JUDGMENT Surinder Sarup, J. 1. The present appeal has been filed by the Defendants-Appellants against the concurrent judgments and decrees of the two Courts below whereby a decree for recovery of Rs. 71,865.10 p. has been passed in favour of the Plaintiff-Respondent along with future interest at the agreed rate. 2. The Plaintiff-Respondent, being the Union of India, filed the suit against the Defendants-Appellants on the pleadings that the Defendant Nos. 2 and 3, on 30.9.1978 had been granted overdraft facility in the sum of Rs. 50,000/ by the Plaintiff-bank. They had agreed to pay interest @ 6% over and above the bank rate with minimum of 15% per annum with quarterly rests. The operation of their accounts by the Defendants was stated to be unsatisfactory. Hence a sum of Rs. 71,865.10 p., inclusive of interest was outstanding against them till the institution of the suit. Hence the suit for recovery of the said amount. 3. The Defendants in their written statement took up the preliminary objections that the suit was barred by limitation; that the suit was barred by misjoinder of parties and that the suit was not maintainable. It was also pleaded that the Plaintiff had not filed the documents in support of its claim along with the suit. Hence the suit was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. Since no plea regarding limitation was made, therefore, the suit was time-barred. On merits, the overdraft facility in question was admitted to have been sanctioned to Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 on 30.9.1978, while the suit had been instituted on 18.8.1986. The Plaintiff was required to state as to how it was within limitation. It was also pleaded that the suit had not been instituted by a duly authorised person, therefore it was incompetent and merited dismissal. 4. On merits, it was pleaded that Defendant No. 1 was the sole proprietorship concern of Defendant No. 2, while Defendant No. 3 had nothing to do with Defendant No. 1. The Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 had admitted having availed of overdraft facility in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- from the Plaintiff-bank on 30.9.1978. According to them, they had not agreed to pay interest at the rate of 6% over and above the bank rate with a minimum of 15% per annum with quarterly rests. 5. The Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 had admitted having availed of overdraft facility in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- from the Plaintiff-bank on 30.9.1978. According to them, they had not agreed to pay interest at the rate of 6% over and above the bank rate with a minimum of 15% per annum with quarterly rests. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the suit amount. If so, with what rate of interest ? OPP. 2. Whether the suit is not maintainable as having not been signed and instituted by authorised person as alleged? OPD. 3. Whether the suit is within limitation? OPP 4. Whether the plaint is not properly verified as alleged? OPD. 5. Whether the plaint is bad for misjoinder of Defendant No. 3? OPD. 6. Whether the suit is not maintainable in view of the preliminary objection No. 5 of the written statement ? OPD 6-A. What is the effect of the absence of averments regarding limitation in the plaint? OPD. 7. Relief. 6. All the Issues were decided in favour of the Plaintiff resulting in the suit being decreed by the trial Court, i.e. the Court of Shri R.L. Raghu, Senior Sub-Judge, Shimla by its judgment and decree dated 13.7.1989. The appeal by the Defendants-Appellants having been dismissed by Shri Shamsher Singh, the then Additional District Judge, Shimla on 31.8.1996 has given rise to the present second appeal. 7. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have examined the record. It has first been submitted by Shri R.L. Sood, learned Counsel for the Appellants that the substantial question of law, as framed vide serial No. 11 to the effect as to what is the effect of non-production of the sanction/ authorisation by the bank in favour of the Manager of the branch to file the suit and whether the suit was bound to be dismissed in the absence of the same, stands established from the cross-examination of PW-1 Shri Anil Kapur. Therefore, I have proceeded to examine the statement of PW-1. He has categorically admitted that the power of Attorney Ex. P-1 is neither registered nor authenticated by any Magistrate. A perusal of this document also substantiates this admission. Therefore, I have proceeded to examine the statement of PW-1. He has categorically admitted that the power of Attorney Ex. P-1 is neither registered nor authenticated by any Magistrate. A perusal of this document also substantiates this admission. In view of this significant fact, I find force in the submission of Shri R.L. Sood, that the suit has not been filed by a duly authorised person. 