An order dated 15th November, 1994 issued by the Govt. of Manipur, Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms (Personnel Division) allowing the writ petitioner to retire compulsorily from the Govt. service with immediate effect by invoking the provisions of law contemplated under Article 311 (2) (c) of the Constitution of India, as in Annexure A/14-1 to the writ petition, is the subject matter under challenge in this writ petition. 2. Having heard Shri N. Kotishwor Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri L. Shyamkishore Singh, learned Senior Govt. Advocate, for the respondents, it appears that the writ petitioner has prayed inter alia: A. A writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing the impugned order as in Annexure A/14-1; B. A writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents to revoke or recall the impugned order as in Annexure A/14-1; C. A writ or order directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner to service to a suitable post, with back pay and allowances and any direction or order appropriate in the nature of the case and cost of the petition. 3. According to the writ petitioner, he is a BA Hons. and MA Economics in educational qualification and he was appointed as a member of Manipur Police Service (hereinafter referred to as MPS), on the recommendation of the Manipur Public Service Commission, (in short MPSC) vide order dated 25.3.1975 passed by the Joint Secretary, to the Govt. of Manipur. After the said appointment, the petitioner was deputed to Phillaur, Punjab for getting training in the Police Training College and on completion of the training, he came back and started discharging his duties in different capacities and at different place of postings as an MPS Officer and in the meantime, his service as an MPS Officer was duly confirmed vide an order dated 18th May, 1984 along with other officers and in the said confirmation order, his name appears at serial No.4. By another Govt. order dated 31st May, 1988, the petitioner was appointed along with other 15 officers to the selection grade of the Manipur Police Service and the said order was given effect from 11th September 1986. After serving at different place of posting including hill areas, the petitioner lastly transferred to Tamenglong District, Manipur while he was working as Superintendent of Police in the Narcotics and Border Affairs Cell. After serving at different place of posting including hill areas, the petitioner lastly transferred to Tamenglong District, Manipur while he was working as Superintendent of Police in the Narcotics and Border Affairs Cell. It is also the case of the writ petitioner that during his last 19 years of services, he apart from successfully completing the departmental examination, he had also successfully undergone the training, namely, (i) Elementary Course in Criminology and Forensic Science (New Delhi), (ii) Weapon and Tactics Course (Indore), (iii) Fundamental Course of Criminology and Forensic Science (New Delhi), (iv) Management Course at (IIPA, New Delhi). He had also earned various achievements and the instance has been cited by the writ petitioner while he was posted at Senapati District, an ambush took place, during which the petitioner not only escaped unhurt and high risk to his life, but also could catch hold and arrest a member of dreaded underground force of NSCN and also seized a Chinese. make machine gun M 22 with 49 rounds, hi that connection a case being FIR No. 23 (8) 1991 Senapati Police Station, under section 121,121A, 307IPC, 3 (2) 9 . (ii) TDAP and 25 (1) (a) of Arms Act was registered. It is also contended that the petitioner after taking over charge of the post of Superintendent of Police, Tamenglong District, a sensitive and vulnerable to underground activities area, took up many measures for effective maintenance of law and order in the district and while checking up, he also found that there were shortage, in strength of police personnels in different ranks and, as such, when an enquiry have been made to the District Head Quarter about the deployment of police personnels, the petitioner had submitted the deployment chart in the district along with other chart showing the shortage in the sanctioned strength of the district under his forwarding letter dated 4.10.94 as in Annexure A/7-1, Annexure A/7-2 and Annexure A/7-3 to the writ petition. He also expressed the grievances of the district in the matter of shortage in the manpower as well as number of good condition vehicles etc. He also expressed the grievances of the district in the matter of shortage in the manpower as well as number of good condition vehicles etc. It is also further averred that in view of the recent underground activities in and around the district and other ethnic group clashes leading to serious consequences, he being alert and mindful of his duties also wrote a letter dated 24.10.94 to the Post Commander CRPF, which was posted in the district after prior consultation with higher rank of CRPF to extend their patrolling duties to some strategic locations, which may be used as access points by underground elements after detailed discussion with IGP, CRPF and IGP L/ 0, Manipur in the office room of IGP (L/0) on 19.10.1994. He also apprised to the Director General of Police of the prevailing situation with a request to strengthen the police organisation of the Tamenglong District. The petitioner went on to state that the situation in the district became worsened due to various occurrences of ethnic clashes between the Naga and Kuki group, and one of such occurrences which took place on the night of 31st October, 1994 some unidentified miscreants belonging to one group shoot one Kaizachawan Paite tribe, as a result, as many as seven (7) employees belonging to the same tribe who were posted at Tamenglong had left the Tamenglong Head Quarter under police escort and under the supervision of the writ petitioner. Moreover, the Assistant Director of Sericulture/Tassar, in the Industries Department, who was one of them, submitted a report to the Deputy Commissioner, Tamenglong, on 1.11.94 before these persons left head quarter, requesting for transferring all of them outside the district and in the night of 31st October, 1994, all these paite officials were given shelter in the District head quarter at Tamenglong for their safety. It is further averred that as the tension died down, the petitioner as a follow up action of earlier pressures/ quaries, from the Head quarter, sent a wireless message to DIG Range on 4.11.94, intimating that the petitioner would be leaving the station for Imphal on the same day to discuss some important matters including preparatory