M. S. A. Siddiqui ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment dated 24. 10. 1994 passed by the M. A. C. T. Delhi, whereby the amount of compensation of Rs. 50,000. 00 as claimed by the appellant was awarded to him. ( 2 ) THE appellant moved the M. A. C. T. Delhi seeking damages to the tune ofrs. 50,000. 00 for the injuries sustained by him in a motor accident. The Tribunaldecreed the said claim but did not allow interest on the facts and circumstances ofthe case. Learned Counsel for the appellant has assailed the impugned award on theground that the learned Tribunal has erroneously exercised his discretion indisallowing interest on amount of compensation. ( 3 ) RELIANCE has been placed on the dedsion of the Apex Court in Ramesh Chandra v. Randhir Singh and Ors. 1990 ACJ 777 (SC), in support of the said contention. Their Lordships have observed that: ". . . . The question of award of interest is dependent on the claim beingallowed. Should the claim be not allowed, the question of grant of interestwould not arise and if awardable, it is in addition to the amount ofcompensation. The Court or Tribunal in these circumstances, should determine, in the first instance, claim for compensation and in the event of itsbeing allowed can further exercise the discretion to grant simple interest interms thereof, but as an additive to the amount of compensation. So theaddition of interest to the compensation, by judicial discretion, is sequentialin the eye of law and no claim in that regard in our view, specifically needbe laid in so many words in the claim petition. The grant of interest, in ourview, is not dependent on any plead ings in that regard and can even be orallyasked if the contingency arises. " ( 4 ) NECDLESS to say that the grant of interest in claim cases filed under the M. V. Act is a discretion vested in the Tribunal. It is however, clear that the discretionvested in the Tribunal must be properly and judicially exercised. It would bedifficult and it is indeed inexpedient to lay down any inflexible rules which shouldgovern the exercise of the said discretion. As observed by Bowen L. J. in Gardner v. Jay, (1885) 29 Ch. D. 50 page 58,that discretion, like other judicial discretion, mustbe exercised according to common sense and according to justice". It would bedifficult and it is indeed inexpedient to lay down any inflexible rules which shouldgovern the exercise of the said discretion. As observed by Bowen L. J. in Gardner v. Jay, (1885) 29 Ch. D. 50 page 58,that discretion, like other judicial discretion, mustbe exercised according to common sense and according to justice". It is well-settledthat in dealing with the matter raised before it at the appellate stage the Appellatecourt would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretionunder appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trialstage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. Thus, it is ordinarily not opento the Appellate Court to substitute its own exercise of discretion for that of the Trialcourt. ( 5 ) THE point that arises in this appeal is whether the exercise of discretion bythe Tribunal in disallowing interest is in law wrongful and improper. In para 15 ofthe impugned judgment, the Tribunal has assigned reasons for disallowing interest. According to the Tribunal, the claim petition was filed on 17. 5. 1976. The process fee,etc. was not deposited by the appellant for suffidently long time, which causedconsiderable delay in summoning the respondents. After respondents, appearanceissues were framed on 18. 8. 1981. Thereafter, the appellant did not take effectivesteps to procure attendance of his witnesses as a result whereof the case underwentunmeritted adjournments from 9. 10. 1981 till 1993. However, on 12. 4. 1993, thetribunal closed the appellant s evidence. This clearly shows that the appellant wasresponsible for the delay in disposal of this case. Keeping in view of the said conductof the appellant, it cannot be held that the Tribunal has acted unreasonably orcapriciously or has adopted an unjudicial approach in disallowing interest on theamount of compensation. ( 6 ) HAVING regard to all the circumstances and facts of this case, I am notdisposed to hold that a case for interference of this case has been made out by theappellant. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.