Judgment :- K.K. Usha, J. Appellants are the supplementary respondents in LA. 247/87 in O.A. 170/77 before the Forest Tribunal, Palghat. They challenge the order passed by the Tribunal by which the application for review filed by the Custodian of Vested Forests and Conservator of Forests and State of Kerala under S.8B of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting & assignment) Act (hereinafter referred to as Act 26/71) was allowed. The order dt. 22.12.1978 passed in O.A. 170/77 was set aside. As a result, the O.A. was dismissed. The original applicant, who was respondent No.1 in I.A. 247/87 eventhough was impleaded as 3rd respondent in this appeal, his name was deleted by the appellants by obtaining an order in C.M.P. No. 3813/97. 2. Original application was filed by one T.K. Kunhunni Nair u/S.8 of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting & assignment) Act seeking a declaration to the effect that the petition schedule property comprised 11 acres and 65 cents was not private forest as per the provisions of Act 26/71. In the alternative, it was contended that the applicant was entitled to exemption u/s.3(2) of Act 26/71 on the ground that the-applicant was owner of the petition schedule property and was in personal cultivation of the same and that he was not having land in excess of the ceiling limit applicable to him under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. Forest Tribunal, by its order dt. 22.12.1978, held that the applicant was entitled to exemption granted u/S.3(2) of Act 26/71. The above order was sought to be reviewed by the Custodian of Vested Forests and Conservator of Forests and State of Kerala, by filing LA. 247/87 under S.8B of Act 26/71. 3. On a consideration of the above application, Tribunal took the view that the disputed property was part of private forest governed by M.P.P.F. Act on the appointed day, that the applicant had no title to the property as he had not proved lease set up by him, that he had not proved the title of the lessor in the disputed property and that even if the lease is proved, it was invalid in view of the provisions contained u/S.3 of the M.P.P.F. Act for want of permission from the District Collector. Tribunal also found that the applicant had failed to prove the other two requirements necessary for exemption u/s.3(2), namely that he had been cultivating the property on the appointed day and that he was not having land in excess of the ceiling area provided under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. The appellants who got impleaded as supplementary respondents in I.A. 247/87 contended that they had acquired the property under two sale deeds dt. 10.2.1981 from one Neelakandan Namboodiri who, in turn, had acquired the property from Kunhunni Nair, the original applicant, under assignment deed dt. 6.7.1979. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants, who had acquired the property about 10 years after Act 26/ 71 came into force, contended that appellants are bonafide purchasers from the ostensible owner and therefore, they are entitled to protection under S.41 of the Transfer of Property Act. According to learned counsel, application for review was filed only after about 9 years and in the mean while, the property was transferred by Kunhunni Nair, the ostensible owner, in favour of Neelakandan Namboodiri and thereafter to the appellants. It would clearly show that there was an implied consent on the part of the State for transferring the property in favour of the appellants by the ostensible owner. Under these circumstances, according to learned counsel, by no order of the Forest Tribunal, transfer of the property in favour of the appellants can be set at naught. It was further contended by learned counsel that the documents which are sought to be produced by the appellant before this Court would clearly prove the lease in favour of Subrahmania Iyer from Poomully Mana and a sublease in favour of Kunhunni Nair from Subrahmania Iyer. According to the appellants, the provisions contained under S.3 of the M.P.P.F. Act cannot have any application to the lease transactions referred above, validity of which are to be considered by the Forest Tribunal under the provisions Act 26/71. Appellants find fault with the Tribunal in not accepting the evidence of the applicant as PW 1 on the question of satisfying the two requirements under S.3(2) namely, his direct personal cultivation of the property in dispute and his having holding property less than the ceiling area provided under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. 5. Appellants find fault with the Tribunal in not accepting the evidence of the applicant as PW 1 on the question of satisfying the two requirements under S.3(2) namely, his direct personal cultivation of the property in dispute and his having holding property less than the ceiling area provided under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. 5. Learned Government Pleader pointed out that the assignees, after the date of vesting, have no locus standi to maintain an application under S.8 of Act 26/71. In support of the above contention, he relies on a decision of this Court in Koya v. State of Kerala 1987 (1) KLT 830. It is further contended by the learned Government Pleader that the appeal as at present, is not maintainable since it is only at the instance of the assignees after the date of vesting and the applicant who was originally impleaded as 3rd respondent has been removed from the party array. According to learned Government Pleader, the contention raised on the basis of the provisions contained under S.41 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be considered at this stage as no such ground was taken in the memorandum of appeal nor such a contention raised before the Tribunal. He also submits that the appellants cannot claim any protection under S.41 of the T.P. Act in view of the provisions contained under S.8-B of Act 26/ 71. 6. It is not disputed before us that while we consider the claim under S.3(2) of Act 26/71, it is the claim of the original applicant, namely, Kunhunni Nair that has to be considered while granting relief in this appeal also. If that be so, we have to examine whether Kunhunni Nair had satisfied all the requirements provided under sub-s.