works for the coming General Election, as repeated reminders had come from the Head quarter in that respect and at the same time the petitioner also directed the SDPO, Nungba, to look after the normal routine works/duties of the SP during his absence, and, thereafter, the petitioner proceeded for Imphal in the afternoon of 4.11.1994 and he also escorted two paite officials, namely, K. Chungzathang, Assistant Director of Sericulture and KM Jalam Paite, UDC/Senior Accountant of Treasury Office of Tamenglong along with him, since they were taking shelter in the District Police Station being afraid of their lives. According to the writ petitioner, 5th November, 1994, being a State holiday due to 'Ningol Chakouba' the petitioner referred the proposed discussion with his superior officers including DIG Range and DIG/OPs in order to hold the same on the next working day, but, he went to the residence of the Inspector General of Police (Law & Order) and apprised him about the situation, and requested him to provide immediate requirements as requested earlier, in view of the mounting problem of the law and order in the district. Over and above the said discussion, the petitioner also had to collect certain documents and informations from the Food and Civil Supplies Department in connection with a complaint from DC Tamenglong regarding large scale misappropriation of sale proceeds of rice and sugar in the district. Over and above the said discussion, the petitioner also had to collect certain documents and informations from the Food and Civil Supplies Department in connection with a complaint from DC Tamenglong regarding large scale misappropriation of sale proceeds of rice and sugar in the district. However, to the surprise of the petitioner on the night of 5.11.94 i.e. the next day of his arrival at Imphal, he was informed that during his absence, the arms and ammunitions from the Police Reserve Line were snatched away by the suspected NSCN by over-powering the sentries and on hearing the said information the petitioner immediately rushed to Tamenglong on the same night and reached there at about 8 AM in the morning of 6.11.94 and, on reaching there he found the Director General of Police, Manipur and the Deputy Inspector General of Police Range and they along with the petitioner jointly conducted search and raid operation in the locality during which they recovered some arms and ammunitions. According to the writ petitioner both the officers left the place and whereas the petitioner stayed behind, and continued the operations and in the course of further enquiry, he found some circumstances, which show signs of connivances between the sentries and the miscreants and in that connection a case being FIR No.67(11) 1994 under section 457, 382,121AIPC was duly registered. It is also contended that while the petitioner was at his place of posting at Tamenglong he was tdephonically informed by the DIG Range that his presence at Imphal, is necessary and, as such, he should come to Imphal and, accordingly, he reached Imphal on 16th November, 1994 and met the DIG Range, but to surprise, he was asked to handover "die' charge to the OC/5th Manipur Rifle Commandant, only then the petitioner had got some scent that something had happened and on enquiry he was given compulsory retirement. 4. According to the writ petitioner, the order of removal of the petitioner was issued under Article 311 (2) (c) of the Constitution of India, purported to be in the interest of the security of the State without stating the material facts and without any materials on record. 4. According to the writ petitioner, the order of removal of the petitioner was issued under Article 311 (2) (c) of the Constitution of India, purported to be in the interest of the security of the State without stating the material facts and without any materials on record. As per contention of the writ petitioner, during the last about 10 years many occurrences or incidents which are/were similar in nature of the incident/occurrence of 5th November, 1994 took place and, as such, the said occurrence at Tamenglong is not an unusual occurrence and almost every day there has been shooting and killing at a particular place and snatching of arms from security forces either by raiding police station or by laying ambushes on patrolling parties, but no- action has been taken against any of the Superintendent of Police of the district or Commandant of the Petrol, but only the petitioner has been singled out and action has been taken against him by invoking extra-ordinary provision of law contemplated under Article 311 (2) (c) of the Constitution of India. The petitioner, in this regard has also cited a case in which the Commandant .of the 2nd Bn. of Manipur Rifle who was charged for illicit supply of olive green uniform meant for Manipur Rifle Jawan to the underground force of NSCN, for which an enquiry is pending and is still going on and has been kept under suspension by following the normal disciplinary proceeding but now reinstated to service. It is also the case of the writ petitioner that he submitted a representation dated 3rd December, addressed to His Excellency, the Governor of Manipur since the State of Manipur has been under President's Rule since 3rd December, 1993 till 13th of December, 1994, requesting him to review or cancel the order of compulsory removal of the petitioner, but on enquiry the petitioner came to know that the said representation has not been attended by any person and hence this petition. 5. 5. It is also the case of the writ petitioner that the materials on record clearly show that the impugned compulsory retirement order as in Annexure A/14-1 is by way of penalty but by avoiding the constitutional mandates laid down under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and as such the impugned order is ultra vires of the constitutional provisions laid down under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India, and the impugned order is malafide and the same is based on extraneous and non existent grounds and. as such, the same is not legally sustainable. The petitioner also contended that the impugned order of compulsory retirement was passed for unauthorised and extraneous purpose where there is nothing on record to justify the compulsory and premature retirement of the petitioner. 