C. K. THAKKER, J. ( 1 ) HEARD Mr. G. M. Joshi, learned Advocate for applicant and Mr. R. S. Sanjanwala for Opponent No. 1. ( 2 ) THIS Civil Application is filed by the applicant (Appellant of Letters Patent appeal No. 731 of 1997) for the following reliefs in terms of para 3, which reads thus :"3. Appellant, therefore, prays that - (A) This Honble Court may be pleased to stay the operation, implementation and execution of the impugned order dated 9-7-1997 passed by the learned single Judge in special Civil Application No. 10451 of 1996. (B) This Honble Court be pleased to grant ad-interim order in terms of para 3a above. (C) Be pleased to pass such other and further orders as may deem just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. " ( 3 ) WE have admitted the appeal. We are, however, of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the case, and taking into account the law laid down by the honble Supreme Court in Saraswati Devi v. Shanti Devi, 1997 (1) SCC 122 , interim relief prayed by the applicant cannot be granted. We are, therefore, recording reasons for refusing interim relief and as to why, in our opinion, the Letters Patent Appeal required admission. ( 4 ) THE applicant is original Respondent No. 6 in Special Civil Application No. 10451 of 1996. That petition was filed by Chandubhai Dahyabhai Rajput, Opponent no. 1 therein. It was his case that in accordance with the provisions of the Gujarat municipalities Act, 1963 (hereafter referred to as "the Act") election of Jambusar municipality was held on December 20, 1994. It was asserted by the petitioner that he contested the election as a member of Jambusar Nagarpalika from Ward No. 7 which was reserved for backward class. He contested the election as a backward class candidate and was declared elected as such. ( 5 ) BY the Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992, Part IXA was inserted making provisions for "municipalities". Art. 243t provides for reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in every Municipality. Clause (4) of Art. 243t makes provision for reservation of Chairpersons in such manner as may be provided by the State Legislature. ( 5 ) BY the Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992, Part IXA was inserted making provisions for "municipalities". Art. 243t provides for reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in every Municipality. Clause (4) of Art. 243t makes provision for reservation of Chairpersons in such manner as may be provided by the State Legislature. Pursuant to the Constitutional amendments and in the exercise of the powers under the Gujarat Municipalities Act, the Gujarat municipalities (Reservation of S. C. , S. T. , B. C. and Women for the Office of the president) Rules, 1994 were framed by the State Government. Rule 2 provided reservation of the office of the President in favour of S. C. , S. T. , B. C. and women in accordance with the roster shown in the Schedule. It is not disputed by and between the parties that so far as Jambusar is concerned, for the year 1995-96, the office of the President was reserved for a Woman, for 1996-97, it was general whereas for the current year, i. e. , 1997-98, it is reserved for Backward Class. ( 6 ) IT is an admitted fact that respondent No. 6 (Applicant herein) also belongs to Backward Class. He also contested the election of the Municipality and got himself elected as a member of the Municipality. It is, however, not disputed that he contested the election and got elected as a member in general category and not as a member belonging to S. C. , S. T. or B. C. The petitioner as well as respondent no. 6 wanted to contest for the office of President of the Municipality. According to respondent No. 6, he was eligible and qualified for the office of President of the Municipality as he belonged to Backward Class whereas according to the petitioner, respondent No. 6 was ineligible and unqualified as he contested the election and got himself elected as a member of the Municipality not from reserved quota but on general seat and hence he could not contest election for the office of President of Municipality. ( 7 ) IN view of rival claims of the parties, this petition came to be filed by the petitioner restraining the authorities from accepting the nomination form of respondent No. 6 for the office of President. ( 7 ) IN view of rival claims of the parties, this petition came to be filed by the petitioner restraining the authorities from accepting the nomination form of respondent No. 6 for the office of President. It appears that the petition was dismissed by the learned single Judge on January 13, 1997 but a review application was filed which was allowed. A Letters Patent Appeal against that order was dismissed. Special leave Petition met with the same fate. Meanwhile, the election was held and respondent No. 6 was elected as the President of the Municipality and is holding the office. ( 8 ) WHEN the petition came for hearing before a single Judge, it was argued that respondent No. 6 was not