8. In the reply, Shri L.C. Sood, learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-Respondent has not been able to satisfy this Court how Ex.P-1 is a proper authorisation to Shri Anil Kapur PW-1 to file the suit on behalf of the Plaintiff. Not only that, a perusal of the plaint shows that in the same, the Plaintiff has been described as the Union Bank of India. The Plaintiff, being a Body Corporate as mentioned in Para 1 of the plaint, had to sue through a properly authorised person. The name of the properly authorised person is missing from the heading of the plaint. 9. It has next been submitted by Shri R.L. Sood, while basing his argument on substantial question of law No. 2 that the statement of account produced by the Plaintiff Respondent (Ex.P-2) which was not certified properly under the Bankers Book Evidence Act, the same cold not be read in evidence, more particularly, when PW-1 Anil Kapur, the Manager of the Bank had catergorically admitted that the same was not a true copy of the ledger book of the bank. This argument is also substantiated by a perusal of the statement of PW-1. In his cross-examination, PW-1 has stated that Ex.P-2, according to his assessment is the account of M/s CM. Auto Stores i.e. the Defendant, taken from the ledger and is a true copy thereof. He has further admitted that in the ledger, the name of the firm, the type of extent of facility, the rate of interest and the constitution and name of partnership is indicated. He has further admitted that Ex.P-2 does not contain these particulars. He has course volunteered to cover up this statement that the statement of account is a part of the ledger, which is registered. He has further admitted that Ex.P-1 is not a true copy of the ledger, It is only an abstract. 10. This argument of Shri R.L. Sood, has also not been controverted by Shri L.C. Sood, learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-Respondent. He has further admitted that Ex.P-1 is not a true copy of the ledger, It is only an abstract. 10. This argument of Shri R.L. Sood, has also not been controverted by Shri L.C. Sood, learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-Respondent. Therefore, this argument also carried weight and is forceful. 11. Shri R.L. Sood has next contended that the suit having been filed on 18.8.1986 is barred by time. He has based his argument on the document Ex.P-2, which is alleged statement of account, which otherwise has been found in this judgment's earlier part to be not a true reflection of the ledger account of the Defendant with the Bank and is thus legally of no consequence, there being no balance confirmation nor any indication of any deposits made. 12. At best, the case of the Plaintiff-Respondent rests on the document Mark 'E'. This document has been relied upon by both the Courts below and in the considered view of this Court, without any legal basis. In this connection, I may refer to para 13 of the judgment of the lower appellate Court, which is reproduced as follows, for facility of reference: ...Apart from the documents marked E, J, H and G, the Plaintiff had produced the declaration of partnership and the application for opening account in the name of Defendant No. 1 executed by both the Defendant Nos. 2 and 3. In the face of the evidence of PW-1 and the documents produced on record, it was too late in the day for Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 to proclaim that the Defendant No. 3 was stranger to Defendant No. 1.... Similarly, the trial Court also fell into error in relying on that document. Although, he has not specifically referred to Mark 'E', while considering Issue N. 6-A relating to limitation, yet he has mentioned in his impugned judgment that there is a specific averment in the plaint in para 3 that the suit is within time, in view of the letters exchanged between the parties lastly up to 19.8.1983. Similarly, while deciding Issue No. 3 he has specifically referred to this letter Mark "E". 13. At the outset, placing reliance merely on a document, which had not been exhibited in evidence as required by law, is wholly untendable in law and unjustified in the facts and circumstances of the case. Similarly, while deciding Issue No. 3 he has specifically referred to this letter Mark "E". 13. At the outset, placing reliance merely on a document, which had not been exhibited in evidence as required by law, is wholly untendable in law and unjustified in the facts and circumstances of the case. In this connection, the authorities relied upon by Shri R.L. Sood are on all fours. He has first cited the reported decision of this Court in the case of United Commercial Bank v. Durga Dass and Anr. 1995 (1) Sim.L.C. 497. It has been laid down therein: on the basis of the law of Evidence Act and the guidelines, which can be taken note of from the cases decided by the Apex Court and referred to above, it can safely be said that merely exhibiting a document will not absolve the party, relying on the document, from proving its execution and the contents thereof in accordance with law especially when the document is a private document, the scribe and the person who executed it, are the witnesses who alone could successfully and legally prove such a document. 