6. The writ petition is opposed by the respondents by filing affidavit-in-opposition. Most of the allegations made by the writ petitioner has been controverted by the respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition. According to the respondents, in Manipur, not only in Tamenglong District but also other remaining districts, there has been a sensitive and vulnerable underground activities and the security of the State is threatened and, as such, the State Govt. has been taking different measures for effective maintenance of law and order of Manipur and to help the Manipur Police in maintaining law and orders, the CRPF personnels and para-military forces have also been deployed and specific instructions have been given by the police head quarter (PHQ for short) to all District Superintendents of Police not to leave station without permission from his superior officers well in advance. It is also the case of the respondents that in hill areas of Manipur the law and order situation is not good due to the activities of the underground elements and situation has worsened due to various occurrence of different ethnic clashes between the Naga and Kuki groups. It is also the case of the respondents that in hill areas of Manipur the law and order situation is not good due to the activities of the underground elements and situation has worsened due to various occurrence of different ethnic clashes between the Naga and Kuki groups. It is also averred that the writ petitioner was posted at Tamenglong Head Quarter as District Superintendent of Police and he was fully responsible for maintenance of law and order situation at Tamenglong District and the petitioner was also fully aware of the worsening law and order situation at Tamenglong areas which are under his supervision and, in spite of knowing the worsening law and order situation and in spite of clear cut instructions to seek prior permission before leaving station, the petitioner who is the most responsible officer of the district, left the station on 4.11.94 without waiting further for any reply to his wireless message 'dated 4.11.94. It is also further averred by the respondents that during the absence of the petitioner on the night of 5.11.94 the fire arms and ammunitions from the Police Reserve Line at Tamenglong District were looted by the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (for short NSCN) and prior to the incident, the petitioner did not take up measures to shift the whole arms and ammunitions to a secured and safe place either to Police Station or the CRPF Camp although he had information of underground elements in that area and despite clear instructions issued by the Director General of Police, Manipur. According to the respondents they have examined the behavior and conduct of the petitioner and the Govt. of Manipur was satisfied that the actions of the petitioner has jeopardised the security of the State and Govt. of Manipur and, as such, the Governor of Manipur in exercise of the power given upon him under Article 311 (2) (c) of the Constitution of India issued the impugned compulsory retirement order of the petitioner with immediate effect. of Manipur was satisfied that the actions of the petitioner has jeopardised the security of the State and Govt. of Manipur and, as such, the Governor of Manipur in exercise of the power given upon him under Article 311 (2) (c) of the Constitution of India issued the impugned compulsory retirement order of the petitioner with immediate effect. The main contention of the respondents is that atleast the petitioner would have waited for reply of his wireless message before leaving his station and; leaving station by a responsible officer for a triviale thing is not called for and in his absence the whole police force at Tamenglong District was without proper command and leadership, and, as a result of which the miscreants were able to do whatever they liked in collecting and snatching the. arms which were kept in the disposal of the petitioner and as such the petitioner is fully responsible for looting of the arms and ammunitions from Police Reserve Line by suspected NSCN and the impugned _ order was passed in the public interest (emphasis laid) and the same was issued in the interest of security of the State and there is no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. It is also contended by the respondents that the snatching of arms from Police Reserve Line Tamenglong Head Quarter by the miscreants in the absence of the petitioner is very much related with th6 security of the State. Therefore, the writ petition is misconceived and the same is liable to be dismissed, the respondents contended. 7. At the hearing of this petition, the first contention raised by Shri N. Kotishwor, learned counsel for the writ petitioner is that the materials on record clearly show that the compulsory retirement vide Annexure A/14-1, is byway of penalty but avoiding the constitutional mandates laid down under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and, as such, the order in Annexure A14/1, is ultra vires of the constitutional provisions laid down in the said Article. Shri Kotishwor further submitted that the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India is concerned with the power of the appointing authority with regard to (1) Dismissal, or, (2) Removal, or (3) Reduction in rank of the Govt. employee and the safeguards and exceptions with the exercise of the said power. 8. Shri Kotishwor further submitted that the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India is concerned with the power of the appointing authority with regard to (1) Dismissal, or, (2) Removal, or (3) Reduction in rank of the Govt. employee and the safeguards and exceptions with the exercise of the said power. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner went on to state that the provisions for compulsory retirement of Govt. servant is provided rather laid down under the relevant service rules governed by Rule 56 (j) of the Fundamental Rules which are adopted by the Govt. of Manipur. Highlighting the relevant provision of die said Rule 56 (j) Shri Kotishwor, submitted that compulsory retirement of a Govt. servant can be effected by (1) giving notice of not less than three months in writing or three months' pay and allowances in lieu of such notice, (2) or if the Govt. servant has attained the age of 50 years in case of group A or group B or in other case if the employee has attained the age of 55 years in the public interest. However, the respondents, instead of invoking the provisions of Fundamental Rule 56 (j), has invoked the provisions of Article 311 (2) (c) for compulsory retirement of the writ petitioner. He also further contended that when the [lower of compulsory retirement is used by way of punishment by the appointing authority, provisions of the Article 311 can be invoked for protection of the concerned Govt. employee, but, the competent authority cannot invoke the provisions of Article 311 as an enabling provision for compulsory retirement of a Govt. servant. He also submitted that the impugned order suffers from fatal defect inasmuch as there is no finding of, the competent authority that the conduct of the petitioner .was such that he deserves the punishment for dismissal or removal from his services in the form of compulsory retirement. 