USHA SHUKIA, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition under Section 482, Cr. P. C has been filed by the petitioner for quashing the proceedings pending before S. D. M. , Raipur under Sections 145 and 146, Cr. P. C. ( 2 ) PETITIONER Yudhisthirlal is a partner in the Firm Sadani Builders of Raipur. This firm has undertaken a multicrore project for construction of 500 shops in village Boriyakala, Police Station Mana Camp in Raipur District. The builder availed of the services of M/s. Begraj Agarwal, a contractor firm, for construction of some of these shops on agreed terms and conditions. The contract of construction was reduced into writing on 19. 12. 1994. In pursuance of this agreement respondent No. 2 started construction work from 19-12-1994. These facts are not in dispute. ( 3 ) IT is further admitted that the contractor respondent No. 2 stopped the construction work in the middle, raising dispute about payment. Complaints were made to the police and eventually Station House Officer, Police Station Mana Camp, filed a report alongwith statements and other documents before S. D. M. Raipur. Proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. were thus initiated and on the very same day, order under Section 146, Cr. P. C. was also passed for attachment of 280 shops and appointment of receiver. Admittedly both parties challenged this order before the 7th Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, who dismissed both these revision petitions and affirmed the order of the S. D. M. ( 4 ) THE petitioner had earlier filed a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the orders both under Section 145, Cr. P. C. , and under Section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. affirmed by the Revisional Court. While dismissing that petition, the Court ob. served that the petitioner may challenge the orders under Section 482, Cr. P. C. ( 5 ) IN this petition under Section 482, Cr. P. C. the petitioner has urged that the agreement dated 19-12-1994 was later modified by mutual agreement on 7-2-1995, 7-5-1995 and 3-10-1995. The number of shops to be constructed through this contractor was reduced to 280. The work was to be completed within 18 months from the original agreement dated 19-12-1994 and was to be carried out under supervision of the petitioner. The number of shops to be constructed through this contractor was reduced to 280. The work was to be completed within 18 months from the original agreement dated 19-12-1994 and was to be carried out under supervision of the petitioner. ( 6 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner he contractor committed breach of conditions of contract and lengthy correspondence between the two followed. The respondent stopped construction work on and from 4:6. 1996 and did not resume the same despite requests including telegraphic message. Respondent No. 2 also admitted stopping of work and removal of staff from the site. ( 7 ) FROM the last week of June, 1996 the petitioners got the work done valued by a registered valuer and started construction work on his own. The petitioner was the owner in possession of the property and the contractor was performing construction work on his behalf. The dispute between them related to payment of bills and was of a civil nature. Respondent No. 2 had stopped the construction work and the petitioner had to take up the construction work himself because he was required to pay huge amount as interest on the loan. The dispute was not covered under Section 145, Cr. P. C. and the proceedings before the S. D. M. , Raipur amount to abuse of the process of Court and therefore, deserve to be quashed. ( 8 ) THE second respondent opposed the petition by contending that the possession of the site was delivered to him in pursuance of the agreement dated 19-12-1994. Special emphasis was laid on Clause 24 of this agreement contending that under this Clause the contractor was entitled to retain possession of the work site till final payment. According to him, over one crore rupees were outstanding against the petitioner. The possession of the property remained with him and he successfully resisted the successive attempts of the petitioner to take forcible possession. The petitioner having failed in his revision before the Additional Sessions Judge, cannot be permitted to agitate the same question under the garb of inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P. C. Objection was also raised to filing of some documents for the first time before the High Court, and the order of the S. D. M was sought to be justified. ( 9 ) THE question of maintainability of this petition under Section 482, Cr. P. C. Objection was also raised to filing of some documents for the first time before the High Court, and the order of the S. D. M was sought to be justified. ( 9 ) THE question of maintainability of this petition under Section 482, Cr. P. C. need not detain us long. The principle is settled by judicial pronouncements that although a second revision is barred by the same person under Section 397 (3), Cr. P. C. , by the High Court can always interfere in exercise of Its inherent powers available under Section 482, Cr. P. C. in case of grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of Court. The latest decision of the Apex Court on this point is Krishnan and another v. Krishaveni and another. 