14. The matter stands clinched by the decision of the Apex Court reported as Sait Tarajee Khimchand and Ors. v. Yelamarti Satyam and Ors. AIR 1971 S.C. 1865. It has been held therein that mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not dispense with its proof. In the present case, the document in question, i.e. Mark 'E' has not even been marked as Exhibited, therefore it defies legal logic how both the Courts below could place reliance on the same. To say the least, this approach of both the Courts below speaks volumes about their knowledge of law. In this behalf, more onerous duty was cat on the learned lower Appellate Court, i.e. the Court of Shri Shamsher Singh, who, as would be indicated in this judgment hereinafter has been found wanting earlier also in his knowledge of law or rather the lack of its while deciding other cases, the judgments of which happened to be under scrutiny in appeal before this Court. On those occasions also, this Court had been constrained to adversely comment on the judgments by Shri Shamsher Singh. 15. On those occasions also, this Court had been constrained to adversely comment on the judgments by Shri Shamsher Singh. 15. As a corollary to this argument, Shri R.L. Sood has vehemently argued that an objection was taken both before the trial Court and the lower appellate Court that the document, which had not been exihibited in accordance with law as enshrined in Section 67 of the India Evidence Act, could not be read in evidence but this objection has not been noticed at all in the impugned judgments. In this connection, my attention has been invited to para 11 under the heading' Issue No. 3' of the judgment of the trial Court. At page 7 of the said judgment, it has been observed as follows: Therefore, even though such documents have been only marked and not exhibited, they have to be read in evidence as duly executed documents by Defendant No. 2 and are, therefore, admitted into evidence. These observations have been made in regard to assessment and production of documents marked A to 0. These were vital documents, which were subject-matter in issue and in the absence of these not being exhibited, as required by law, they could not be read in evidence. The approach of both the Courts below to the contrary is highly deprecatory. 16. Mark 'A' was the alleged over-draft facility in the form of agreement and the document Mark 'B' is the alleged demand promissory note. Other documents on record, i.e. Mark 'C and 'D' are the alleged hypothecation agreement, etc. Apart from these, I finds that the Courts below have relied upon un-exhibited documents in the shape of letters, which are marked 'G', 'H' and 'J', respectively. This is wholly unwarranted and unjustified for the reasons already indicated hereinbefore. 17. Adverting again to the question of limitation, in the plaint, there is no plea, whatsoever, regarding the suit being within the period of limitation and how it was so. This is in utter violation of the mandatory provisions of Order 7 Rule 7 Code of Civil Procedure Insofar as the learned lower appellate Court is concerned, Shri Shamsher Singh had dealt with this aspect of the case is a very perfunctory manner. This is in utter violation of the mandatory provisions of Order 7 Rule 7 Code of Civil Procedure Insofar as the learned lower appellate Court is concerned, Shri Shamsher Singh had dealt with this aspect of the case is a very perfunctory manner. This approach of his is highly one-sided because an onerous duty was cat on him, on being the appellate Court, to meticulously decide the contentions issues between the parties and the issue regarding limitation was one such issue. Rather than adersely commenting on the omission of the Plaintiff to plead the question of limitation specifically, as required under Order 7 Rule 7 Code of Civil Procedure, he has gone to the extent of holding that as regards the issue of limitation, the Defendant No. 2 had raised a cock and bull story and with a view to wriggle out of the liability on account of interest being disputed by proclaiming that Defendant No. 3 had nothing to do with Defendant No. 1 for some period of time. In the considered view of this Court, the lower appellate Court, presided over by Shri Shamsher Singh, has been absolutely myopic in deciding the question of limitation. 18. In order to lend force to his argument regarding limitation, Shri R.L. Sood has cited a number of authorities. They may be briefly noticed and discussed. In Sha Manmall Misrimall v. K. Radhakrishnan AIR 1972 Mad 108 it was held that where letters written by Defendant to Plaintiff merely calling for the statement of account do not amount to acknowledgment by Defendant of his liability. It was further held that under Order 7 Rule 6 Code of Civil Procedure relating to the plea of exemption from limitation that the Plaintiff must show in his pleading the grounds upon which an exemption from limitation is claimed and it will not be open to him to rely on the exemption not pleaded in the plaint. This authority is directly on the point in issue. Shri R.L. Sood has also placed reliance in the authorities reported as Corporation Bank v. D.S. Gowda and Anr. (1994) 5 SCC 213 and Ratan Lal and Anr. v. Commercial and Industrial Bank Ltd. AIR 1965 AP 349 on this point. They lend support to his submission. 