ORDER 1. This petition under section 482 CrPC has been filed by the petitioner for quashing the proceedings pending before S.D.M. Raipurunder sections 145 and 146 CrPC. .... 2. Petitioner Yudhisthirlal is a partner in the Firm Sadaqi Builders of Raipur. The firm has undertaken a multicrore project for construction of 500 shops in village Boriyakala, Police Station Mana camp in Raipur District. The builder availed of the services of M/s. Begraj Agarwal contractor firm, for construction of some of these shops on agreed terms• and conditions. The contract of construction was reduced into writing on 19.12.94. In pursuance of this agreement respondent No.2 started construction work from 19.12.94. These facts are not in dispute. 3. It is further admitted that the contractor respondent No.2 stopped the construction work in the middle, raising dispute about payment, complaints were made to the police and eventually Station House Officer, Police Station Mana Camp, filed a report along with statements and other documents before S.D.M. Raipur. Proceedings under section•145 CrPC were thus initiated and on the very same day, order under section 146 CrPC was also passed for attachment of 280 shops and appointment of receiver. Admittedly both parties challenged this order before the 7th Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, who dismissed both these revision petitions and affirmed the order of the S.D.M. 4. The petitioner had earlier filed a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the orders both under section 145 CrPC, and under section 146 (1) CrPC affirmed by the Revisional Court. While dismissing that petition, the Court observed that the petitioner may challenge the orders under section 482 CrPC. 5. In this petition under section 482 CrPC the petitioner has urged that the agreement dated 19.12.94 was later modified by mutual, agreement on 7.2.95, 7.5.95 and 3.10.95. The number of shops to be constructed through this contractor was reduced to 280. The work was to be completed within 18 months from the original agreement dated 19.12.94 and was to be carried out under supervision of the petitioner. 6. According to the petitioner the contractor committed breach of conditions of contract and lengthy correspondence between the two followed. The respondent stopped construction work on and from 4.6.96 and did not resume the same despite requests including telegraphic message. Respondent No.2 also admitted stopping of work and removal of staff from the site. 7. 6. According to the petitioner the contractor committed breach of conditions of contract and lengthy correspondence between the two followed. The respondent stopped construction work on and from 4.6.96 and did not resume the same despite requests including telegraphic message. Respondent No.2 also admitted stopping of work and removal of staff from the site. 7. From the last week of June, 1996 the petitioners got the work done valued by a registered valuer and started construction work on his own. The petitioner was the owner in possession of the property and the contractor was performing construction work on his behalf. The dispute between them related to payment of bills and was of a civil nature. Respondent No.2 had stopped the construction work and the petitioner had to take up the construction work himself because he was rquired to pay huge amount as interest on the loan. The dispute was not covered under section 145 CrPC and the proceedings before the S.D.M. Raipur amount to abuse of the process of Court and therefore deserve to be quashed. 8. The second respondent opposed the petitioner by contending that the possession of the site was delivered to him in pursuant of the agreement dated 19.12.94. Special emphasis was laid on Clause 24 of this agreement contending that under this clause the contractor was entitled to retain possession of the work site till final payment. According to him, over one crore rupees were outstanding against the petitioner. The possession of the property remained with him and he successfully resisted the successive attempts of the petitioner to take forcible possession. The petitioner having failed in his revision before the Additional Sessions Judge, cannot be permitted to agitate the same question under the garb of inherent powers under section 482 CrPC. Objection was also raised to filing of some documents for the first time before the High Court, and the order of the S.D.M. was sought to be justified. 9. The question of maintainability of this petition under section 482 CrPC need not detain us long. The principle is settled by judicial announcements that although a second revision is barred by the same person under section 397 (3) CrPC, but the High Court can always interfere in exercise of its inherent powers available under section 482 CrPC in case of grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of Court. The principle is settled by judicial announcements that although a second revision is barred by the same person under section 397 (3) CrPC, but the High Court can always interfere in exercise of its inherent powers available under section 482 CrPC in case of grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of Court. The latest decision of the Apex Court on this point is Krishnan and another v. Krishaveni and another [1997 (1) MPLJ 290]. In this case, the observations made in Dharampal and others v. Smt. Ramshri and others [1993 (1) MPWN 85 = AIR 1993 SC 1361 ], on which reliance was placed by non-applicant No.2, which has been extensively quoted in his application dated 17.3.97 raising preliminary objection about maintainability, have beenheld to be not correct. 