eligible to contest as President and hence he could not have been elected to that office. The learned single Judge, by a judgment and order dated July 9, 1997 allowed the petition upholding the contention of the petitioner. In the operative part, the learned single Judge observed :- (Paras 11 and 12 at page No. 547)"in view of the aforesaid discussion, the petition is allowed. It is declared that respondent No. 6 is not entitled to hold the office of the President of Jambusar nagarpalika as he is not elected from the reserved seat belonging to Backward class and therefore, was not entitled to contest for the office of the President of the Jambusar nagarpalika. A writ of quo-warranto shall, therefore, be issued removing respondent no. 6 from the office of the President, Jambusar Nagarpalika forthwith. Respondent nos. 2 and 3 are directed to take appropriate steps for filing in the post of President, jambusar Nagarpalika in accordance with law forthwith. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent with costs which is quantified at Rs. 5,000. 00 to be paid by respondent no. 6. At this stage, Mr. Joshi prays for the stay of this order for a period of four weeks. In view of the fact that the question involved herein is now settled, I do not see any reason to accede to the request made by Mr. Joshi. Hence rejected. "it is against that judgment that the present appeal is filed. Mr. Joshi, learned counsel for the applicant-appellant raised various contentions. In view of the fact that the question involved herein is now settled, I do not see any reason to accede to the request made by Mr. Joshi. Hence rejected. "it is against that judgment that the present appeal is filed. Mr. Joshi, learned counsel for the applicant-appellant raised various contentions. Mainly, it was urged that the learned single Judge has committed an error of law apparent on the face of record in entertaining a petition and in exercising powers under Art. 226 of the constitution. It was submitted that looking to the scheme of the Constitution, in light of 74th Amendment, it is amply clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Art. 226. For that submission Mr. Joshi placed reliance on Art. 243- p, 243-Q, 243-R, 243-ZA and 243-ZG of Part IX-A of the Constitution. Art. 243- p defines "municipality" as "an institution of self-Government constituted under Art. 243-Q. Art. 243-Q enacts that there shall be constituted in every State, "a Municipal council for a smaller urban area" in accordance with Part IX-A. Art. 243-R provides for "composition of Municipalities", whereas Art. 243-T makes provision for "reservation of Seats". Art. 243-ZA speaks about "elections of the Municipalities". Art. 243-ZG ousts jurisdiction of Court in electoral matter. This provision is material for our purpose and requires to be quoted in extenso :-"243-ZG. Bar to interference by Courts in electoral matters :-Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution - (a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under Art. 243-ZA shall not be called in question in any Court; (b) no election to any Municipality shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State. " ( 9 ) IT was contended by Mr. Joshi that the bar contained in Art. 243-ZG is complete and absolute. It is not that an alternative remedy is available to a party and that in its discretionary jurisdiction, the High Court may not entertain a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. " ( 9 ) IT was contended by Mr. Joshi that the bar contained in Art. 243-ZG is complete and absolute. It is not that an alternative remedy is available to a party and that in its discretionary jurisdiction, the High Court may not entertain a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The argument is that the provision is explicitly clear and in no uncertain terms, it mandates that, no election to any Municipality shall be called in question except by an election petition; meaning thereby that the bar is total, not partial. Reliance is also placed on the opening part of Art. 243-ZG which starts with a non-obstante clause, "notwithstanding anything in this constitution. " ( 10 ) MR. Joshi contended that the learned single Judge has committed an error of law in assuming jurisdiction and in observing that though alternative remedy is available to the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the case, power under art. 226 ought to be exercised. The Counsel contended that the learned single Judge by exercising power under Art. 226 has committed an error of jurisdiction inasmuch as the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain petition. It was submitted that only when two remedies are available to a person, filing of Election Petition can be said to be an alternative remedy. The argument, however, is that a remedy under Art. 226 is not available at all in view of non-obstante clause in Art. 243-ZG. There is, therefore, an error apparent on the face of record by the learned single Judge in holding that the petitioner could have