9. servant. He also submitted that the impugned order suffers from fatal defect inasmuch as there is no finding of, the competent authority that the conduct of the petitioner .was such that he deserves the punishment for dismissal or removal from his services in the form of compulsory retirement. 9. Supporting the case of the writ petitioner Shri Kotishwor, learned counsel for the writ petitioner relied upon certain decisions of the Apex Court rendered in Tulshiram Patel's case reported in (1985) 3 SCC 398 ; in AK Kaul & another vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 73 and in a case between State of UP vs. Shri Shyam Lai Sharma, reported in (1972) 2 SCC 514 and submitted that misconduct, however, must be deserving of any of the major punishment of dismissal, or removal (including punitive compulsory retirement) or reduction in rank before the second (2) proviso of Article 31.1 of the Constitution of India can be put into operation and if the conduct of the incumbent concerned is such as to deserve a punishment different from those mentioned above, the second proviso cannot come into play at all, because Article 311 (2) is itself confined only to these 3 penalties. He also submitted that there is no material on record for imposing such penalty of compulsory retirement virtually amounting to dismissal or removal from services as against the writ petitioner and as such it is a clear case of non application of mind of the competent authority while passing the impugned order. There is also no whispering in the impugned order as to why it is not expedient to hold such enquiry as against the writ petitioner. In this regard, the respondents are not in a position to satisfy the reasons and the grounds for invoking the provisions of law contemplated under Article 311 (2) (c) of the Constitution while passing the impugned order. There is also no material for establishing the fact that the writ petitioner deserves the punishment of dismissal or removal in the form of compulsory retirement on the ground of his misconduct as required by the related provisions of law. There is no subjective satisfaction of the competent authority while passing the impugned order, Shri Kotishwor, contended. There is also no material for establishing the fact that the writ petitioner deserves the punishment of dismissal or removal in the form of compulsory retirement on the ground of his misconduct as required by the related provisions of law. There is no subjective satisfaction of the competent authority while passing the impugned order, Shri Kotishwor, contended. Shri Kotishwor, went on to contend that almost every day there has been shooting and killing, at a particular place or other and snatching of arms from security forces, either by raiding police station by or laying ambushes on patrolling parties and in this connection he drew the attention of this Court to the instances as narrated in a separate sheet appended to the writ petition and submitted that the petitioner has been singled out and imposed penalty of compulsory retirement amounting to dismissal or removal from services without any justification. He also submitted that the impugned compulsory retirement order is by way of penalty by avoiding the constitutional mandates laid down under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India, and, as such, the impugned order is ultra vires of the Constitution. 10. In reply to the contention of Shri Kotishwor, learned counsel for the writ petitioner, Shri N. Shyamkishore Singh, learned Senior Govt. Advocate of Manipur for the respondents submitted that no illegality has been committed by the authority concerned in passing the impugned order of compulsory retirement as against the writ petitioner and the provision of compulsory retirement falls within the ambit of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. He also submitted that the State Govt. has been taking different measures for effective maintenance of law and order in Manipur for which specific instructions have been given by the Police Headquarter (PHQ in short) to all District Superintendents of Police not to leave station without permission from the superior officers as well in advance. Drawing my attention to the circular/order dated 17.2.92, circular/order dated 24th May, 1993 and circular/order dated 17th October, 1994 as in Annexure D/l, D/2 and D/3 to the affidavit-in-oppositionby Shri Shyamkishore Singh, learned Senior Govt. Drawing my attention to the circular/order dated 17.2.92, circular/order dated 24th May, 1993 and circular/order dated 17th October, 1994 as in Annexure D/l, D/2 and D/3 to the affidavit-in-oppositionby Shri Shyamkishore Singh, learned Senior Govt. Advocate for the respondent Nos.l to 6, he submitted that when the Unit Commanders desire to visit Imphal on any work they must obtain a prior permission of their DIG/IG concerned and their movement in Imphal must be kept and inform to DG Control room so that they can be contacted in emergency and they should seek permission from the controlling officers for visit to Impahal and to inform their controlling officer/DC control room about their movements in the district, but the writ petitioner had failed to comply with the directions and without waiting further reply from the concerned authority or without permission, the petitioner left the station on 4.11.94. At least the petitioner should have waited for the reply of his wireless message before leaving station from the competent authority, and leaving station by a responsible officer for a trivial thing is not called for; and in the absence of the writ petitioner, the whole police force at Tamenglong District was without proper command and leadership. Therefore, Shri Shyamkishore Singh, contended that the impugned order as in Annexure A/14-1 was issued in the interest of the security of the State and there is no stigma nor any misbehaviour in the impugned order. 