Honble YADAV, J. – Instant Appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 12.2.86 passed by learned District Judge, Tonk in Civil Suit No. 8/79 whereby he decreed the suit of the plaintiff-respondent for specific performance and cancelled the registered sale deed executed by Ram Deva/appellant No. 1 in favour of Ram Kumar on 30.8.77 and another sale deed executed by Ram Kumar in favour of Ram Niwas on 10.7.79. (2). Brief facts giving rise to this appeal are that the plaintiff/respondent filed a suit in the court of District and Sessions Judge, Tonk for specific performance of the written agreement dated 1.8.72. On the basis of written agreement dated 1.8.72 for Rs. 8,500/-, it was pleaded that the land bearing Khasra No. 3313 (old Khasra No. 2966) Raqba 3 Biswa and Khasra No. 3315 (old Khasra No. 2968) Raqba 1 Bigha 4 Biswa out of 000 Bigha 12 Biswa situated in village Garbi Tonk was agreed to be sold. It was further pleaded that the remaining land of 8 biswa of Khasra No. 3315 was also agreed to be sold by defendant Ram Deva to Kana for a consideration of Rs. 7,000/- on 5.4.76 orally in presence of witnesses and the said amount of Rs. 7,000/- was paid to defendant No. 1. According to the averments made in the plaint, the possession of both the plots mentioned in the written agreement and oral agreement mentioned in the written agreement and oral agreement was handed over to the plaintiff by the defendant No. 1 Ram Deva. It is also pleaded by the plaintiff that it was agreed upon between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1/Ram Deva that the defendant No. 1 Ram Deva will redeem the mortgage of the land in question from Bhumi Vikas Bank, Tonk within a period of three years and there after redemption the mortgage from the aforesaid bank he will execute a sale-deed in favour of plaintiff-respondent. It is also averred that instead of executing the sale-deed in favour of defendant No. 1 he has now sold the land to defendant No. 2, Raj Kumar on 30.8.77 on alleged consideration of Rs. 5,000/- and in quick succession the defendant No. 2 Raj Kumar executed a sale-deed in favour of defendant No. 3 Ram Niwas on 10.7.79. It is also averred that instead of executing the sale-deed in favour of defendant No. 1 he has now sold the land to defendant No. 2, Raj Kumar on 30.8.77 on alleged consideration of Rs. 5,000/- and in quick succession the defendant No. 2 Raj Kumar executed a sale-deed in favour of defendant No. 3 Ram Niwas on 10.7.79. It is prayed by the plaintiff that the aforesaid two registered sale-deed executed by Ram Deva in favour of defendant No. 2 Raj Kumar and subsequent sale-deed by Raj Kumar in favour of defendant No. 3-Ram Niwas on 10.7.79 are sham transactions and as such these two sale deeds are void ab initio and as such are liable to be cancelled. (3). Defendant No. 1 filed his written statement alleging therein that no written agreement was executed on 1.8.72 by him in favour of plaintiff-respondent Kana to sell the land bearing Khasra No. 2966 and 2968 and he did not receive any amount of Rs. 8,500/- as consideration. The defendant No. 1 also denied the oral agreement dated 5.4.76 and denied receipt of consideration of Rs. 7,000/-. (4). It is pertinent to mention that the defendant No. 1 admitted the mortgage of land with Bhumi Vikas Bank, Tonk. He further admitted that he executed a sale-deed in favour of defendant No. 2 for a consideration of Rs. 5,000/- who has executed another registered sale-deed in favour of defendant No. 3 Ram Niwas on 10.7.79 his son for consideration of Rs. 6,000/- and possession of land has been handed over to defendant No. 3, Ram Niwas. The defendant No. 3 also filed a separate written statement wherein he denied the plaint allegation. He reiterated the averments made in the written statement of defendant No. 1 his father Ram Deva with an additional plea that he is a bone fide purchaser for value. It is alleged that mutation was opened in his name and the same was not challenged by the plaintiff therefore it has attained finality and he is de-barred from questioning the sale- deed executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 on 30.8. 77 and the subsequent sale-deed dated 10.7.79 in his favour. (5). It is alleged that mutation was opened in his name and the same was not challenged by the plaintiff therefore it has attained finality and he is de-barred from questioning the sale- deed executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 on 30.8. 