invoked Art. 226. According to Mr. Joshi the only remedy available to the petitioner was to file an Election Petition and when that remedy is not availed of, the High Court could not have exercised jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution as there is inherent lack of jurisdiction. The learned Counsel submitted that when there was absence of jurisdiction, no order could have been passed and no direction could have been issued against the appellant by the Court. In this connection, reliance was placed on the following decisions of the honble Supreme Court : (i) N. P. Ponnuswami v. The Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, namakkal, Salem District , AIR 1952 SC 64 ; (ii) State of U. P. v. Pradhan Singh Kshetra Samiti, 1995 Suppl. In this connection, reliance was placed on the following decisions of the honble Supreme Court : (i) N. P. Ponnuswami v. The Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, namakkal, Salem District , AIR 1952 SC 64 ; (ii) State of U. P. v. Pradhan Singh Kshetra Samiti, 1995 Suppl. (2) SCC 305; (iii) Anugrah Narain Singh v. State of U. P. , 1996 (6) SCC 303 ; (iv) Boddula Krishnaiah v. State Election Commissioner, A. P. , 1996 (4) SCC 416 . ( 11 ) OUR attention was in particular invited to Anugrah Narain Singh (supra ). Considering the provisions of Art. 243-ZG, with which we are concerned in the instant case, in para 12, their Lordships observed :"the bar imposed by Art. 243-ZG is two-fold. Validity of laws relating to delimitation and allotment of seats made under Art. 243-ZA cannot be questioned in any Court. No election to a Municipality can be questioned except by an election petition. Moreover, it is well settled by now that if the election is imminent or well under way, the Court should not intervene to stop the election process. If this is allowed to be done, no election will ever take place because someone or the other will always find some excuse to move the Court and stall the elections. . . . . . " (Emphasis supplied) it was argued that though the case was under Clause (a) of Art. 243-ZG, a declaration of law in para 12 would govern not only clause (a) but clause (b) as well, and no election to a Municipality can be called in question except by an election petition and as that there was "complete and absolute bar", the petition filed by first respondent was not maintainable at law. Reliance was also placed on an analogous provision found in Art. 329 of the Constitution, which reads thus :"329. Reliance was also placed on an analogous provision found in Art. 329 of the Constitution, which reads thus :"329. Bar to interference by Courts in electoral matters :- Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution - (a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under Art. 327 or Art. 328, shall not be called in question in any Court; (b) no election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the legislature of the State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature. " ( 12 ) IN the leading decision of N. P. Ponnuswami (supra) it was held that there is a bar on jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writs under Art. 226 of the constitution. A statement of law was also shown to us from a decision of the Supreme court in Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 530 . In para 373 referring N. P. Ponnuswami (supra) it was observed that the jurisdiction of the High court under Art. 226 could not be invoked against an order of rejection of nomination paper. ( 13 ) MR. Sanjanwala, on the other hand, drew our attention to a decision in State of u. P. v. Pradhan Singh Kshetra Samiti, 1995 Supp. (2) S. 305; Anugrah narian Singh (supra) and in Boddula Krishnaiah v. State Election Commissioner a. P. , 1996 (3) SCC 416 . In Boddula (supra) after referring to various decisions of the Court, it was observed :"thus, it would be clear that once election process has been set in motion, though the High Court may entertain or may have already entertained a writ petition, it would not be justified in interfering with the election process, giving direction to the Election officer to stall the proceedings or to conduct election process afresh in particular when election has already been held in which voters were allegedly prevented from exercising their franchise. "reliance was also placed on Saraswati Devis case (supra) for submitting that the point is finally concluded by the Supreme Court in favour of the petitioner. "reliance was also placed on Saraswati Devis case (supra) for submitting that the point is finally concluded by the Supreme Court in favour of the petitioner. ( 14 ) WE are impressed by the arguments of learned Counsel for the petitioner. In Saraswati Devi (supra) also, a backward class candidate contested the election as a member of the Municipality not from the reserved seat but from general seat and then she wanted to contest election as President by invoking the provisions for election of a President from backward class. There also, a similar argument