11. Supporting the case of the respondents Shri Shyamkishore Singh, learned Senior Govt. Advocate relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in a case between Motiram Deka's case reported in AIR 1964 SC 600 and submitted that the compulsory retirement of the writ petitioner amounts to removal within the meaning of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. Shri Shyamkishore Singh, further relying another decision of the Apex Court rendered in a case between Union of India, vs. VP Seth & another, reported AIR 1994 SC 1461 , submitted that the rule, 'audi altram partem' is not applicable in the instance case since the order of compulsory retirement imposed upon the writ petitioner is not penal in nature. Examining the behaviour and conduct of the writ petitioner, the Govt. of Manipur was satisfied that the action of the petitioner has jeopardised the security of the State and thus the respondents passed the impugned order Shri Shyamkishore Singh further contended. Examining the behaviour and conduct of the writ petitioner, the Govt. of Manipur was satisfied that the action of the petitioner has jeopardised the security of the State and thus the respondents passed the impugned order Shri Shyamkishore Singh further contended. It is also submitted that the impugned order as in Annexure A/14-1 was issued by the competent authority in the interest of the security of the State and in that order of 15.11.94 there is no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. According to Mr. L. Shyamkishore Singh, learned Senior Govt. Advocate, lapses and deriliction to duty on the part of the petitioner is .against the interest of the security of the State. He also submitted mat at least the petitioner should have waited for the reply of his wireless message before leaving the station. Now, this Court is to examine as to whether the respondents had rightly invoked the provisions of Article 311 (2) (c) of the Constitution of India while passing, the impugned order of 15.11.94.as in. Annexure A/14-1 or not. After hearing the learned counsel on both sides and also on careful perusal of the available materials on record, I am of the view that it would be just and proper to formulate the following substantial questions of law for just determinatiion of the rule points in controversies between the parties : . (1) Whether the competent authority .can invoke the provisions of Article 311 (2) (c) of the Constitution of India when the competent authority decided to compulsorily retire the present writ petitioner from his services; (2) Whether the term 'compulsory retirement' amounts to removal or dismissal within the meaning of service jurisprudence or within the purview of Article 311 of the Constitution. . (3) Whether the impugned order is violative of Article 311 (2) (c) of the Constitution and Rule 56 (j) of the Fundamental Rules or not. . (3) Whether the impugned order is violative of Article 311 (2) (c) of the Constitution and Rule 56 (j) of the Fundamental Rules or not. In order to clarify the points of law as raised in advance by the learned counsel on both sides and for better appreciation in the matter, I once again refer back to the decisions of the Apex Court rendered in Motiram Deka (supra) ( AIR 1964 SC 600 ) and Gurdev Singh Sidhu (supra) reported in AIR 1964 SC 1585 , wherein the Apex Court held thus : "if any rule permits the appropriate authority to retire compulsorily a civil servant without imposing a limitation in that behalf, that such servant should have put in a minimum period of service, that rule would be invalid and the so-called, retirement ordered under the said rule would amount to removal of the civil servant within the meaning of Article 311 (2) (c) of the Constitution." In Gurdev Singh Sidhu (supra), the Supreme Court also held thus : "It is hardly necessary to emphasis that for the efficient administration of the State, it is absolutely essential that permanent public servants should enjoy a sense of security of tenure. The safeguard which Article 311 (2) affords to permanent public servants is no more than this that in case it is intended to dismiss, remove or reduce them in rank, a reasonable opportunity should be given to them of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to them. It seems that only two exceptions can be treated as valid in dealing with the scope and effect of the protection afforded by Article 311 (2). If a permanent public servant is asked to retire on the ground that he has reached me age of superannuation which has been reasonably fixed, Article 311 (2) does not apply, because such retirement is neither dismissal nor removal of the public servant. If a permanent public servant is compulsorily retired under the rules which prescribe the normal age of superannuation and provide for a reasonably long period of qualified service after Which alone compulsory retirement can be ordered, that again may not amount to dismissal or removal under Article 311 (2) mainly because that is the effect of a long series of decisions of this Court. But where, while reserving the power to the State to compulsorily retire a permanent public servant, a rule is framed prescribing a proper age of superannuation, and another rule is added giving the power to the State to compulsorily retire a permanent public servant at the end of 10 years of his service, that cannot be treated as falling outside Article 311 (2). The termination of the service of a permanent public servant under such a rule, though called compulsory retirement, is, in substance, removal under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution." From these decisions of the Apex Court, it is crystal clear that if permanent public servant is compulsorily retired under the relevant Fundamental Rules 56 (j) which prescribed a normal age of superannuation and provide for a reasonably long period of qualified services and the reasoned terms and conditions and after which alone compulsory retirement can be ordered, that will not amount to dismissal or removal under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. But, if any rule permits the competent authority to retire compulsorily, a civil servant at the end of 10 years of his services or at the end of an unreasonable and unjust period of services, that rule should be declared as invalid and the order of compulsory retirement issued under the said invalid rule, that cannot be treated as falling outside Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and it will amount to removal within Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. It is well seeded that Rule 56 (j) of the Fundamental Rules is a valid rule in the eye of law. It is also well settled that while exercising the extra-ordinary power vested upon the competent authority under Article 311 (2) (c) of the Constitution, the competent authority should exercise such power sparingly but not lightly or whimsically; and that the satisfaction of the President or the Governor for passing an order under Article 311 (2) (c) of me Constitution would be vitiated if it is based on circumstances having no bearing on the security of the State. In this regard, I again