77 and the subsequent sale-deed dated 10.7.79 in his favour. (5). On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court framed as many as 13 issues, focussing the attention of the plaintiff and defendants to adduce evidence with regard to their respective claims. (6). In support of his case the plaintiff examined PW 1 Jagannath, PW 2 Kanhaiya Lal, PW 3 Imamuddin, PW 4 Bhura, PW 5 Chothu and PW 6 Chandmal and also filed documentary evidence. In rebuttal the defendant examined DW 1 Ram Deva, DW 2 Ram Niwas, DW 3 Zubed Ahmad, DW 4 Gop and DW 5 Raj Kumar. (7). Learned trial court treated issues No. 7,8,9 and 11 as preliminary issues and after hearing the learned counsel for the parties decided the same on 23.4.81. In the judgment dated 23.4.81 issue No. 7 was decided in favour of plaintiff-respondent whereas issues No. 8,9 and 11 could not be decided as a preliminary issues in absence of evidence, therefore, it was held that these issues are required to be decided along with issue No. 6, after evidence. The finding recorded by learned trial court on 23.4.81 on issue No. 7 has been made part of this judgment. (8). The learned trial court after analytical discussion of the oral and documentary evidence on record decreed the suit of the plaintiff for specific performance of the written agreement mentioned in the preceding paragraph of this judgment and cancelled both the sale-deeds dated 30.8.77 executed by Ram Deva in favour of Ram Kumar and subsequent sale deed executed by Ram Kumar in favour of Ram Niwas on 10.7.79. The defendant appellants were restrained to interfere in the peaceful possession of the plaintiff-respondents and they were further directed to execute a sale deed within a period of one month in favour of plaintiff- respondent failing which the sale-deed would be executed through the court in favour of plaintiff-respondent. (9). I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the judgment given by the learned trial court. (10). (9). I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the judgment given by the learned trial court. (10). From the rival contentions raised at the Bar, in the present appeal, the following points for determination emerge:– 1. Whether in First Appeal it is incumbent upon the appellants to show some reason that the judgment under appeal given by learned trial court should be set aside ? 2. What is the extent of re-evaluation of oral evidence adduced by the parties before first appellate court ? 3. Whether the suit filed by plaintiff-respondent on 6.7.89 was within limitation ? 4. Whether in the present case the plaintiff-respondent has successfully proved written agreement to sell dated 1.8.72 and oral agreement dated 5.4.76 and payment of consideration thereof, together with delivery of possession in pursuance of aforesaid two agreements to sell? In the present case it would be pertinent to mention that plaintiff-respondent Kana is son-in-law of Ram Deva defendant appellant No. 1 and he is brother-in-law of Ram Niwas defendant No. 3. It is true as stated at the Bar that Ram Kumar in whose favour sale-deed was executed by defendant No. 1 Ram Deva on 30.8.77 for a consideration of Rs. 5,000/- is a stranger to the family of defendant No. 1 and 3. POINTS FOR DETERMINATION NO. 1 AND 2 :– Since points for determination No. 1 and 2 are inter-linked therefore they are dealt with together : (12). It is to be imbibed that in very First Appeal it is necessary on the part of appellant to show some reason why the decree under appeal passed against him should be set aside. There must be some points in his favour when all the evidence and circumstances are considered together to justify the alteration of the judgment given by trial Court. The first appellate court after reappreciation of evidence can reverse the finding of trial court only if the contradictions in the oral statements are either so glaring which could not be reconciled or oral evidence are found to be inconsistent with some admissible documentary evidence or where oral evidence is excluded under Indian Evidence Act or for any other compelling reason anologous to the aforesaid grounds. (13). (13). I am of the view that a first appellate court while re- evaluating the testimonial value of oral evidence evaluated by the learned trial court is not in the same advantageous position in which the learned trial Judge was while evaluating the oral evidence at the trial stage, therefore, in my considered opinion duty is cast upon the appellate court in such cases to see whether the evidence taken as a whole can reasonably justify the conclusion upon which the trial court had arrived, or whether there is an element of improbability arising from the number of circumstances which in the opinion of the appellate court outweighed the findings of fact recorded by trial court. QUESTION NO. 3 : (14). With the aforesaid introspection now I would like to appreciate the argument raised at the Bar. It is argued at the first instance by