Judgment : This second appeal is at the instance of the defendants in a suit for eviction and is directed against the judgment and decree dated January 15, 1990 passed by the Assistant District Judge, Howrah in Title Appeal No. 53 of 1989 thereby reversing those dated February 28, 1989 passed by the learned Munsif, 3rd Court, Howrah in Title Suit No. 34 of 1984. 2. The original respondents filed the aforesaid suit for eviction of the appellants on the ground of default in payment of rent, reasonable requirement, causing damages to the suit properties, making unauthorised construction in the suit property and causing annoyance to the neighbours. 3. In the plaint of the aforesaid suit, the date of induction of the appellants in the suit property was not mentioned. It may be mentioned here that appellants Nos. 1 and 2 are the two brothers and appellant No. 3 is their mother. 4. The appellants contested the aforesaid suit by filing written statement as well as additional written statement thereby denying materials allegations made in the plaint. In the additional written statement filed by the appellant, they specifically stated that suit was not maintainable for not adding all the tenants in the suit. They specifically averred that Keshab Ranjan Mukherjee the father of appellants Nos. 1 and 2 and the husband of appellant No.3 was the original tenant of the suit property who died leaving appellants and also other two sons and three daughters. In the additional written statement names of all the heirs of the original tenant was mentioned. 5. It appears from the record that the original respondents twice amended their plaint for elaborating the ground of reasonable requirement but in spite of the fact that in the additional written statement filed by the appellants the, took specific plea of non-joinder of necessary parties, the original respondents although subsequently amended the plaint, did not deal with the said fact nor did they plead surrender of the tenancy by the remaining heirs of the deceased tenant. 6. The learned Trial Judge on consideration of materials on record held that some of the heirs of the original tenant not having been impleaded and no notice for eviction having been addressed to those heirs and served upon them, the suit was not maintainable. 6. The learned Trial Judge on consideration of materials on record held that some of the heirs of the original tenant not having been impleaded and no notice for eviction having been addressed to those heirs and served upon them, the suit was not maintainable. The learned Trial Judge also held that the respondent failed to prove any of the grounds mentioned in the plaint. 7. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, original respondents preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No. 53 of 1989 which was ultimately heard by the learned Assistant District Judge 1st Court, Howrah and the learned Assistant District Judge by his judgment and decree dated January 15, 1990 was pleased to reverse those passed by the learned Trial Judge and decreed the suit on the ground of reasonable requirement. While setting aside the finding of the learned Trial Judge, the learned ht Appellate Court relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in (1) 1989(2) CLJ 351 . The learned 1st Appellate Court further held that in view of the fact that there is no provision for bath and kitchen in the suit properly in occupation of the plaintiffs/respondents, even if the case of the appellants that the original respondents constructed two rooms during the pendency of the suit is accepted, the laid newly constructed rooms cannot be said to be an alternative reasonable accommodation of the plaintiffs. Thus, the learned 1st Appellate Court decreed the suit on the ground of reasonable requirement. 8. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the 1st Appellate Court, the defendants have preferred the instant second appeal. It may be mentioned here that during the pendency of the instant second appeal both the plaintiffs having died, their heirs and legal representative have been substituted as respondents but no application either for amendment of plaint or for taking note of subsequent event has been filed before this Court. 9. Mr. S.P. Roychowdhury, the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants has firstly contended that the learned 1st Appellate Court erred in law in holding that the suit was maintainable against some of the heirs of late Keshab Ranjan Mukherjee who was admittedly the original tenant of the suit property. Mr. 9. Mr. S.P. Roychowdhury, the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants has firstly contended that the learned 1st Appellate Court erred in law in holding that the suit was maintainable against some of the heirs of late Keshab Ranjan Mukherjee who was admittedly the original tenant of the suit property. Mr. Roychowdhury further contends that in view of subsequent Supreme Court decisions in (2) Textile Association (India) v. Balmohan Gapal Kurup & Anr. reported in AIR 1990 SC 2053 and (3) Kumar Jagadish Chandra v. Eileen K. Patrica D' Rozarie reported in 1995(1) SCC 164 , the Division Bench decision reported in 1989(2) CLJ 351 , upon which the 1st Appellate Court relied, is no longer a good law. Mr. Roychowdhury further contends that in spite of specific plea taken by the appellants that the suit is not maintainable for non-joinder of neccssary parties, the respondents not having amended their plaint thereby pleading surrender by the remaining heirs of original tenant, the learned Court of Appeal below erred in law in accepting the case of implied surrender by the other heirs of the original tenant which is not borne out by the pleading. Mr. Roychowdhury has drawn my attention to Exbt. A-1 which clearly shows that even after the death of original tenant the respondents granted receipt in the same of the present appellants and also other two brothers. Thus, according to Mr. Roychowdhury the finding of the learned 1st Appellate Court cannot be maintained. 10. Mr. Roychowdhury further contends that so far the ground of reasonable requirement is concerned, in view of the fact that both the original plaintiffs having died during pendency of the instant second appeal, all their children have now become owners of the suit property. Although they have been substituted in place of the original respondents but there has been no pleading incorporating the fact that they have no other reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere. According to Mr. Roychowdhury unless specific amendment is made incorporating accommodations available to all the respondents, no decree under Section 13(1)(ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act can be passed in favour of the substitute respondents. 11. Mr. According to Mr. Roychowdhury unless specific amendment is made incorporating accommodations available to all the respondents, no decree under Section 13(1)(ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act can be passed in favour of the substitute respondents. 