Honble KHAN, J.–On January 28,1980 the Food Inspector had purchased Khandsari for analysis from M/s Pawan Trading Co. Losal which had purchased the same from M/s Amar Trading Co. Marsh Ganj Shamli (U.P.) The petitioner is the partner of M/s Amar Trading Co. On Public Analyst reprting that the sample of "Khandsari" was adulterated the Food Inspector filed a complaint u/s 7/16 of Preven-tion of Food Adulteration Act 1954 (the Act ) against M/s Pawan Kumar Trading Co. Losal and M/s Amar Trading Co. Shamli. The petitioner represented M/s. Amar Trading Co. in his capacity as a partner thereof but he himself was not an accused in the complaint along with his partnership firm. In the course of enquiry into the said offence the learned trial court, on 30.12.80 ordered to implead Smt. Rajni, ShriKanwar Vir Singh & Sri Om Prakash all partners of M/s Amar Trading Co. Shamli as accused in the case. However the learned Sessions Judge, Sikar wide his order dated 27.7.82 made in Revision application No.12 of 1981 set aside that order of the learned Magistrate. The case therefore, proceeded against M/s Amar Trading Co. Shamli & Pawan Kumar of M/s Pawan Kumar Trading Co. Losal and on 11.12.89both the above named accused were charged with the offence u/s 7/16 of the Act through their respective counsel. (2). After close of complainants evidence. Pawan Kumar accused in person and M/s Amar Trading Co. Shamli through its partner Ashok Kumar the petitioner were examined u/s 313 Cr.P.C on 27.3.90 and final argument in the case were heard.The case was fixed for pronouncement of judgment. The case could not be decided on the date fixed & was adjourned to 30.6.93. On 30.6.93 the learned Magistrate observed that though the above named three partners of M/s Amar Trading Co. Shamli could no longer be summoned as co-accused in the case due to the order of the learned Sessions Judge dated 27.7.82 yet since the petitioner had all alongbeen appearing for and on behalf of the aforesaid partnership firm, he was required to be impleaded as an accused. Expressing his intention to consider the petitioners as accused in the case in that way the learned magistrate required the counsel to address him on the point whether charge be framed against the petitioner & he be examined u/s. 313 Cr.P.C.. Expressing his intention to consider the petitioners as accused in the case in that way the learned magistrate required the counsel to address him on the point whether charge be framed against the petitioner & he be examined u/s. 313 Cr.P.C.. On 26.8.93 the learned Magistrate held that since thepetitioner had put in appearance on almost all dates of hearing & was thus well acquainted of the nature of offence charactor of evidence brought on record by the prosecution in support of such offence there was no necessity of either framing a charge against him or examining him i/s 313 Cr.P.C. It is that order, as passed by the learned Magistrate, which is being challenged by the petitioner through thispetition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. (3). The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the impugned order besides being totally illegal and against the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 and the principles of natural justice was also in the nature of gross abuse of the process of the court by the learned Magistrate. The learned Public Pro-secutor simply made vain efforts to support the impugned order. (4). Sec 17 of the Act deals with offences by companies. It says that where an offence under the Act has been committed by a company the person who has been nominated by such company to be incharge of and responsible to it for the conduct of its business, or where no person has been so nominated, every person who, atthe time the offence was committed was incharge of or responsible to it for the conduct of its business, shall be liable to be proceeded against & punished accordingly. It is settled position of law that a deeming provision in a statute should be strictly contrued and its scope should not be extended beyond the area it was intended to operate in Sec. 17 makes, in the cases of commission of an offence un-der the Act two categories of person liable to be proceeded against & punished accordingly. In the first category fall the person nominated to be the incharge of or responsible to the company/firm for the conduct of its business or, in the absence of such nomination, every person, who at the time the offence was committed, was incharge of and responsible to the company/firm for the conduct of its business. In the first category fall the person nominated to be the incharge of or responsible to the company/firm for the conduct of its business or, in the absence of such nomination, every person, who at the time the offence was committed, was incharge of and responsible to the company/firm for the conduct of its business. Both the types of persons in this category are mutually exclusive in as much as that if a person has been nominated to be the incharge of and responsible to the company/firm for the conduct of its business the other type of person who may be a Director/employee of the company or a partner of the firm can not be simultaneously proceeded against & punished. This position of law is clear from the use of the conjunction "or" between sub clauses (i) and (ii) of clauses (a) of sub sec. (1) of sec. 17 of the Act. In the second category falls the company or the firm, as the case may be. The use of the conjunction "and" between clauses (a) and (b) of sec. (1) of sec. 17 does not mean that they are mutually inclusive and must co-existtogether for successful prosecution u/s 17. Either of the two categories of persons, mentioned in clauses (a) & (b) of sec. 17(1) may, co-jointly or severally, be prose- cuted and the absence of one in a prosecution would not be fatal for the prosecution of the other. The only requirement for their joint or separate trial, and even of one with no joint or separate trial of the other, is that the offence, alleged to havebeen committed, must be proved to have been committed by the company/firm. (5). Sec. 319 Cr.P.C. confers powers on a court to proceed against other persons not being accused in the case, who appear to be guilty of the offence being tried by it. Such power is required to be exercised after recording same evidence at the trial and such evidence showing the concern or involvement of such otherperson in the commission of the offence being probed by the court. The purpose behind this provision is that guilty person should not escape punishment for the offence he is found to be concerned with or involved in. (6). The purpose behind this provision is that guilty person should not escape punishment for the offence he is found to be concerned with or involved in. (6). A combined reading of Sec. 17 of the Act & Sec. 319 Cr.P.C. would show that only such Director of a company or a partner of a firm, when such Director orpartner has not been made co accused in the case along with the company or a firm as the case may be, who is prima facie found to be incharge of or responsible to the company or the firm for the conduct of its business, may be summoned as accused in the case. The rigours of Sec. 319 Cr.P.C. in fact stands relaxed in such cases in view of the nature of the offence and the nature of the duties of such per-sons in the areas of their functioning. If the above foundational facts are found existing in a case, such officer/employees of the company or the firm may be summoned as accused in the case. (7). In the instant case the learned Magistrate appear to have acted in total disregard of the relevant provisions of law. He overlooked the fact that a firm wasa juridical person having quite an independent identity & personality of its own and was a distinct & separate entity from that of its partners. It has as such, the capability to sue &be sued in its own name but being a juridical person has to be represented by some one. The petitioner had been appearing for and on behalf of his firm but such appearance by him did not satisfy the requirement of his being responsibleto or incharge of the firm for the conduct of the business thereof. If the learned Magistrate wanted to summon the present petitioner as an additional accused in the case he must have recorded a finding to the effect that the petitioner was incharge of and responsible to the firm for the conduct of its business. There being no such finding his summoning of any, considering, the petitioner as an accusedin the case was inherently bad in law and on facts of the case. (8). There being no such finding his summoning of any, considering, the petitioner as an accusedin the case was inherently bad in law and on facts of the case. (8). The Magistrate further erred in law in directing that there was no need of framing a charge against and examining u/S. 313 Cr.P.C., person who was not initially arrayed as an accused in the case and was subsequently proceeded against in the case. A bare glance at the relevant provisions contained in Sec. 319 wouldclearly inform that a denovo trial is contemplated in such a situation. (9). In view of the discussion made hereinabove I entertain no doubt that the impugned order is, on the face of it, quite illegal besides being in gross abuse of the process of the court. The same deserves to be vacated. (10). In the result the impugned order is set aside and proceeding initiated against the petitioner on the basis thereof quashed & dropped. The petition is allowed.