10. It may be mentioned here that Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1978 SC 47 ) was cited by both sides. This case lays down the principles about exercise of inherent powers by the High Court. Madhu Limaye' s case has been followed in Krishnan's case Supra. 11. State of Haryana and others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others (AIR 1992 SC604), GovindDasBiyaniv. Badri Narayan Rathi (1995 JLJ231 = 1995MPLJ 194) and Allen Pharmaceutical Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India ( 1994 MPLJ 247 ) were also relied on by the applicant. In all these cases the powers of the High Court to interfere under section 482 CrPC were recognised. The objection raised by respondent No.2 on this count therefore does not hold any water. 12. We now come to the merits of the case. Enquiry under section 145 CrPC is limited to the question as to who was in actual possession of the property on the date of preliminary order, or in case of forcible and wrongful dispossession, the Magistrate has to decide as to who was in possession within two months next before the date on which the report of the police officer or other information was received by the Magistrate. The prerequirement for proceeding under section 145 CrPC is that there should be dispute concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof and there should be likelihood of breach of peace. 13. The prerequirement for proceeding under section 145 CrPC is that there should be dispute concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof and there should be likelihood of breach of peace. 13. It has been vehemently argued on behalf of the applicant that in this particular case, there was no dispute regarding any land, nor could there be any question about the actual possession over the land on the relevant date. It is not in dispute that the land in question belonged to firm Sadani Builders of which applicant Yudhishtirlal was a partner. The second non-applicant had merely been engaged as 11 contractor for construction of shops according to the agreement between the parties. The possession of non-applicant No.2 was for and on behalf of the applicant for that specific purpose. Under the circumstances possession of non-applicant No.2 was permissive possession as the agent of the applicant. And there is ample authority to hold that a servant or agent cannot turn round and set up his own possession to the exclusion of his employer. S.R. Srinivas Thathachariar; v. Pitchai Muthu Mo pan and others ( 1972 CrLJ 287 ) and Meghraj Singh v. Devidas ( 1976 JLJ 567 ) were relied upon. 14. On behalf of the non-applicant, reliance was placed on Anamallai Club v. Governmentrof T.N. and others [ (1997) 3 SCC 169 ]. This was a case of resumption of government grant after termination of a licence. The case is distinguishable on facts because in the instant case, the contract of construction does not create any interest in land in favour of the contractor. 15. Both parties have filed and relied upon a number of documents. The Istgasa filed before the Magistrate is dated 22.10.96 and copies thereof have been filed by both parties along with copy of Rojnamcha and statement of witnesses recorded by the police. It is clearly mentioned in all these documents that non-applicant No.2 had stopped the construction work on account of dispute about payment, and the applicant had started construction on his own at the site. The applicant admittedly was the owner of the land and also continued to be in possession thereof. The possession of the second non-applicant was only for and on behalf of the applicant as his agent and that too for the specific purpose of construction as per contract between the parties. The applicant admittedly was the owner of the land and also continued to be in possession thereof. The possession of the second non-applicant was only for and on behalf of the applicant as his agent and that too for the specific purpose of construction as per contract between the parties. That work also was stopped by this non-applicant and the applicant took up construction on his own. It is thus evident that the dispute in this case related to payment rather than possession. This being a dispute of a civil nature, proceeding under section 145 CrPC was nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court. Such proceedings are liable to be quashed in exercise of the inherent powers of this Court under section 482 CrPC. 16. For the reasons aforesaid, this application is allowed. The impugned orders and the proceedings pending before S.D.M. Raipur are hereby quashed.