the learned counsel for appellant that the instant suit was not within limitation. It is borne out from the record that suit was filed and was registered before the learned trial Judge on 6.7.79. The question of limitation was treated to be a preliminary issue No. 7 along with issues No. 8,9 and 11. The learned trial Judge decided the aforesaid issue of limitation treating it to be a preliminary issue on 23.4.81 and held that the suit was within limitation. (15). It is evident from the perusal of paragraph 2 of the plaint that plaintiff respondent has clearly stated that it was agreed upon between the parties that the defendant No. 1 Ram Deva after redeeming the mortgage of the land in question from Bhumi Vikas Bank, Tonk will execute a sale-deed within a period of three years from the date of redemption of mortgage from the bank. The defendant has filed his written statement wherein although he admitted its redemption but its date of redemption has not been disclosed for the reasons best known to the defendant appellants. The averments made in Paragraph 2 of the plaint are conclusively proved by the plaintiff-respondent by producing written agreement executed by defendant-appellant No. 1 in his favour on 1.8.72 wherein there is a specific stipu- lation to the effect that after redemption from the bank he will execute a sale-deed in favour of plaintiff-respondent within three years. (16). The averments made in Paragraph 2 of the plaint are conclusively proved by the plaintiff-respondent by producing written agreement executed by defendant-appellant No. 1 in his favour on 1.8.72 wherein there is a specific stipu- lation to the effect that after redemption from the bank he will execute a sale-deed in favour of plaintiff-respondent within three years. (16). For deciding the question about limitation I consider it just and proper to quote Article 54 of the Indian Limitation Act which reads thus :– ``54 For specific performance of a contract the date fixed for the per- formance, or if no such date is fixed when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. In the agreement dated 1.8.72, no specific date is fixed, therefore, limitation will begin to run in the present suit from the date of refusal of the performance by the defendant No. 1. It is specifically alleged in the plaint and also proved by the oral evidence that the plaintiff-respondent was constantly making request from defendant No. 1, Ram Deva to execute a sale-deed in his favour but he did not execute the same. When he executed sale deed in favour of Ram Kumar on 30.8.77 for alleged consideration of Rs. 5,000/- he was scared. (18). The learned trial court in the present case has rightly arrived at a conclusion that the defendant No. 1 Ram Deva did not concede request of the plaintiff-respondent to execute a sale- deed in his favour but when he executed the aforesaid sale-deed in favour of Ram Kumar on 30.8.77 then the said date should be taken to be refusal to execute the sale-deed in his favour. (19). In my considered opinion in the present case limitation of three years would begin to run from the date of execution of sale-deed by Ram Deva in favour of Ram Kumar on 30.8.77. As the suit was filed on 6.7.79 therefore it was well within limitation and an argument contrary to it is devoid of merit, therefore, it is hereby repelled. The learned trial court has committed no error in holding that the present suit was filed within limitation. QUESTION NO. 4 : (20). As the suit was filed on 6.7.79 therefore it was well within limitation and an argument contrary to it is devoid of merit, therefore, it is hereby repelled. The learned trial court has committed no error in holding that the present suit was filed within limitation. QUESTION NO. 4 : (20). The learned counsel for appellant strenuously argued before me that plaintiff-respondent has examined himself as PW 2 in the present case and in his oral statement he has clearly stated that he has paid only 8,000/- as a consideration on the date of written agreement dated 1.8.72 whereas from the written agreement Ex. 1 it is apparent that Rs. 8500/- was paid as a consideration by him to the defendant No. 1 Ram Deva. According to the learned counsel for appellant the contradiction in the deposition of the plaintiff-respondent is fatal and it indicates that no written agreement was executed by the defendant No. 1 in his favour on 1.8.72. Suffice it to say in this regard that in such a situation, the defendant was under legal obligation to get the aforesaid statement contradictated as postulated under Sec. 145 of Indian Evidence Act during his cross-examination in failure to do so the defendants are not entitled to get benefit of the aforesaid contractions. (21). The