recall the decision of the Apex Court rendered in AK Kaul & another vs. Union of India & another (supra) in which the Apex Court held: "As regards the scope of judicial review of the President's satisfaction, the view of the majority in SR Bommai case was as follows : (i) the satisfaction of the President while making a proclamation under Article 356 (1) is justiciable; (ii) it would be open to challenge on the ground of malafides or being based wholly on extraneous and/or irrelevant grounds; (iii) even if some of the" materials on which the action is taken is found to be irrelevant, the Court would still not interfere so long as there is some relevant material sustaining the action; (iv) the truth or correctness of the material cannot be questioned by the Court nor will it go into the adequacy of the material and it will also not substitute its opinion for that of the President; (v) the ground of malafides takes in inter aha situations where the proclamation is found to be a clear case of abuse of power or what is sometimes called fraud on power; (vi) the Court will not lightly presume abuse or misuse of power and will make allowance for the fact that the President and the Union Council of Ministers are the best judge of the situation and that they are also in possession of information and material and that the Constitution has trusted their judgment in the matter, and (vii) this does not mean that the President and the Council of Ministers are the final arbiters in the matter or that their opinion is conclusive," There is nothing in the provisions of clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) which compels a departure from the principles laid down in SR Bommai governing justiciability of the satisfaction of the President in the matter of exercise of power under Article 356. Clause (b) of the said proviso to Article 311 (2) differs from clause (c) inasmuch as under clause (b) the competent authority is required to record in writing the reasons for its satisfaction and there is no such requirement in clause (c). This difference does not mean that the satisfaction of the President or the Governor under clause (c) is immune from judicial review and is not justiciable. This difference does not mean that the satisfaction of the President or the Governor under clause (c) is immune from judicial review and is not justiciable. It only means that the provisions contained in clause (c) are more akin to those contained in Article 356 (1) which also does not contain any requirement to record the reasons for the satisfaction of the President. Since the satisfaction of the President in the matter of making a proclamation under Article 356 (1) is justiciable within the limits indicated in Sr. Bommai the satisfaction of the President or the Governor, which forms the basis for passing an order under clause (c)of the second proviso to Article 311 (2), can also be justiciable within the same limits. Under clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) the President or the Governor has to satisfy himself about the expediency in the interest of the security of the State to hold an enquiry as prescribed under Article 311 (2). But the considerations involving the interests of the security of the State cannot be said to be of such a nature as to exclude the satisfaction arrived at by the President or the Governor in respect of the matters from the field of justiciability. Article 19 (2) of the Constitution permits the State of impose, by law, reasonable restrictions in the interests of the security of the State on the exercise of the right to freedom speech and expression conferred by sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 19. The validity of the law imposing such restrictions under Article 19 (2) is open to judicial review on the ground that the restrictions are not reasonable or they are not in the interests of the security of the State. Therefore, the Courts can be said to be competent also to go into the question whether the satisfaction of the President or the Governor for passing an order under Article 311 (2) (c) is based on considerations having a bearing on the interests of the security of the State. In various cases, the Supreme Court has emphasised the distinction between security of the State and maintenance of public order and has observed that only serious and aggravated forms of public order which are calculated to endanger the security of the State would fall within the ambit of the security of the State. In various cases, the Supreme Court has emphasised the distinction between security of the State and maintenance of public order and has observed that only serious and aggravated forms of public order which are calculated to endanger the security of the State would fall within the ambit of the security of the State. The President or the Governor while exercising the power under Article 311 (2) (c) has to bear in mind this distinction. The satisfaction of the President or the Governor for passing an order under Article 311 (2) (c) would be vitiated if is based on circumstances having no bearing on the security of the State." 12. Now, this Court will go to the related provisions of Rule 56 (j) of the Fundamental Rules and also relevant laws and decisions in the matter of compulsory retirement. Rule 56 (j) of the Fundamental Rules reads thus : "FR 56. (j) Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule, the appropriate authority shall, if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest so to do, have the absolute right to retire any Govt.. servant by giving him notice of not less than three months in writing or three months' pay and allowances in lieu of such notice; (i) If he is, in Group 'A' or Group 'B' service or post in a substantive, quasi permanent or temporary capacity and had entered Govt.. service before attaining the age of 35 years, after he has attained the age of 50 year; (u) in any other case after he has attained the age of fifty-five years; Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to a Govt. servant referred to in clause (e), who entered Govt. service on or before the 23rd July, 1966." There are other relevant instructions relating to premature retirement of Central Govt. servants adopted by the Govt. of Manipur which find its place in Appendix 10 of the Swamy's Pension Compilation incorporating CCS Pension \ Rules containing criteria, procedure and guidelines relating to the Constitution of Review Committee, According to the said instructions, the rule relating to premature retirement should not be used: (a) to retire a Govt. servants adopted by the Govt. of Manipur which find its place in Appendix 10 of the Swamy's Pension Compilation incorporating