JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J. :- Respondent was tried before the court below for having committed offences under Section 379 I.P.C. and Section 33 of the Indian Forest. Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Challan in this case was filed by S.H.O. Police Station (Enforcement), South Zone, Shimla before the court. 2. As per prosecution case, in the month of June, 1983 Salig Ram Badiala (PW- 1), Range Officer, Jubbel found that the respondent had encroached upon the forest land situated in Chhanjpur Lehat area and before doing so, he illicitly felled trees of different species. In these circumstances, area was got demarcated from the revenue officials and it transpired that 6.14 bighas of land had been encroached upon by the respondent comprised in Khasra No.297/1 and 181 tress of different species were illicitly felled by him. In this background, letter (Ext. PW-l/A was written lo the Superintendent of Police (Inforcement), Shimla complaining about the said acts of the respondent which resulted in lodging of F.I.R. (Ext. PW-17/B). The matter was taken up for investigation. Land was got demarcated from the various officials in the presence of the respondent and demarcation report alongwith other revenue papers was proved on record as Exts. P- l to P-9. 181 stumps of felled trees were got analysed from the various officials when Range Officer. Jubbal vide Ext. PW -1/B opined that the trees felled from Khasra No.297/1 were, in fact, felled between 2 to 4 years, meaning thereby somewhere in the year 1980-81. Because earlier the area in question was under Settlement which in the meantime was completed, therefore, demarcation was carried out as aforesaid. During the course of demarcation it further transpired that the area encroached upon by the respondent was 24-10 bighas and not 6-14 bighas comprised in Khasra Nos. 519 to 521 & 528 (New.) Besides this another 20 trees were felled by the respondent after December, 1983. In this background, challan was filed against the respondent by the Enforcement Department. Charge under Section 33 of the Act for illicit felling of trees from the aforesaid land as also theft of different trees having been committed by the respondent was alleged against him and value of such trees was found to be of Rs. 47,425/-, such trees belonged to the Forest Department of which theft was committed. Charge under Section 33 of the Act for illicit felling of trees from the aforesaid land as also theft of different trees having been committed by the respondent was alleged against him and value of such trees was found to be of Rs. 47,425/-, such trees belonged to the Forest Department of which theft was committed. Finally by means of impugned judgment without going into other questions on the ground of the limitation, the prosecution case has been turned down, hence this appeal at the instance of the State. 3. Shri M. L. Chauhan, Learned Assistant Advocate General who appeared in support of this appeal submitted that the case instituted against the respondent out of which this appeal has arisen was well within time. The offence had been detected as per Ext. PW-l/A in the month of December, 1983 and challan was put in court in the month of October, 1986 i.e. within three years of the detection of the offence. Alternate argument of Shri Chauhan was that this is a continuing offence and as per provisions of Section 472 Cr.P.C. the complaint was well within time and he urged for reversal of the impugned judgment. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent controverted the plea raised by the learned Assistant Advocate General and pointed out that on its own showing, first damage report (Ext. PW-4/A) was issued by PW-4, Attar Singh Forest Guard. Thus, according to him offence came to be detected on 2.4.1983 and thereafter in the month of June, 1983 both the commission of offence as well as the offender had been named which position is clear from Ext. PW-l/A collective reading of Ext. PW-l/A the F.I.R. Lodged with the Enforcement Department and the damage report vide Ext. PW-4/A clearly belied the stand of the prosecution as per learned counsel for the respondent. 5. In order to properly appreciate the respective submissions of both the parties, provisions of Sections 468, 469 and 472 Cr.P.C. need to be referred to. 6. In the instant case, offence under Section 379 I.P.C. is punishable-with three years imprisonment or fine or both. PW-4/A clearly belied the stand of the prosecution as per learned counsel for the respondent. 5. In order to properly appreciate the respective submissions of both the parties, provisions of Sections 468, 469 and 472 Cr.P.C. need to be referred to. 6. In the instant case, offence under Section 379 I.P.C. is punishable-with three years imprisonment or fine or both. Under Section 469 Cr.P.C., the procedure for computing the period of limitation is from the date when the offence is committed or where the commission of offence is not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, then on the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier, or where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer making investigation into the offence which ever is earlier. 7. So far plea of continuing offence is concerned. Section 472 Cr.P.C. was pressed into service by Shri Chauhan who submitted that once the respondent had entered upon the forest land, till he vacated, the offence of trespass was continuing. This argument appears to be without any basis and cannot be accepted in the facts and circumstances of the case. It may be appropriate to mention here that continuing offence in law is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguished from the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule of its requirement is obeyed or complied with. The plea that the respondent continued cutting trees and encroaching upon forest land does not show the commission of a continuing offence either under Section 379 I.P.C. or 33 of the Act. In this behalf, it may be appropriate to mention here that the nature of a continuing offence would not depend upon factum of overt act, but in the inherent peculiarities and the qualities of certain offences, which without any overt act of the accused, can be termed as the continuing offence. This be termed as the continuing offence. In this behalf, it may be appropriate to mention here that the nature of a continuing offence would not depend upon factum of overt act, but in the inherent peculiarities and the qualities of certain offences, which without any overt act of the accused, can be termed as the continuing offence. This be termed as the continuing offence. This is not the situation in the present case. In addition to this, offence under Section 379 IPC is complete as soon as taking of immovable property is effected by the accused with the requisite dishonest intention. Once the act is accomplished in the said manner, the offence under Section 379 IPC is complete as nothing remains to be done thereafter on the