111 this case, the observations made in Dhilrampal and others v. Smt. Ramshri and others, on which reliance was placed by non-applicant No. 2, which has been extensively quoted in his application dated 17. 3. 1997 raising preliminary objections about maintainability, have been held to be not correct. ( 10 ) IT may be mentioned here that Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharshtra, was cited by both sides. This case lays down the principles about exercise of inherent powers by the High Court. Madhu Limayets case (supra) has been followed in Krishnans case (supra ). ( 11 ) STATE of Haryana and others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, Gouind Das Biyani v. Badri Narayan Rathi, and Allen Pharmaceutical Put. Ltd. v. Union of India, were also relied on by the applicant. In all these cases the powers of the High Court to interfere under Section 482, Cr. P. C. were recognised. The objection raised by respondent No. 2 on this count therefore, does not hold any water. ( 12 ) WE now come to the merits of the case. Enquiry under Section 145, Cr. P. C. is limited to the question as to who was in actual possession of the property on the date of preliminary order, or in case of forcible and wrongful dispossession, the Magistrate has to decide as to who was in possession within two months next before the date on which the report of the Police Officer or other information was received by the Magistrate. The pre-requirement for proceeding under Section 145, Cr. The pre-requirement for proceeding under Section 145, Cr. P. C. is that there should be dispute concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof and there should be likelihood of breach of peace. ( 13 ) IT has been vehemently argued on behalf of the applicant that in this particular case, there was no dispute regarding any land, nor could there be any question about the actual possession over the land on the relevant date. It is not in dispute that the land in question belonged to firm Sadani Builders of which applicant-Yudhisthirlal was a partner. The second non-applicant had merely been engaged as a contractor for construction of shops according to the agreement between the parties. The possession of non-applicant No. 2 was for and on behalf of the applicant for that specific purpose. Under the circumstances possession of non-applicant No. 2 was permissive possession as the agent of the applicant. And there is ample authority to hold that a servant or agent cannot turn round and set up his own possession to the exclusion of his employer. S. H. Srinivas Thathachariar v. Pitchai Muthu Morpan and others, and Meghraj Singh v. Devidas, were relied upon. ( 14 ) ON behalf of the non-applicant, reliance was placed on Anamallai Club v. Government of T. N. and others. This was a case of resumption of Government grant after termination of a licence. The case is distinguishable on facts because in the instant case, the contract of construction does not create any interest in land in favour of the contractor. ( 15 ) BOTH parties have filed and relied upon a number of documents. The Istgasa filed before the Magistrate is dated 22. 10. 1996 and copies thereof have been filed by both parties alongwith copy of Rojnamcha and statement of witnesses recorded by the Police. It is clearly mentioned in all these documents that non-applicant No. 2 had stopped the construction work on account of dispute about payment, and the applicant had started construction on his own at the site. The applicant admittedly was the owner of the land and also continued to be in possession thereof The possession of the second non-applicant was only for and on behalf of the applicant as his agent and that too for the specific purpose of construction as per contract between the parties. The applicant admittedly was the owner of the land and also continued to be in possession thereof The possession of the second non-applicant was only for and on behalf of the applicant as his agent and that too for the specific purpose of construction as per contract between the parties. That work also was stopped by this nonapplicant and the applicant took up construction on his own. It is thus evident that the dispute in this case related to payment rather than possession. This being a dispute of a civil nature, proceeding under Section 145, Cr. P. C. was nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court. Such proceedings are liable to be quashed in exercise of the inherent powers of this Court under Section 482, Cr. P. C. ( 16 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, this application is allowed. The impugned orders and the proceedings pending before S. D. M. , Raipur are hereby quashed. Petition allowed. .