JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J. :- This is a tenants revision against the judgment dated 10.10.1996 passed by Appellate Authority (2), Shimla. By means of impugned judgment, Appellate Authority below has allowed the appeal filed by the landlords-respondents and has set aside the order of the Rent Controller below. While allowing the appeal of the landlords-respondents, the eviction petition has been remanded to the Rent Controller (1), Shimla for disposal in accordance with law. This judgment has been questioned by the tenants in this revision petition. 2. In order to properly understand the controversy involved in this revision, it is necessary to refer to a few material facts relevant in this case. Landlords filed the ejectment petition against the tenants on the ground of premises having been sub let by New Bank of India to Punjab National Bank, and the latter being in exclusive possession of the entire premises without any consent of the landlords. Further case of the landlords was that it is the P.N.B. through its Regional Manager and employees and servants who is in exclusive possession of the entire tenanted premises. It was further the case of the landlords that the premises in question were initially let out by means of a registered lease deed on 15.6.1974 to New Bank of India. Landlords had reason to believe that under Notification issued by Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Banking Division), on 4.9.1993 New Bank of India was amalgamated with the Punjab National Bank and all assets and liabilities of New Bank of India were taken over by the Punjab National Bank. 3. This petition was contested and resisted by the tenants who pleaded that this is not a case of sub letting or parting with possession, rather due to amalgamation of New Bank of India with Punjab National Bank name has been changed and staff has swapped places. A notification of such amalgamation was issued under Section 9 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970. Thus the claim of the landlords was repudiated by the tenants. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, trial Court framed following issues on 24.2.1994 1. Whether the respondent No. 1 has sub let the premises to respondents No.2 and 3? OPA 2. Whether the respondents No.2 and 3 have become tenants by operation of law? OPR 3. Whether the petition is not maintainable? OPR. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, trial Court framed following issues on 24.2.1994 1. Whether the respondent No. 1 has sub let the premises to respondents No.2 and 3? OPA 2. Whether the respondents No.2 and 3 have become tenants by operation of law? OPR 3. Whether the petition is not maintainable? OPR. 4. Relief. 4. Record of the Rent Controller below shows that an application was filed by the tenants. As per this application, it was proposed to raise two additional pleas in order to defeat the claim of the landlords namely, that the premises in dispute were public premises and tenant being a corporation established under law as such proceedings for its ejectment from the public premises was not maintainable before the Rent Controller, but was competent before special authority constituted under the Public Premises (Eviction of Un-authorised occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Public Premises Act), and thus Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the matter: Oilier plea was that the petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground that the erstwhile New Bank of India had merged with the Punjab National Bank and thus the erstwhile New Bank of India is honest. This application is at page 36 of the trial Court file on which itself learned counsel for the landlords has made endorsement not objected. Vide its order dated 26.9.1994 the amendment of reply by the tenants was allowed and following additional issues were framed: 3-A Whether the premises in question 3re public premises, as alleged? OPR 3-B Whether the respondent New Bank of India has merged with Punjab National Bank, if so, its effect ? OPR While framing addition issues, Issue No.3-A was ordered to be taken up as preliminary issue as no evidence was to be examined by the tenants. Finally vide its order dated 25.11.1995, it was held that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain the eviction petition since the premises were public premises and consequently, the eviction petition was dismissed. 5. Against the order of dismissal of their eviction petition, landlords preferred an appeal wherein the impugned order has been passed, which is the subject matter of this revision petition. 5. Against the order of dismissal of their eviction petition, landlords preferred an appeal wherein the impugned order has been passed, which is the subject matter of this revision petition. At this stage it may be appropriate to notice the provisions of Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act, which is to the following effect: 2(e) "Public premises "means (1) any premises belonging to, taken on lease, or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the Central Government, and includes any such premises which have been placed by the Government, whether before or after the commencement of the Public Premises (Eviction of Un-authorised Occupants) Amendment Act, 1980, under the control of the Secretariat of either House of Parliament for providing residential accommodation to any member of the staff of that Secretariat; (2) Any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by or on behalf of ,— (i) any company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central Government or any company which is a subsidiary (within the meaning of that Act) of the first-mentioned