(2) of S.3 for claiming exemption. At this juncture It has to be noted that a claim for exemption u/s.3(2) has to be considered when it is found that the property in dispute is private forest as defined in Act 26/ 71. In the present case, even in the first order of the tribunal dt. 20.12.78, no declaration was granted to the applicant to the effect that the property in dispute was not private forest. Relief was granted only under S.3(2). In the present case, even in the first order of the tribunal dt. 20.12.78, no declaration was granted to the applicant to the effect that the property in dispute was not private forest. Relief was granted only under S.3(2). While considering I. A. 247/87, Tribunal considered the question again and came to the conclusion that the disputed property is part of private forest governed by the provisions of M.P.P.F. Act on the appointed day. Apart from the fact that this was the admitted case of the applicant, when he was examined as PW1, no arguments were addressed before us by the learned counsel for the appellants against the finding of the Tribunal that the property in dispute is part of a private forest governed by M.P.P.F. Act on the appointed day. It is the case of the original applicant that he obtained an oral lease of the property from one Subramania Iyer. Date of the oral lease is not given in the original application. When examined as PW1 in the year 1978, applicant stated that the oral lease was obtained about 17 years back. He had originally produced Exts. Al to A4 receipts which were for the period from 1962-63 onwards, in support of his case of lease from Subrahmania Iyer. These documents had been taken back by the applicant and were not produced before the Tribunal at the time when it considered I.A. 247/87. Appellants have filed CMP 3814/97 to receive and consider the above-mentioned receipts and also copy of a report dt. 3.8.1983 from Spl. Dy. Tahsildar, Taluk Land Board to the Chairman, Taluk Land Board, Palghat as evidence in this case. These receipts were not proved by examining Subrahmania Iyer before the Tribunal, even though as PW-1, the applicant had stated that Subramania Iyer was alive at the time of trial of the case. We cannot therefore, find fault with the Tribunal in taking the view that these documents were not properly proved by the person who issued it. Even if these documents stand proved, we do not think that it will in any way enhance the case of the original applicant. Copy of a pattern deed executed by Poomully Mana in favour of Subrahmania Iyer dt. 22.3.1959 is sought to be produced before this Court as additional evidence. This document had not been made available before the Tribunal. Even if these documents stand proved, we do not think that it will in any way enhance the case of the original applicant. Copy of a pattern deed executed by Poomully Mana in favour of Subrahmania Iyer dt. 22.3.1959 is sought to be produced before this Court as additional evidence. This document had not been made available before the Tribunal. But, we are of the view that even this document would not be of any help to the original applicant to establish his case u/S.3(2). Admittedly, as mentioned earlier, the property is covered by the provisions of MPPF Act which came into force in the year 1949. S.3 of the above Act provides that no owner of any forest shall, without the previous sanction of the District Collector, sell, mortgage, lease or otherwise alienate the whole or any portion of the forest. It is also provided that any contravention of the above shall be null and void. Neither the original applicant nor the present appellants have any case before the Tribunal or before this Court that permission from the District Collector was obtained before executing pattom deed dated 22.3.1959 or before granting the oral lease in favour of Kunhunni Nair. If that be so, Tribunal was fully justified in holding that these transactions even if proved, are null and void and would not give any title to Kunhunni Nair. 6 A. In order to get the benefit of S.3(2) of Act 26/71, Kunhunni Nair had to prove that the property in dispute was held by him as an owner. The term 'owner' in relation to private forest, has been defined under S.2(c) of Act 26/71. It includes a mortgagee, lessee or other person having right to possession and enjoyment of the private forest. Since the lease granted in favour of Subrahmania Iyer, was without getting prior permission from the District Collector, the transaction is void and he does not get any right from that document which can be transferred to Kunhunni Nair. Apart from the above, Kunhunni Nair also would not acquire any leasehold right or any right to possession and enjoyment of the private forest since the transaction is void in view of the provisions contained under S. 3 of the MPPF Act. In the result, it has to be taken that Kuhunni Nair would not satisfy one of the 3 requirements u/S.3(2) namely, ownership over the property. In the result, it has to be taken that Kuhunni Nair would not satisfy one of the 3 requirements u/S.3(2) namely, ownership over the property. We also agree with the finding of the learned Tribunal that the mere interested testimony of the applicant as PW-1 was not sufficient to satisfy the other two requirements, namely that the land was under his personal cultivation and that he was having property within the ceiling limit applicable to him under the Kerala Land Reforms Act as on the relevant date. 7. Now coming to the contention raised by learned counsel for the appellants relying on the provisions contained u/S.41 of the T.P. Act, we are of the view that there is no merit in such a contention. S.8-B(3) of Act 26/ 71 reads as follows: "(3) On receipt of an application under sub-s.(1), the Tribunal shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in the Limitation Act, 1963 (Central Act 36 of 1963), or in any law for the time being in force, or in any judgment, decree or order of any court or other authority, review decision and pass such orders as it may think fit." The above provision would clearly show that the Tribunal has got jurisdiction to review its original order if the conditions referred under sub-s.