was advanced that even if a person had not contested the election as a member of the municipality as a backward class candidate, if he/she belonged to backward class, there would be no bar in contesting the election as President of the Municipality as a backward class candidate. The said contention was, however, negatived by the court holding that to be eligible to be elected as President of the Municipality as a backward class candidate, not only that the candidate concerned must belong to that class but that he/she must have contested the election as a backward class candidate. ( 15 ) IN the instant case, in our opinion, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Saraswati Devi (supra) squarely applies. Here also, the appellant belongs to backward class but he did not contest the election as a candidate of the backward class. So far as President is concerned, the seat is reserved for backward class candidate and hence, as per the ratio laid down in Saraswati Devi (supra) he could not have contested the election. We have admitted the appeal, since in our opinion, prima facie the points raised require consideration. At the same time, however, we must refer to a recent decision of the Supreme Court to which our attention was drawn. In L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India , 1997 (3) SCC 261 , the Honble Supreme Court was called upon to decide the Constitutional validity of Art. 323-A and 323-B, of the constitution. At the same time, however, we must refer to a recent decision of the Supreme Court to which our attention was drawn. In L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India , 1997 (3) SCC 261 , the Honble Supreme Court was called upon to decide the Constitutional validity of Art. 323-A and 323-B, of the constitution. In S. P. Sampatkumar v. Union of India, 1987 (1) SCC 124 , a constitution Bench of five Judges declared Art. 323-A of the Constitution as well as S. 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 intra vires which provided exclusion of jurisdiction of all Courts, including High Courts under Art. 226 and 227 and of the Supreme Court under Art. 32 and by keeping intact jurisdiction of supreme Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution of India. The correctness of the said decision was before a larger Bench. In L. Chandra Kumar (supra), the Court observed that a right of judicial review is basic structure of the Constitution and there cannot be any amendment in the Constitution affecting basic structure. According to their Lordships, power of judicial review conferred by the Founding Fathers under art. 32, 226 and 227 of the Constitution forms part of basic structure of the Constitution and the said power cannot be curtailed or whittled down. Such a provision must be held to be ultra vires and unconstitutional. Hence, clause 2 (d) of Art. 323-A and Clause 3 (d) of Article 323-B to the extent they excluded jurisdiction of High Courts and the Supreme Court under Art. 226, 227 and 32 of the Constitution respectively were declared unconstitutional. Similarly, S. 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 was also declared ultra vires and unconstitutional. ( 16 ) MR. Sanjanwala submitted that in view of unequivocal declaration of law, by the Supreme Court that Art. 226 forms basic structure of the Constitution and power of judicial review cannot be taken away even by a Constitutional amendment, now it cannot be contended that a High Court has no jurisdiction under Art. 226 in election matters. At the most, a High Court as well as Election Tribunal has jurisdiction but when a High Court has jurisdiction and the Court has exercised it, the order cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. There is substance in the argument of Mr. Sanjanwala. At the most, a High Court as well as Election Tribunal has jurisdiction but when a High Court has jurisdiction and the Court has exercised it, the order cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. There is substance in the argument of Mr. Sanjanwala. However, in view of the observations made by the supreme Court in Anugrah Narain Singh (supra) we are of the view that it would not be proper to dismiss the appeal at threshold. Instead, it would be better to finally decide after hearing all the parties. ( 17 ) SO far as the interim relief is concerned, as stated by us, in our opinion, the point is finally concluded by the Apex Court in Saraswati Devi (supra ). In our opinion, therefore, no interim relief can be granted. In view of the above observations, ad-interim relief granted earlier stands vacated. Civil Application stand rejected. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. ( 18 ) MR. Joshi, learned Counsel for appellant prays that ad-interim relief granted by us may be continued so as to enable the applicant to approach higher forum. It was objected by Mr. Sanjanwala. In our opinion when the point is concluded by the supreme Court, it would not be proper to continue ad-interim relief. Hence, the prayer is rejected. .