19. This authority is directly on the point in issue. Shri R.L. Sood has also placed reliance in the authorities reported as Corporation Bank v. D.S. Gowda and Anr. (1994) 5 SCC 213 and Ratan Lal and Anr. v. Commercial and Industrial Bank Ltd. AIR 1965 AP 349 on this point. They lend support to his submission. 19. On the other hand, Shri L.C. Sood, in order to meet the argument of Shri R.L. Sood, has cited The Rajputana Trading Co. Ltd. v. Malay Trading Agency AIR 1974 Cal. 152. He has relied on head note A of this authority. With due respect to him, I find that it has no bearing as regards the question of limitation on the facts of the present case. Therein, it has only been observed that an order condoning delay is not a final order. I fail to see how this ruling has any bearing to the facts of the instant case. Shri L.C. Sood has then cited Mst. Dhani v. State and Anr. AIR 1965 Raj. 70. That was a case under Section 417 (3)(4) of old Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898. I fail to see how that authority is of any use in deciding the question of limitation in the present case. Reliance has then been placed by Shri L.C. Sood in Fullbarunessa v. The Assam Board of Revenue, Gauhati AIR 1974 Gau 50. This again is a case relating to the interpretation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and has no bearing at all to the present case. 20. Shri L.C. Sood, has then placed reliance on the case of Binod Bihari Singh v. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 1245. He has mainly relied on head note 'C' discussed in detail in para 10 of that report. All that it says is that where in an application for making an award the rule of the Court, it was the positive case of the applicant that he had filed the application within three weeks from the date of receipt of the award, the delay in filing the application cannot be condoned on the ground that he was not aware of the change of the law of limitation and that he was misled because of the provisions of the old Limitation Act. With utmost respect to Shri L.C. Sood, it appears that he has not been able to grasp the point in issue regarding limitation in the present case. In view of the above discussion, I would hold that the suit was barred by limitation. 21. Shri L.C. Sood has resorted to an argument of despair by referring to Mark 'E', i.e. letter dated 19.8.1983, alleged to have been written on behalf of Defendant No. 1 by Shri V.P. Sood Defendant No. 2. From the said document, Shri L.C. Sood has tried to bring the suit within limitation by submitting that it contains an acknowledgment of their liability by the Defendants. This argument has to be rejected on the short ground that this document, not having been admitted in evidence, as required by law, cannot be read as an acknowledgment of their liability by the Defendants. 22. The next argument, which is also not without force, of Shri R.L. Sood, is that non-production of documents of reliance by the Plaintiff with the plaint is certainly vital to the suit. In this connection, he has placed reliance on the relevant provisions of Code of Civil Procedure and has cited M/s National Rice and Dal Mills v. The Food Corporation of India 1970 Punjab Law Reporter 778. It has been laid down therein that sub rule (1) of Rule 14 applies to a document in the possession or power of Plaintiff upon which he sues, that is which forms the basis of his suit. Such a document must be presented to the court alongwith the plaint. Sub-rule (2) of that Rule relates, on the other hand, to the Plaintiff's supporting documentary evidence, that is, evidence which lends strength to his claim without being the basis of the suit. The details of such supporting evidence must be entered by the Plaintiff in a list to be added or annexed to the plaint. Sub-rule (2) of that Rule relates, on the other hand, to the Plaintiff's supporting documentary evidence, that is, evidence which lends strength to his claim without being the basis of the suit. The details of such supporting evidence must be entered by the Plaintiff in a list to be added or annexed to the plaint. The consequences of non-observance of the provisions of Rule 14 are laid down in Sub-rule (1) of Rule 18 which states that documents not produced or entered in accordance with the former Rule 18 which states that documents not produced or entered in accordance with the former Rule shall not be received in evidence at the hearing of the suit except with the leave of the Court, but then Sub-rule (2) of Rule 18 makes an important exception in the case of three types of documents, namely: (1) documents produced for cross-examination of the Defendant's witnesses; (2) documents produced in answer to any case set up by the Defendant; and (3) documents handed to a witness merely to refresh his memory. 