of the Division Bench decision in Prem Lals case was that the grounds of eviction set out under Section 13(1) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short `the Act hereinafter), do not constitute a necessary part of cause of action for eviction and the original cause of action was the determination of jural relationship between the landlord and tenant by serving notice of termination of tenancy. This according to the learned counsel needs to be reconsidered in the light of the V. Dhanapals case (supra), which holds that notice of termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not necessary in a suit for eviction from the tena- ncy premises to which Rent Act applies. (7). To appreciate the correct legal position, the ratio - decidendi of Prem Lals case (supra) as well as V. Chanapals case (supra) has to be taken into account. (8). Prem Pals case went before the Division Bench on a reference doubting the correctness the decision of Jagat Narain, J., in Rajeshwar Dayal vs. Padam Kumar Kothari (3) and reiterated by him in Kedarnath vs. Pana Devi (4), holding that an application by the plaintiff for amendment of the plaint seeking to introduce a new ground of eviction viz. on the ground of default based on clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, cannot be allowed under Section 153 or Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where such ground arises after the institution of a suit for the eviction of the defendant on one or more of the grounds set forth in Section 13(1) of the Act, inasmuch as that would be tantamount to allowing the plaintiff to include a cause of action which had not accrued on the date of the decision. (9). In Rajeshwar Dayal and Kedarnaths cases (supra), the learned single Jud- ge had proceeded on the assumption that the existence of one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 13(1) of the Act constitutes a necessary part of the cause of action for eviction of a tenant for accommodation and therefore where such a ground after institution of the suit on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 13(1) of the Act, the plaintiff cannot be permitted to amend the plaint to introduce such a ground/s. The learned single Judge had held that the Court had no power either under Section 153 or under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code to allow an amendment of the plaint so as to include a cause of action which had not accrued on the date of the suit. (10). (10). The Division Bench disagreeing with the learned single Judge held that he had proceeded on a wrong premises in assuming that incorporation of a new ground in a suit brought by the landlord under Section 13(1) of the Act due to subsequent event cannot be permitted under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code as there was no warrant for such a proposition. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhaiya Punjalal Ghagwanddin vs. Dave Bhagwat Prasad Prabhu Prasad (5) and M/s. Raval and Co. vs. K.G. Ramchandra (6), the Division Bench observed that the grounds constituted under Section 13(1) of the Act are nothing but conditions upon which a decree can be passed or eviction ordered. The existence of one or more of the grounds mentioned is Section 13(1) of the Act, therefore, does not constitute a necessary part of the cause of action in a suit for eviction of a tenant from an accommodation. What constitutes the cause of action is the termination of the tenancy by service of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The grounds but make it possible to get the relief of ejectment. No doubt, the plaintiff has to allege the existence of one or more of the grounds specified in Section 13(1) of the Act and has the burden of proving that such grounds exist, but the existence of the grounds is not a part of the cause of action. If any of such grounds exists, the tenant is not entitled to any protection from eviction. The Court has, therefore, to see if any of the grounds exists, as in that event, the suit would be maintainable. Thus, Section 13(1) of the Act is nothing but a procedural restriction and does not create a substantive right. (11). After referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Qudrat Ullah vs. Municipal Board Bareilly (7), Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu vs. The Motor & General Traders (8) and Shri Rattan Lal vs. Shri Vardesh Chander (9), the Division Bench in paragraphs 18, 27 and 30 had observed as follows :– ``Para 18 ``It would thus appear that the cause of action for a suit for eviction is based on the fact that there is a valid determination of the lease under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The existence of one or more of the grounds under Section 13(1) of the Act is but a condition on which the fetters placed against the execution of a decree for eviction can be removed. ``Para 27: ``The effect of allowing the amendment will not alter the nature and character of the suit, nor will it cause any prejudice to the defendant. It still remains a suit based on the original cause of action i.e., on determination of the jural relationship of the landlord and the tenant. There is no question of taking away from the defendant any legal right which has accrued to him by lapse of time, nor does the amendment introduce a totally different, new and inconsistent case. Para 30 : ``The present trend of the Supreme Court decisions referred to above does lend support to the view that Sec. 13(1) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 is only a procedural res- triction and does