company, (ii) any Corporation (not being a company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act,"1956 (1 of 1956). or a local authority) established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government, (iii) any University established or incorporated by any Central Act, (iv) any Institute incorporate by the Institutes of Technology Act, 1961 (59 of 1961) (v) Any Board of Trustees constituted under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 (38 of 1963), (vi) The-Bhakra Management Board constituted under Section 79 of the Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966 (31 of 1966), and that Board as and when renamed as the Bhakra -Beas Management Board under sub-section (6) of Section 80 of the Act; (vii) any State Government or the Government of any Union Territory situated in the National Capital Territory of Delhi or in any other Union Territory ; (viii) any Cantonment Board constituted under the Cantonments A 1924 (2 of 1924);and (3) In relation to the (National Capital Territory of Delhi).— (i) any premises belonging to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, any municipal committee or notified area committee, (ii) any premises belonging to the Delhi Development Authority whether such premises are in the possession of, or leased out by] the said Authority, (and). (iii) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned Ira or on behalf of any State Government or the Government of any Union Territory).. 6. From the narration of the above facts, it is clear that both New Bank of India the original lessee of the premises in question and subsequent Bank with which the tenant had merged i.e. Punjab National Bank both were create! under the provisions of the Banking Companies (Acquisition & Transfer of] Undertakings) Act, 1970, the bank in which the original tenant amalgamated i.e. Punjab National Bank being nationalised bank were both corporation established by a Central Act and those were owned and controlled by the Central Government. So far Punjab National Bank is concerned it still retains its character. 7. In the context of Section 2(e)(2) (ii) of the Public Premises Act premises belonging to or taken on lease on behalf of any Corporation would include to be corporations of the pattern constituted under the Central Act wherein the entire paid-up capital vests in the Central Government. So far Punjab National Bank is concerned it still retains its character. 7. In the context of Section 2(e)(2) (ii) of the Public Premises Act premises belonging to or taken on lease on behalf of any Corporation would include to be corporations of the pattern constituted under the Central Act wherein the entire paid-up capital vests in the Central Government. In context, it may not be out of place to mention that after the Banking companies (Acquisition & Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 element of their being members constituting a corporation is missing in the case of nationalised Banks. As the said Act does not provide for any membership to these Banks, but in fact a new pattern of Public corporation has been developed as there are no shares and no shareholders, either public or private, of such corporation as the entire paid up capital vests in the Central Government. Such nationalised banks are also instrumentalities of State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 8. What is the effect of Public Premises Act vis-a-vis Rent Control legislation has been elaboratedly dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in die case of Ashok Marketing Ltd. and another v. Punjab National Bank and others, AIR 1991 S.C. 855. While considering the effect of Public Premises Act vis-a-vis Delhi Rent Control, Act, 1958, it was observed as under :- “50. On such principle of statutory interpretation which is applied to be is contained in the latin maxim: leges posteriores priors conterarieas abrogant (later laws abrogate earlier contrary laws). This principle is subject to the exception embodied in the maxim: generalia specialibus non derogant (a general provisions does not derogate from a special one).This means that where the literal meaning of the general enactment covers enactment covers a situation for which specific provision is made by another enactment contained in an earlier Act, it is presumed that the situation was intended to continue to be dealt with by the specific provision rather than the later general one Benion : Statutory Interpretation PP.433-34." 54. The Public Premises Act is a later enactment, having been enacted on 23rd August, 1971, whereas the Rent Control Act was enacted on 31st December, 1958. The Public Premises Act is a later enactment, having been enacted on 23rd August, 1971, whereas the Rent Control Act was enacted on 31st December, 1958. It represents the later will of Parliament and should prevail over the Rent Control Act unless it can be said that the Public Premises Act is a general enactment, whereas the Rent Control Act is a special enactment and being a special enactment the Rent Control Act should prevail over the Public Premises Act. The submission of learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the Rent Control Act is a special enactment dealing with premises in occupation of tenants, whereas the Public Premises Act is general enactment dealing with the occupants of Public premises and that insofar as public premises in occupation of tenants are concerned the provisions of the Rent Control Act would continue to apply and to that extent the provisions of the Public Premises Act would not be applicable. In support of this submission reliance has been placed on the non obstinate clauses contained in Ss. 14 and 22 of the Rent Control Act as well as the provisions contained in Ss.50 and 54 of the said Act. