JUDGMENT 1. - In this case, Sh. S.P. Dixit, Food Inspector. Ajmer purchased the sample mixed milk from the petitioner on 4.4.1975 at Mir Shah Ali Colony, Ajmer and on analysis by the public analyst such sample milk was found containing milk fat contents at 5.0% and solids non-fat contents at 6.34% as against the prescribed standard of 4.5% and 8.5% respectively. The sample milk was found containing 25% of added water also and accordingly declared as adulterated. On a complaint filed by the Food Inspector the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ajmer framed charge for offence Under section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (the Act) read with Rule 50 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (the Rules). Confessing his guilt, the petitioner pleaded guilty to the aforesaid charge. The learned Magistrate accordingly convicted the petitioner of the aforementioned offences and sentenced him to the minimum punishment of six months R.l. and fine of Rs.1000/-. On appeal, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge confirmed the order of conviction and sentence of the petitioner, as made by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. Hence this petition Under section 397 Cr.RC. before this court. 2. Mr. Madan lal Kumawat, the learned counsel for the petitioner did not challenge the facts of the case, as narrated above, and the concurrent findings as recorded thereon by both the courts below. The learned counsel, however, submitted that since the petitioner had pleaded guilty to the charge framed against him and had thus helped the disposal of a case expeditiously he should have been given the benefit of probationary provisions or visited with nominal punishment of fine only. Reduction in sentence imposed upon the petitioner was prayed for also on the ground of protracted litigation. I find no merits in these submissions. 3. On examining the record of the court of the learned C.J.M. I feel satisfied that the petitioner had voluntarily confessed his guilt and pleaded guilty to the charge Under section 7/16 of the Act read with Rule 50 of the Rules. Before recording his plea the learned Magistrate had informed the petitioner that it was not necessary for him to confess his guilt and that on his confessing the guilt he may be awarded sentence of imprisonment. Before recording his plea the learned Magistrate had informed the petitioner that it was not necessary for him to confess his guilt and that on his confessing the guilt he may be awarded sentence of imprisonment. The learned Magistrate further appears to have sought the admission or denial of all the relevant documents from the petitioner who had admitted them as correct. Besides framing the charge against him and reading and explaining such charge to him and on his pleading guilty thereto the Magistrate had also examined the petitioner Under section 313 Cr.PC. and in his examination the petitioner had accepted and admitted the prosecution case and the documents adduced in support of such case, as true. The learned Magistrate had, therefore, rightly accepted the plea of guilty of the petitioner and acted thereupon accordingly. There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention made in the petition that it was a case of inducement to him to plead guilty on promise of less or normal punishment and consequently of non-voluntary confession made by him. The learned Magistrate, before recording the plea of the petitioner, had given sufficient time and opportunity to him to consider the consequences of his intended act and prepared a full and complete record of the proceedings in that behalf. This court records its appreciation of the precautions taken by the learned Magistrate in recording the plea of guilty of the petitioner and expects the Magistracy in the State to follow such procedure in recording the plea of guilty' in criminal cases. 4. Before the appellate court the petitioner appears to have stressed that since the offence in this case was committed before coming into force of the amended provisions of Section 20AA of the Act, w.e.f. 1.9.1976 the petitioner was entitled to be released on probation. By his very well written and well reasoned order the learned appellate Judge has very rightly rejected such a contention on the basis of the ratio-decidendi of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Ishar Dass v. State of Punjab, (1972 F.A.C. 150) and P.K. Tejani v. Mahadev Ram Chandra Dauge, ( AIR 1974 S.C. 228 ) . In the case of Ishar Dass (supra) the Apex Court had no doubt observed that" its (Probation of Offenders Act, 1958) beneficial provisions should receive wide interpretation and not be read in restricted sense" but this statement was qualified by certain limitations. Their Lordship had further observed that adulteration of food is a menace to public health. The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act has been enacted with the aim of eradicating that social evil and for ensuring purity in the articles of food. In view of the object of the Act and the intention of the legislature as revealed by the fact that a minimum sentence of imprisonment for a period of six months and fine of Rs. 1,000/- has been prescribed, the courts should not lightly resort to the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act in the case of persons above 21 years of age found guilty of offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act..." It is thus clear that much before the insertion of the provisions of Section 20AA in the Act the judicial approach had disfavoured the kindly application of the beneficial provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act. 1958 to the cases of offenders under the Act. Even in its 47th Report the Law Commission of India had recommended the exclusion of the Probation of Offenders Act to social and economic offences by suitable amendments by observing that we appreciate that the suggested amendment would be in apparent conflict with current trend in sentencing. But ultimately, the justification of sentencing is the protection of society. There are occasions when an offender is so antisocial that his immediate and sometimes prolonged confinement is the best assurance of society's protection. The consideration of rehabilitation has to give way, because of the paramount need for protection of society. We are, therefore, recommending suitable amendments in all the Acts, to exclude probation in the above cases". Taking note of such views on the desirability of extending the application of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 to cases involving socio-economic offences, in PK. Tejani's case (supra) the Apex Court again observed that the kindly application of the probationary principles is negatived by the imperatives of social defence and the improbabilities of moral proselytisation. No chances can be taken by society with a man whose anti-social operation, disguised as a respectable trade, imperil numerous innocents. Tejani's case (supra) the Apex Court again observed that the kindly application of the probationary principles is negatived by the imperatives of social defence and the improbabilities of moral proselytisation. No chances can be taken by society with a man whose anti-social operation, disguised as a respectable trade, imperil numerous innocents. He is a security risk " In view of such judicial pronouncement from the Apex Court the learned appellate court has rightly refused to extend the benefits of probationary measures to the petitioner. 5. Mr. Kumawat then urged that the sentence imposed on the petitioner be scaled down in view of the history of protracted litigation in this case. In view of the provisions contained in the Proviso to section 16(1) of the Act I would have felt persuaded by the argument to restrict the sentence for three months Rigorous Imprisonment and fine of Rs. 500/- only had I been successful in overlooking and ignoring the broad fact that the petitioner remained absconded for about 15 years during the trial against him. The petitioner had jumped the bail on 9.9.75 and did not appear at his trial despite issuance of warrants of arrest repeatedly for about 15 years. He surrendered in the court on 3.9.90 and on his pleading guilty to the charge framed against him on 4.9.90, he was convicted and sentenced. This conduct of the petitioner himself cannot be read as adequate and special reason for scaling down the sentence awarded to him. Instead, it could have been read as justification for imposing sentence in excess of the minimum imposed. In this behalf it would be appropriate to remember the guiding words of Ray.J. of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajiv v. State of Rajasthan ( 1996 (2) SCC 175 ) that "....the court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime which has been committed not only against the individual victim but also against the society to which the criminal and victim belong. The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it should respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminal." 6. The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it should respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminal." 6. In view of the above discussion I find no merits in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed. The bail bonds of the petitioner are hereby cancelled and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ajmer is directed to take necessary steps to get the petitioner arrested and send him to jail to serve out the remaining part of his sentence. 7. A copy of this order shall be placed by the Registry before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for his Lordship kind consideration if the order may be circulated for guidance of the Magistracy in the State.> Petition dismissed. *******