aforesaid argument of the learned counsel for appellant is not tena- ble inasmuch as Sec. 145 of Evidence Act casts a duty upon the defendant to contradict during the course of cross- examination not only to the previous statements made by plaintiff in writing but also any other thing which is reduced into writing and relating to the matters in question. When the written agreement Ex. 1 was not shown to the plaintiff-respondent during the course of his cross-examina- tion for purpose of contradicting him the defendants cannot be allowed to rely upon the contradiction pointed out by their counsel regarding payment of Rs. 8,500/- written in the written agreement Ex. 1. The plaintiff was entitled to have been given an opportunity to explain after showing the written agreement Ex. 1 regarding the contradiction pointed out by the learned counsel for appellant. (22). The learned counsel for appellant urged before me that if written agreement Ex. 1 would have been shown then the plaintiff- respondent who was examined as PW 2 would have explained the contradiction. 1 regarding the contradiction pointed out by the learned counsel for appellant. (22). The learned counsel for appellant urged before me that if written agreement Ex. 1 would have been shown then the plaintiff- respondent who was examined as PW 2 would have explained the contradiction. As a matter of fact the aforesaid contention made by the learned counsel for appellant runs counter to the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sec. 145 of Evidence Act. As a matter of fact, the aforesaid contradiction has been explained fully by PW 5 Chottu who has stated in his deposition before the trial court that Rs. 500/- was paid to defendant No. 1, Ram Deva two or three days before the Rs. 8000/- was paid to him by the plaintiff-respondent Kana on the date of execution of agreement Ex. 1. (23). In view of the facts and circumstances as discussed above, the defen- dant-appellants have no justification to rely upon the aforesaid contradiction regarding payment of consideration at the time of agreement Ex. 1. As regards oral agreement dated 5.4.76 it has been duly proved by the oral evidence adduced by plaintiff-respondent and no contradiction has been pointed out in this regard. (24). As regards the genuineness of the execution of written agreement Ex. 1 and oral agreement dated 5.4.76 and about delivery of possession on the date of both the agreements, the learned counsel for appellant has pointed out some minor contradictions in the statements of witnesses examined by the plaintiff- respondent. These minor contradictions of inconsequential nature having no bearing has already been discussed by the learned trial court with which I am in full agreement. (25). It is well to remember that only tutored witnesses can be expected to repeat the same thing. These minor contradictions pointed out by the learned counsel for appellant occurred due to the fact that the statements of these witne- sses were examined after expiry of about 10 years. The executness of statements of PW 1 to 5 cannot be adjudged on the ground of mechanical process. These witnesses cannot be expected to state the same things as `tap-records. The human memory and human perception differ from man to man, therefore, the minor contradictions of inconsequential nature pointed out by the learned counsel for appellant have no bearing on the merits of the case. (26). These witnesses cannot be expected to state the same things as `tap-records. The human memory and human perception differ from man to man, therefore, the minor contradictions of inconsequential nature pointed out by the learned counsel for appellant have no bearing on the merits of the case. (26). A close scrutiny of the judgment given by the learned trial court reveals that these contradictions were pointed out before it which has been rejected after giving cogent and convincing reasons by the learned trial court. The minor contradictions which were pointed out before the learned trial court are being again re- peated before this court which is not acceptable for the reasons stated above. I am in full agreement with the finding recorded by learned trial court on the questions of possession, consideration and genuineness of two agreements in question. (27). In my considered opinion, the learned trial court has committed no error in appreciating the oral and documentary evidence in its judgment, hence it deser- ves to be affirmed. The findings recorded by learned trial court are eminently just and proper which is hereby upheld. (28). As a result of aforementioned discussion, the instant appeal lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed. Both the parties are directed to bear their own costs.