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1997 DIGILAW 393 (MP)

SOHANLAL AGRAWAL v. REGISTRAR AND COMMISSIONER CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES

1997-07-16

DEEPAK VERMA

body1997
DEEPAK VERMA, J. ( 1 ) BY filing this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, petitioner challenges the correctness, validity and propriety of the order dated 25. 5. 1995, passed by respondent No. 9 / Board of Revenue, in petitioner's appeal filed by him under Section 77 (l) (b) of M. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 For brevity, hereinafter referred to as the 'act' ). Petitioner's appeal has been rejected on the short question of having been filed beyond the period of limitation. ( 2 ) FEW facts material for deciding the said petition are mentioned here in below. ( 3 ) PETITIONER claims to be the member of Citizen Urban Co-operative Bank ltd. , Indore. He has submitted that he is interested in the affairs and proceedings of the said Bank. Enquiry in regard to the Constitution working and financial condition of Bank was held, as contemplated under Section 59 of the Act. Show-cause notice was issued to the Bank as to why the Board of Directors of Bank be not suspended and superseded. The Joint-Registrar / respondent No. 3, herein, then, passed an order dated 16. 3. 1992, suspending the Board of Directors of the Bank, exercising powers under Section 53 (10) of the Act and also appointed an Authorised Officer till passing of final order under Section 53 (1) of the Act. Consequently, an order of Supersession, superseding the Board of Directors of the Bank was also passed. After these orders were passed, respondent No. 2 / Addl. Registrar, issued a fresh show-cause notice under Section 69 of the Act to the Bank. Averment is made that Officer-in-Charge of the said Bank / respondent No. 7, submitted his reply, and admitted that he has no objection, if, the said Bank is liquidated and, virtually, accepted the grounds of liquidation. ( 4 ) PETITIONER's contention is, that for the first time, he came to know about the order of liquidation dated 23. 4. 1993 on 22. 8,1993. On coming to know about the said order of liquidation of the Bank, of which, petitioner claims to be a member, he preferred to file a writ petition in the High Court of M. P. at Indore, which was registered as M. P. No. 1704/1993. The said writ petition was disposed of on 6. 9. 1993. 1993 on 22. 8,1993. On coming to know about the said order of liquidation of the Bank, of which, petitioner claims to be a member, he preferred to file a writ petition in the High Court of M. P. at Indore, which was registered as M. P. No. 1704/1993. The said writ petition was disposed of on 6. 9. 1993. On the ground that petitioner has an alternative and efficacious remedy of filing an appeal against the said order. Not having exercised his right to file the appeal, petition was not entertained. However, a direction was given to him to approach the Board of Revenue by filing an appeal. The said order of the High Court was passed on 6. 9. 1993. ( 5 ) PETITIONER, then, applied for certified copy of the said order dated 23. 4. 1993, by which, the Bank was directed to be liquidated, as the appeal could be filed against this order dated 23. 4. 1993, only after getting certified copy of the same. Since, the certified copy was not received by petitioner, he filed an appeal on 22. 9. 1993 under section 77 (l) (b) of the Act, alongwith the photo copy of the order dated 23. 4. 1993, which was sought to be challenged before respondent No. 9 / Board of Revenue. Petitioner also submitted an application for dispensing with the filing of certified copy of the impugned order. Separate application under Section 79 of the Act, seeking condonation of delay in filing the aforesaid appeal was also filed by petitioner. ( 6 ) RESPONDENT No. 7 / O. I. C. of Bank opposed the said prayer of petitioner before the Board of Revenue and filed his preliminary objection. Petitioner submitted his reply to the said preliminary objection. Respondent No. 9/board of revenue, heard the appeal on the question of limitation. In passed the impugned order on 25. 5. 1995, dismissing the petitioner's appeal as barred by limitation. Petitioner is challenging the said order passed by Board of Revenue, dismissing his appeal, as barred by limitation. ( 7 ) SHOW-CAUSE notices against admission were issued to respondents. Respondent nos. 1 to 3 have filed their reply in oppugnation. Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 have also filed their counter-affidavit, denying the reliefs claimed by petitioner. Petitioner is challenging the said order passed by Board of Revenue, dismissing his appeal, as barred by limitation. ( 7 ) SHOW-CAUSE notices against admission were issued to respondents. Respondent nos. 1 to 3 have filed their reply in oppugnation. Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 have also filed their counter-affidavit, denying the reliefs claimed by petitioner. Their main thurst is, that financial position of the Bank had gone from bad to worst, due to negligence and mismanagement of the elected Board of Directors of Bank and for this reason, they have justified the order of supersession, passed against the Bank. It has also been submitted, that respondent No. 2 / Addl, Registrar, after considering all the facts and material placed before him, came to the conclusion that it was a fit case, where powers conferred on him, under Section 69 of the Act, should be exercised. Consequently, an order of liquidation has been passed. ( 8 ) THEY have further submitted, that petitioner should have preferred an appeal within thirty days, as provided under Section 77 of the Act. He had failed to do so within the prescribed period of limitation and, therefore, respondent No. 9 Board of Revenue was justified in rejecting his appeal. The word "communicated" as appearing in Section 77 (3) of the Act, has been explained by saying that the appeal could be preferred only by those persons, who were affected parties or who were parties in the litigation before the subordinate authority. Since the petitioner was neither of the two, he could not prefer an appeal. Thus, the appeal was rightly dismissed on the ground of limitation. They have also justified that petitioner has been benefited substantially or account of the order of liquidation, as he was able to receive back the amounts which were in deposit with the Bank. Thus, in any case, petitioner cannot be said to be an affected party, especially, in view of the order of liquidation. Submission is made, that in this view of the matter, petition deserves to be dismissed. ( 9 ) OTHER respondents, who appeared, but have not filed their reply in oppug-nation, have adopted the Returns filed by the aforesaid respondents and have argued vehemently for dismissal of the petition. ( 10 ) I have heard Counsel for parties, perused the record. Submission is made, that in this view of the matter, petition deserves to be dismissed. ( 9 ) OTHER respondents, who appeared, but have not filed their reply in oppug-nation, have adopted the Returns filed by the aforesaid respondents and have argued vehemently for dismissal of the petition. ( 10 ) I have heard Counsel for parties, perused the record. ( 11 ) THE short question, that arises for consideration of this Court, is whether board of Revenue was justified in rejecting petitioner's appeal on the ground of limitation ? ( 12 ) WORDINGS of Section 77 (3) of the Act are reproduced hereinbelow :"section 77 (3 ). Every appeal shall be presented in the prescribed manner to the appellate authority concerned within 30 days of the date on which the order appealed against was communicated to the party affected by the order : provided that in computing the period of limitation under this sub-section the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded. " ( 13 ) THIS clearly stipulates that the order impugned in appeal has to be communicated to the party effected by the order and appeal could be preferred annexing certified copy of the order sought to be challenged in appeal. The actual copying days consumed in obtaining the copy would be excluded from the period of limitation. Sub-section 5 of Section 77 shows that the provision of Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, shall apply to the appeals, filed under this section. Thus, it clearly shows that in case any appeal is barred by limitation, then, an application can be made explaining the delay. ( 14 ) IN the said case, as mentioned above, petitioner had applied for certified copy of the order, which was sought to be challenged in appeal. Since, his earlier petition was dismissed on 6. 9. 1993, even, though, certified copy of the order was not received by him, but, still he preferred an appeal on 22. 9. 1993, thereafter filed an application on 24. 9. 1993, for dispensing with filing of the certified copy of the order. This was duly supported by an affidavit. Since, his earlier petition was dismissed on 6. 9. 1993, even, though, certified copy of the order was not received by him, but, still he preferred an appeal on 22. 9. 1993, thereafter filed an application on 24. 9. 