CCS Pension \ Rules containing criteria, procedure and guidelines relating to the Constitution of Review Committee, According to the said instructions, the rule relating to premature retirement should not be used: (a) to retire a Govt. servant on grounds of specific acts of misconduct as short cut to initiating formal disciplinary proceeding; or (b) for reduction of surplus staff or as a measure of effecting general economy without following the rules and instructions relating to retrenchment. I am of the view that apart from these instructions, there are relevant decisions 02 the Apex Court as well as principle of law laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of compulsory retirement. . It is well settled that the compulsory retirement is not an order of punishment. It is a prerogative of the Govt., but such order should be based on materials and has to be passed on the subjective satisfaction of the authority, hi absence of any malafide or arbitrariness the order passed under FR 56 (j) is held to be valid. This principle of law finds its place in a decision rendered in a case viz., Union of India & others, vs. Dulal Dutta reported in (1993) 2 SCC 179 . The Apex Court in a case between State of UP & another vs. Bihari Lai reported in AIR 1995 SC 1161 held that the decision on compulsory retirement should be taken on consideration of entire service record. Decision taken bonafide and in public interest, there can be no interference on the ground that different view is possible, hi that case; State of UP & another, vs. Bihari Lai (supra) the Apex Court held thus : "It is now, settled law that the entire service record should be considered before taking a decision to compulsorily retire a Govt. servant exercising the power under Rule 56 0) of the Fundamental Rules. It is not necessary that adverse remarks should be communicated or every remark, which may sometimes be categorised as adverse, be communicated. It is on an overall assessment of the record the authority would reach a decision whether the Govt. servant exercising the power under Rule 56 0) of the Fundamental Rules. It is not necessary that adverse remarks should be communicated or every remark, which may sometimes be categorised as adverse, be communicated. It is on an overall assessment of the record the authority would reach a decision whether the Govt. servant should be compulsorily retired in public interest In an appropriate case, there may not be tangible material but the reputation of officer built around him could be such that his further continuance would imperil the efficiency of the public service and would breed indiscipline among other public servants. Therefore, the Govt. could legitimately exercise their power to compulsorily retire a Govt. servant. The Court has to see whether before the exercise of the power, the authority has taken into consideration the overall record even including some of the adverse remarks, though for technical reasons might be expunged on appeal or revision. What is needed to be looked into is the bonafide decision taken in the public interest to augment efficiency in the public service. In the absence of any malafide exercise of power or arbitrary exercise of power, a possible different conclusion would not be a ground for interference by the Court/Tribunal in exercise of its judicial review.” The Hon'ble Supreme Court in another case between S. Ramachandra Raju, vs. State of Orissa reported in AIR 1995 SC 111 held that the entire service record, more particular, the latest should form foundation for opinion of Govt. in the matter of compulsory retirement. In that case the Supreme Court held thus: "though the order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment and the Govt. employee is entitled to draw all retiral benefits including pension, the Govt. must exercise its power only in the public interest to effectuate the efficiency of the service. The dead wood need to be removed to augment efficiency. Integrity in public service need to be maintained. The exercise of power of compulsory retirement must not be a haunt on public servant but must act as a check and reasonable measure to ensure efficiency of service and free from corruption and incompetence. The officer would live by reputation built around him. In an appropriate case, there may not be sufficient evidence to take punitive disciplinary action of removal from service. The officer would live by reputation built around him. In an appropriate case, there may not be sufficient evidence to take punitive disciplinary action of removal from service. But his conduct and reputation is such that his continuance in service would be a menace in public service and injuries to public interest. The entire service record or character rolls or confidential reports maintained would furnish the back drop material for consideration by the Govt. or the Review Committee or the appropriate authority. On consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances alone, the Govt. should form the opinion that the Govt. officer needs to be compulsorily retired from service. Therefore, the entire service record more particularly the latest, would form the foundation of the opinion and furnish the base to exercise the power under the relevant rule to compulsorily retire a Govt. officer." 13.1 am of the view that this Court is confined to an examination! of the material to see whether a rational mind may conceivably be satisfied that compulsory retirement of the officer concerned is necessary in public interest or, in the interest of the security of the State and whether the present respondents had disclosed the materials so that the Court may be satisfied that the order is not bad for want of any material, whatever is to a reasonable mean, reasonably instructed in law, is sufficient to sustain the ground of 'public interest' or 'in the interest of the security of the State' justifying the forced retirement of the public servant. 