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondents have urged that the Rent Control Act is a general enactment dealing with the relationship of landlord and tenant generally, whereas the Public Premises Act is a special enactment making provision for speedy recovery of possession of Public premises in un-authorised occupation and that the provisions of the Public Premises Act, a later Special Act, will, therefore, override the provisions of the Rent Control Act in so far as they are applicable to public premises in occupation of persons who have continued in occupation after the lease has expired or has been determined. The learned counsel for the respondents have placed reliance on S. 15 of the Public Premises Act which bars the jurisdiction of all courts in respect of the eviction of any person who is in unauthorized occupation of any public premises and other matters specified therein. It has been submitted that the said provision is also in the nature of a non obstinate clause which gives overriding effect to the provisions of the Public Premises Act. It has been submitted that the said provision is also in the nature of a non obstinate clause which gives overriding effect to the provisions of the Public Premises Act. Thus each side claims the enactment relied upon by it is a special statute and the other enactment is general and also invokes the non obstinate clause contained in the enactment relied upon. 55. The Rent Control Act makes a departure from the general law regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant contained in the Transfer of Property Act inasmuch as it makes provision for determination of standard rent, it specifies the grounds on which a landlord can seek the eviction of a tenant, it prescribes the form for adjudication of disputes between landlords and tenants and the procedure which has to be followed in such proceedings. The Rent Control Act can, therefore, be said to be a special statute regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant in the Union Territory of Delhi. The Public Premises Act makes provision for a speedy machinery to secure eviction of un-authorised occupants from public premises. As opposed to the general law which provides for filing of a regular suit for recovery of possession of property in a competent court and for trial of such a suit in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, the Public Premises Act confers the power of pass an order for eviction of an un-authorised occupant in a public premises on a designated officer and prescribes the procedure to be followed by die said officer before passing such an order. Therefore, the Public Premises Act is also a special statute relating to eviction of un-authorised occupants from public premises. In other words, both the enactment namely, Ac Rent control Act and the Public Premises act, are special statutes in relation to the matters dealt with therein. Since, the Public Premises Act is a special statute and not a general enactment the exception contained in the principle that a subsequent general law cannot derogate from an earlier special law cannot be invoked and in accordance with the principle mat the later laws abrogate earlier contrary laws, the Public Premises Act must prevail over the Rent Control Act. 67. 67. It has also been urged that in S.22 of the Rent Control Act, special provision has been made for recovery of possession of premises belonging to a company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution and that premises belonging to companies, corporations and autonomous bodies mentioned in Cls. (2) and (3) of S.2(e) of the Public Premises would be covered by the said provision and that in view of this special provision it is not necessary to have a further provision in the Public Premises Act for the recovery of possession belonging to those bodies and, therefore, the provisions of the public Premises Act should be confined in their application to premises other than premises covered by the Rent Control Act. S.22 of the Rent Control Act provides as under: "Where the landlord in respect of any premises is any company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution and the premises are required for the use of employees of such landlord or in the case of a public institution for the furtherance of its activities, then, notwithstanding anything contained in S.I4 or any other law, the Controller may, on an application made to him in this behalf by such landlord, place the landlord in vacant possession of such premises by evicting the tenant and every other person who may be in occupation thereof, if the Controller is satisfied - (a) that the tenant to whom such premises were let for use as a residence at a time when he was in the service or employment of the landlord, has ceased to be in such service or employment; or (b) that the tenant has acted in contravention of the terms, express or implied under which he was authorised to occupy such premises; or (c) that any other person is in un-authorised occupation of such premises; or (d) that the premises are required bonafide by the public institution for the furtherance of its activities. Explanation -For the purpose of this section, "public institution" includes any educational institution" library, hospital and charitable dispensary but does not include any such institution set by any private trust." 68. Explanation -For the purpose of this section, "public institution" includes any educational institution" library, hospital and charitable dispensary but does not include any such institution set by any private trust." 