1993, for dispensing with filing of the certified copy of the order. This was duly supported by an affidavit. ( 15 ) HOWEVER, with an intention to make sure that his appeal is not dismissed on the ground of limitation, he also filed a separate application under Section 79 of the Act, which was also duly supported by an affidavit, praying the condonation of delay (if, any) in filing the appeal. But as was expected by petitioner, his appeal came to be dismissed on the ground of limitation only. ( 16 ) THE Board of Revenue has wrongly held that petitioner had not approached with clean hands in filing the appeal. Petitioner had earlier filed a writ petition, challenging the said order of liquidation, but, the same was not entertained, on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. While disposing of the said petition, direction was given that in case petitioner prefers an appeal, then, same shall be disposed of in accordance with law and filing of certified copy of the impugned order shall be dispensed with, if, the same is not obtained within 15 days. ( 17 ) PETITIONER acted in promptitude and filed the appeal within 30 days from 6. 9. 1993, the date of dismissal of his earlier petition and also filed other I. As. , as mentioned above on different dates, claiming various reliefs. All I. As. were considered by respondent No. 9/board of Revenue, while rejecting petitioner's appeal on the ground of limitation. ( 18 ) NOTHING has been brought to my notice, that as required in sub-section (3)of Section 77 of the Act, petitioner was communicated of the impugned order before the month of August, 1993, the date mentioned by him, in his application filed under section 79 of the Act. In this view of the matter, it is to be believed as correct that petitioner, for the first time came to know of the passing of the order of liquidation in the month of August, 1993. He, then, preferred to file a writ petition, which was dismissed in motion hearing. Immediately, thereafter, he filed the appeal before board of Revenue. In this view of the matter, it is to be believed as correct that petitioner, for the first time came to know of the passing of the order of liquidation in the month of August, 1993. He, then, preferred to file a writ petition, which was dismissed in motion hearing. Immediately, thereafter, he filed the appeal before board of Revenue. Thus, petitioner has shown his bona fide in filing and prosecuting the appeal in right earnest. He has even, explained the delay in not preferring the appeal earlier. I, therefore, find, that this petition deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 25. 3. 1995 (Annexure-P. 12) is quashed. ( 19 ) BEFORE parting, I may also make a reference to a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Barkatkhan v. Board of Revenue and others, 1979 RN 118. While considering the scope of Section 77 (3) of the Act, the Division Bench has held that period of limitation, for filing an appeal would start only from a particular date of knowledge of the order, or, from the date when order was formally communicated to affected party. It has further been held that it is not the duty of the appellant to search for the order, before formal communication. Thus, relying on this judgment also, I find that there is merit in submissions as advanced by learned Counsel for petitioner. ( 20 ) IT may further be mentioned here that in all appeals filed under Section 77 of the Act, provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act have also been made applicable. The petitioner had filed separate application under Section 79 of the Act, praying for condonation of delay. It is now well-settled that question of delay has to be construed liberally and appeals should not be thrown out at the threshold on such technicalities. Thus, taking a liberal view of the matter, I find that petitioner had been able to explain the delay, if, any, in filing 'the appeal. Respondent No. 9 was not justified in rejecting the petitioner's appeal on the ground of limitation. ( 21 ) THE petition, as mentioned above, is hereby allowed. The matter is remitted to respondent No. 9 / Board of Revenue for disposal of petitioner's appeal in accordance with law. Respondent No. 9 was not justified in rejecting the petitioner's appeal on the ground of limitation. ( 21 ) THE petition, as mentioned above, is hereby allowed. The matter is remitted to respondent No. 9 / Board of Revenue for disposal of petitioner's appeal in accordance with law. Since the matter is already delayed, it is expected of respondent No. 9 / Board of Revenue, to hear the parties and dispose of petitioners' appeal on merits within a period of Four months from today. Parties are directed to appear before respondent No. 9 / Board of Revenue for further participation in appeal on 1. 8. 1997. No notices shall be required to be sent to them by respondent No. 9. ( 22 ) LOOKING to the facts and circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition allowed. .