M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner's learned Advocate raised certain pleas principally to the effect that the three distances which have been referred to in the Tribunal's order roughly of about 2 k. ms. , 1/2 k. m. and one furlong wherein overlapping is alleged, would be excludable for certain reasons. Basically, he contended that one of these areas is covered within the Municipal limit and according to him, the other two small areas are such that they could possibly come within the definition of inter-section or, they would qualify for exemption because there is no other alternate route available. None of these points were urged before the tribunal nor was the supportive material produced at that time and it is not permissible for this Court to go into these factual aspects and adjudicate on them for the first time in a writ petition. A strong plea was advanced both by the respondents' learned Advocate and by the learned Government Advocate that as the record stands, the order of the Tribunal is perfectly justified and that no interference is called for. Under normal circumstances, I would have straightaway dismissed this writ petition because even if the aforesaid contentions are raised, they are questions of fact and it is not permissible to plead them for the first time before the High Court. ( 2 ) THE position however is not so simple in so far as the real issue that this Court will have to take into consideration is as to whether, if these points were raised before the Tribunal along with supportive material, the decision of the Tribunal would normally have been different to the present one. The fact remains that these are points which are not devoid of substance and had they been raised before the Tribunal and substantiated, there is every possibility that the Tribunal would not have allowed the appeals in question. It therefore follows that the case of the present petitioner has gone by default and the petitioner's learned Advocate relied on the old maxim that a client cannot be punished for the lapse of his Lawyer. It therefore follows that the case of the present petitioner has gone by default and the petitioner's learned Advocate relied on the old maxim that a client cannot be punished for the lapse of his Lawyer. It is unfortunate that this Court has consistently come across instances of this type where cases are taken up by members of the Bar, the client's interest is not looked into that it is virtually sacrificed and that thereafter all sorts of sympathy pleas are sought to be put forward before the High Court at a very late stage. It is precisely this poor level of advocacy that has given rise to litigation that has gone on for decades together and that has necessitated remands in virtually hundreds of cases only because of the overwhelming ends of justice which has got to be served. As indicated by me, the points raised by the petitioner's learned Advocate are aspects of the matter which certainly do require to be looked into and if this Court were to refuse to permit the petitioner a second opportunity, it would perhaps be doing injustice to the petitioner. That does not however mean that this Court sanctions or approves of this state of affairs and that the situation will continue unabated whereby lapses of this type are committed some times due to rank negligence but perhaps in some of the instances even deliberately and thereafter, the litigation is allowed to run in circles almost like a merry-go-round. The party who has committed the default, still necessarily has to be answerable. That can only be done by imposing exemplary costs on the party concerned. ( 3 ) IN the special facts and circumstances of this case, the order of the Tribunal is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Tribunal with a direction that it should be taken up for rehearing as expeditiously as possible. Notice shall be issued to the parties concerned and being an old matter, the Tribunal shall not be obliged to grant a single adjournment nor shall the tribunal be obliged to wait if any of the parties or their representatives remain unrepresented. Notice shall be issued to the parties concerned and being an old matter, the Tribunal shall not be obliged to grant a single adjournment nor shall the tribunal be obliged to wait if any of the parties or their representatives remain unrepresented. Also, since a strong plea has been made to me that the interim relief granted by this court should not be revoked, I am inclined to permit the interim order to continue until the disposal of the matter by the Tribunal subject however to the condition that since the decision that has resulted due to default of the petitioner, in considerable waste of judicial time, that the petitioner shall be liable to deposit in the tribunal costs that shall be quantified at Rs. 500/- per month for the period that the interim order continues, which shall be computed from the date of disposal of this petition up to the date on which the Tribunal hears the matter. It shall be open to the petitioner to request the Tribunal for a hearing. It is clarified that if the costs are not deposited, that this writ petition shall be treated as having been dismissed. ( 4 ) WITH these directions, the writ petition which partially succeeds to stand disposed of. ( 5 ) THE petitioner's learned Counsel rightly points out to me that all the contesting parties are represented before this Court and that they have knowledge of the order. Under the circumstances, the Tribunal shall list the matter for directions on 1-9-1997. --- *** --- .