23. Coming to the facts of the present case, it will be seen that the trial Court has mentioned that the documents on which the judgment is based, i.e. agreement, hypothecation deed and the demand promissory notes were filed in the Court on May 26, 1987 before the settlement of issues. Though it has not been so mentioned in the impugned judgment of the trial Court, it is clear that the suit was instituted on 18.8.1986. Therefore, in view of the M/s National Rice and Dal Mills case (supra), the non-filing of those documents on which the entire claim of the Plaintiff rested, is also fatal to its claim in the suit. 24. The matter can be examined from Anr. angle. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the documents in question were subsequently filed with the leave of the Court. That being the position, the non-filing of the documents, on which the claim of the Plaintiff rested in the suit, would make the suit liable to be dismissed. Here again, the approach of the lower appellate Court is most perfunctory. It appears that he has not adverted to this aspect of the case at all in the impugned judgment. That being the position, the non-filing of the documents, on which the claim of the Plaintiff rested in the suit, would make the suit liable to be dismissed. Here again, the approach of the lower appellate Court is most perfunctory. It appears that he has not adverted to this aspect of the case at all in the impugned judgment. Shri L.C. Sood has faintly sought to argue that this point having not been raised, the lower appellate Court was not enjoined to decide the same. I find no force in the contention of Shri L.C. Sood for the reasons that this was one of the integral objections in the written statement and a specific issue was also framed. It was incumbent on the lower appellate Court, being the Court of appeal to decide all the points in issue. Moreover, the entire approach of the learned lower appellate Court is one-sided in favour of the Plaintiff. 25. It has lastly been submitted by Shri R.L.Sood that there has been interpolation in the agreement of hypothecation. The lower appellate Court has held on this aspect of the case that the Defendant No. 2, having admitted his signatures on the documents was presumed to have executed the documents after having understood the contents thereof. This finding is not supported by any reasons and is wholly perverse. 26. A bare perusal of the said document, which is not even exhibited, i.e. Mark D indicates that some of the blanks have been filled in ball point ink. However, the alleged signatures of Vishwa Bhushan Banta Defendant No. 2 are in fountain pen ink, which is different from other entires. This, prima facie, lends support to the argument of Shri R.L. Sood that there has been interpolation in this document. This being the position, the Plaintiff has not come to the Court with clean hands and had prima facie fabricated evidence in order to prove its case. 27. In fairness to Shri L.C. Sood, learned Counsel for the Plaintiff, he has relied on a number of authorities. Some of them may be noticed here before parting with this judgment. In Major U.R. Bhatt v. Union of India AIR 1962 SC 1344, the Apex Court had occasion to decide what is a substantial question of law. 27. In fairness to Shri L.C. Sood, learned Counsel for the Plaintiff, he has relied on a number of authorities. Some of them may be noticed here before parting with this judgment. In Major U.R. Bhatt v. Union of India AIR 1962 SC 1344, the Apex Court had occasion to decide what is a substantial question of law. The test laid down therein fully applies to the present case inasmuch as this Court has dealt with only the substantial question of law which goes to the root of the lis between the parties and on the basis of the same has come to the conclusion that the findings recorded by both the Courts below are wholly untenable in law. 28. In Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkati and Ors. AIR 1977 SC 2517, the Apex Court held that under Section 100(5) Code of Civil Procedure, in second appeal, where the High Court permitted the new plea to be raised on the ground that it was a legal plea, the leave of the High Court was not proper. It was further held that for permitting the new plea to be raised, the High Court should be satisfied that the case involves substantial question of law. The decision of the trial Court on the facts of that case was set aside by the Apex Court. For the reasons already recorded hereinabove, this authority has no bearing to the facts of the present case. 29. In Radheshyam G. Gargv. Smt. Safiyabai Ibrahim Lightwalla: AIR 1988 Bombay 361, it was laid dowlas follows: In my judgment the aforesaid view of the learned Judge of the lower appellate Court was hypertechnical. The said extract of account was duly signed by the Agent of the bank. Implicit in it was a certificate that it was a true copy of the entry contained in one of the ordinary books of the bank and was made in the usual and ordinary course of business and that such book was in the custody of the bank. The detailed ingredients mentioned in the defining CI. 8 of Section 2 of the Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891 for qualifying to be 'certified copy' are not mandatory but