not create a substantive right. The landlord sets out the ``grounds of ejectment in the plaint, not because they constitute his cause of action, but in anticipation of the tenant claiming the protection provided in Section 13(1) of the Act, to show that conditions have arisen which have taken away the protection of the tenant and removed the impediment in the way of the landlord recovering possession. In our opinion, the grounds mentioned in Section 13(1) of the Act, therefore, do not constitute a necessary part of the cause of action for eviction of the tenant from an accommodation. (12). The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that the very basis of the decision of the Division Bench in Prem Lals case (supra) is that the original cause of action in a suit for ejectment is the termination of tenancy by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. According to the learned counsel this basis has been knocked out by the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanapals case (supra) wherein it has been held that notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act is not necessary for maintaining a suit for eviction for an accommodation to which State Rent Control Act applies. According to the learned counsel this basis has been knocked out by the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanapals case (supra) wherein it has been held that notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act is not necessary for maintaining a suit for eviction for an accommodation to which State Rent Control Act applies. The learned counsel on this basis contended that when notice terminating the tenancy was not the basic cause of action for a suit, the existence of ground of eviction under Section 13(1) of the Act will have to be taken as a cause of action. V. Dhanpals case (supra) has therefore to be examined with the angle as to whether it lays down expressly or by necessary implication that grounds of eviction under State Act could constitute cause of action. A careful reading of the entire decision leads us to the conclusion that nei- ther the question as to whether termination of tenancy by serving a notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act would constitute a cause of action for a suit for ejectment nor the question as to whether grounds for eviction required to be proved under the State Rent Control Act would constitute causes of action were the posers in that case. What was decided in that case was summarized at the end of paragraph 18 of that judgment as follows : ``. . . . But on the first assumption we have taken a different view of the matter and have come to the conclusion that determination of a lease in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary and a mere surplusage because the landlord cannot get eviction of the tenant even after such determination. The tenant continues to be so even thereafter. That being so, making out a case under the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself is sufficient and it is not obligatory to found the proceeding on the basis of the determination of the lease by issue of notice in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. (13). This cannot be construed to mean that the Supreme Court has held that the notice terminating the tenancy did not constitute a cause of action or the grounds to be proved for getting an order of eviction under the Rent Act did constitute separate cause of action. (13). This cannot be construed to mean that the Supreme Court has held that the notice terminating the tenancy did not constitute a cause of action or the grounds to be proved for getting an order of eviction under the Rent Act did constitute separate cause of action. Moreover, in Paragraph 24 of the decision in Prem Lals case (supra), the Division Bench has also held that in a given fact situation, the cause of action which has arisen subsequent to the filing of the suit could also be allowed to be relied upon by way of amendment. It would be useful to reproduce Paragraph 24 to imbibe the full implication of the decision on this aspect. ``The dictum of Swift J., in Eshelby vs. Federated European Bank Ltd., (1932 (1) K.B. 254)on which Jagat Narain J., relies, lays down that a plaintiff cannot except by consent, amend and set up a cause of action which has accrued since the issue of the writ. In the Court of Appeal, the majority of the learned Lord Justices expressed no opi- nion on the question. That apart, the strict rule enunciated by Swift J., is not strictly adhered to. There is no inflexible rule that a cause of action arising subsequent to the filing of a suit cannot be added by way of an amendment, introduction of a new case is no ground for refusal so long as the defendant has an opportunity of meeting the new case by amendment of written statement and by leading evidence in support of that defence. (14). It is therefore clear that in accordance with the view taken by the Division Bench in Prem Lals case (supra), even if we assume that every ground of eviction enumerated in Section 13(1) of the Act, constitutes a separate cause of action, there is no prohibition against allowing a cause of action arising subsequent to the filing of the suit being relied upon by way of amendment. (15). In the light of the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that V. Dhanapal Chettiar vs. Yesodai Ammals case (supra) will have no effect on the correctness and efficacy of the decision in Prem Lals case (supra). (16). This revision petition has to be and is hereby dismissed without notice to the other side.