ORDER T.S. Doabia, J. Shri P.L. Jain, Advocate for the Petitioner. The Respondent has been served. No one has put in appearance on behalf of Respondent. The short submission which has been made in this petition is that even though a decree of specific performance has been passed in favour of the Petitioner, the Petitioner has been deprived of the full benefits of the decree. The argument which prevailed with the executing Court was that in the decree which was passed, relief of specific performance of agreement was ordered and there was nothing mentioned therein that the possession is also to be delivered to the successful Plaintiff. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has placed reliance on a decision given by this Court in the case reported as Bata Shoe Co. v. Preetamdas, 1982 MPLJ 560 : 1983 JLJ 422 . In the aforementioned case, it has been specifically held that even if in the decree there is no provision directing delivery of possession even then, the executing Court can order delivery of possession. Para 18 of the Order is relevant and it be noticed: The next objection is that as the decree is only for specific performance, but does not contain a direction for delivery of possession, the delivery of possession could not be ordered by the Court below. The case on which reliance is placed by the learned Counsel is a case reported in one AIR 1948 406 (Nagpur) . It would be relevant for considering this case that the decree which was the subject matter of consideration in this decision, the relevant portion of the decree has been quoted by the learned Judge in his judgment and it reads: It is ordered that the Plaintiff do deposit in Court for payment to the Defendant on or before 28-8-34 the sum of Rs. 2,402-12-0 and it is further ordered that the Plaintiff do produce and file in Court the necessary stamp paper for the execution of sale-deed on or before 28-8-34. It is further decreed that on the Plaintiff's doing this the Defendant shall execute the necessary sale-deed conveying the house described below to the Plaintiff and shall get it registered at the cost of the Plaintiff, and that the sum of Rs. It is further decreed that on the Plaintiff's doing this the Defendant shall execute the necessary sale-deed conveying the house described below to the Plaintiff and shall get it registered at the cost of the Plaintiff, and that the sum of Rs. 386-4-0, be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff on account of costs of this suit in case Plaintiff does not deduct this sum from the sale price. It is, therefore, clear that in this decree there was a specific direction for execution and registration of a sale-deed only, and the learned Judge came to the conclusion that a direction for delivery of possession could not be given. The learned Counsel also referred to another decision reported in Dadulal Hanumanlala v. Deo Kunwar, 1962 MPLJ 328 : 1963 JLJ 234 which has taken a contrary view. In this decision Order 21, Rule 32, CPC read with Rule 34 thereof were specifically considered and it was held that a decree-holder is entitled to a direction for delivery of possession in execution of a decree for specific performance. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that there appears to be a conflict in these two decisions. This conflict has been settled by a Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 6 of 1968, decided on 30-11-71, and it has now been held by this Court in that decision as under: Thus, not only there was a specific stipulation in the agreement of sale about delivery of possession but also there was a specific prayer in the relief clause of the plaint. However, it appears that the learned Additional District Judge merely mentioned that specific performance was being granted. Therefore, the question arises whether the relief of delivery of possession should be deemed to have been refused. It is true that ordinarily where the Court does not grant a particular relief, it ought to be deemed to have been refused. But, in the present case in view of the specific clause in the agreement of sale and a specific prayer in the relief clause of the plaint, the Court, in our opinion will be deemed to have granted all the relief clause claimed by the Plaintiff in the plaint when no part of the Plaintiff's claim was dismissed by the trial Judge and the suit was decreed in its entirety. The omission to mention the relief of delivery of possession under such circumstances will, in our opinion, not be fatal to the Plaintiff's case that he has been given all the reliefs claimed in the plaint. Thus, the controversy which was there prior to the coming into force of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, would not arise in the present case and it is no more necessary to resolve the conflict of views in the present appeal. But considered as a whole, we feel that the learned Single Judge was right in holding that the Executing Court under the circumstances was empowered to deliver possession of the property to the Respondent. In this view of the matter, the judgment-debtor Appellant's objection was rightly rejected and we see no reason to take a different view. Following the view expressed by this Court which view is based on earlier Division Bench decision of this Court, it is held that the person in whose favour decree of specific performance is passed is entitled to possession also. The decision given to the contrary by the Court below is set aside. The executing Court would now proceed according to law. As there is no opposition, there would be no order as to the costs. This petition is disposed of accordingly.