part of the accused. The moment trees were illicitly cut and severed by the respondent from the forest land, as claimed by the prosecution, then the taking within the meaning of Section 378 IPC was complete. In this context, it may be appropriate to mention that each time on each occasion when trees were illicitly cut and removed by the respondent, each transaction was a separate and distinct offence from the other as per Section 218 Cr.P.C. and was liable to be dealt with accordingly unless, of course, the case fall within the ambit of Section 220 Cr.P.C. 8. Considering the present case in the aforesaid facts there are two parts of the transactions one as per Ext. PW-l/A and Ext. P.W-4/A relates to 181 trees of different species having been committed before 3.4.1983 when damage report was prepared by PW-4 Attar Singh, and thereafter in the month of June, 1983 when both the offences as well as the offender were known to the complainant. The second act of illicit felling, according to prosecution, was undertaken by the respondent when he felled another 20 trees after lodging of the F.I.R. and before the institution of the complaint. It is not understood as to how both these transactions were joined so as to initiate prosecution against the respondent. 9. Purpose of putting up both these matters together appears to be to bring the complaint within limitation as well as to make out a case of continuing offence within the meaning of Section 272 Cr.P.C. which is not the factual position. 9. Purpose of putting up both these matters together appears to be to bring the complaint within limitation as well as to make out a case of continuing offence within the meaning of Section 272 Cr.P.C. which is not the factual position. That being so it cannot be said that the trial Court had committed an error while acquitting the responding holding that the launching of prosecution was barred by time. 10. Another argument urged by Shri Chauhan in support of this appeal was that the plea ought to have been raised by the respondent immediately after filing of the challan. By having not raised the plea of limitation at any stage, respondent is precluded from making any grievance in this appeal and in no case he should have been permitted to raise the plea of limitation during the course of final hearing of the case before the trial court 11. In this context, it may be worthwhile to notice that the prosecution is required to stand on its own legs irrespective of an accused like the respondent in the instant case, having not raised a legitimate ground by which he could defeat the claim of the prosecution. This Court is of the view that before issuing the process, it was expected of the trial Court to have applied its mind to the facts existing on the challan file and then should have ordered the issuance of process in case all the requirements of law including that of limitation were made out. That is not the position here. In audition to this, simply because the respondent did not raise the plea at the initial stage of the trial, would not preclude him to have raised the plea of limitation and prayed for his acquittal during the course of hearing of the case before the trial Court. When this appeal was being heard, learned Assistant Advocate General was called upon to satisfy this Court that the challan is still within time, he could not point out anything from the record of the trial Court to show that the challan filed against the respondent was within time. That being so the plea urged by Shri Chauhan is an argument of frustration and has been raised simply to be rejected. 12. That being so the plea urged by Shri Chauhan is an argument of frustration and has been raised simply to be rejected. 12. So, far the offence of Section 33 of the Act is concerned that was also known to the prosecution in April, 1983 when damage report was issued vide Ext.PW-4/A. Somewhere in June. 1983 nature of offence as well as offender both had been identified by the forest officials. Still the matter was kept pending till December, 1983. Why and for what reason, has not been explained by any of the prosecution witnesses. Not only this, but prosecution evidence is positive to the effect that trees had been felled, land had been broken and thereafter apple trees having been planted and broken land had also been brought under plough. All these acts could not be undertaken over-night or with a magic wand. Felling of trees thereafter breaking the land and then planting apple trees as also fencing the area in question is a process which would consume lot of time besides physical exercise with the help of other persons. All these acts could not be performed in a calendestine manner so that the forest officials could not have known it. In this context this court is constrained to observe that from the year 1980 till 3.4.1983, forest officials who were responsible to have gone to the forest in question or to have undertaken patrol in the forest wherever illicit felling had been done and the forest area had been further encroached upon were either sleeping or were totally oblivious of their duty. PW-2 Balak Ram Range Officer has clearly stated that he was touring the forest in question once in 2/3 months. If this was so then the action of the other prosecution witnesses from forest department to say that 181 stumps of the trees found at the spot were 2/3 years old, is not correct. In the ordinary course of things had the Forest Guard in whose beat the area in question fell, in fact patrolled the forest during his such patrol(s), there is no reason why either encroachment or illicit felling could not be detected. In the ordinary course of things had the Forest Guard in whose beat the area in question fell, in fact patrolled the forest during his such patrol(s), there is no reason why either encroachment or illicit felling could not be detected. In fact, Enforcement Department while investigating the case had not examined the case from the aspect of involvement of the forest staff in the present case or from the point of view of dereliction of duty on their part which is writ large. In fact, the Enforcement Department was satisfied by initiating the prosecution against the respondent alone. In any event, in the background of this case, concerned Forest Guard/Beat Guard as well as other forest officials like Ranger/Block Officer etc. Should have been called upon by the Department if no evidence was forth coming against them as to how illicit felling of such a big number of forest trees and how such a vast area came to be encroached upon by the respondent. 13. No other point was urged in support of this appeal. 14. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the prosecution I launched against the respondent in the instant case was barred by time and I acquittal recorded by the trial Court on that ground calls for no interferences the present appeal. Consequently the appeal has no merit and the same is dismissed accordingly. Respondent is on bail his personal surety bond is hereby discharged. -