merely directory. Sufficient compliance depending upon facts and circumstances of each case is enough to qualify a document to be 'certified copy'. The detailed ingredients mentioned in the defining CI. 8 of Section 2 of the Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891 for qualifying to be 'certified copy' are not mandatory but merely directory. Sufficient compliance depending upon facts and circumstances of each case is enough to qualify a document to be 'certified copy'. I, therefore, hold that the said extract of account produced at Ex. 55-A is admissible in evidence. The said extract along with the bank pass-book as also counter-foils of check book undoubtedly support the defence contention that he has paid the rent to the landlady Asmabai. Though Defendant in his reply dated 29th April, 1977 had positively averred that he had paid rent by cheques sent to the landlady Asmabai under certificate of posting, the Plaintiff took no steps to examine Asmabai, who was none else but the mother of the Plaintiff. It was open to Asmabai to step into witness box and depose as to whether the Defendant's case that he had paid rent to her was true or false. In that view of matter, I hold that the Plaintiff is not entitled to a decree for possession on the ground of default in payment of rent. This authority has been cited by Shri L.C. Sood as regards the statement of account Ex.P-2 but it is not applicable to the facts of the present case on the short ground that it has been admitted by PW-1 Shri Anil Kapur that the said document is not a true copy of the ledger but is only an abstract and does not contain the particulars as required by the Bankers' Book Evidence Act, for qualifying to be a certified or a true copy. Therefore, this ruling also, is of no avail to Shri L.C. Sood, learned Counsel for the Plaintiff. 30. Before parting with this judgment, this Court will be failing in its duty by not advent to the judgment rendered by the lower appellate Court, presided over by Shri Shamsher Singh, the then Additional District Judge, Shimla. Apart from the adverse remarks/comments already mentioned hereinbefore in this judgment, this Court is constrained to hold that the entire approach of Shri Shamsher Singh in the present case has been one-sided oscillating entirely towards the Plaintiff's case. Reading between the lines, the impugned judgment indicates a totally perfunctory and biased approach to the case of the Defendants-Appellants. Apart from the adverse remarks/comments already mentioned hereinbefore in this judgment, this Court is constrained to hold that the entire approach of Shri Shamsher Singh in the present case has been one-sided oscillating entirely towards the Plaintiff's case. Reading between the lines, the impugned judgment indicates a totally perfunctory and biased approach to the case of the Defendants-Appellants. For the reasons already referred to above, while deciding the various substantial questions of law involved in the present appeal, Shri Shamsher Singh seems to have no knowledge of the bare provisions of the procedural law i.e. Code of Civil Procedure and the Evidence Act. He has relied on unexhibited documents which have merely been marked and has completely shut his eyes to the settled law on this point. Had he taken recourse to Section 67 of the Evidence Act, light might have dawned on him on this aspect of the case. Moreover, his finding that the alleged hypothecation agreement, which has not even been exhibited in evidence and could not be relied upon, does not contain any interpolation as mere use of different pen/ink to fill in the columns by itself was not invalid, is based on no reasons, whatsoever. This illustrates the one-sided and biased approach of this Judicial Officer on the facts and circumstances of the present case. 31. It will be pertinent to mention here that this is not the first occasion that this Court has been constrained to adversely comment/ remark on the judgments recorded by Shri Shamsher Singh both as trial Court as well as Appellate Court during his judicial career. Although on the earlier occasions, this Court had stopped short of recommending any action against them by merely confining itself to make adverse observations against his judgments, it is high time that he should be brought to book For this reason, it is directed that necessary entry may be made in the service record regarding his knowledge of law or rather lack of it on the basis of the findings recorded in this judgment of mine. It is also directed that a copy of this judgment be sent to Shri Shamsher Singh, now posted as Additional District Judge, Mandi for his information and enlightenment. 32. For the reasons recorded above, this appeal succeeds and is accepted. It is also directed that a copy of this judgment be sent to Shri Shamsher Singh, now posted as Additional District Judge, Mandi for his information and enlightenment. 32. For the reasons recorded above, this appeal succeeds and is accepted. The judgments and decrees of both the Courts below are set aside and the suit of the Plaintiff-Respondent is dismissed with costs.