JUDGMENT N. Pandey, J. All these cases are between the same parties and practically for same cause of action, therefore, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. It appears the plaintiff Baidyanath Singh filed Title Suit No. 113 of 1987 in the court of Munsif, Aurangabad for a declaration that he was senior most professor of Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav College, Aurangabad. Therefore, defendant Ganesh Prasad Singh had no right to disturb his functionings in capacity of Professor Incharge. 3. Defendant filed a petition on 27.11.1987, raising preliminary objection regal ding maintainability of the suit in view of bar under section 80A of the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976. On behalf of the plaintiff, it was pointed out that from a reference to the provisions of Section 80A, it would appear that with regard to the reliefs, sought for the civil court was quite competent to adjudicate. Because the jurisdiction of civil court was bar, when a suit or proceeding instituted in a civil court was with respect to implementation of the provisions of the Bihar State Universities Act. The plaintiff had merely sought for a declaration that he was senior to defendant no. 1. The dispute therefore, being purely of a civil nature, most appropriate forum for adjudication of such a dispute was the civil court. In the aforesaid backgrounds, the learned Munsif held that the suit was maintainable. 4. Therefore, the solitary question emerges for determination is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, provisions of Section 80A of the Bihar State Universities Act would operate as a bar to maintain a suit before the civil court. 5. In fact, no direct decision of this Court or any other court was brought before me, whether Section 80A would bar all nature of suit, before Civil Court. Mr. Harendra Pd. learned counsel for the petitioners, however, referred a decision of this court in the case of Miss Krishna Bala Sinha vs. Smt. Manju Verma & ors., 1995 (1) P.L.J.R. 314, whereby, it was held that in appropriate cases, bar under section 80A would also come into effect, even at the second appellate stage, but effect of such a provision can not be made retrospective. Therefore, I can not take any aid from the said decision. 6. Mr. Therefore, I can not take any aid from the said decision. 6. Mr. Singh, on the other hand, appearing for the plaintiff, submitted that this Court while examining similar provisions incorporated under section 43 of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 and 16 of the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956 had held in unambiguous terms that if a proceeding under the said Act or the orders passed therein are completely without jurisdiction, then the bar to the maintainability of a suit in a civil court would not apply. In other words, the bar of the relevant provisions would not stand in the way of plaintiff to satisfy the civil court that the decision in the impugned proceeding was without jurisdiction and void. Reference in this regard can be made to the following cases 1965 B.L.J.R. 744 (Jagdeo Gope Vs. The State of Bihar & ors., 1978 B.L.J.R. 416=A.I.R. 1978 Pat. 315 (Nand Kishore Singh & anr. Vs. Satya Narain Singh & anr. and 1983 P.L.J.R. 16 (Sk. Halaluddin & ors. Vs. Habi Hasan & ors). 7. In my view, having regard to the ratio laid down in the above-mentioned cases the court below was required to examine, whether plaintiff had in fact, sought a direction regarding implementation of the provisions of the Act or statute. This has to be remembered that the Apex Court as back as in the year, 1966 in the case of Ram Swarup & ors. Vs. Shikar Chand & anr. (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 803) had ruled that such a statutory provisions must be expressed and clear. A bar created by the relevant provision of the Statute, to exclude the jurisdiction of the civil court cannot operate in a case, where plea raised before the civil court goes to the root of the matter and would, if uphold, lead to the conclusion that the impugned order was nullity. A determination regarding maintainability of the suit depends upon adjudication of the relevant materials and nature of the dispute, but not in such a short-cut manner. In that view of the matter, though I dismiss C.R. Nos. 99 and 111 of 1988, but with a liberty to the defendants to raise the question regarding maintainability of the suit at the time of final hearing of the suit. 8. In that view of the matter, though I dismiss C.R. Nos. 99 and 111 of 1988, but with a liberty to the defendants to raise the question regarding maintainability of the suit at the time of final hearing of the suit. 8. Civil Revision No. 249 of 1988 has been preferred on behalf of the plaintiff against the order of the learned District Judge dated 5.2.1988. Whereby, he had stayed the operation of the order of the learned Munsif dated 22.1.1988. It appears from the order of this Court dated 1.3.1988, that the order of the learned District Judge was stayed until final decision. I have been informed by Mr. Prasad that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant are presently functioning as Professor Incharge. In fact, some body else had joined. Mr. Singh on the other hand, submitted that the Principal, was posted in this college, has now been shifted to another place. 9. Be that as it may, since the post of Principal is now to be filled up on the basis of the recommendation of the College Service Commission, therefore, no useful purpose would be served in keeping the order of injunction, passed by the learned Munsif alive or the order of the District Judge, whereby, he had stated the operation of the order of injunction. In that view of the, matter, to avoid unnecessary complications, it would be in the interest of justice to set aside both the orders. 10. To the aforesaid extent, this civil revision is partly allowed, but the parties are left to bear their own costs. P.K. Sarkar, J. I agree, Civil Revision Partly Allowed.