11. Mr. Saktinath Mukherji, the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents on the other hand bas contended that after the death of the original tenant, his heirs have become joint tenant of the suit property and in view of the decision in (4) H.C. Pandey v. G.C. Paul reported in AIR 1989 SC 1470 , a suit against some of the heirs is maintainable. Mr. Mukherji further relied upon two decisions of this Court in (5) Sambhu Charan Hazra v. Sm. Bandana Laha reported in 1993(1) CLT 113 and (6) Sm. Kamala Devi v. Arun Dasgupla & Orss. reported in 1993(2) CLT 226 in support of his contention that suit against some of the heirs of the original tenant is maintainable. 12. As regards ground of reasonable requirement, Mr. Mukherji contends that in view of the Commissioner's Report indicating that there is no bath and kitchen in possession of the respondents in the suit house, the accommodation of one room available to the respondents in the suit property is of no use. Mr. Mukherji further contends that as there is no bath and kitchen in the suit property his client although constructed two additional rooms in the suit property, let out those to the existing tenants of the suit property. 13. After hearing the learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the parties and after going through the materials on record I find substance in the contention of Mr. Roychowdhury. In this case the appellants in Paragraph 9 of the additional written statement filed on June 2, 1987 specifically made the following averments :- "That originally the defendants' predecessor Keshab Ranjan Mukherjee since deceased was the recorded premises tenant la respect of the suit property. Said Keshab Ranjan Mukherjee died in 1974 at the suit property leaving widow (the defendant No.3), four sons named Basudev, Biswadev (the defendant No.1), Sri Bimandev and Sri Billadev (the defendant No.2) and three married daughters named Sm. Anima Roy Chowdhury, Sm. Ashima Chatterjee and Sm. Said Keshab Ranjan Mukherjee died in 1974 at the suit property leaving widow (the defendant No.3), four sons named Basudev, Biswadev (the defendant No.1), Sri Bimandev and Sri Billadev (the defendant No.2) and three married daughters named Sm. Anima Roy Chowdhury, Sm. Ashima Chatterjee and Sm. Anupama Chatterjee respectively as his legal heirs and representatives and as such on death of said original tenant Keshab Ranjan Mukherjee all his said legal heirs by way of inheritance under Hindu Succession Act have become tenants in common and/or joint tenants but the alleged ejectment notice being not addressed and sent to all the said tenants in common the alleged ejectment notice is bad, illegal and void and also all the said tenants in common being not party in this suit, the instant suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and as such the instant suit is not maintainable un the eye of law". 14. It appears from the record that even thereafter the plaintiff on August 22, 1988 made an application for amendment of plaint. But in the said application for amendment the plaintiff did not try to incorporate the fact that after the death of the original tenant, the other heirs than defendant surrendered their tenancy right. Even at the time of hearing, P.W. 1 in Examination-In-Chief did not utter a single word about surrender by the other heirs of the original tenant. Although in cross-examination the suggestion given by the appellants that all the heirs of late Keshab Ranjan Mukherjee were tenants was denied. But as already mentioned, from the rent receipt granted by the respondent, it appears that in some of the rent receipts the name of the tenants were mentioned as "Biswadev Mukherjee, Billadev Mukherjee, two brothers and mother". It appears from Exbt. A-1 the name of the tenants were described as follows: "Biswadev + Billadev + two brothers + mother". In view of the aforesaid rent receipt it is clear that eve n after the death of the original tenant the plaintiffs granted rent receipt in favour of at least five persons but the instant suit has been filed only against three. In the decision reported in AIR 1990 SC 2053 which consists of three Judges it has been specifically held that if some of the heirs of the original tenant is left out in that event no effective decree for eviction can be passed. In the decision reported in AIR 1990 SC 2053 which consists of three Judges it has been specifically held that if some of the heirs of the original tenant is left out in that event no effective decree for eviction can be passed. In this connection reference also be made to the decision in Kumar Jagadish Chandra v. Eileen K. Patrica D' Rozarie reported in 1995(1) SCC 164 where the Apex Court while construing the definition of a tenant as appearing in West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 clearly laid down that in case of death of contractual tenant all his heirs and legal representatives are tenants. It may be mentioned here that the respondent himself has admitted that Keshab Ranjan Mukherjee died in the year 1974 and at that point of time no notice for eviction was issued and as such Keshab Ranjan Mukherjee was a contractual tenant. In the decisions in Sambhu Charan Hazra v. Sm. Bandana Laha reported in 1993(1) CLT 113 and in Sm. Kamala Devi v. Arun Dasgupta and Ors. reported in 1993(2) CLT 226 it was found by the Court that after the death of original tenant either some of the heirs impledly surrendered or allowed one of them to represent the estate. But in the instant case as stated earlier the rent receipts granted by the respondents show that even after the death of original tenant rent receipts were granted in favour of five persons. Even P.W. 1 in his cross-examination has made the following statement: "prior to the death of my father I used collect rent from Keshab Ranjan Mukherjee and after his death from his heirs". In view of the aforesaid statement it cannot be argued on behalf of the respondent that there has been surrender by the other heirs than the appellants. 15. Thus, in my opinion, in the absence of the other heirs of Keshab Ranjan Mukherjee the instant suit is not maintainable and no effective decree call be passed in such a suit. Since I am inclined to dismiss the suit for want of necessary parties, it is not necessary for me to consider the ground of reasonable requirement inasmuch as such finding will not be binding upon the heirs who have been left out. Thus, I find merit ill the instant second appeal and the same is allowed. Since I am inclined to dismiss the suit for want of necessary parties, it is not necessary for me to consider the ground of reasonable requirement inasmuch as such finding will not be binding upon the heirs who have been left out. Thus, I find merit ill the instant second appeal and the same is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the 1st Appellate Court is hereby set aside and the Title Suit No. 94 of 1984 of the 3rd Court of Munsif, Howrah is dismissed as not maintainable for want of necessary parties. There will be however no order as to costs.