68. The said special provision shows that, it enables recovery of possession of premises of which the landlord is a company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution in certain circumstances viz., if the premises are required for the use of the employees or Such landlord. In the case of public institutions possession can also be obtained under this provision if the premises are required for the furtherance of its activities. In other words, recovery of possession is permissible under this provision only in certain circumstances and for certain-purposes. In spite of this provision Parliament has considered it necessary to extend the Police Premises Act to premises belonging to companies, corporations and, statutory bodies mentioned in Cls. (2) and (3) of S.2(e) by widening the definition of expression "public premises" in S.2(e) of the Public Premises Act The scope and ambit of the aforesaid power conferred under the Public Premises act cannot be restricted by reference to the provision contained in S.22 of the Rent Control Act. 69. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that any of the corporations referred to in S.2 (e)(2)(») of the Public Premises Act, like the nationalised banks and the Life Insurance Corporation, are trading corporations and under the provisions of the enactments whereby they are constituted these corporations are required to carry on their business with a :\v to earn profit, and that there is nothing to preclude these corporations to buy property in possession of tenants at a law price and after buying such property evict the tenants after terminating the tenancy and thereafter sell the aid property at a much higher value because the value of property in possession of tenants is much less as compared to vacant property. We are unable to cut down the scope of the provisions of the Public Premises Act of the basis of such an apprehension because as pointed out by this Court in M/s Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293: (AIR 1989 SC 1942 at Page 1649) : "Every activity of a public authority especially in the background of the assumption on which such authority enjoys immunity from the rigour of the Rent Act must be informed by reason and guided by the public interest. All exercise of discretion or power by public authorities as the respondent, in respect of dealing with tenants in respect of which they have been treated separately and distinctly from other landlords on the assumption that they would not act as private landlords must be judged by that standard." These observations were made in the context of the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 whereby exemption from the provisions of the Act has been granted to premises belonging to the Bombay Port Trust. The consequence of giving overriding effect to the provisions of the Public Premises Act is that premises belonging to the companies and statutory bodies referred to in Cls.(2) and (3) of S.2(e) of the Public Premises Act would be exempted from the provisions of the Rent Control Act. The actions of the companies and statutory bodies mentioned in Cls. (2) and (3) of S.2(e) of the Public Premises Act while dealing with their properties under the Public Premises Act will, therefore, have to be judged by the same standard. 70. For the reasons aforesaid, we are unable to accept the contention of the landlord counsel for the petitioners that the provisions contained in the Public Premises Act cannot be applied premises which fall within the ambit of the Rent Control Act In our opinion, the provisions of the Public Premises Act. in the extent they cover premises falling within the ambit of the Rent Control Act. Over ride the provisions of the Rent Control act and a person in un-authorised occupation of Public premise under S. 2(e) of the Act cannot invoke the I protection of the Rent Control Act" 9. in the extent they cover premises falling within the ambit of the Rent Control Act. Over ride the provisions of the Rent Control act and a person in un-authorised occupation of Public premise under S. 2(e) of the Act cannot invoke the I protection of the Rent Control Act" 9. That being so the contention urged on behalf of the tenant that the I premises were taken on lease by the corporation i.e. the tenant-Bank and thus I Rent Controller had no jurisdiction d serves to be upheld and it is ordered accordingly. In a similar situation a question arose in respect of a public building which was exempted from operation of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. In case State of U.P. & another v. Malik Zarid Khalid, AIR 1988 SC 132, it was held by the Honble court that such buildings include in which Government is only a tenant and landlords remedy against Government to recover possession would lie under general law and not under the said U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Definition of public building under the U.P. Act supra was to the following effect: "S.3 (o) public building means any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government (including the Government of any other State) and includes any building belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority or any public sector corporation." In the case State of U.P. and another (supra) a plea was raised on behalf of State of U.P. that the premises are still governed by the U.P. Urban Rent Control Act when it was held as under: 6. We have set out above the definition of public building. in S. 3(O) after the 1976 amendment. The language of this definition is very wide. It takes in three categories of buildings : (i) buildings belonging to (that is, owned by) the Central or State Government; (ii) buildings (not belonging to the Government) but taken on lease or requisitioned by it or on its behalf and (iii) buildings belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf by local authority or any public sector corporation. In the present case, the building in question is one taken on lease by the State Government and so it falls squarely within the definition of public building. It is, therefore, exempt from the application of the Act by reason of S. 2(J) as it stood at the relevant time. It would follow, therefore, that the respondents remedy to recovery possession lay under the general law and had to be enforced by a suit for recovery of possession which is exactly what he has done. Prima fade, therefore, the trial Judge and the High Court were right in decreeing his suit. 14. It is true that there are situations in which courts are compelled to subordinate the plain meaning of statutory language. Not un-often, Courts do read down the plain language of a provisions or give it a restricted meaning, where, to do otherwise may be clearly opposed to the object and scheme of the Act or may lead to an absured, illogical or unconstitutional result. But we think that this mode of construction is not appropriate in the context of the present legislation from a number of reasons. In the first place, such an interpretation does not fit into the legislative history we have traced earlier. It does not explain why the legislature should have, while enacting the 1976 amendment, omitted certain operative words and used certain wider words instead. As we have pointed out earlier, if the idea had only been to add to the exclusion buildings owned or let out by public sector corporations, that result could have been achieved by a minor amendment to S.2 (l)(a) as it stood earlier. A conscious and glaring departure from the previous language must be given its due significance. Secondly, the Rent Act is a piece of legislation which imposes certain restrictions on a landlord and confers certain protections on a tenant. It could well have been the intention of the legislature that the Government, local bodies and public sector corporations should be free not only from the restrictions they may incur as landlords but also that they need not have the protections given to other ordinary tenants. It could well have been the intention of the legislature that the Government, local bodies and public sector corporations should be free not only from the restrictions they may incur as landlords but also that they need not have the protections given to other ordinary tenants. To say that the legislature considered the Government qua landlord to be in a class of its own and hence entitled to immunity from the restrictions of the Act but that, qua tenant, it should be on the same footing as other tenants will be an interpretation which smacks of discrimination. The legislature could have certainly intended to say that the Government, whether landlord or tenant, should be outside the Act. Thirdly, while it is true that the result of the interpretation we favour would be to facilitate easy eviction of Government, local authorities and public corporations, there is nothing per se wrong about it because, with their vast resources or capacity to argument their resources, these bodies would not be in as helpless a position as ordinary tenants for whose benefit the legislation is primarily intended............." 10. A Division Bench of High Court of Bombay in case S.R. P. Giakwad v. The Union of India and others, AIR 1977 Bombay 220, held that in case of lease of premises in favour of Central Government having been determined and Central Government becoming statutory tenant under the Bombay Rent Act, 1974 still the premises did not cease to be public premises. 11. While passing the impugned judgment, learned Appellate Authority below appears to have not at all cared to examine the provisions of Public premises which has been re-produced here-in-above. It did not only amount to include any premises belonging to any corporation but the definition was inclusive End the premises which were taken on lease, as in the present case have also been included in such definition. Thus the authority below has fallen into error while observing, " in the case in hand, the respondents were not owners of the demises premises" on which basis the appeal filed by the landlords was allowed and the case was remanded back to the Tribunal below. 12. Thus the authority below has fallen into error while observing, " in the case in hand, the respondents were not owners of the demises premises" on which basis the appeal filed by the landlords was allowed and the case was remanded back to the Tribunal below. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it .is clear that since the disputed premises as in the present case retained by the tenant-bank are also public premises within the meaning of the Public Premises Act, therefore the Rent controller had no jurisdiction to have entertained and /or-to have adjudicated the matter relating to its eviction from the tenanted premises. While holding so, it may be clarified here that it is admitted case of the parties that the tenanted premises were leased to New Bank of India (which has since amalgamated with the Punjab National Bank), by means of a registered lease deed, Photostat copy whereof has been placed on record and the -averments made in the petition in this behalf have been admitted by the tenants in their joint reply filed. 13. Consequently the present revision petition filed by the tenant deserves to be allowed and is ordered accordingly, as a result of this, the order passed by the Appellate Authority (1), Shimla in CMA No.l7-S/14 of 1996 dated 10.10.1996 is hereby set aside and the order of the Rent Controller (1). Shimla in case No.21/2 of 1994 dated 25.11.1995 dismissing the eviction petition filed by the landlords is hereby upheld. No costs.