JUDGMENT Tej Shanker, J. 1. This appeal has arisen out of an order dated 27.7.1993 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Basoda, whereby the Tribunal has awarded interim award of Rs. 7,500/- against the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 including the appellant. 2. Learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection that the appeal is not maintainable in view of the fact that it is an interim award of Rs. 7,500/- and in view of the provisions made under Section 173(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, no appeal lies against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than Rs. 10,000/-. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the occurrence had taken place in the year 1983, when the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was in force and as such the law applicable at that time shall apply. In support of his contention he placed reliance upon Ramesh Singh v. Cinta Devi 1996 ACJ 730 (SC), wherein the Apex Court held that where a claim was instituted under the old Act, it has to be disposed of in accordance with the old Act even if the new Act has come into force. 3. Learned counsel pointed out that under the provisions of Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, under Sub-section (2) thereof appeal shall not lie against the award which was less than Rs. 2,000/-, hence provisions of Section 173(2) of the new Act are not applicable. 4. On merits, learned Counsel contended that under Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, liability with respect to death or permanent disability of a person resulting from accident was of the owner of the vehicle or the owners of the vehicles jointly or severally. Driver was not mentioned therein. The appellant was admittedly a driver, hence no liability can be fastened against him. Learned counsel, therefore, urged that the appeal be allowed. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand argued on merits that the liability of the owner is vicarious under the Act in case of the driver and as such the driver can also be made liable. I have given my anxious thought to the arguments advanced before me by the learned Counsel for the parties. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand argued on merits that the liability of the owner is vicarious under the Act in case of the driver and as such the driver can also be made liable. I have given my anxious thought to the arguments advanced before me by the learned Counsel for the parties. The principle of law that the law which was prevalent at the time of accident has to be applied has been set at rest by the Apex Court in aforesaid case of Ramesh Singh 1996 ACJ 730 (SC). Thus, there is not much to say on this point. If we apply the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, we find that Section 110-D makes a provision for appeals. Sub-section (2) bars an appeal against the award passed by a Claims Tribunal if the amount awarded is less than Rs. 2,000/-. Admittedly, the interim award in the present case is of Rs. 7,500/- and as such, it cannot be said that the appeal is barred. I, therefore, hold that the appeal is maintainable. 6. Now, I come to the merits. It may be mentioned that under Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, provision for liability to pay compensation is made in case of a death or permanent disability of any person resulting from accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. Under this provision, owner of the vehicle or the owners of the vehicles jointly and severally have been made liable to pay the compensation in respect of such death or disability in accordance with the provisions of that section. The section does not make any provision for any liability against the driver. Of course, the liability of the owner is vicarious as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the respondents, but as there is no specific provision for fastening liability on the driver under this Act, driver cannot be made personally liable for any compensation, as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant. In this view of the matter, the appellant cannot be made responsible to pay any amount as compensation either jointly or severally. Consequently, the appeal has to be accepted. 7. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and it is held that the appellant, who is a driver admittedly, is not liable to pay any amount of compensation. In this view of the matter, the appellant cannot be made responsible to pay any amount as compensation either jointly or severally. Consequently, the appeal has to be accepted. 7. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and it is held that the appellant, who is a driver admittedly, is not liable to pay any amount of compensation. Costs of the appeal shall, however, remain easy.