14.1 have perused the relevant original file bearing No. 18/1/95-MPS/DP produced by the learned Senior Govt. Advocate appearing for the respondents. The relevant observations made by the competent authority for passing the impugned order finds its place at P. 18 (Note 1) of the file. For better appreciation \>f the said findings/observation of the competent authority I hereby reproduce the said Note 1, 2 and 3 as hereunder to meet the ends of justice : "On 5.11.94 the Kote(1) of the Reserve Line, Tamenglong was looted by suspected armed UGs in which approximately 42 303 rifles some stenguns carbines have been taken away. The crime was committed by removing the latch which was attached to the door for locking the room. There does not appear to be any resistance by the sentries on duties. The crime was committed by removing the latch which was attached to the door for locking the room. There does not appear to be any resistance by the sentries on duties. Subsequent to the incident the matter was not reported immediately to the CRPF post or the Police Station hereby. It is suspected that they had colluded with the miscreants in the incident Adm.. is separately being taken against them for their role. 2. This context, the enquiry has thrown doubts about the conduct of SP Tamenglong. Apart from the failure to ensure proper security for the Kote, it was found that the Superintendent of Police Shri M. Sushilkumar Singh was not at Us HQ on the day of incidence. The SP has left the HQ without obtaining permission from his senior officers. The District Magistrate, Tamenglong was away on an official duly and as per the direction of the Govt. both DC and SP should not have been simultaneously out of the HQs. Even so SP (Tml) left the HQs without permission from any competent authority. SP has sent one WT message stating that he was leaving station but he did not wait for permission from DGP. Even in Imphal he did not meet the DGP. On the night of the incident he was in Kakching his home town. The date of the incident was general holiday of Ninglo Chakkouba which is an important festival for Manipur. It was specifically directed that no absenteeism should be permitted. Further, the SP had stated in his WT message that SDPO Nungba will be in charge at the District HQ in his absence but he left without waiting for the arrival of the SDPO, Nungba. The SP had also taken along the ASI in charge of the Kote with him to Imphal. Thus he did not observe the directions issued by the DGP in respect of absenteeism. He is thus guilty or gross negligence in his duties and is not fit to continue in service. Since, as pointed out by DGP, the departmental enquiry against the delinquent officer would be a long drawn affair and delay is likely to encourage other officers in similar responsible behaviour, it is proposed that prompt action should be taken against the delinquent officer by taking recourse to Article 311 (2) proviso (c). It is proposed that Shri M. Sushilkumar Singh should be compulsorily retired. It is proposed that Shri M. Sushilkumar Singh should be compulsorily retired. May kindly approve." 15. On further perusal of the said file it has been revealed that the competent authority in case of the writ petitioner, made a decision/recommendation for recalling the impugned order of compulsory retirement of the writ petitioner and for his reinstatement with immediate effect, but the Governor of Manipur disagreed with the said recommendation, and thus the Governor of Manipur had opined that as the writ petitioner has already filed an application in the High Court on May 26, 1995, against the State Govt., hence; to await the learned High Court's decision on the writ petition. On perusal of the observations and findings made in the Note No. (1) as mentioned above, the competent authority opined that the writ petitioner is guilty of gross negligence in his duties and is not fit to continue in service and the departmental enquiry against the writ petitioner will be a long drawn affair and delay is likely to encourage other officers in similar responsible behaviour, as pointed out by the DGP and thus it has been proposed that prompt action should be taken against the delinquent officer by taking recorse to Article 311 (2) (c) of the Constitution. There is no wispering in the said recommendation or observation for establishing the fact that it is not expedient to hold an enquiry as against the writ petitioner in the interest of the security of the State. I 16, As discussed above the words "in the interest of the security of the State" enshrined under Article 311 of the Constitution and that the words, "in the public interest" as contemplated in FR 56 (j) have different meanings and they are quite different from each other under service jurisprudence. According to me if an officer/employee is to be allowed to retire compulsorily the competent authority should have form an opinion that in the public interest the compulsory retirement of the officer incumbent is called for, and that the competent authority has absolute right to retire any Govt. servant under due process of law, reasonably by invoking the provisions of law as laid down under FR 56 (j) as discussed above. servant under due process of law, reasonably by invoking the provisions of law as laid down under FR 56 (j) as discussed above. In my considered view the impugned order is based on circumstances having no bearing in the "interest of the security of the State" and it is based on extraneous circumstances having no bearing on the 'security of the State', and thus the satisfaction of the Governor in passing the impugned order by invoking Article 311 (2) (c) would be vitiated on this ground alone. It is needless to highlight that the respondents had completely misappreciated, rather misconceived, the provisions of law laid down under Article 311 (2) (c) of the Constitution of India and FR 56 (j). With these observations made above this Court, thus, answer the above questions of law. It is needless to highlight that the respondents did not make any statement in their counter-affidavit denying the factum of discrimination meted out by them to the writ petitioner inasmuch as the officers, who are similarly situated with the writ petitioner, have not been dismissed or removed from their services. There is also no material on record for establishing the fact the services of the writ petitioner is no longer required in the public interest and the compulsory retirement of the writ petitioner is called for within the ambit of FR 56(J); or that there is also no prima-facie material to establish the fact that it is not expedient to hold an enquiry as against the writ petitioner in the interest of the security of the State. 17. For the reasons and discussions made above, the impugned order dated 15.11.94asin Annexure A/14-1 is hereby quashed, and thus, the respondents are directed to take back the writ petitioner to service forthwith and allow him to work/serve as usual. Further, the writ petitioner is entitled for his back salary for the period from 15.11.94 till date, and for which the respondents are directed to make necessary arrangement for payment of the same within 2 (two) months from today. So far the claim of the writ petitioner for his service promotional benefits made by him through his counsel Shri Kotishwar Singh is left open to the wisdom of the respondents. In the result the writ petition is allowed. No costs.