(1) are satisfied. Whether any third party has acquired any right in the property and thereby the said third party can put forward a contention under the provisions of S.41 of the T.P. Act or any other law for the time being in force, are all irrelevant considerations. If the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants that once the property is transferred by the original applicant, it would be taken out of the purview of the provisions of the Act is accepted, we are afraid that the very object of introducing the provisions contained under s.8B would be defeated. If the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants that once the property is transferred by the original applicant, it would be taken out of the purview of the provisions of the Act is accepted, we are afraid that the very object of introducing the provisions contained under s.8B would be defeated. The circumstances under which S.8B, 8C and 8D had been incorporated in the Act are detailed in the preamble to Act 36 of 1986 as follows: "WHEREAS a large number of applications filed before the Tribunals under S.8 of the Private Forests (Vesting & assignment) Act 1971 have been decided in favour of the applicants either on the basis of concessions made before the Tribunals without the authority in writing of the Custodian or the Government or due to the failure to produce relevant data and other particulars before such Tribunals; AND WHEREAS in a large number of cases, appeals have not been preferred before the High Court against such decisions of the Tribunals by reason of the delay in applying for and obtaining the certified copies of those decisions or on the ground that the decisions where made on the basis of concessions made before the Tribunals or on other grounds; AND WHEREAS a large number of appeal s filed by the Government before the High Court under S.8A of the said Act have been dismissed by that Court either on the basis of concessions made before the Court without the authority in writing of Government or due to the failure to produce the relevant data and other particulars before the said court; AND WHEREAS petitions by the Government for special leave to appeal against the orders of the High Court under S.8A of the said Act have been dismissed by the Supreme Court; AND WHEREAS a large number of the judgments and orders of the High Court in writ petitions or other proceedings, relate to private forests vested in the Government and such judgments and orders have been passed due to suppression or misrepresentation of facts or due to failure to produce relevant data and other particulars before the said Court; AND WHEREAS possession of large extent of private forests or lands comprised in private forests which have vested in the Government under the said Act are liable to be restored by the Custodian to the persons who are owners thereof immediately preceding the commencement of that Act, resulting in great loss to the State and detriment to the public interest." If we have to accept the contention raised by learned counsel for the appellants on the basis of S.41 of the T.P. Act, it would certainly defeat the very purpose for which S.8-B has been enacted. Apart from the above, in the facts of this case, we are of the view that the appellants cannot claim the benefit of S.41. One of the requirements to be satisfied for application of S.41 is that the transferee has acted in good faith, taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to transfer In this case, appellants cannot contend that they were not aware of the fact that the property which they acquired from Neelakandan Namboodiri was private forest coming under the MPPF Act. Reference is made in their assignment deeds to the proceedings before the Forest Tribunal. Even the original order of the Tribunal had granted relief to the applicant only under S.3(2). There was no declaration granted to the effect that it is a private forest as defined in Act 26/71. If that be so, appellants should have taken sufficient care to find out whether permission from the District Collector had been obtained for the transfer in favour of Subrahmania Iyer, and thereafter in favour of Kunhunni Nair. If necessary enquiries had been made by them in that direction, they could have found that neither Subrahmania Iyer nor Kunhunni Nair would acquire any right over the property in view of the provisions contained under S.3 of M.P.P.F. Act. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants, even though did not argue for the position that the property in question is not private forest covered by M.P.P.F. Act, made an attempt to rely on a copy of the communication dt. 3.8.1983 addressed by Special Deputy Tahsildar, Taluk Land Board to the Chairman, Taluk Land Board, Palghat to contend that the property would not come within the purview of M.P.P.F. Act. We are afraid that no reliance can made on this communication. It is only a report submitted by a Special Deputy Tahsildar. It is not binding on the Tribunal and it has no evidentiary value also. Apart from the above, a reading of the above report would show that even in the year 1983, the appellant had taken the contention that the land which he had purchased would come under purview of M.P.P.F. Act and therefore, the provisions of Kerala Land Reforms Act are not applicable to the land. 9. This Court had occasion to consider in M.F.A. 989/88, the correctness of an order passed in I.A. 261/87 in O.A. 166/77 by the Forest Tribunal, Palghat. 9. This Court had occasion to consider in M.F.A. 989/88, the correctness of an order passed in I.A. 261/87 in O.A. 166/77 by the Forest Tribunal, Palghat. In the above case, the applicant claimed' verumpattom' right under Subrahmania Iyer, who in turn, obtained leasehold right from Poomully Maha. The property in dispute in the above case also formed part of Ayyan Mala as in the present case. This Court held that assuming there was a lease in favour of the applicant, it was not valid as no sanction by the District Collector under S.3 of M.P.P.F. Act was obtained. On that ground, it was held that the applicant cannot claim any exemption under S.3(2) of Act 26/71. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the Tribunal was fully justified in setting aside the order in O.A. 170/77 and dismissing the application under S.B. Appellants have not made out a case for interference by this Court in the order impugned. In the result, the appeal fails and it stands dismissed.